I 


ANTIETAM 

AND  THE  MARYLAND  AND  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGNS 
OF  1862. 


ANTIETAM 

AND  THE  MARYLAND  AND  VIRGINIA 
CAMPAIGNS  OF  1862 

FROM  THE  GOVERNMENT  RECORDS — UNION  AND 
CONFEDERATE — MOSTLY  UNKNOWN  AND  WHICH 
HAVE  NOW  FIRST  DISCLOSED  THE  TRUTH 

APPROVED   BY  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT 


BY 
CAPTAIN  ISAAC  W.   HEYSINGER,  M.A.,  i\i:i>. 

OF    THE    MILITARY    ORDER    OF    THE    LOYAL    LEGION,   AND 

OF   THE    MILITARY    SERVICE     INSTITUTION     OF     THE 

UNITED  STATES,   GOVERNOR'S  ISLAND,  N.  Y. 


NEW  YORK 

THE  NEALE  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 
1912 


Copyright,   1912,  by 
The  Neale  Publishing  Company 


DEDICATION 

TO  MY  COMRADES  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTO 
MAC  ;  AND  TO  MY  COMRADES  OF  OUR  OTHER 
ARMIES,  IN  THE  WEST  ;  To  THE  SURVIVORS 
OF  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  WHOM  IN 
IDLE  HOURS  WE  LOVED,  AND  IN  BUSY  HOURS  WE 
FOUGHT;  To  THE  MEMORY  OF  LINCOLN,  WHOSE 
GREAT  HEART  WAS  so  BORNE  UPON;  AND  OF  Mc- 
CLELLAN,  WHO  FELT  THE  SAME  WEIGHT;  AND  OF 
THOMAS  JEFFERSON,  WHOSE  BRAVE  WORDS,  "WHEN 
TWO  PARTIES  MAKE  A  COMPACT,  THERE  RESULTS  TO 
EACH  A  POWER  OF  COMPELLING  THE  OTHER  TO  EXE 
CUTE  IT,"  LED  HUNDREDS  OF  THOUSANDS  OF  HEROES 

TO  BATTLE  AND  VICTORY;  To  MILITARY  STUDENTS, 
AND  TEACHERS  OF  THE  ART  OF  WAR,  HERE  AND 
ABROAD;  To  THE  CALM  JUDGMENT  OF  THE  AMERI 
CAN  PEOPLE;  AND  TO  VINDICATION  OF  THE 
TRUTH  OF  HISTORY,  THIS  VOLUME  is  INSCRIBED. 


733441 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER                                                                                 PAGE 
I.  INTRODUCTORY — INACCURACY   OF   ALL   THE   CUR 
RENT    HISTORIES 19 

II.  THE  PENINSULA 26 

III.  THE   ADVENT   OF    POPE 38 

IV.  THE  SECOND  MANASSAS 50 

V.  OPENING  OF  THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN  ...  55 

VI.  REORGANIZATION   ON   THE   MARCH 64 

VII.  LEE'S   LOST   ORDER 75 

VIII.  MCQLELLAN'S    SWIFT   ADVANCE 87 

IX.  LEE'S  PROJECTED  TURNING  MOVEMENT  ....     90 
X.  THE  EVE  OF  ANTIETAM 100 

XI.   McCLELLAN's    PLAN    OF    BATTLE— BURNSIDE    .       .    1 04 

XII.  ANTIETAM — FORCES    ENGAGED 116 

XIII.  MARCHING — FIGHTING— STRAGGLING— LOSSES  .     .130 

XIV.  SEPTEMBER,   18-19 — AMMUNITION 143 

XV.  LEE'S  FLIGHT  TO  VIRGINIA— MCCLELLAN'S  VIC 
TORY   150 

XVI.  SHEPHERDSTOWN — SEPTEMBER,  20 154 

XVII.  STUART'S  USELESS  CAVALRY  RAIDS — THE  RAIDS 
OF  FORREST — THE  UNION  RAID  FROM  HAR 
PER'S  FERRY,  SEPTEMBER  14,  15,  1862  .  .  .  .159 

XVIII.    McCLELLAN's  PLAN  TO  DRIVE  LEE  BY  A  FRONTAL 

ATTACK  UP  THE  VALLEY 169 

XIX.  DOCTORED  SYSTEM  OF  SUPPLIES  FOR  MCCLELLAN'S 

ARMY 173 

XX.  THE  GREAT  MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER  .  .  .  .178 
XXI.  CELERITY  OF  ARMY'S  ADVANCE — COMPARISON 

WITH  OTHER  MOVEMENTS 191 

XXII.    LONGSTREET    ISOLATED — JACKSON    CUT    OFF LEE 

BEWILDERED — THE  CAMPAIGN  WON — THE 
ARMIES  FACE  TO  FACE  AT  CULPEPER,  PROPOR 
TION  3  TO  i 201 


8  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  pAGE 

XXIII.  LONGSTREET'S    BATTLE    ORDER — BURNSIDE'S    RE 

TREAT — LEE'S  GREAT  RELIEF 209 

XXIV.  WAR  DEPARTMENT  STRATEGY,  CONFEDERATE  AND 

UNION 215 

XXV.  MCCLELLAN'S  STRATEGY  FOR  TURNING  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  POSITIONS  ON  THE  PENINSULA  MADE 
IMPOSSIBLE  BY  INTERFERENCE  FROM  WASHING 
TON  221 

XXVI.  POSITION  AND  NUMBERS  OF  CONFEDERATE  FORCES 
WHEN  MCCLELLAN  OCCUPIED  THE  YORKTOWN 

FRONT  ON  THE  PENINSULA 231 

XXVII.  THE  DETRACTORS  OF  MCCLELLAN — His  FRIENDS 
AND  SUPPORTERS — LINCOLN'S  VINDICATION  OF 
MCCLELLAN 235 

XXVIII.  THE  CAUSE  OF  MCCLELLAN'S  REMOVAL  ....  242 
XXIX.  OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL  IN  THE  CLOSING  YEAR  OF 

THE  WAR 253 

XXX.  GRANT'S  PICTURE  OF  SECRETARY  STANTON'S  CHAR 
ACTERISTICS — DANGER  OF  THE  REWARD  OF  MC 
CLELLAN'S  SUCCESS — MCCLELLAN'S  QUALITIES 

AS  A   COMMANDING  GENERAL 271 

XXXI.  WHY  WAS  MCCLELLAN  REMOVED  AND  FITZ  JOHN 
PORTER  COURT-MARTIALED? — THE  POPE-HAL- 

LECK-STANTON  DISPATCHES 278 

XXXII.  POPE'S  BATTLE  AND  His    DEFEAT — SECOND  MA- 

NASSAS 287 

XXXIII.  POPE'S   DEMAND  WHICH   HALLECK  DARED  NOT 

REFUSE — THE  FALSE  DISPATCH  OF  HALLECK'S 
WHICH  BROUGHT  POPE  AND  HALLECK  TO  COM 
MAND  AT  WASHINGTON 291 

XXXIV.  MCCLELLAN — THE    PRESIDENT — THE    ARMY    OF 

THE  POTOMAC — CONCLUSION 298 

XXXV.  SOME  NOTES  OF  MCCLELLAN'S  LIFE  AND  PER 
SONALITY  300 

NOTES 307 

INDEX 3" 


PREFACE 

THIS  work,  while  in  narrative  form  for  the 
public,  is  based  entirely  upon  the  official  records  of 
the  United  States  Government,  Union  and  Con 
federate;  supported,  when  required,  by  the  endorse 
ment  of  eminent  officers  of  the  United  States  War 
Department  and  the  Army,  and  by  evidence  taken 
at  the  time,  but  not  then  published,  before  the  Con 
gressional  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War; 
by  reports  of  Cabinet  officers  of  the  Government; 
and  by  records  contained  in  official  Government 
publications,  as,  for  example,  General  Upton's 
"Military  Policy  of  the  United  States/' 

The  facts  relating  to  the  Antietam  and  the  Vir 
ginia  and  Maryland  campaigns  of  1862  are  analo 
gous  to  those  in  works  that  treat  of  Napoleon,  of 
whom  to-day  no  record  has  any  value  which  has 
not  appeared  until  nearly  forty  years  after  Water 
loo,  having  theretofore  been  hidden,  suppressed,  or 
perverted.  Since  then  thousands  of  volumes  have 
appeared,  and  are  still  appearing,  all  of  which  make 
prior  books  a  travesty  on  the  truth  of  history.  So, 

9 


io  PREFACE 

too,  with  Antietam;  only  latter-day  investigations 
disclose  the  truth. 

Popular  or  political  histories,  prejudiced  or  pur 
posely  garbled  newspaper  accounts, — of  which  I 
have  read  and  examined  hundreds  with  the  greatest 
care,  and  compared  with  official  data, — I  have  been 
compelled  to  totally  ignore,  as  the  information  was 
based  on  unofficial  data,  and  was  practically  censored 
by  other  influences.  The  personal  facts  were  doubt 
less  often  correct,  but  the  inferences,  probably  from 
lack  of  actual  knowledge  or  collateral  circumstances 
quite  unknown  to  the  narrator,  or  from  other  rea 
sons,  were  erroneous  in  nearly  every  case,  as  the 
subsequent  records  show.  To  quote  from  Max 
Miiller,  in  his  "Lectures  on  India,"  before  the  Uni 
versity  of  Cambridge:  "It  is  this  power  of  dis 
covering  what  is  really  important  that  distinguishes 
the  true  historian  from  the  mere  chronicler." 

The  principal  sources  from  which  was  obtained 
the  material  brought  together  in  this  book  were,  of 
course,  the  great  series  of  works  containing  the 
original  data,  and  known  as  the  "War  of  the  Re 
bellion :  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Con 
federate  Armies."  This  great  work  contains  no 
comments,  connections,  explanations,  or  criticisms, 
but  is  confined  to  the  literal  reproduction  of  official 
data — chronologically  arranged  whenever  possible — • 
under  the  direction  of  eminent  army  officers  and 
experts,  detailed  for  that  purpose,  during  twenty 
years  of  study,  collection,  and  arrangement. 


PREFACE  ii 

The  first  volume  was  issued  in  1881,  the  last 
volume  in  1900,  and  the  General  Index,  of  1242 
pages,  in  1901.  The  principal  part  of  this  stupen 
dous  work,  as  stated  on  pages  xiii  and  xiv  of  the 
Preface  to  the  Index,  was  arranged  as  follows: 

"Major  (now  Brigadier-General  and  Judge  Ad 
vocate  General)  George  B.  Davis,  Judge  Advocate, 
United  States  Army,  was  appointed  military  mem 
ber  and  president  of  the  board  thus  authorized." 

The  work  consists  of  128  parts,  arranged  in  70 
volumes,  comprising  an  aggregate  of  135,579  pages, 
and  a  large  folio  atlas  containing  1006  maps  and 
sketches,  all  official. 

The  publication  was  authorized  under  Act  of 
Congress  in  1874.  The  first  volume  was  issued 
in  1 88 1,  the  last  volume  in  1900,  and  the  general 
index  in  1901.  The  cost  of  publication  alone  has 
been  $2,858,514,  besides  the  pay  of  army  and  Con 
federate  officers  detailed  or  employed  on  this  work, 
and  other  necessary  and  very  large  expenditures. 

The  whole  constitutes  the  most  complete  and 
comprehensive  record  of  actual  war  that  has  ever 
been  put  forth  by  any  government,  and  is  a  mine 
which  will  constitute  the  storehouse  and  basis  of 
all  authentic  history  of  this  war  for  all  time  to 
come. 

It  may  be  well  to  note  here,  however,  that  the 
Supplemental  Volume  (LI),  in  two  parts,  was  not 
issued  until  late  in  1898  or  in  1899.  The  import 
ance  of  this  note  lies  in  the  fact  that  a  large  por- 


12  PREFACE 

tion  of  this  supplemental  volume,  relating  to  the 
events  I  describe,  and  which  should  have  been  em 
bodied  in  Volume  xix,  published  in  1887,  had  been 
hidden  or  suppressed,  so  that  the  records  were  not 
available  for  public  use  until  ten  years  or  more 
later,  when  they  appear  only  in  a  supplemental 
volume.  This  material  comprises  thousands  of  dis 
patches,  reports,  notes,  orders,  and  other  data  of 
the  highest  importance,  and  all,  so  far  as  I  know, 
entirely  new  to  the  public,  and  which  never  has  been 
used  in  any  history. 

Every  part,  volume,  and  page  of  this  great  work 
has  been  studied,  selected,  arranged,  and  annotated 
in  writing,  in  the  preparation  of  this  volume.  From 
these  records,  examined  and  carefully  annotated,— 
a  work  of  years, — the  narrative  embodied  in  the 
following  pages  has  been  studied,  compared,  and 
arranged. 

I  have  also  cited  in  a  number  of  cases  the  auto 
graph  letters  of  Major-General  Emory  Upton 
which  are  found  in  the  biography  of  that  great  sol 
dier,  by  General  Peter  S.  Michie,  published  by 
Appleton  &  Co.  in  1885. 

General  Michie,  professor  at  the  West  Point 
Military  Academy,  was  graduated  from  that  insti 
tution  in  1863,  standing  second  in  his  class.  As 
signed  to  the  engineer  corps, — the  highest  grade, — 
he  was  immediately  made  assistant,  and  then  chief 
engineer  in  the  operations  against  Charleston,  and 


PREFACE  13 

then  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  James, 
where  I  first  came  to  know  him  personally.  He  was 
made  Brigadier-General  January  i,  1865,  m  1867 
was  appointed  on  the  staff  of  instruction  at  West 
Point,  and  in  1871  professor  of  natural  and  experi 
mental  philosophy.  In  1871  Princeton  University 
gave  him  the  degree  of  Ph,  D.,  and  in  1873  Dart 
mouth  the  degree  of  M.  A.  He  has  served  on  Gov 
ernment  commissions  in  Europe,  and  is  the  author 
of  several  important  scientific  works  besides  his 
"Life  of  General  Upton." 

Major-General  James  H.  Wilson,  of  the  Army, 
wrote  a  twenty-page  introduction  to  Michie's  "Life 
of  Upton."  General  Wilson  was  the  celebrated 
Western  cavalry  commander,  in  our  army,  of  the 
War.  He  was  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1860; 
was  assigned  to  the  corps  of  topographical  engi 
neers  ;  served  as  chief  topographical  engineer  of  the 
Port  Royal  Expedition,  then  in  the  Department  of 
the  South;  was  an  aide-de-camp  to  McClellan  till 
October,  1862,  and  was  at  the  battles  of  South 
Mountain  and  Antietam.  He  was  appointed  lieu 
tenant-colonel  of  volunteers  in  November,  1862, 
and  afterwards,  in  our  Western  Army,  commanded 
a  cavalry  corps  of  fifteen  thousand  men.  He  was 
the  author  of  several  important  works,  among 
others  his  work  on  China,  made  from  his  own  per 
sonal  observations,  and  was  the  co-author,  with 
Charles  A.  Dana,  of  the  "Life  of  General  Grant." 


14  PREFACE 

Of  General  Upton  Wilson  says :  "I  have  con 
stantly  maintained,  since  the  close  of  the  War,  that 
at  that  time  Upton  was  as  good  an  artillery  officer 
as  could  be  found  in  any  country,  the  equal  of  any 
cavalry  commander  of  his  day,  and,  all  things  con 
sidered,  was  the  best  commander  of  a  division  of 
infantry  in  either  the  Union  or  Rebel  army.  He 
was  incontestably  the  best  tactician  of  either  army, 
and  this  is  true  whether  tested  by  battle  or  by  the 
evolutions  of  the  drill  field  and  parade.  In  the  ser 
vice,  it  is  not  too  much  to  add  that  he  could  scarcely 
have  failed  as  a  corps  or  an  army  commander  had 
it  been  his  good  fortune  to  be  called  to  such  rank." 

In  an  address  delivered  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
at  the  laying  of  the  corner-stone  of  the  Army  War 
College  at  Washington,  February  21,  1903,  the 
Secretary  spoke  of  General  Upton  in  the  following 
terms : 

"Brevet  Major-General  Emory  Upton,  colonel  of 
the  Fourth  Artillery,  graduated  from  \Vest  Point 
in  the  year  1860,  became,  while  almost  a  boy,  one 
of  the  most  distinguished  officers  of  the  Civil  War. 
He  commanded  successively  a  battery  of  artillery, 
a  regiment  of  infantry,  a  brigade  of  artillery,  and 
a  division  of  cavalry.  Constantly  in  the  field,  he 
exhibited  in  camp  and  march  and  in  scores  of 
battles  dauntless  and  brilliant  courage,  strict  and 
successful  discipline,  and  the  highest  qualities  of 
command." 


PREFACE  15 

I  cite  the  above — which  could  be  greatly  ampli 
fied — to  show  that  in  relying,  as  I  have  done,  on 
the  official  statements  and  letters  of  General  Upton, 
I  am  supported  by  an  authority  as  competent  and 
valid  as  any  of  those  cited  directly  from  the  Offi 
cial  War  Records,  especially  so  since  his  great 
work,  "The  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States," 
from  which  I  have  freely  quoted,  has  been  officially 
published  by  the  United  States,  "Washington: 
Government  Printing  Office,  1904." 

Of  the  Battle  of  Antietam,  which  constitutes  the 
central  axis,  as  it  were,  of  the  present  work,  and 
which  battle  purposely  was  so  greatly  minimized 
and  depreciated  by  political  officialdom  at  the  time, 
President  Roosevelt  more  than  forty  years  after 
ward,  at  the  dedication  of  the  New  Jersey  Soldiers' 
Monument  on  that  battle-field  September  17,  1903, 
placed  it  in  its  full  light  and  proper  perspective  in 
his  own  vivid  and  incisive  way : 

"We  meet  to-day  upon  one  of  the  great  battle 
fields  of  the  Civil  War.  No  other  battle  of  the 
Civil  War  lasting  but  one  day  shows  as  great  a  per 
centage  of  loss  as  that  which  occurred  here  upon 
the  day  on  which  Antietam  was  fought.  Moreover, 
in  its  ultimate  effects  this  battle  was  of  momentous 
and  even  decisive  importance. 

"If  the  issue  of  Antietam  had  been  other  than  it 
was,  it  is  probable  that  at  least  two  great  European 
Powers  would  have  recognized  the  independence  of 
the  Confederacy,  so  that  you  who  fought  here 


16  PREFACE 

forty-one  years  ago  have  the  profound  satisfaction 
of  feeling  that  you  played  well  your  part  in  one  of 
those  great  crises  big  with  the  fate  of  all  mankind. 

"The  great  American  Republic  would  have  be 
come  a  memory  of  derision;  and  the  failure  of  the 
experiment  of  self-government  by  a  great  people  on 
a  great  scale  would  have  delighted  the  heart  of 
every  foe  of  republican  institutions." 

It  seems  almost  a  coincidence  that  Napoleon,  too, 
subjected  to  similar  malign  influences,  had  to  wait 
for  his  vindication  and  fame  till  forty  years  after 
Waterloo,  which  now  the  whole  world,  including 
his  opposing  enemies,  fully  and  grandly  acclaims. 

Based,  as  the  following  work  is,  strictly  on  offi 
cial  records,  many  of  which  were  long  suppressed, 
I  can  appeal  with  confidence  to  the  United  States 
War  Department  for  its  correctness,  as  has  al 
ready  been  done. 

Of  a  somewhat  similar  case,  in  American  his 
tory,  Parkman  says:  "Some  of  the  results  here 
reached  are  of  a  character  which  I  regret,  since 
they  cannot  be  agreeable  to  persons  for  whom  I 
have  a  very  cordial  regard.  The  conclusions  drawn 
from  the  facts  may  be  matter  of  opinion :  but  it  will 
be  remembered  that  the  facts  themselves  can  be 
overthrown  only  by  overthrowing  the  evidence  on 
which  they  rest,  or  bringing  forward  counter-evi 
dence  of  equal  or  greater  strength;  and  neither 
task  will  be  found  an  easy  one." 

This  work  is  a  simple,  straightforward,  and  dis- 


PREFACE  17 

passionate  record  of  the  truth,  and  its  statistics,  all 
new,  and  its  stragetical  movements,  which  to  the 
civilian  may  appear  dry  reading,  to  the  old  soldiers 
will  be  bread  and  meat,  for  they  understand  them 
like  the  multiplication  table,  and  have  always  longed 
to  learn  just  what  they  were  "up  against." 

THE  AUTHOR. 


ANTIETAM 

AND  THE  MARYLAND  AND  VIRGINIA 
CAMPAIGNS     OF  1862 


I 


INTRODUCTORY INACCURACY    OF    ALL    THE 

CURRENT  HISTORIES 

IN  order  to  fully  understand  the  Maryland  cam 
paign  of  1862  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  events 
which  immediately  preceded,  and  of  which  this 
momentous  chapter  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
was  the  consequence. 

Full  significance,  and  the  high  importance  of  the 
military  operations  of  this  epoch  have  never,  for 
many  reasons,  been  found  in  the  ordinary  histories 
of  this  period.  There  is,  indeed,  no  campaign  of 
the  wrar  so  little  understood  in  its  military  and 
national  aspects  as  this,  which  had  for  its  central 
feature  the  battle  of  Antietam,  but  which  bristles 
from  end  to  end,  at  every  point,  with  questions 
which  never  have  been  answered,  and  never  could 
have  been  answered,  until  the  Government,  with  a 
care  and  cost  which  must  extort  the  heartfelt  grati 
tude  of  every  patriot  and  soldier,  has  placed  in  our 

19 


20  ANTIETAM 

hands  the  whole  original  record,  without  blot  or 
emendation,  and  without  the  possibility  of  ques 
tion,  and  has  made  for  us  and  for  the  historian 
of  the  future  all  these  events  so  clear  and  startling 
that  no  student  of  war  or  of  his  country  need 
longer  doubt  or  hesitate.  I  will  endeavor  to  briefly 
depict  the  facts.  T  cannot  in  this  brief  presentation 
cite  all  the  authorities  at  length  by  page  and  date,  but 
in  a  case  of  this  kind  every  statement  made  must 
be  reen  forced  by  unimpeachable  original  authority, 
and  these  I  have  included  in  the  text  as  references 
in  corroboration  of  the  various  facts  hitherto 
doubtful  or  ignored. 

I  trust  that  in  presenting  these  facts  entirely 
without  prejudice,  and  in  vindication  of  historic 
truth  and  of  the  noble  army  which  did  such  glori 
ous  service  in  these  campaigns,  the  writer  may  ask 
for  that  consideration  which  long  and  faithful 
study  of  the  records  contained  in  many  volumes, 
and  a  personal  participation  in  the  events  them 
selves,  as  well  as  a  perfect  familiarity  from  boy 
hood  with  the  whole  country  covered  by  these 
operations,  may  appear  to  deserve.  Forty-nine 
years  is  full  long  enough  to  enable  the  calm  light 
of  history  to  displace  the  temporary  and  partial 
views  of  the  great  events  with  which  I  shall  so 
briefly  undertake,  in  outline  at  least,  to  deal. 

When  General  Emory  Upton  had  written  his 
great  work,  "The  Military  Policy  of  the  United 
States,"  published  by  the  United  States  Govern- 


INTRODUCTORY  21 

ment,  up  to  the  campaigns  of  1862  he  had  found 
during  all  the  preceding  military  operations  of  our 
country  no  especial  difficulty;  but  he  now  encoun 
tered  problems  impossible  of  solution  on  any  mili 
tary  principles.  He  found  defeats  and  disasters, 
movements  and  disco-ordinations,  and  a  labyrinth 
of  incompatibilities  which  could  not  be  accounted 
for  with  the  ordinary  historical  data  at  hand. 

To  Colonel  DuPont,  his  classmate  at  West  Point 
and  life-long  friend,  he  writes  in  1879:  "To 
morrow  I  shall  finish  the  original  draft  of  the  cam 
paign  of  1862.  Its  volume  is  startling.  Twice  I 
destroyed  all  that  I  had  finished,  because  it  fell 
short  of  carrying  conviction.  .  .  .  The  Mc- 
Clellan  question  has  run  the  manuscript  up  by 
nearly  four  hundred  pages.  The  campaign  of 
1862,  the  most  critical  of  the  war,  is  hardly  in 
shape  for  your  painstaking  revision.  I  fear  I 
have  made  too  many  quotations,  and  yet  nothing 
will  be  received  as  condemnatory  of  Stan  ton's 
interference  unless  substantiated  by  documentary 
proof."  He  continues:  "The  campaign  of  1862 
is  very  difficult.  If  I  make  it  short,  the  reader  may 
doubt  my  facts  and  conclusions.  If  too  long,  he 
may  weary  of  the  subject.  If  you  want  to  know 
who  was  the  cause  of  a  three  years'  war  after  we 
created  a  disciplined  army  of  six  hundred  thousand 
men,  it  was  Stanton.  But  Stanton  did  not  create 
the  system — the  system  created  Stanton." 

In  a  letter  to  General, — afterwards  President, — 


22  ANTIETAM 

Garfield,  in  1879,  he  says:  "When  in  1862  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  after  being  relieved  from  command, 
rode  the  lines  of  his  army,  neither  my  regiment 
nor  myself  joined  in  the  demonstrations  of  affec 
tion  and  applause  which  nearly  everywhere  greeted 
his  appearance.  .  .  .  The  son  of  an  Aboli 
tionist,  an  Abolitionist  myself,  both  as  a  cadet  and 
an  officer,  my  sympathies  were  strongly  on  the  side 
of  the  Administration  in  its  effort  to  abolish 
slavery,  and  I  could  not  therefore  even  indirectly 
participate  in  an  ovation  which  might  be  construed 
as  a  censure  on  either  the  civil  or  military  policy 
of  the  Government.  With  these  views  you  will 
naturally  infer  that  I  have  always  been  anti- 
McClellan,  anti-Fitz-John  Porter,  and  such  is  the 
fact. 

"Up  to  a  few  months  ago,  when  I  began  our  mili 
tary  policy  during  the  Rebellion,  I  believed  that 
these  officers,  differing  in  policy  from  the  Adminis 
tration,  had  not  done  their  whole  duty  to  the  coun 
try.  But  in  the  process  of  this  investigation  I  have 
been  compelled  to  change  my  mind.  Like  many 
millions  of  our  people,  my  opinions  were  vague  and 
shadowy;  they  had  no  foundation  in  fact. 

"You  will  remember  that  from  the  nth  of 
March  till  the  nth  of  July,  1862,  we  had  no  gen- 
eral-in-chief.  Our  armies,  numbering  more  than 
six  hundred  thousand  men,  were  commanded  by 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  Could  I 
lay  before  you  all  the  facts  that  have  come  under 


INTRODUCTORY  23 

my  observation,  I  believe  you  would  be  convinced 
that  the  causes  of  a  four  instead  of  a  one  year's 
war  can  all  be  traced  to  this  brief  but  disastrous 
period. 

"It  was  during  this  time  that  the  troops  east  of 
the  Alleghanies  were  divided  up  into  six  inde 
pendent  commands.  It  was  during  the  same  period 
that  the  great  arm y  concentrated  at  Corinth,  and 
which  might  have  made  a  summer  excursion  to 
Vicksburg  and  Jackson,  was  dispersed  from 
Memphis  to  Cumberland  Gap,  a  distance  of  nearly 
three  hundred  miles.  In  both  cases  the  result  was 
the  same.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  called 
back  to  the  Potomac;  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was 
called  back  to  the  Ohio.  It  may  be  added,  as  a 
further  coincidence,  that  the  commanders  of  the 
two  armies,  against  whose  protests  the  division  of 
our  forces  was  made,  were  relieved  from  their 
command." 

It  may  be  added  further,  that  when  Halleck  was 
brought  east  as  general-in-chief,  in  July,  1862,  he 
came  with  a  handicap  known  to  Stanton,  but  un 
known  to  the  country,  which  General  Pope  used 
against  him  to  force  the  removal  of  McClellan, 
saying,  "The  circumstances  under  which  you  came 
to  Washington  and  I  undertook  the  campaign  in 
Virginia  are  well-known  to  one-half  of  Congress." 

With  this  bomb-shell — to  which  I  shall  again 
refer — in  the  hands  of  Pope  and  Stanton,  and 
ready  to  be  exploded  under  him,  Halleck  became  a 


24  ANTIETAM 

mere  agency  in  carrying  out  the  military  projects 
of  the  civilians  who  had  so  long  dominated  and 
directed  the  operations  of  the  army. 

Says  General  Michie,  the  biographer  of  Upton : 
"The  great  War  Secretary,  Stanton,  a  man  of  im 
perious  will,  became  the  supreme  and  controlling 
spirit  in  every  military  movement,  and  in  the  con 
duct  of  military  affairs,  and  to  his  interference  all 
our  military  disasters  of  that  year  may  be  traced." 

And  we  shall  find  that  these  disasters  did  not 
cease  with  the  second  Bull  Run  campaign,  but  that 
Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville  are  a  part  of 
the  same,  in  the  midst  of  which  McClellan's  inter 
regnum,  enforced  by  the  personal  orders  and  right 
eous  wrath  of  the  President,  who  took  the  bit  be 
tween  his  teeth  and  rose  to  an  almost  unapproach 
able  majesty  in  this  great  emergency,  shines  out 
like  a  glorious  star. 

Referring  to  this  "War  Department  strategy," 
as  General  Upton  designates  it,  he  demonstrates 
that  it  was  a  clear  usurpation,  saying :  "Neither  by 
the  Constitution  nor  the  laws  is  the  Secretary  of 
War  entitled  to  exercise  command.  Whenever  he 
departs  from  the  sphere  of  administration  to  con 
trol  military  operations  he  is  nothing  more  or  less 
than  a  usurper.  The  Constitution,  laws,  decisions 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  of  the  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  nowhere  give  him  the  authority  to  command." 

In  other  words,  the  Secretary's  duties  were  those 
of  administration,  and  the  President  is  made,  by 


INTRODUCTORY  25 

the  Constitution,  the  commander-in-chief,  and  the 
commander-in-chief  has  no  more  power  to  delegate 
his  command  than  the  President  has  to  delegate  his 
veto. 

Just  on  the  eve  of  McClellan's  movement  by 
water  to  the  Peninsula,  in  March,  1862,  his  posi 
tion  as  general-in-chief  was  taken  away  from  him, 
and  he  commanded,  henceforth,  only  the  ground 
which  his  army  covered  and  only  the  troops  which 
covered  it. 

Says  General  Michie:  "By  thus  assuming  the 
direction  of  military  affairs  both  the  Secretary  and 
the  President  became  from  this  moment  as  much 
responsible  for  whatever  of  disaster  might  befall 
the  army  as  if  they  had  actually  taken  command  in 
the  field.  No  sooner  had  the  commander  of  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  sailed  for  Fortress  Monroe 
than  the  disintegration  of  the  forces  which  he  had 
relied  upon  for  his  purpose,  and  which  had  been 
promised  him,  began  to  take  place." 


II 


THE  PENINSULA 

WE  know  the  result.  When  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  reached  the  front  of  Richmond  its 
line  of  supply  was  by  the  York  River,  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  while  Richmond,  the 
objective,  was  miles  away  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy.  This  uncanny  stream  thus  of 
necessity  divided  our  army.  As  soon  as  the  James 
River  had  become  free,  by  the  destruction  of  the 
Merrimac,  and  with  the  ascent  of  our  war  vessels 
to  the  Chickahominy  and  above,  correct  military 
principles  required  that  our  base  should  be  changed 
to  the  James. 

But  this  was  forbidden  by  two  circumstances. 
By  Stanton's  order  of  May  18  McClellan  was 
directed  to  extend  his  right  wing  so  as  to  effect  a 
junction  with  McDowell's  left  wing  advancing 
from  Falmouth,  and  to  establish  this  connection  as 
soon  as  possible,  by  extending  McClellan's  right 
wing  to  the  north  of  Richmond ;  and  Stanton's 
orders  to  McDowell  of  June  8  directed  that  officer 
to  move  his  command  immediately  in  the  direction 

26 


THE  PENINSULA  27 

of  Richmond,  to  cooperate  with  McClellan.  Wrote 
McDowell,  to  McClellan:  "For  the  third  time  I 
am  ordered  to  join  you,  and  this  time  I  hope  to  get 
through."  (See  War  Records,  vol.  xi.) 

But  he  didn't,  and  McDowell  was  tied  fast,  and 
Stonewall  Jackson  was  turned  loose.  Then  came 
the  heroic  Seven  Days'  battles,  when  McClellan, 
having  no  hope  from  McDowell,  but  altogether 
the  reverse,  made  that  remarkable  change  of  base 
to  the  James  River,  at  almost  precisely  the  spot 
where  Grant,  two  years  later,  did  the  same,  after 
sacrificing  more  men  overland  than  his  antagonist 
had  with  which  to  oppose  him,  and  finally  opened 
the  door  to  Richmond  and  brought  about  the  end 
of  the  war.  McClellan's  plan  was  outlined  in  his 
correspondence  with  Commodore  Rodgers, — who 
commanded  the  fleet  in  the  James  River, — under 
dates  June  24  and  25,  and  with  Woodruff  and 
Felton,  June  20.  (War  Records,  vol.  xi,  part  3, 
page  220. ) 

McClellan's  plan,  in  brief,  was  to  hold  the  Con 
federate  army  in  front  of  his  heavy  works  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  and  throw  the  bulk 
of  his  army  across  to,  and  over,  the  James  River, 
attacking  Richmond  from  the  south  and  west.  He 
had  had  all  the  roads  through  this  wilderness  al 
ready  surveyed  and  mapped  for  this  purpose  (See 
"W.  R."  vol.  xi;  vol.  xi,  part  I,  pp.  37,  152,  264, 
270,  998;  part  3,  pp.  24,  226,  229,  236,  246,  250, 
251,  255,  256,  258,  262,  265,  272.)  Confirmatory 


28  ANTIETAM 

of  the  above  is  the  statement  of  Lieutenant-General 
Dick  Taylor  (son  of  President  Taylor),  who  com 
manded  a  division  in  Lee's  army  in  the  battles  from 
Games'  Mill  to  Malvern  Hill,  ("Destruction  and 
Reconstruction,"  page  87),  'The  Confederate  com 
manders  knew  no  more  about  the  topography  of  the 
country  than  they  did  about  Central  Africa.  .  .  . 
McClellan  was  as  superior  to  us  in  knowledge  of 
our  own  land  as  were  the  Germans  to  the  French 
in  their  late  war."  But  the  junction  of  Jackson 
with  Lee — directly  due  to  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington — and  their  combined  attack  on  McClellan's 
right,  at  Games'  Mill,  disarranged  these  plans,  and 
compelled  him  to  do,  in  the  midst  of  open  battle, 
what  he  had  intended  to  do  in  advance  by  secret 
movements. 

And  now  we  come  to  the  question  of  forces  en 
gaged  on  each  side,  and  this  question  will  dominate 
the  entire  Maryland  campaign  as  well.  It  is  need 
less  to  say  that  the  Confederate  force  was  pur 
posely  minimized,  and  McClellan's  exaggerated,  in 
both  cases,  in  all  the  War  Department  figures,  at 
Washington. 

The  regimental  organization  in  both  armies  was 
identical.  The  very  day  McClellan  had  landed  on 
the  Peninsula,  and  when  about  going  into  a 
long,  exhaustive,  and  depleting  campaign,  Secretary 
Stanton  issued  his  general  order  of  the  War  De 
partment  April  3,  1862 :  "The  recruiting  service 
for  volunteers  will  be  discontinued  in  every  State 


THE  PENINSULA  29 

from  this  date.  The  officers  detailed  on  Volunteer 
Recruiting  Service  will  join  their  regiments  with 
out  delay.  .  .  .  The  public  property  belong 
ing  to  Volunteer  Recruiting  Service  will  be  sold  to 
the  best  possible  advantage."  (See  Official  Orders, 
War  Department,  1862.) 

As  stated  in  Lee's  letter  of  August  16,  1862,  and 
Jefferson  Davis's  "History  of  the  Confederacy," 
the  Confederates  immediately  countered  on  this 
order,  April  13,  ten  days  afterward,  by  the  first 
general  conscription  of  "All  white  men  resident  of 
the  Confederate  States,  between  the  ages  of  eigh 
teen  and  thirty-five  years,  and  to  continue  those  al 
ready  in  the  field  until  three  years  from  the  date  of 
their  enlistment."  Those  under  eighteen  and  over 
thirty-five  were  required  to  remain  ninety  days. 
And  as  a  counter  to  the  President's  War  Order  No. 
3,  of  March  n,  just  before  the  Peninsula  cam 
paign  began,  relieving  General  McClellan  from  the 
control  of  our  armed  forces  as  a  whole,  General 
R.  E.  Lee,  by  General  Orders  No.  14,  dated  Rich 
mond,  March  13  (only  two  days  afterward),  was 
"assigned  to  duty  at  the  seat  of  government,  and 
was  charged  (directly  under  the  President)  with 
the  conduct  of  military  operations  in  the  armies  of 
the  Confederacy." 

The  above  general  conscription  alone  should  have 
given  the  Confederate  armies  more  than  800,000 
men,  in  addition  to  the  forces  already  in  the  field; 
the  entire  Union  armies  at  this  time,  East  and 


30  ANTIETAM 

West,  did  not  number,  even  on  paper,  more  than 
600,000  men.  (See  General  Michie's  "Biography 
of  Emory  Upton,"  p.  459.)  The  results  of  this 
suicidal  policy  at  Washington,  and  of  this  magnifi 
cent  counter-stroke  at  Richmond,  were  soon  ap 
parent.  In  war,  military  principles  as  contrasted 
with  political  practices  will  win  in  every  case. 

It  will  be  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  this  his 
tory  to  determine  the  actual  numbers  of  the  oppos 
ing  forces  during  the  Seven  Days,  as  this  will  give 
us  a  standard  of  comparison  for  the  succeeding 
campaigns. 

It  is  well  known  that  for  purposes  of  com 
parison,  the  Union  official  figures  are  worthless,  as 
our  generals  were  obliged  to  report  the  "ration 
strength,"  while  the  Confederate  forces  reported 
only  the  "fighting  strength." 

The  reports  of  a  great  many  regimental  and 
other  organizations  engaged  in  the  Seven  Days' 
battles,  on  both  sides,  give  the  number  of  their  men 
taken  into  action.  These  came  from  all  parts  of 
each  army,  and  are  a  fair  index  of  the  average 
strength,  conforming  also  to  the  ratio  of  officers 
and  the  system  of  organization,  which  was  alike 
in  both  armies.  The  average  strength  of  the  Con 
federate  infantry  was  542  officers  and  men  for 
each  regiment.  For  the  Union  army  the  average 
was  487  per  regiment.  (See  vol.  xi,  "War 
Records.") 

As    the    conscription    had    brought    in    its    men 


THE  PENINSULA  31 

freely,  during  the  previous  two  and  one-half  months, 
and  recruiting  had  brought  none  at  all  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  we  may  be  sure  that  if  there  be 
any  error  it  must  be  in  underestimating  the  Con 
federates. 

It  may  be  well  to  pursue  this  question  some 
what  further.  In  vol.  xi,  part  3,  p.  615,  W. 
R.,  is  given  the  "present"  on  June  23,  1862, 
of  twenty- four  Virginia  regiments, — which  (see 
Longstreet's  letter  on  page  614,  ibid.),  are  really 
present  for  duty  in  battle, — as  "7000  are  at  times 
absent  from  their  posts."  Excluding  these,  the 
total  is  11,380;  but  in  the  letter  Longstreet  sums 
up  the  whole  (including  officers)  at  13,000.  This 
gives  an  average  regimental  strength  of  542.  As 
the  6813  others  are  only  "absent  at  times/'  the  ef 
fective  strength  in  battle  would  be  considerably 
greater.  On  the  same  page  the  average  battery 
strength  of  thirteen  batteries  is  given  as  present 
for  duty  in  battle  76  men,  besides  officers,  per 
battery.  The  total  per  battery  may  be  put  at  a 
minimum  of  80. 

Lee's  published  field  return  for  July  20',  1862, 
gives  as  present  for  duty,  exclusive  of  Jackson  and 
Ewell,  69,732.  This  includes  Holmes's  division; 
but  this  division  was  present  and  engaged  in  the 
Seven  Days'  battles.  (See  volume  xi,  part  2,  p. 
906.)  Lee,  in  his  letter  to  Jackson  of  July  27  (see 
War  Records,  vol.  xii,  part  3,  p.  918),  gives  the  ef 
fective  strength  of  Jackson  and  Ewell  at  18,000 


32  ANTIETAM 

men.  Adding  officers  in  the  proportion  of  Lee's 
army — 1200 — would  make  this  force  19,200.  The 
Confederate  losses  in  the  Seven  Days,  which  are 
much  underestimated  in  the  returns,  since  there  are 
large  discrepancies  in  their  own  accounts  (com 
pare  volume  xi,  part  2,  pp.  973-984  with  p.  502), 
were  not  less  than  20,077. 

Aggregating  these  items,  we  have  a  Confederate 
total  taken  into  action  in  the  Seven  Days'  battles 
of  108,899,  which  is  less  than  the  true  aggregate. 

Comparing  Lee's  field  return  of  officers  present 
for  duty  July  20,  and  adding  the  officers  of  Jack 
son  and  Ewell,  1200,  we  have  a  total  of  5533  com 
missioned  officers  left  in  Lee's  army  after  the  Seven 
Days'  battles. 

McClellan's  field  return  of  July  10,  after  deduct 
ing  Dix's  command,  which  had  remained  at  Fort 
Monroe  and  was  not  under  McClellan's  command, 
gives  an  aggregate  of  3834  commissioned  officers 
present  for  duty  with  McClellan's  entire  army  after 
the  Seven  Days. 

McClellan  made  no  complaint  of  his  army  being 
under-officered. 

Lee  (see  vol.  xi,  War  Records,  part  3,  pp.  669  and 
671),  wrote  urgently  and  repeatedly  to  the  Rich 
mond  authorities  about  his  shortage  of  officers.  He 
says :  "The  want  of  officers  of  proper  rank  renders 
many  regiments  and  companies  inefficient ;  regiments 
being  in  some  cases  under  the  command  of  captains 
and  many  companies  without  their  proper  comple- 


THE  PENINSULA  33 

ment  of  officers."  Again,  later,  he  writes:  "I  am 
very  anxious  that  the  vacancies  among  the  regi 
mental  officers  should  be  filled  as  soon  as  possible," 
etc.,  etc. 

As  Lee's  losses  in  the  Seven  Days'  battles  were 
at  least  one-third  greater  than  those  of  McClellan, 
after  making  due  allowance  for  this  casualty  defi 
ciency  of  officers  in  Lee's  army,  we  still  see  that  his 
force  after  the  battles  must  have  been  decidedly  in 
excess  of  that  of  McClellan.  So  much  so,  in  fact, 
that  one  might  suppose  that  the  Confederate 
strength  in  the  Seven  Days  was  really  much  greater 
than  the  estimated  regimental  strengths  would  ag 
gregate,  since  Lee  had  one-third  more  officers  after 
the  battle  than  McClellan  had,  and  was  nevertheless 
urging  the  Richmond  authorities  that  his  shortage 
of  officers  rendered  many  of  his  organizations  inef 
ficient. 

It  is  needless  to  repeat,  of  course,  that  the  system 
of  organization  was  the  same  in  both  armies. 

At  the  end  of  July  Lee  sent  to  Jackson  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  and  two  Louisiana  regiments,  the 
latter  to  be  brigaded  with  those  already  in  Jackson's 
force.  These  numbered  altogether  thirty  regiments. 
(See  War  Records,  vol.  xi,  part  3,  p.  648,  and  vol. 
xii,  part  3,  p.  918.)  Lee  says:  "These  troops  will 
exceed  18,000  men."  Adding  their  officers,  we  have 
19,200  at  least,  and  dividing  by  thirty  we  have 
an  aggregate  regimental  strength  of  640  each,  offi 
cers  and  men. 


34  ANTIETAM 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  Confederates  did  not 
multiply  new  regiments  as  we  did,  but  kept  filling  up 
their  old  regiments.  Very  few  of  the  Confederate 
States  show  regimental  numbers  exceeding  50  or  60. 
The  highest  regimental  number  in  Virginia  was  61, 
and  this  number  appears  in  the  Seven  Days.  So  also 
of  Georgia  and  the  other  States.  This  system,  of 
course,  added  enormously  to  the  value  and  efficiency 
of  these  organizations. 

Coming  directly  now  to  the  numbers  engaged  on 
each  side  in  the  Seven  Days'  battles,  we  find, 
from  the  Confederate  roster  (vol.  xi,  part  2,  pp. 
483-489)  that  General  Lee  had  under  his  direct 
command,  and  actually  engaged  in  these  battles,  182 
regiments  of  infantry,  u  regiments  of  cavalry,  and 
87  batteries  of  field  artillery, — besides  the  heavy 
guns  in  the  works, — making  a  total  battle-field 
strength  of  110,802,  which  is  a  minimum. 

McClellan  had  under  his  command  at  the  same 
time  143  regiments  of  infantry,  6  regiments  of 
cavalry,  and  57  batteries  of  artillery,  making  a  total 
battle-field  strength  of  81,797,  which  is  a  maximum. 

The  Confederates  had  an  excess  over  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  of  44  regiments  of  infantry,  5  regi 
ments  of  cavalry,  and  30  batteries  of  field  artillery, 
making  an  aggregate  excess  in  numbers  of,  at  least, 
29,000  men. 

At  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill,  June  27,  when  the 
combined  divisions  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  Ewell, 
A.  P.  Hill,  D.  H.  Hill,  and  Longstreet,  with  Stuart's 


THE  PENINSULA  35 

cavalry,  made  a  concerted  attack  on  three  sides,  the 
Confederates  had  engaged  124  regiments  of  infan 
try,  8  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  27  batteries  of 
artillery;  while  the  Union  forces  comprised  only 
49  regiments  of  infantry,  3  regiments  of  cavalry, 
and  21  batteries  of  artillery.  (See  casualty  returns 
of  opposing  armies  in  vol.  xi,  W.  R.) 

The  strength  of  the  Confederates  in  this  battle 
was  nearly  in  the  proportion  of  three  to  one,  yet 
under  McClellan's  eve.  and  with  Fitz-John  Porter  in 
immediate  command,  our  troops  inflicted  far  greater 
losses  than  they  sustained,  and  at  nightfall  crossed 
the  Chickahominy  with  all  their  force  intact  and 
ready  for  the  battles  yet  to  follow,  which  battles 
concluded  with  that  astonishing  and  overwhelming 
victory  over  all  Lee's  army  at  Malvern  Hill,  which 
perhaps  gave  the  highest  example  of  what  artillery 
can  do  when  properly  handled,  to  be  found  in  all 
history,  unless  Antietam  may  furnish  another 
instance. 

The  obvious  course  for  the  Union  army,  now,  was 
to  do  as  we  did  two  years  later,  for  the  James  and 
the  York  rivers,  the  Peninsula  and  the  Appomattox, 
were  all  in  our  possession,  and  the  vast  defensive 
works  in  front  of  Petersburg  and  Richmond  had 
been  as  yet  barely  begun.  (See  Confederate  engi 
neers'  reports,  W.  R.) 

McClellan,  perfectly  secure  in  his  magnificent 
position  at  Harrison's  Landing,  with  tidewater  sup 
plies  open  from  every  quarter,  and  with  natural  de- 


36  ANTIETAM 

fenses  all  around,  and  almost  under  the  shadow  of 
Malvern  Hill,  of  unsavory  memory  to  the  Con 
federates,  awaited  support  from  Washington,  as 
Grant  did  two  years  later,  to  complete  his  work. 

The  editors  of  Upton's  United  States  Govern 
ment  publication,  "The  Military  Policy,"  in  a  note, 
describe  Harrison's  Landing  as  one  of  the  best  on 
the  James  River.  It  was  twenty-five  miles  below 
Richmond,  with  a  high  and  open  country  between, 
and  guarded  by  water  on  both  flanks  and  in  front. 
It  was,  in  fact,  immediately  across  the  James  River 
from,  and  less  than  four  miles  below,  City  Point; 
whence  Grant  carried  on  his  final  campaign,  in  1864 
and  1865.  In  fact,  McClellan  occupied  both  sides 
of  the  James  River,  as  the  War  Records  (vol.  xi) 
show. 

But  other  counsels  prevailed. 

Concerning  the  operations  from  Harrison's  Land 
ing,  including  General  Sumner's  report  of  the  cap 
ture  of  Malvern  Hill,  August  5,  see  War  Records, 
vol.  xi,  part  3,  p.  356;  of  McClellan's  urgent  ap 
peals  for  ferry-boats  to  cross  the  James  River  in 
force,  August  3,  see  same  volume  and  part,  p.  351 ; 
of  Averell's  cavalry  action  south  of  the  James,  Au 
gust  o,  see  same  volume,  part  2,  pp.  946-948,  and  D. 
H.  Hill's  report  of  same,  p.  948;  and  of  other  occu 
pations  of  the  southern  side,  pp.  949,  950.  See  also 
Fitz-John  Porter's  letter  to  McClellan  of  August  5, 
to  push  over  to  the  Suffolk  Railroad,  destroying  all 
bridges  over  the  Black  water  River,  etc.,  etc. 


THE  PENINSULA  37 

The  protest  of  Commodore  Wilkes  to  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  Welles,  of  August  5,  1862,  against  the 
removal  of  the  army  from  the  front  of  Richmond  to 
Washington  is  an  important  and  elaborate  statement 
of  the  facts,  on  the  spot  and  at  the  time,  and  will  be 
found  at  length  in  the  War  Records,  vol.  xi,  part  2, 
pp.  356-358.  He  concludes:  "I  trust  in  God  this 
direful  act  will  not  be  carried  out;  our  noble  cause 
will  be  ruined  if  it  is.  General  McClellan  is  con 
fident  as  I  am  in  the  result,  if  left  here,  the  capture 
of  the  Rebel  capital,  and  of  maintaining  the  honor, 
safety,  and  glory  of  the  Union  and  its  army." 


Ill 

THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE 

POPE  had  been  brought  to  Washington  and  been 
given  command  of  a  new  army,  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia,  made  up  of  the  scattered  forces  of  Fremont, 
Banks,  McDowell,  and  the  garrisons  at  Washing 
ton,  with  comprehensive  orders  from  the  civilians  at 
Washington  to  "operate  in  such  manner  as,  while 
protecting  Western  Virginia  and  the  national  capital 
from  danger  or  insult,  it  shall  in  the  speediest 
manner  attack  and  overcome  the  Rebel  forces  under 
Jackson  and  Ewell,  threaten  the  enemy  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Charlottesville,  and  render  the  most  effective 
aid  to  relieve  General  McClellan  and  capture  Rich 
mond." 

Surely  it  was  a  task  worthy  of  those  fabled  an 
cient  heroes,  and  we  need  not  wonder  that  General 
Pope,  in  command  of  this  "one  army,"  should  in  his 
published  address  "To  the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of 
the  Army  of  Virginia,"  tell  them  what  manner  of 
man  he  was.  "Let  us  understand  each  other,"  he 
said.  "I  have  come  to  you  from  the  West,  where  we 
have  always  seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies;  from 
an  army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek  the  ad- 

38 


THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE  39 

versary  and  beat  him  when  he  was  found;  whose 
policy  has  been  attack  and  not  defense.  In  but  one 
instance  has  the  enemy  been  able  to  place  our  West 
ern  armies  in  defensive  attitude.  I  presume  I  have 
been  called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system,  and  to 
lead  you  against  the  enemy.  It  is  my  purpose  to  do 
so,  and  that  speedily.  I  am  sure  you  long  for  an  op 
portunity  to  win  the  distinction  you  are  capable  of 
achieving.  That  opportunity  I  shall  endeavor  to 
give  you.  Meantime,  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from 
your  minds  certain  phrases  which  I  am  sorry  to  hear 
so  much  in  vogue  among  you.  I  hear  constantly  of 
'taking  strong  positions  and  holding1  them,'  of  'lines 
of  retreat/  and  of  'bases  of  supplies.'  Let  us  dis 
card  such  ideas." 

But  he  might  have  been  more  modest ;  for  an 
analysis  of  his  returns  from  the  official  War 
Records,  for  the  nine  months  up  to  April  8,  1862, 
while  in  the  West,  when  his  force  was  25,000  men, 
shows  that  his  entire  losses  were  only  1 1  men  killed 
and  35  wounded;  while  during  the  so-called  siege 
of  Corinth  his  entire  losses  aggregated  only  about 
20  killed  and  180  wounded  and  missing. 

Those  were  the  trophies  which  he  brought  East, 
besides  Halleck's  false  despatch  of  June  4  (which, 
after  the  war,  Pope  repudiated),  purporting  that  the 
latter  was  pushing  the  enemy  with  all  his  might  and 
had  already  captured  10.000  prisoners,  15,000  stand 
of  arms,  etc.,  etc.,  and  on  which  report  Stanton  tele 
graphed,  "Your  glorious  despatch  has  just  been  re- 


40  ANTIETAM 

ceived,  and  I  have  sent  it  into  every  State.  The 
whole  land  will  soon  ring  with  applause  at  the 
achievement  of  your  gallant  army  and  its  able  and 
victorious  commander."  And  on  which  the  Presi 
dent  sent  his  message,  "Your  despatch  of  to-day  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  received.  Thanks  for  the 
good  news  it  brings."  And  on  which,  also,  as  I 
shall  show,  later  on,  both  Pope  and  Halleck  came 
to  Washington  to  command.  Well  might  General 
Upton  say,  of  Pope,  that  "he  now  labors  under  the 
imputation  of  not  having  understood  his  own  plans." 
(See  "Military  Policy.") 

When  this  despatch  was  sent,  as  General  Pope 
afterward  testified  before  the  Congressional  Com 
mittee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  he  was  lying  sick 
in  his  own  quarters,  not  four  miles  from  Halleck, 
and  Halleck  knew  it.  No  wonder  General  Halleck, 
who  had  been  a  canny  lawyer  in  San  Francisco,  had 
caused  "that  portion  of  the  despatches  and  reports 
concerning  the  operations  around  Corinth  which 
bore  upon  this  question  to  be  cut  out  of  the  official 
books  and  brought  with  you"  (as  says  General  Pope 
in  his  letter  to  Halleck  of  July  5,  1865),  "to  Wash 
ington,  leaving  the  official  records  mutilated  and  in 
complete."  We  can  see  here  already  that  Halleck 
did  not  intend  that  Pope,  or  the  Washington 
authorities,  should  be  able  to  prove  that  his  glowing 
despatch  of  June  4  was  not  based  on  any  report 
from  Pope  or  from  anyone  else.  But  Pope  proved 


THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE  41 

that  it  was  not,  nevertheless,  but  at  a  time  when  it 
was  useless  to  the  country. 

These  questions  are  all  related  to  the  Maryland 
campaign,  and  must  be  understood  in  order  to  cor 
rectly  understand  that  campaign. 

After  the  Seven  Days'  battles  the  armies  lay  con 
fronting  each  other  below  Richmond.  July  13 
Jackson's  force,  with  Ewell,  which  did  not  belong- 
to  Lee's  own  army,  had  been  sent  up  to  Louisa 
Court  House,  and  to  Gordonsville — but  still  within 
reach  of  Lee — toward  the  Valley,  where  it  properly 
belonged. 

Burnside's  force  was  now  coming  up  from  North 
Carolina,  and  Lee  anxiously  watched  to  see  whether 
it  would  come  up  the  James  River  or  go  on  to 
Aquia  Creek,  and  to  Pope.  In  the  former  case  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  be  reinforced  and 
Jackson  and  his  other  outlying  troops  were  to  be 
within  call  from  Richmond;  if  the  latter,  then  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  be  moved,  also,  to 
Aquia  Creek  and  up  the  Rappahannock.  Lee  writes 
Jackson,  July  27:  "I  want  Pope  to  be  suppressed; 
strike  your  blow,  and  be  prepared  to  return  to  me 
when  done,  if  necessary.  I  will  endeavor  to  keep 
General  McClellan  quiet  till  it  is  over,  if  rapidly 
executed." 

For  this  expedition  he  reinforced  Jackson  with 
A.  P.  Hill's  division  and  one  extra  brigade,  number 
ing,  in  all,  thirty-three  regiments,  "which  will  ex 
ceed  18,000  men,"  said  General  Lee,  giving  an  aver- 


42  ANTIETAM 

age  regimental  strength  of  about  580  officers  and 
men.  The  bulk  of  Lee's  army  still  lay  in  front  of 
McClellan. 

Burnside's  force  went  in  driblets  to  Fredericks- 
burg,  but  still  Lee  lingered.  McClellan  asked  what 
was  to  be  done  with  the  army,  and  urged  an  imme 
diate  reply.  August  3  came  the  order,  which  by  its 
very  terms  precluded  swift  and  open  movements. 
Halleck's  order  stated  that  it  was  determined  to 
withdraw  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Penin 
sula  to  Aquia  Creek,  but  that  it  was  to  be  done  in 
secret.  "Its  real  object  and  withdrawal  should  be 
concealed  even  from  your  own  officers.  Your 
material  and  transportation  should  be  removed 
first." 

The  work  was  pushed  on  with  the  greatest  ce 
lerity,  but  it  involved  the  removal  of  the  sick  and 
stores,  and  of  the  troops  by  land  to  Fortress 
Monroe. 

Fitz-John  Porter's  5th  corps  were  sent  ahead,  and 
obtained  transports  and  sailed  at  once.  But  as  the 
reports  show,  transports  were  wanting  at  the  time 
for  the  others,  due  to  further  blundering  at  Wash 
ington. 

McClellan  was  acused  of  slowness ;  but  General 
Upton  has  entirely  vindicated  him.  Indeed,  both 
the  President's  order  appointing  Pope  and  Halleck's 
letter  to  McClellan  of  August  7,  stated  that  Mc 
Clellan  would  have  command  of  all  the  forces  of 
both  Pope  and  Burnside,  as  well  as  his  own  (see 


THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE  43 

War  Records,  vol.  xi,  part  3,  p.  360;  vol.  xii,  part 
3,  p.  435),  so  that  the  change  offered  a  larger  in 
stead  of  a  smaller  field  to  McClellan. 

And  the  charge  of  slowness  is  fully  refuted  by 
both  General  Pope  and  President  Lincoln.  (See 
vol.  xi,  War  Records,  part  3,  p.  269.)  Says  Presi 
dent  Lincoln :  "We  protected  Washington  and  the 
enemy  concentrated  on  you.  Had  we  stripped 
Washington,  he  would  have  been  upon  us  before 
the  troops  could  have  been  gotten  to  you."  Page 
297,  Pope  writes,  July  4 :  "If  my  command  be  em 
barked  and  sent  to  you  by  James  River  the  enemy 
would  be  in  Washington  before  it  had  half  accom 
plished  the  journey."  As  the  distance  and  diffi 
culties  are  the  same  one  way  as  back  the  same  way, 
it  will  be  seen  that  McClellan  was  twice  as  swift  as 
Pope  supposed  he  could  be ;  for  the  bulk  of  Pope's 
army  in  the  battles  at  the  second  Bull  Run  was  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  just  returned  from  Rich 
mond.  (See  General  Upton's  "Military  Policy," 

P-  370-) 

As  soon  as  McClellan  started  for  Fort  Monroe, 
Lee  started  for  the  Rapidan.  (See  War  Records, 
vol.  xi,  part  3,  pp.  634,  647,  675-6,  676,  677,  680.) 
All  that  had  been  keeping  Lee  at  Richmond  was 
McClellan,  and,  as  General  Upton  says,  "The  fact 
should  not  be  overlooked  that  the  misguided  advisers 
of  the  President  and  the  Confederate  commander 
were  aiming  at  the  same  object." 

Had  it  been  even  possible  for  McClellan  to  have 


44  ANTIETAM 

started  on  the  3d  or  4th  of  August,  it  would  have 
been  all  the  same,  as  General  Upton  demonstrates, 
since  Lee  would  have  started  the  next  day,  and 
would  have  caught  Pope  in  a  still  worse  position 
than  he  subsequently  did,  and  further  from  relief. 
For  Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill  had  been  sent  up  to 
Louisa  Court  House  some  weeks  before,  and  had 
fought  Pope  at  Cedar  Mountain,  away  out  near 
Culpeper.  As  McClellan's  army  would  have  had  to 
march  sixty  miles  to  Fort  Monroe,  and  from  thirty 
to  fifty  more  at  least  from  Aquia  Creek  or  Fal- 
mouth,  making  ninety  or  one  hundred  in  all,  besides 
the  water  transport,  while  Lee  had  at  most  only 
seventy  to  march,  it  offered  Lee  a  fine  chance  to 
cut  in  behind  Pope,  drive  him  west  to  the  moun 
tains,  and  then  turn  on  the  detachments  of  the  arriv 
ing  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  drive  them  back  to 
Washington. 

The  troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  came 
on  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Colonel  Ingalls,  the  chief 
quartermaster,  reported  to  General  Meigs,  August 
15 :  "Up  to  this  moment  the  thing  could  not  have 
been  done  faster."  There  were  delays,  from 
Fortress  Monroe  to  Washington,  but  these  were  due 
to  Washington  and  not  to  the  army.  Transports 
went  helter-skelter,  some  were  drafted  away  to  New 
York,  and  there  was  a  great  storm.  McClellan  had 
nothing  to  do  with  all  this — all  he  could  do  was  to 
urge  and  strive. 

August  12  Halleck  ordered  Burnside,  then  at  Fal- 


THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE  45 

mouth,  to  divide  his  forces  and  send  the  bulk  of 
them  up  the  river  to  Pope.  August  13  the  move 
ment  began,  by  McClellan  and  Burnside,  and  the 
march  of  troops  proceeded ;  "not  an  hour  has  been 
lost  up  to  this  time."  (Colonel  Ingalls.) 

August  13  Lee  first  gave  his  orders  to  move 
Longstreet's  whole  force,  together  with  Hood's,  to 
the  Rappahannock  front,  saying :  "From  every  indi 
cation  it  appears  [August  14!  that  McClellan's 
forces  are  being  withdrawn  and  sent  to  reinforce 
Pope."  Lee  was  now  turned  loose,  and  McClellan 
tied  fast. 

August  24  Lee  reports  the  capture  of  a  letter  from 
Pope  to  Halleck.  dated  August  20,  reporting  his 
force  for  duty  at  4^,000,  independent  of  Burnside, 
and  not  including  any  part  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  Meantime  the  movement  of  the  latter 
army  bv  water  from  the  Peninsula  continued. 

McClellan  thus  came  with  his  armv  directly  into 
the  territory  occupied  bv  General  Pope.  In  the 
President's  order,  dated  June  26.  appointing  Pope 
to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  it  was 
stated  that  when  the  latter  and  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  were  in  position  to  communicate  and  di 
rectly  cooperate,  the  chief  command  "shall  be  gov 
erned,  as  in  like  cases,  by  the  Rules  and  Articles  of 
War."  August  7  Halleck  wrote  McClellan :  "As  I 
told  you  when  at  your  camp,  it  is  my  intention  that 
you  shall  command  all  the  troops  in  Virginia  as  soon 
as  we  can  get  them  together ;  and  with  the  army  thus 


46  ANTIETAM 

concentrated  I  am  certain  that  you  can  take  Rich 
mond."  Halleck  declared  that  he  staked  his  reputa 
tion  on  it.  So  the  charge  that  McClellan  was 
actuated  by  personal  motives  to  oppose  the  removal 
is  not  true ;  for  he  would  command  a  much  larger 
army,  more  directly  under  the  eyes  of  the  nation, 
and  with  results  more  theatrically  effective,  by  com 
ing  north  than  by  remaining  in  the  Peninsula.  But 
he  would  not  be  doing  so  much  to  end  the  war,  and 
this  he  well  knew. 

Halleck,  afterward,  in  endeavoring  to  soothe  the 
ruffled  feelings  of  General  Pope,  then  an  exile,  as 
he  called  it,  in  Minnesota,  wrote  him  October  10, 
1862:  "You  complain  that  I  acted  unfriendly  to 
you  in  giving  the  command  to  General  McClellan. 
On  the  contrary,  I  advised  against  it.  The  facts  do 
not  sustain  your  assertion.  As  General  McClellan's 
army  arrived  here  by  detachments,  every  man  I 
could  move  was,  against  his  protest,  sent  to  your 
command.  He  claimed  that  when  the  two  armies 
began  to  unite,  he,  as  ranking  officer,  had  a  right 
to  command  both.  His  claim  was  not  admitted, 
and  he  remained  in  command  only  of  the  defenses 
of  Washington." 

This  statement  contains  three  errors  of  fact : 
i — McClellan  did  not  protest  against  his  organiza 
tions  being  sent  forward;  he  objected  to  sending 
forward  Franklin's  corps  in  a  rush  without  artillery, 
without  horses,  without  wagons,  without  supplies, 
and  without  ammunition  excepting  what  the  men 


THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE  47 

had  in  their  cartridge-boxes.  And  the  corps  was 
sent  as  soon  as  these  supplies  were  received,  even  in 
part.  Pleasonton's  cavalry  was  detained  on  the 
Peninsula  for  want  of  transports,  which  had  been 
sent  elsewhere  by  orders  from  Washington.  2 — 
McClellan  did  not  claim  the  command  specifically 
by  rank,  though  he  was  the  ranking  general,  but 
by  the  orders  of  the  President  and  the  letter  of  the 
general-in-chief,  Halleck  himself.  3 — He  did  not 
"remain  in  command  of  the  defenses  in  Washing 
ton"  (as  Halleck  stated),  for  he  had  not  been  given 
the  command  of  these  at  all.  General  Barnard,  by 
special  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  No.  190, 
dated  August  14,  1862,  was  "assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  fortifications  surrounding  Washing 
ton."  He  retained  this  place  until  September  i,  and 
only  relinquished  his  command  by  a  letter  and  order 
September  2,  after  Pope's  defeat. 

Pope's  army  was  defeated  and  flying  back  to 
Washington.  In  the  midst  of  this  awful  cataclysm 
McClellan,  who  had  seen  his  forces  ordered  away 
from  him  until  he  had  only  his  personal  staff,  about 
one  hundred  men,  under  his  command,  and  had  to 
send  out  to  learn  the  countersign,  was  thus  addressed 
by  Halleck,  September  i :  "General  Pope  was 
ordered  this  morning  to  fall  back  to  line  of  fortifi 
cations,  and  has  been  moving  all  day  in  this  direc 
tion."  But  Pope  was  then  acting  under  orders  of 
General  Lee,  and  not  of  General  Halleck,  and  the 
President  demanded  that  McClellan  be  sent  for. 


48  ANTIETAM 

The  whole  story  is  told  by  Secretary  Welles,  of 
Lincoln's  Cabinet,  who  did  not  especially  love  Mc- 
Clellan,  but  who  did  love  truth  and  decency.  I  refer 
to  his  book,  "Lincoln  and  Seward."  He  says :  "But 
Pope  was  defeated,  and  the  army,  sadly  demoral 
ized,  came  retreating  to  the  Potomac.  The  War 
Department,  and  especially  Stanton  and  Halleck, 
became  greatly  alarmed."  A  paper  was  brought  to 
Secretary  Welles,  in  the  handwriting  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  demanding  McClellan's  immediate  dis 
missal.  Four  members  of  the  Cabinet  were  ready 
to  sign  it,  but  Seward  and  Welles  were  not,  on  the 
ground  that  "the  combination  was  improper  and  dis 
respectful  to  the  President,  who  had  selected  his 
Cabinet  to  consult  and  advise  with,  not  to  conspire 
against  him." 

Secretary  Welles  adds  that  he  had  doubted  the 
wisdom  of  recalling  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
Richmond.  "The  object  of  bringing  that  army 
back  to  Washington,"  he  says,  "in  order  to  start 
anew,  march  overland,  and  regain  the  abandoned 
position  I  did  not  understand,  unless  it  was  to  get 
rid  of  McClellan;  and  if  that  was  the  object,  it 
would  have  been  much  better  to  place  another  gen 
eral  at  the  head  of  the  army  while  it  was  yet  on  the 
James." 

A  cabinet  council  was  being  held,  September  i. 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  not  yet  arrived  when  Stanton  en 
tered  the  room  and  said,  with  great  excitement,  that 
he  had  just  learned  from  General  Halleck  that  the 


THE  ADVENT  OF  POPE  49 

President  had  placed  General  McClellan  in  com 
mand  of  the  forces  in  Washington.  The  President 
arrived;  "and  Stanton,  with  some  feeling,"  says 
Secretary  Welles,  "remarked  that  no  order  to  that 
effect  had  issued  from  the  War  Department.  The 
President  calmly,  with  some  emphasis,  said  the 
order  was  his,  and  he  would  be  responsible  for  it  to 
the  country." 

Here  spoke  the  real  Lincoln,  the  great  Lincoln, 
the  Lincoln  of  history,  and  of  a  loving  and  glorify 
ing  country!  And  what  a  weight  of  suffering  he 
bore !  How  pathetic  his  complaint,  "I  am  so  borne 
upon." 

Not  daring  to  remove  McClellan  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  as  that  required  the  direct  order 
of  the  President,  it  still  had  seemed  possible  to  re 
move  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  McClellan, 
for  that  was  a  detail  of  the  "War  Department 
strategy"  which  General  Upton  so  graphically  char 
acterizes  as  being  operated  by  the  civilians  in  their 
offices. 

And  now  this  hope  was  gone,  for  Lincoln  in  his 
majesty  and  power  had  opened  wide  the  arms  of 
the  "old  commander"  to  receive  the  disjecta  membra 
of  three  defeated  armies,  now  pouring  back  into 
Alexandria  and  Washington.1 

note    pp.    309-310. 


IV 

THE   SECOND    MANASSAS 

SUCH  a  defeat  ought  not  to  have  occurred.  The 
same  critical  examination  of  the  forces  at  the  second 
Manassas  as  I  have  applied  to  the  Seven  Days' 
battles  will  show  us  what  forces  General  Pope,  who 
was  on  the  defensive,  had  under  his  command  on 
the  field  of  battle,  and  which  regiments,  as  the 
casualty  reports  show,  all  suffered  actual  losses  in 
battle,  and  not  trifling  losses  either.  These  include 
the  army  corps  of  Sigel,  Banks,  and  McDowell, 
Reynolds's  division,  Heintbleman's  corps,  Fitz  John 
Porter's  corps,  Taylor's  brigade  of  the  sixth  corps, 
and  Burnside's  Ninth  army  corps.  These  forces  ag 
gregated  on  the  field  of  battle  167  regiments  of  in 
fantry,  14  of  cavalry,  one  regiment  of  heavy  artil 
lery,  and  43  batteries. 

The  Confederate  forces  opposed  numbered  134^2 
regiments  of  infantry,  141/2  regiments  of  cavalry, 
and  61  batteries  of  artillery.  But  not  all  these  were 
actively  engaged;  only  120  regiments  of  infantry  re 
ported  losses.  The  disproportion  in  favor  of  Pope, 

50 


THE  SECOND  MANASSAS  51 

in  this  battle,  was  almost  the  same  as  the  dispropor 
tion  against  McClellan  in  the  Seven  Days. 

The  crisis  was  now  upon  the  country.  McClellan, 
by  the  mandate  of  the  President,  was  now  in  com 
mand  of  the  forces  as  they  poured  back,  and  of  the 
fortifications  as  they  surrounded  Washington;  but 
all  the  rest  of  the  country  was  open  to  the  Con 
federate  army. 

Lincoln  excused  himself,  says  Secretary  Welles, 
for  appointing  McClellan  to  command  the  fortifica 
tions,  by  saying  "he  was  a  defensive  man,  and  could 
reorganize  the  army  better  than  anyone  else,"  which 
was  true,  for  he  had  created  it  out  of  the  ruins  of 
the  First  Bull  Run  and  the  panic  of  the  preceding 
summer.  But  he  now  cast  a  doubt  on  Welles's 
memory  by  appointing  McClellan  to  do  the  most 
critical  act  in  the  whole  history  of  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion ;  that  is  to  say,  to  take  this  "defeated  and 
shattered  army,  this  retreating  and  demoralized 
army,"  as  the  President  called  it,  and  reorganize  it 
indeed ;  but  reorganize  it  upon  the  march,  with 
a  victorious  army  sweeping  across  his  front, — not 
yet  organized, — north  to  Maryland  and  Pennsyl 
vania,  not  with  the  Confederate  force  merely  which 
had  met  and  defeated  Pope  and  driven  him  into 
Washington,  but  with  all  these  and  more  than  fifty 
new  and  fresh  veteran  regiments  directly  from  Rich 
mond  added  to  the  invading  force.  And  all  this 
must  be  done  inside  of  two  weeks,  for  in  two  weeks 
Lee's  armies  would  have  been  in  Pennsylvania  and 


52  ANTIETAM 

marching  up  the  Cumberland  Valley,  or  else  to  York 
and  the  Susquehanna  River,  as  they  did  a  year  later 
under  almost  similar  circumstances,  and  with  an 
army  no  larger,  and  no  better,  to  break  in  a  surge, 
scattered  into  bloody  spray  on  the  impregnable 
heights  of  Gettysburg,  "the  high-water  mark  of  the 
Rebellion" ;  while  now.  with  McClellan's  remnants, 
he  was  to  do  all  this,  reinforced  by  twenty-nine  regi 
ments  of  raw  recruits,  who  never  had  seen  any 
enemy  and  never  fired  a  shot,  and  with  as  many 
other  hacked-up  veteran  regiments  left  behind,  with 
many  thousands  of  others  also  left  behind,  to  still 
guard  "from  insult"  that  ever-imperiled  capital. 
Napoleon  well  said  that  "to  defend  a  capital 
you  must  make  such  war,  and  at  such  distance,  that 
the  capital  cannot  be  attacked;  if  fully  invested  it  is 
already  lost."  But  civilians  do  not  understand  these 
things — they  would  keep  out  an  invasion  as  they 
would  keep  out  a  freshet  in  a  mill-race. 

General  Grant,  in  his  "Memoirs,"  amusingly  re 
lates  how  Mr.  Lincoln,  when  he  (Grant)  was  about 
to  take  command  of  the  armies  in  the  spring  of 
1864,  gave  him  a  plan  for  a  campaign  of  his  own. 
"He  pointed  out,"  says  Grant,  "on  the  map  two 
streams  which  empty  into  the  Potomac,  and  sug 
gested  that  the  army  might  be  moved  on  boats  and 
landed  between  the  mouths  of  these  streams.  We 
would  then  have  the  Potomac  to  bring  our  supplies, 
and  the  tributaries  would  protect  our  flanks  while 
we  moved  out.  I  listened  respectfully,  but  did  not 


THE  SECOND  MANASSAS  53 

suggest  that  the  same  streams  would  protect  Lee's 
flanks  while  he  was  shutting  us  up." 

General  Grant  significantly  adds:  "I  did  not 
communicate  my  plans  to  the  President,  nor  did  I 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  or  to  General  Halleck." 

Wasn't  this  splendid?  I  have  often  envied,  as  it 
were,  Grant's  magnificent  opportunity,  which  time 
and  the  trend  of  events  had  given  him,  so  that  he 
could  act  according  to  military  principles  and 
achieve  military  results  in  defiance  of  those  malevo 
lent  civilian  forces  which  had  bound  hard  and  fast 
the  military  hands  and  feet,  and  crushed  the  mili 
tary  mind,  and  blinded  the  military  eye,  during  all 
those  long,  weary,  hapless  months  while  the  nation 
groaned  in  spirit  and  the  great  heart  of  Lincoln  was 
wrung  with  unutterable  woe! 

And  now,  for  ten  weeks,  this  great  curtain  of 
darkness  was  to  be  lifted  from  the  tragedy  of  the 
spring  and  summer,  and  McClellan  was  to  be  sent 
forward  to  do  that  work  for  which  he  was  the  best 
fitted, — that  swift  marching  and  fierce  attack  which 
other  interests  had  denied  him,  for  alas!  in  those 
earlier  days  our  people  at  home  did  not  know  that 
an  army  was  an  article  of  manufacture  and  not  a 
mob  organized  on  paper.  Napoleon  said  that  it  took 
ten  months'  drill  and  several  campaigns  to  make  an 
army.  McClellan  made  his  in  half  the  time.  Grant 
never  made  an  army;  he  never  had  to;  they  were 
made  for  him  by  others,  as  Sheridan's  were.  Sher- 


54  ANTIETAM 

man,  Thomas,  Buell,  Meade,  and  McClellan,  these 
made  armies,  for  they  were  all  with  McClellan  in 
1861-1862,  and  they  learned  how  to  do  it  under 
McClellan.  McClellan  had  learned  it  in  Europe, 
where  the  Government  had  sent  him,  and  improved 
on  his  teachers. 


OPENING  OF  THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN. 

AND  now  the  Maryland  campaign  opens,  and 
what  we  have  been  considering  will  be  found  to  be 
the  key  to  these  wonderful  ten  weeks,  commencing 
in  the  suburbs  of  Washington  and  ending  in  front 
of  Culpeper,  with  Longstreet's  vain  orders  for  a 
battle  which  was  destined  never  to  be  fought,  but 
which,  if  McClellan  had  fought  it,  would  have  led 
practically  to  the  destruction  of  the  Confederate 
armies,  to  the  elimination  at  one  blow  of  all  Vir 
ginia  from  the  Confederacy,  and  to  the  ending  of 
the  war  in  1862. 

As  McClellan  came  in  on  the  heels  of  Pope's 
worst  defeat,  he  was  destined  to  go  out  in  the  face, 
and  on  the  eve,  of  his  own  greatest  victory. 

What  was  this  Maryland  invasion  of  Lee?  Did 
it  contemplate  a  rapid  circling  around  from  Point 
of  Rocks  to  Williamsport,  and  then  back  up  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  again?  Who  is  so  ignorant  as 
to  believe  that  Lee  did  not  know  better  ?  When  Lee 
entered  Maryland  he  meant  business ;  and  what  he 
did  in  1863  showed  what  he  meant  to  do  in  1862 

55 


56  ANTIETAM 

had  McClellan  permitted  him.  But  we  are  not  with 
out  positive  evidence  that  Lee's  invasion  was  an  in 
vasion  of  Pennsylvania,  and  not  of  Maryland;  and 
that  Maryland  was  crossed  over  simply  because 
Pennsylvania  lay  beyond  Maryland. 

The  evidence  that  the  invasion  was  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  not  of  Maryland,  is  conclusive:  but  the 
same  policy  which  sought  to  belittle  the  great  work 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  this  supreme  crisis 
of  the  nation's  life  ignored  this  evidence,  thereby 
belittling  the  Battle  of  Antietam  and  needlessly  de 
priving  its  gallant  and  triumphant  soldiers  of  their 
just  meed  of  valor  and  success. 

Lee  reported  to  President  Davis,  on  September  7, 
that  "all  divisions  of  the  army  have  crossed  the 
Potomac,  unless  it  be  General  Walker's,  from  whom 
I  have  had  no  report  since  the  5th." 

But,  three  days  before,  from  his  camp  at  Lees- 
burg,  Va.,  Lee  wrote  Davis,  September  4:  "Should 
the  results  of  the  expedition  justify  it,  I  propose  to 
enter  Pennsylvania,  unless  you  should  deem  it  inad 
visable  upon  political  or  other  grounds." 

On  the  contrary,  Davis  heartily  approved  it,  and 
immediately  sent  Lee  the  draft  of  a  proclamation, 
with  the  place  for  the  name  of  the  State  left  blank, 
so  as  to  be  available  in  both  Pennsylvania  and 
Maryland,  and  using  this  language :  "We  are 
driven  to  protect  our  own  country  by  transferring 
the  seat  of  war  to  that  of  an  enemy  who  pursues  us 
with  a  relentless  and  apparently  aimless  hostility; 


MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN  57 

our  fields  have  been  laid  waste,  our  people  killed, 
many  homes  made  desolate,  and  rapine  and  murder 
have  ravaged  our  frontiers;  the  sacred  right  of  self- 
defense  demands  that,  if  such  a  war  is  to  continue, 
its  consequences  shall  fall  on  those  who  persist  in 
their  refusal  to  make  peace.  The  Confederate  army 
therefore  comes  to  occupy  the  territory  of  their 
enemies  and  to  make  it  the  theater  of  hostilities." 

That  was  not  Maryland,  but  Pennsylvania ;  Lee 
had  many  troops  in  his  own  army  from  Maryland, 
and  many  splendid  officers. 

September  9  Lee  again  wrote  Davis,  from  his 
camp  at  Frederick,  Md. :  "I  shall  move  in  the  direc 
tion  I  orginally  intended,  toward  Hagerstown  and 
Chambersburg."  And  even  after  the  battle  of  Antie- 
tam  he  wrote  to  General  Loring,  commanding  in  the 
Kanawha  Valley,  in  Western  Virginia :  "Probably 
a  combined  movement  into  Pennsylvania  may  be 
concerted." 

Doctor  Lewis  H.  Steiner,  a  surgeon  and  inspector 
of  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commission,  who 
spent  the  whole  five  days  of  the  Confederate  occupa 
tion  of  Frederick  among  the  Rebel  soldiers  and  of 
ficers,  says  in  his  diary,  under  date  September  8-9 : 
"Their  army  is  plainly  intended  for  an  advance  into 
Pennsylvania,  and  they  speak  freely  of  their  inten 
tion  to  treat  Pennsylvania  very  differently  from 
Maryland.  I  fear  there  will  be  great  destruction  of 
property  as  they  move  forward.  Many  a  citizen  will 
lose  his  all  of  this  world's  goods  in  this  raid,  for 


58  ANTIETAM 

devastation  is  meant  to  be  the  order  or  disorder  of 
their  march  when  they  cross  the  border." 

When  Lee's  army  left  Frederick,  Longstreet's 
whole  force  moved  directly  northwest  through  the 
South  Mountain  to  Hagerstown,  near  the  Pennsyl 
vania  border.  The  army  reached  and  held  Hagers 
town  until  the  battle  of  South  Mountain  occurred 
and  the  passes  were  forced  (thus  imperiling  Lee's 
detached  commands,  across  the  Potomac  from 
Harper's  Ferry),  when  Longstreet  was  suddenly 
halted  and  brought  back  to  Rohrersville,  and  then 
deflected  south  to  Antietam.  The  Confederate 
army  within  the  next  four  days  bade  farewell  to 
Pennsylvania  for  this  year — as  it  did  a  year  later — 
along  the  same  reach  of  the  Potomac  River,  after 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Following  the  affair  at  Chantilly  and  McClellan's 
reorganization  of  the  routed  fragments  of  Pope's 
army  behind  the  defenses  of  Washington,  of  which 
he  had  been  put  in  command  by  the  President  per 
sonally,  as  stated,  the  Confederate  army  turned  its 
head  to  the  north  and  concentrated  around  Lees- 
burg.  On  the  5th,  6th  and  7th  of  September  it 
forded  the  Potomac  River  near  Point  of  Rocks, 
the  river  being  little  more  than  knee  deep. 

As  a  personal  reminiscence  I  may  mention  that 
from  the  rough  look-out  on  the  summit  of  Mary 
land  Heights,  opposite  Harper's  Ferry,  which  over 
looked  the  country  for  many  miles,  for  three  days 
we  could  watch  the  long  thread  unwinding  across 


MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN  59 

the  river,  and  with  glasses  distinguish  the  guns, 
wagons,  even  the  regiments,  with  their  flashing 
battle-flags.  It  was  a  glorious,  and  albeit  a  peaceful, 
yet  a  terrible  sight;  it  was  the  unfolding  panorama 
of  a  great  war,  displayed  as  though  it  were  on  ex 
hibition.  The  cavalry  to  which  I  belonged  had  re 
treated — under  orders  of  Halleck  dated  September 
2,  1862 — from  the  Upper  Shenandoah  at  and  be 
yond  Winchester,  and  had  just  reached  Harper's 
Ferry,  where,  incredible  as  it  may  seem,  it  was  sent 
over  to  assist  in  garrisoning  the  summit  of  Mary 
land  Heights — the  cavalry!  with  thousands  of  in 
fantry  in  Harper's  Ferry. 

General  Wool,  in  whose  department  Harper's 
Ferry  then  was,  and  who,  together  with  Stanton  and 
Halleck,  was  trying  to  take  care  of  it,  reports  a  des 
patch  from  Colonel  Miles,  commanding  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  under  date  n  A.  M.,  September  7,  stating 
that  Lee's  army  "has  crossed  and  is  still  crossing 
into  Maryland,  below  Point  of  Rocks.  I  will  send 
up  to  the  observatory  to  look  out  for  dust,  and  I 
will  inform  you."  There  was  plenty  of  dust. 

After  crossing,  the  Confederate  army  moved  di 
rectly  up  to  Frederick,  where  it  concentrated, 
September  9.  Meantime,  what  was  McClellan 
doing,  for  he  was  the  only  one  at  Washington  ap 
parently  capable  of  doing  anything  for  the  country  ? 

September  2,  i  p.  M.,  McClellan  writes  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief  (and  we  can  see  what  sort  of  a  general- 
in-chief  Halleck  was  willing  to  be)  as  follows : 


6o  ANTIETAM 


DEAR  HALLECK:  My  ordnance  officer  in 
forms  me  that  General  Ripley  says  that  he  has  just 
received  an  order  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  ship 
everything  from  this  arsenal  to  New  York.  I  had 
sent  to  General  Ripley  to  learn  what  small  arms 
were  here,  so  that  I  might  be  prepared  to  arm 
stragglers,  &c.  I  do  not  think  this  order  ought  to 
be  carried  out  so  promptly.  I  do  not  despair  of 
saving  the  capital.  Better  destroy  all  there  is  at  the 
eleventh  hour  than  to  send  them  off  now." 

What  had  the  Secretary  of  War  to  do  with  this 
sort  of  work,  anyhow?  But  Halleck  replied,  not 
repudiating  the  order,  but  saying  that  "at  least 
50,000  or  60,000  arms  will  be  kept,  and  a  large 
number  of  pieces  of  artillery."  Doubtless,  had  Lee 
reached  as  far  as  New  York  City,  he  would  have 
found  it  thus  made  impregnable;  and  the  way  for 
him  to  reach  New  York  City  was  for  us  to  ship 
Washington's  defenses  thither  and  remove  Mc- 
Clellan  from  any  marching  command,  if  not  alto 
gether. 

But  Lincoln  again  rose  in  his  majesty  and  power. 
He  sent  for  McClellan,  and  Secretary  Seward  was 
present,  who  told  the  story,  afterward  corroborated 
by  Welles  and  McClellan.  Lincoln  begged  Mc- 
Clellan  to  take  the  army.  McClellan  feared  the 
cabal;  but  at  length  patriotism,  sense  of  duty, 
loyalty,  and  love  for  the  President  —  whom  he  never 
ceased  to  honor  and  believe  in  —  prevailed,  and  he 


MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN  61 

took  this,  as  it  were,  back-door  responsibility,  for 
there  was  no  official  order. 

Halleck's  order  of  September  2,  "Major-General 
McClellan  will  have  command  of  the  fortifications 
of  Washington  and  of  all  the  troops  for  the  de 
fense  of  the  capital/'  was  issued,  and  you  will  find 
no  other  official  order. 

Had  McClellan  failed,  he  would  have  been  liable 
to  court-martial  for  taking-  "the  troops  for  the  de 
fense  of  the  capital"  a  hundred  miles  away  from  the 
capital.  Yet  that  was  the  only  way  to  save  Penn 
sylvania,  to  save  the  country,  and  to  save  the  capital 
itself.  But,  as  has  been  said,  he  fought  this  cam 
paign  with  a  rope  about  his  neck. 

Could  Lincoln  have  saved  him?  Did  he  save 
him,  afterward,  when  he  confronted  Longstreet  at 
Culpeper,  and  when  to  lose  him  cost  the  country 
nearly  everything  then  worth  having? 

Halleck's  position  was  officially  strong.  Septem 
ber  3  he  wrote  General  Pope:  "Reorganization  of 
an  army  for  the  field  will  be  immediately  made. 
Till  then,  General  McClellan,  as  senior  (he  was 
senior  still)  and  as  commanding  the  defenses  of 
Washington,  must  exercise  general  authority." 

Till  then? 

From  September  3  to  September  7  McClellan 
was  frequently  directed  as  to  the  sending  out  of 
various  forces  from  Washington;  sending  cavalry 
to  Edward's  Ferry;  changing  corps  commanders; 
dispatching  troops,  Sumner,  etc.;  letting  trWps 


62  ANTIETAM 

move;  moving  McDowell's  corps;  danger  of  strip 
ping  Washington  forts  on  the  Virginia  side;  but 
nothing  at  all  about  McClellan  himself  moving. 
(War  Records,  vol.  xii,  part  3,  pp.  787-791,  802- 
810,  811-812,  812-813;  vol.  xix,  part  2,  pp.  169  to 
209,  and  McClellan's  letter  to  Halleck,  Sept.  8,  p.  209. 
Also  McClellan's  letter  to  Lincoln,  from  Rockville, 
where  he  had  just  joined  the  army,  Sept.  8,  page  210.) 
September  8  he  seems  to  have  gotten  away  entirely, 
and  writes  to  Halleck  from  near  Rockville  :  "Frank 
lin  has  reached  Muddy  Branch;  Sykes,  Sumner,  and 
Banks  near  here.  Burnside  and  Hooker  move  to 
day  to  Brookville,  Pleasonton  will  advance  his  cav 
alry  to  Barnesville,  &c.  We  have  cavalry  at  Pooles- 
ville.  No  enemy  at  Edward's  Ferry;  I  think  they 
are  beyond  the  Monocacy.  Couch  will  remain  at 
Offutt's  until  I  ascertain  whether  there  is  any  large 
force  at  Dranesville.  which  T  hope  to  know  any 
moment." 

McClellan  was  certainly  in  command.  The  orders 
have  the  genuine  ring  for  the  first  time  for  many 
weeks,  and  the  President  telegraphed  him  in  the 
evening,  "How  does  it  look  now?" 

We  could  answer,  to-day,  that  it  looked  very  well, 
very  well  indeed. 

Yet  all  this,  and  all  that  McClellan  did  afterward, 
was  done  only  on  the  private,  personal,  and  verbal 
order  of  the  President.  Quoting  from  General  Up 
ton,  in  his  "Military  Policy,"  p.  376,  who  cites  the 
"Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 


MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN  63 

the  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  451-452:  "To  reinstate  the 
deposed  commander  was  to  confess  that  the  whole 
campaign  was  a  failure;  yet  something  had  to  be 
done.  Bragg,  in  the  West,  had  begun  his  march  to 
ward  the  Ohio  River,  while  Lee,  with  renewed  con 
fidence,  was  crossing  into  Maryland.  For  two  or 
three  days  the  President  consulted  his  advisers,  but 
with  no  satisfactory  results.  At  last,  assuming  all 
the  responsibility,  he  took  the  general-in-chief  with 
him,  turned  his  back  on  the  War  Department,  and, 
without  disclosing  his  purpose,  proceeded  to  the 
house  of  General  McClellan,  where,  for  the  moment, 
he  brought  the  long  controversy  to  a  close  by  say 
ing,  "General,  you  will  take  command  of  the  forces 
in  the  field."  .  .  .  He  at  once,  like  a  faithful 
and  subordinate  soldier,  crossed  the  Potomac  to 
make  dispositions  against  attack.  The  moment  he 
appeared,  the  acclamations  of  the  troops  could  be 
heard  for  miles,  throughout  the  whole  extent  of 
the  long  columns"  (p.  377). 


VI 

REORGANIZATION  ON  THE  MARCH 

MCCLELLAN  thus  had  three  broken  and  disorgan 
ized  armies  consolidated  in  the  field  and  under  his 
command — the  Army  of  Virginia,  the  Army  of 
North  Carolina,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ex 
cepting  the  52,000  troops  still  left,  September  10,  in 
Washington  for  its  further  defense,  and  increased 
ten  days  later  to  more  than  80,000.  But  these  three 
disorganized  armies  were  now  being  welded  by  Mc- 
Clellan,  for  all  time,  into  that  one  glorious  army  of 
the  Potomac,  never  more  to  be  divided — for  the 
shadow  of  Grant  was  already  looming  up,  far  away. 

Halleck  says  in  his  report:  "General  McClellan 
was  directed  to  pursue  Lee  with  all  the  troops  which 
were  not  required  for  the  defense  of  Washington." 

This  is  true;  but  he  was  not  so  directed  by  Hal 
leck,  or  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  but  by  a  greater 
one,  and  verbally  only. 

As  an  example  of  this  War  Department  strategy, 
Harper's  Ferry,  a  key-point  position,  was  not  put 
under  McClellan's  command  till  September  u,— 
while  it  was  being  invested, — and  then  only  when 

64 


REORGANIZATION,  ETC.  65 

McClellan  should  be  able  to  open  communication 
with  it.  For  this  it  was  now  too  late,  although 
McClellan  repeatedly  attempted  to  do  so.  Prior  to 
this,  the  position  was  under  the  joint  command, 
apparently,  of  Wool  and  Halleck;  and  General  Wool 
had  thus  directed  poor  Miles  on  September  5 :  "You 
will  not  abandon  Harper's  Ferry  without  defending 
it  to  the  last  extremity." 

This,  poor  Miles — who  was  afterward  killed  in 
Harper's  Ferry — tried  to  do,  for  I  was  there.  It 
could  have  been  done  only  by  throwing  his  whole 
force  over  to  Maryland  Heights,  for  Harper's  Ferry 
was  merely  the  bottom  of  a  bowl,  with  Maryland 
'Heights,  Loudon  Heights,  and  the  Bolivar  Virginia 
Heights  surrounding  it  on  every  side.  Now,  how 
ever,  on  Maryland  Heights  already  were  the  Con 
federate  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  with 
sixteen  brigades ;  on  Loudon  Heights  Walker's  divi 
sion  of  two  brigades,  and  on  the  Virginia  Heights 
Stonewall  Jackson's  whole  force,  with  A.  P.  Hill 
and  Ewell.  Had  McClellan  had  possession  of  it  in 
time  no  such  nonsense  would  have  occurred.  Sup 
pose  Miles  had  used  common  sense, — for  he  was  a 
good  regular  army  officer, — and  had  retired  to 
Maryland  Heights;  and  Harper's  Ferry  had  been 
raided — as  it  would  have  been — by  Jackson,  and  all 
its  stores  destroyed :  where  would  poor  Miles  have 
been  in  the  coming  day  of  judgment?  So  Harper's 
Ferry,  Maryland  Heights,  and  Loudon  Heights 
were  all  lost  before  McClellan  got  within  communi- 


66  ANTIETAM 

eating  distance.  He  had  absolutely  no  chance  to 
save  them. 

Now  a  word  about  the  topography  of  Harper's 
Ferry  and  its  surroundings.  Franklin  and  Couch 
have  been  blamed  for  not  relieving  Harper's  Ferry 
when  they  were  so  near  and  were  firing  guns  to  let 
the  garrison  know  that  they  were  so  near. 

This  was  on  Sunday,  September  14,  the  day  of 
the  battle  of  South  Mountain,  through  which  moun 
tain  range,  but  further  south,  Crampton's  Gap 
passes.  With  Turner's  Gap — where  the  battle  of 
South  Mountain  occurred — still  in  Confederate 
hands  and  being  contested  for;  with  Longstreet 
foot-free  beyond  it,  so  that  any  move  down  Pleasant 
Valley  would  have  been  into  a  cul-de-sac;  with  Mc- 
Laws  and  Anderson  stretched  across  the  Valley  and 
with  Maryland  Heights  already  two  days  in  their 
possession,  and  overlooking  Pleasant  Valley  for 
four  miles,  within  easy  cannon  range ;  with  Loudon 
Heights  directly  in  Franklin's  front  across  the  river ; 
with  Walker  in  position  there  already,  for  two  days, 
and  with  Longstreet's  whole  force  moving  down 
from  its  position  at  the  head  of  Pleasant  Valley, 
in  Franklin's  rear — it  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose 
that  any  force  marching  down  Pleasant  Valley  to 
the  Potomac  would  reach  or  come  near  to  Harper's 
Ferry.  The  South  Mountain,  coming  down  from 
Pennsylvania,  crosses  the  Potomac  at  the  east  of 
Weverton,  about  four  miles  east  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
It  reappears  beyond  the  Potomac  as  a  series  of  scat- 


REORGANIZATION,  ETC.  67 

tered  hills,  called  the  Short  Hills,  which  disappear 
three  or  four  miles  south  of  the  river. 

The  Blue  Ridge,  coming  up  from  Virginia, 
crosses  the  Potomac  immediately  east  of  Harper's 
Ferry  and  west  of  Pleasant  Valley,  across  the  river, 
and  continues  on  as  the  Maryland  Heights,  or  Elk 
Ridge,  for  about  eight  miles  north  of  the  river, 
when  this  also  disappears.  It  makes  a  sort  of  two- 
ply  parallel  arrangement,  so  that  a  force  moving 
down  Pleasant  Valley — which  is  east  of  Maryland 
Heights — will  find  itself  also  east  of  Loudon 
Heights.  The  latter  separate  Harper's  Ferry  and 
the  Shenandoah  river  from  the  north  and  south 
line  of  advance  of  such  an  advancing  force.  You 
could  not  even  see  Harper's  Ferry — which  lies  be 
hind  the  mountains — during  all  this  march.  To  reach 
Harper's  Ferry  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  down 
the  eastern  side  of  Pleasant  Valley, — which  is  about 
two  and  one-half  miles  wide, — for  there  is  no  access 
along  the  western  side  to  the  Potomac,  and  debouche 
on  a  shelf  scooped  out  from  the  rocks,  along  the 
river,  and  just  wide  enough  for  a  road,  the  railroad, 
and  the  canal.  These  triple  passageways  are  bor 
dered,  along  the  river  bank  behind  them,  by  a  rocky 
precipice  from  twenty  to  thirty  feet  high,  extending 
from  Sandy  Hook  under  the  Maryland  Heights  up 
to  Harper's  Ferry.  Then  by  marching  up  this  nar 
row  road  along  the  river  bank,  and  passing  directly 
between  the  lofty  Maryland  Heights  on  the  northern 
bank  and  the  less  lofty  Loudon  Heights  on  the 


68  ANTIETAM 

southern  bank,  you  would  finally  come  opposite 
Harper's  Ferry.  Here  a  single  pontoon  bridge  only, 
under  the  guns  on  each  side  of  the  river,  and  hun 
dreds  of  feet  above,  would  have  allowed  you  to 
cross  the  Potomac  to  Harper's  Ferry — if  you  be 
haved  yourself. 

Between  Maryland  Heights  and  the  Antietam 
Creek  there  is  nothing  but  almost  roadless  moun 
tains.  South  of  the  Potomac  there  are  no  passes  in 
the  Blue  Ridge  for  miles,  and  Harper's  Ferry,  in 
vested  as  it  was,  was  as  hopeless  of  relief  from  the 
north  or  east  as  if  it  were  on  the  planet  Mars.  The 
miscalculation  was  not  McClellan's — it  was  before 
McClellan. 

The  best  maps  to  illustrate  the  topography  of 
Harper's  Ferry  and  its  surroundings  are  "Harper's 
Ferry,"  sheet  XLII,  part  9,  Atlas  to  Accompany  the 
Official  War  Records,  which  also  shows  the  preci 
pice  under  which  the  only  road  of  access  passes  from 
Sandy  Hook,  under  Maryland  Heights,  across  the 
river  to  the  Ferry;  No.  12,  on  sheet  LXXXII,  part 
17,  of  said  Atlas,  which  shows  Maryland  Heights, 
Loudon  Heights,  and  Bolivar  Heights,  with  the 
tcwn  of  Harper's  Ferry  as  in  the  bottom  of  a  bowl, 
in  the  middle;  and  the  Harper's  Ferry  battle-field 
map  of  the  operations  of  this  campaign,  on  sheet 
xxix,  part  6,  of  the  same  atlas.  It  will  be  clearly 
seen  that,  with  the  Confederates  within  easy  cannon 
range  on  the  precipitous  Maryland  Heights,  any 
force  approaching  from  the  east  or  the  northeast 


REORGANIZATION,  ETC  69 

would  be  compelled  to  advance  by  the  flank  for  two 
miles  or  more  along  the  front  of  a  perfectly  pro 
tected  and  strongly  occupied  mountain — a  mountain 
totally  inaccessible  from  the  east  even  to  a  climber. 
Further,  the  advance  would  be  in  the  face  of  heavy 
guns  and  infantry  along  the  southern  bank  and  on 
Loudon  Heights  across  the  river,  and  directly  in 
front  at  less  than  a  mile  distance.  Only  a  narrow 
roadway  ran  along  the  river  from  Sandy  Hook, — 
hemmed  in  by  a  precipice  on  the  north, — and  fully 
exposed  to  rifle  and  cannon  fire  from  the  south 
across  the  river,  with  a  single  narrow  pontoon  at  the 
Ferry  as  the  only  means  of  crossing  the  river,  even 
if  undefended.  Therefore  it  can  plainly  be  seen 
that  the  approach  to  Harper's  Ferry  was  impossible 
for  any  relieving  force  approaching  from  that  direc 
tion. 

There  were  two  men  in  the  opposing  armies  who 
understood  this  topography;  the  one  was  General 
Lee,  who  had  occupied  Harper's  Ferry  during  the 
John  Brown  troubles,  and  the  other  was  General 
McClellan,  who  had  worked  this  whole  ground  over 
when  operating  up  the  Potomac  the  preceding  fall. 
I  often  think,  when  reading  current  history,  that 
those  are  the  only  people  who  ever  knew  of  that 
topography,  even  up  to  this  day — and  they  are  both 
dead. 

So  the  advance  of  McClellan  continued.  There 
were  troubles  with  the  trains.  They  got  balled  up, 
and  stalled,  and  blockaded,  as  we  know.  But 


70  ANTIETAM 

General  Ingalls  investigated  the  troubles,  and  found 
that  they  were  all  due  to  Pope's  Army  of  Virginia 
transportation;  the  administration  of  the  old  Army 
of  the  Potomac  went  on  like  clock-work;  and  when 
McClellan  started  south  at  the  beginning  of  Novem 
ber  the  administration  of  all  parts  went  on  like 
clock-work.  He  was  a  member  of  that  firm  which 
is  styled,  "We  know  how." 

As  showing  how  the  army  was  reorganized  on 
the  march,  General  Crawford,  writing  September 
8  from  Rockville,  Md.,  describes  the  condition  of 
his  brigade,  which  had  suffered  severely  at  Cedar 
Mountain.  "No  time  or  opportunity  has  been  al 
lowed,"  he  says,  "either  to  rest  the  men  or  to  re 
organize  the  companies  and  regiments,  which  have 
lost  field  and  staff  and  company  officers,  both  com 
missioned  and  non-commissioned,  and  I  am  now  in 
command  of  a  brigade  which,  consisting  nominally 
of  four  regiments,  numbers  at  this  moment,  in  the 
rank  drawn  up  in  the  advance  line  to  meet  the  enemy, 
but  six  hundred  and  twenty-nine  effective  men." 

In  consequence,  the  Fifth  Connecticut  was  de 
tached  by  McClellan  September  9,  and  three  new 
nine-months  Pennsylvania  regiments,  just  com 
pleted,  were  added,  and  in  the  ensuing  actions  these 
three  regiments  lost  327  men. 

New  regiments,  in  like  manner,  were  incorpo 
rated  with  old  brigades  on  the  march  in  other  cases ; 
and  General  Humphreys,  in  his  application,  on 


REORGANIZATION,  ETC.  71 

March  28,  1863,  for  a  court  of  inquiry,  details  his 
experiences  with  his  division  composed  altogether 
of  new  troops,  7000  in  number.  Halleck  had  threat 
ened  him  with  arrest,  September  13,  if  he  did  not 
immediately  join  his  division.  He  left  Washing 
ton  on  the  twelfth.  He  had  no  staff  officers,  one  of 
his  brigades  had  no  rations,  all  its  arms  were  un 
serviceable,  and  had  to  be  exchanged  en  route,  and 
Humphreys  himself  forced  the  exchange.  The  divi 
sion  had  no  ammunition  wagons,  and  no  supply 
train.  It  had  only  one  ambulance  to  a  regiment, 
and  no  shelter  tents.  It  marched  September  14, 
halted  by  orders  at  Frederick,  left  Frederick  and 
marched  all  day  and  all  night  and  most  of  the  fore 
noon  of  next  day,  reaching  the  field  of  Antietam  the 
morning  of  September  18,  the  day  after  the  princi 
pal  battle,  after  a  continuous  march  of  23  miles. 

Any  one  familiar  with  military  matters  and  with 
the  state  of  the  army  on  the  2d  and  3rd  of  Septem 
ber  when  streaming  back  to  Washington,  disorgan 
ized  (as  President  Lincoln  said),  with  the  enormous 
losses  of  baggage  and  transportation  of  that  ill- 
starred  campaign,  will  know  that  the  army  which 
began  fighting  only  ten  days  later,  September  14, 
eighty  miles  away  from  Washington,  must  have  been 
reorganized  on  the  march,  if  much  of  it  was  not  to 
fight  as  a  mob.  That  army  did  as  good  work  at 
South  Mountain  and  Antietam  as  any  American 
army  ever  did  anywhere. 


72  ANTIETAM 

Lee's  army  encamped  around  Frederick  until  Sep 
tember  10  and  n,  when  Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill 
marched  by  way  of  Martinsburg,  Va.,  crossing  the 
Potomac  near  Williamsport,  and  thence  down  the 
river  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Walker's  division  marched 
due  south  from  Frederick,  crossing  the  Potomac 
near  Point  of  Rocks  and  occupying  London  Heights, 
which  commanded  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  east.  The 
divisions  of  McLaws  and  R.  H.  Anderson  marched 
down  Pleasant  Valley  to  seize  Maryland  Heights 
and  prevent  attack  from  the  north,  while  Long- 
street,  Hood,  and  D.  H.  Hill  moved  forward  di 
rectly,  Hill  halting  in  Turner's  Gap  to  prevent 
pursuit  and  Longstreet  advancing  to  Hagerstown. 
The  cavalry  covered  the  rear.  (See  Dr.  Steiner's 
diary.) 

McClellan's  advance  entered  Frederick  late  in  the 
day  of  September  12  (see  diary).  On  the  I3th  the 
army  entered,  and  closed  up,  and  passed  through 
Frederick  in  pursuit,  and  next  day  was  fought  the 
successful  battle  of  South  Mountain.  Franklin  had 
been  sent  south,  and  the  same  day  successfully  en 
gaged  McLaws  and  forced  Crampton's  Gap.  Mary 
land  Heights  being  already  in  possession  of  the 
enemy,  and  Walker  in  front  across  the  river,  it  was 
impossible  to  drive  the  enemy  to  the  Potomac,  as 
Longstreet  had  already  sent  a  part  of  his  force  in 
behind  Franklin  to  Keedysville,  so  as  to  close  upon 
Franklin's  rear  should  he  advance  further  than  the 
eastern  gaps. 


REORGANIZATION,  ETC.  73 

The  next  morning-,  Monday,  September  15,  Har 
per's  Ferry  was  surrendered. 

While  at  Frederick,  on  the  afternoon  of  Septem 
ber  13,  an  order  of  Lee  was  picked  up,  which  de 
scribed  Lee's  contemplated  movements.  To  deter 
mine  if  the  order  was  genuine,  at  3  P.  M.,  Septem 
ber  13,  McClellan  immediately  directed  General 
Pleasonton,  commanding  the  cavalry,  "to  ascertain 
whether  this  order  of  march  has  thus  far  been  fol 
lowed  by  the  enemy."  (War  Records,  vol.  xix. 
part  i,  pp.  47,  48,  209;  part  2,  pp.  281-282;  and 
especially  vol.  LI,  part  i,  for  McClellan's  order  to 
Pleasonton  of  Sept.  13,  3  P.' M.  (page  829),  "Gen 
eral  McClellan  desires  you  to  ascertain  whether  this 
order  of  march  has  thus  far  been  followed  by  the 
enemy,"  &c.)  It  was  this  information  which  de 
termined  his  movements,  or  rather  confirmed 
them;  for  before  he  reached  Frederick,  and  before 
Lee's  order  was  discovered,  he  had  written 
Halleck  from  Clarksburg,  fifteen  miles  southeast 
of  Frederick,  at  10  A.  M.,  September  12:  "My 
columns  are  pushing  on  rapidly  to  Frederick.  I 
feel  perfectly  confident  that  the  enemy  has  aban 
doned  Frederick,  moving  in  two  directions,  viz.,  on 
the  Hag  erst  own  and  Harper's  Ferry  roads."  This 
information  was  preciselv  correct,  and  was  to  the 
same  effect  as  that  embodied  in  Lee's  orders,  which 
more  than  twenty- four  hours  subsequentlv  were 
picked  UD  in  Frederick  and  fell  into  McClellan's 
hands.  The  separation  and  divergence  of  these 


74  ANTIETAM 

separated  parts  of  Lee's  army  along  lines  almost  at 
right  angles  to  each  other  constituted  the  entire 
key  to  the  situation ;  and  McClellan  had  this  infor 
mation,  and  from  it  divined  the  whole  campaign  a 
day  before  Lee's  order  was  heard  of;  but  not  be 
fore  it  was  being  executed  in  all  its  details. 


VII 


LEE'S  LOST  ORDER 


I  HAVE  recently  been  asked  a  curious  question 
by  one  who  ought  to  have  known  better.  It  re 
veals  the  existence,  even  at  this  late  day,  of  two 
theories  entirely  incompatible  with  each  other.  Both 
originated  from  Washington,  and  both  were  in 
tended  to  exploit  McClellan's  alleged  inactivity.  His 
inactivity,  whenever  it  at  all  existed,  had,  by  a  long 
course  of  dominating  "War  Department  strategy" — 
as  General  Upton  calls  it — been  forced  upon  Mc- 
Clellan  against  every  fiber  of  his  nature. 

The  question  asked  me  was  why,  when  Lee's 
orders  revealing  his  whole  course,  and  all  his  plans, 
had  fallen  into  McClellan's  hands  he  paid  no  atten 
tion  to  them,  instead  of  circumventing  them  at  once 
with  his  whole  army,  "as  he  could  have  done."  Lee's 
order  was  dated  September  9,  and  was  directed  to 
General  D.  H.  Hill.  A  soldier  found  it  wrapped 
around  a  bunch  of  cigars,  and  it  came  into  McClel 
lan's  possession  late  on  the  I3th  of  September. 
When  Hill  received  the  order  on  the  Qth,  McClellan, 
who  had  just  joined  his  army,  was  concentrating  it 
at  Brookville,  Middlebrook,  Darnestown,  Seneca 

75 


76  ANTIETAM 

Creek,  and  Rockville,  near  Washington.  He  had, 
in  fact,  just  been  put  in  command,  while  Lee  had 
already  cut  across  the  Potomac  directly  south  of 
Frederick,  but  twenty  miles  distant,  and  marched 
on  that  place.  McClellan  did  not  see  the  order  until 
four  days  after  it  had  been  issued. 

These  "Special  Orders,  No.  191,  September  Qth, 
1862,"  provided  that  Lee's  army  should  resume  its 
march  the  next  day  (the  loth),  taking  the  Hagers- 
town  Road  from  Frederick.  Jackson,  in  the  advance, 
would  push  on  ahead,  turn  south,  cross  the  Poto 
mac,  and  march  down  the  Virginia  side  and  seal 
up  Harper's  Ferry.  This  was  to  be  accomplished  by 
the  nth,  two  days  before  Lee's  order  was  found. 
Longstreet  was  to  march  to  Boonsborough,  on  the 
Hagerstown  Road,  and  there  halt.  The  divisions 
of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  sixteen  brigades,  under 
McLaws,  were  to  leave  the  column  at  Middletown, 
turn  south,  and  by  Friday  morning  (more  than 
twenty-four  hours  before  Lee's  order  was  found) 
"possess  himself  of  Maryland  Heights."  General 
Walker  at  the  same  time  was  to  march  south,  back 
to  the  Potomac  by  the  same  road  he  had  come  up, 
cross  the  river  into  Virginia  and  take  possession 
of  Loudon  Heights,  on  the  Virginia  side,  just  across 
the  Shenandoah  River  from  Harper's  Ferry. 

The  reserve  artillery,  ordnance,  supply  trains, 
etc.,  were  to  precede  D.  H.  Hill,  whose  division 
would  form  the  rear  guard  of  the  army  through 
the  South  Mountain,  by  Turner's  Gap.  Stuart's 


LEE'S  LOST  ORDER  77 

cavalry  was  to  cover  the  route  of  the  army  and 
bring  up  all  stragglers. 

Now  we  not  only  know  from  the  reports  of  these 
officers  that  Lee's  army  did  so  move,  but  from  the 
independent  testimony  of  Surgeon  Steiner  of  the 
Sanitary  Commission  (who  was  in  Frederick),  that 
"Wednesday,  September  tenth,  at  four  o'clock  this 
morning  the  Rebel  army  began  to  move  from  our 
town,  Jackson's  force  taking  the  advance.  The 
movement  continued  until  8  o'clock  p.  M.,  occupying 
sixteen  hours."  D.  H.  Hill's  division  could  not  get 
away  on  the  loth,  but  marched  on  the  morning  of 
September  n.  Friday,  September  12,  Stuart's 
cavalry  passed  through  Frederick,  to  the  west,  fol 
lowing  Lee's  army.  Two  companies  were  left  in  the 
town  to  observe  the  Union  advance. 

During  the  I2th,  "cannonading  was  heard  in  the 
distance."  The  advance  Union  cavalry  charged 
into  town,  and  were  met  by  a  counter-charge  of 
Stuart's  men.  The  latter  fell  back,  "carrying  with 
them  seven  of  our  men  as  prisoners,  and  leaving 
many  of  their  own  men  wounded  on  the  ground." 
Then  came  a  regiment  of  Ohio  men,  and  then  Burn- 
side's  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Septem 
ber  13,  about  nine  o'clock,  McClellan  with  his  staff 
rode  through  the  town  and  encamped  with  a  large 
portion  of  his  army  on  Dr.  Steiner's  own  farm,  west 
of  Frederick.  The  writer  says :  "The  nature  of 
the  camp  and  its  arrangements  prevented  one  form 
ing  any  other  conclusion  than  that  it  was  a  bivouac, 


78  ANTIETAM 

and  only  intended  for  temporary  occupation.  Some 
onward  movement  of  the  army  was  evidently  al 
ready  in  contemplation."  Now  this  was  not  earlier 
than  noon,  and  while  bivouacking  here  McClellan 
got  hold  of  Lee's  orders,  on  the  I3th  of  September, 
between  that  hour  and  3  p.  M. 

If  Lee's  orders  had  been  carried  out  before  this 
time, — already  by  two  days, — Jackson,  with  his 
force  and  Ewell's  and  that  of  A.  P.  Hill,  was  in 
vesting  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  southwest  and 
west,  on  the  Virginia  side.  Walker  was  invest 
ing  it  on  the  east,  on  the  Virginia  side,  and  McLaws 
and  Anderson  had  captured  Maryland  Heights  and 
were  then  investing  it  on  the  north  and  northeast. 

All  these  events  had  so  occurred.  Jackson  had 
crossed  the  Potomac,  near  Williamsport,  on  the 
nth,  into  Virginia,  and  had  left  all  of  Lee's  army 
and  thirty  miles  of  distance,  and  the  Potomac  river, 
between  himself  and  McClellan;  on  the  night  of 
September  10  and  the  morning  of  the  nth  Walker 
had  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Point  of  Rocks,  east 
of  the  South  Mountains  and  opposite  Harper's 
Ferry,  into  Virginia;  September  u  McLaws,  with 
his  own  and  Anderson's  divisions,  had  reached  and 
occupied  Pleasant  Valley,  beyond  Maryland  Heights, 
on  the  east,  and  between  them  and  the  South  Moun 
tains,  and  had  sent  Kershaw's  and  Barksdale's 
brigades  up  through  Solomon's  Gap,  on  the  north, 
with  other  brigades  in  support,  to  move  down  the 
summit  of  the  ridge  toward  Harper's  Ferry  and 


LEE'S  LOST  ORDER  79 

carry  Maryland  Heights,  immediately  opposite  and 
overhanging.     Another  brigade,  with  artillery,  was 
sent  up  the  South  Mountain,  on  the  east,  across 
Pleasant  Valley,  to  close  the  gaps,  and  the  main 
force  then,  having  invested  Harper's  Ferry  securely, 
fronted   north    against   McClellan's   approach   and 
guarded  the  eastern  passes  in  the  mountains.     The 
next  morning,  the  I3th,  McLaws  assaulted  Mary 
land   Heights,   commanding  Harper's   Ferry,   and, 
as  his  report  says,  after  a  very  sharp  and  spirited 
engagement,  through  the  dense  woods  and  over  a 
very  broken  surface,  "carried  the  main  ridge,"  and 
by  4  P.  M.  had  possession  of  the  entire  heights  over 
looking  by  a  thousand  feet  Pleasant  Valley  and 
Harper's  Ferry.     It  will  therefore  be  seen  that  by 
the  time  McClellan  had  obtained  Lee's  order  all  the 
movements  embraced  in  that  order  had  already  been 
made  one  or  more  days  before,  and  all  the  results 
provided  for  in  that  order  had  already  been  secured 
while  Harper's  Ferry  was  not  in  McClellan's  com 
mand  or  control.     McClellan  was  in  bivouac  west 
of  Frederick,  on  the   I3th,  which  was   Saturday. 
When  Surgeon  Steiner  saw  him,  "in  the  afternoon," 
not  all  of  McClellan's  army  had  yet  arrived.     The 
Twelfth   corps    did   not   pass   through   Frederick, 
Steiner  says,  till  Sunday  morning,  September  14. 
General  Humphreys's  division  did  not  reach  Fred 
erick  till  September  17,  and  on  the   I3th  he  was 
still  at  Washington,  trying  to  beat  the  authorities 
into  giving  them  muskets  which  could  be  fired. 


8o  ANTIETAM 

So  we  find  McClellan  west  of  Frederick  on  the 
afternoon  of  Saturday,  September  13,  with  Lee's 
orders  in  his  possession.  We  can  now  settle  the 
activity  question  very  easily.  The  complete  invest 
ment  of  Harper's  Ferry  was  already  accomplished. 
If  Maryland  Heights  and  Loudon  Heights  were 
held  in  force  by  the  enemy,  its  fate  was  sealed.  If 
the  garrison  had  abandoned  the  town  and  planted 
itself  on  Maryland  Heights,  McLaws  and  Anderson 
could  not  have  carried  these  heights  from  the  north 
or  from  the  east,  the  latter  almost  too  precipitous 
for  nearly  a  thousand  feet  of  elevation,  for  an  un 
armed  man  even  to  climb.  The  former, — and  the 
spine  of  the  ridge  itself, — was  open  only  from  Solo 
mon's  Gap,  four  miles  up  the  range  to  the  north, 
and  could  be  held  by  a  very  moderate  force  for  days 
against  any  enemy;  could  have  been  so  held  by 
Miles,  had  he  been  there. 

The  whole  question,  then,  turned  on  whether 
Miles,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  had  employed  decent  com 
mon-sense  and  got  out  of  the  bottom  of  the  soup- 
tureen  and  up  on  to  the  rim — or  had  not.  Mc 
Clellan  had  no  notion  that  the  War  Department 
strategists  at  Washington  (for  Harper's  Ferry  was 
then,  and  had  been,  out  of  McClellan's  jurisdiction) 
could  possibly  have  sent  him  the  absurd  order  to 
hold  on  to  the  town  of  Harper's  Ferry,  with  its  pots 
and  kettles  and  the  old  John  Brown  engine-house, 
to  the  last  extremity,  while  the  only  possible  mean? 
of  holding  anything  at  all  lay  outside  the  town, 


LEE'S  LOST  ORDER  81 

across  the  river,  and  on  the  top  of  a  lofty  range  of 
mountains  easily  accessible  to  him,  but  totally  in 
accessible,  if  so  held,  to  the  enemy.  But  Maryland 
Heights  had  already  been  captured  and  occupied 
before  McClellan  reached  Frederick  or  saw  Lee's 
order. 

Turning  to  the  orders  in  Supplemental  Volume 
LI,  of  the  Official  Records,  we  find  that  September 
1 1  McClellan  ordered  Burnside  to  push  on  to  Fred 
erick,  if  the  enemy  had  marched  toward  Hagers- 
town.  Sumner  was  ordered  to  Urbana,  and  on  the 
1 2th  to  Frederick,  with  Banks's  corps  to  follow; 
Franklin  to  Buckeystown,  there  to  await  orders  to 
move  either  on  Harper's  Ferry  or  Frederick ;  Porter 
to  push  forward  with  his  reorganized  Fifth  corps; 
and  Couch  to  follow  Franklin.  On  the  night  of  the 
I2th,  at  ii  P.  MV  Burnside  was  ordered  to  advance 
with  his  whole  command  from  Frederick  to  the 
Catoctin  Valley,  opening  the  way  to  Pleasonton's 
cavalry,  which  was  to  scout  up  to  Pennsylvania,  and 
also  to  learn  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  Pleasonton  was  to  co-operate  with  Burnside 
in  his  operation.  "If  the  enemy  has  marched  by  the 
National  road  the  Pass  must  be  taken ;  but  the  at 
tack  upon  it  must  only  be  made  with  a  sufficiency 
of  troops."  September  13,  Sumner  was  ordered  to 
move  punctually  at  seven  next  morning,  ammunition 
wagons  to  move  with  the  troops,  ambulances  in  rear 
of  all  the  troops,  in  order  of  corps.  Franklin  was 
ordered  at  6.30  P.  M.,  September  13,  "to  move  south 


82  ANTIETAM 

at  daybreak  next  morning  by  Jefferson  and  Burkitts- 
ville,  upon  the  road  to  Rohrersville,  and  down  into 
Pleasant  Valley,  to  seize  the  passes,  and  cut  off, 
destroy,  or  capture  McLaws'  command,  and  relieve 
Colonel  Miles."  Couch  was  ordered  to  join  Frank 
lin  as  soon  as  possible. 

At  the  same  time  "a  division  of  Burnside's  com 
mand  started  several  hours  ago  to  support  Pleason- 
ton,  and  the  whole  of  Burnside's  command,  includ 
ing  Hooker's  corps,  march  this  evening  [i3th]  and 
early  to-morrow  morning,  followed  by  the  two 
corps  of  Sumner  and  Banks,  and  Sykes'  division, 
upon  Boonsborough,  beyond  Turner's  Gap,  to  carry 
that  position." 

Franklin  was  ordered  to  attack  "a  half -hour  after 
you  hear  severe  firing  at  the  pass  on  the  Hagerstown 
pike,  where  the  main  body  will  attack."  This  was 
the  scene  of  the  Battle  of  South  Mountain,  on  Sun 
day. 

This  latter  direction,  a  high  evidence  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  sagacity  and  military  genius,  was  also  (as 
usual)  tortured  against  him, — and  received  public 
credence  because  the  public  knew  nothing  of  the 
topography  of  the  country. 

Anyone  who  consults  the  map  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
sheet  XLII,  Atlas  of  Official  War  Records,  or  the 
admirable  official  maps  in  the  great  Government 
Atlas,  of  "Military  Maps,  Armies  of  the  Potomac 
and  James"  (1867),  w^  see  at  a  glance  why  it  was 
necessary  for  Franklin  to  await  the  attack  at  Tur- 


LEE'S  LOST  ORDER  83 

ner's  Gap  above,  after  he  had  passed  Rohrersville 
and  moved  down  Pleasant  Valley,  which  opened,  as 
I  have  shown,  not  on  Harper's  Ferry  at  all,  but  on 
the  Potomac  east  of  the  mountains  behind  which 
Harper's  Ferry  lay  ensconced. 

Lee's  orders  had  now  told  McClellan  what  force 
it  was  which  Franklin  was  moving  against  in  his 
advance  down  Pleasant  Valley.  This  valley  was 
two  miles  wide,  and  girt  on  the  east  by  the  rugged 
South  Mountains,  one  thousand  feet  high,  and  on 
the  west  by  Maryland  Heights,  still  more  lofty.  The 
railroad  from  Weverton  to  Rohrersville  runs  up 
this  valley  now,  and  the  traveler  can  enjoy  the  wild 
and  rugged  scenery  on  each  side. 

McLaws  and  Anderson  had  ten  brigades,  com 
prising  forty-two  veteran  regiments  of  infantry  and 
nine  batteries  of  artillery,  of  which  force  the  six 
teen  regiments  of  McLaws  had  not  drawn  a  trigger 
since  the  Seven  Days  before  Richmond,  two  and  a 
half  months  before. 

Franklin's  two  divisions  numbered  six  brigades, 
consisting  of  twenty-seven  regiments  of  infantry 
and  seven  batteries  of  artillery;  and  Couch,  not  yet 
up,  added  three  brigades,  consisting  of  fifteen  regi 
ments  and  four  batteries ;  the  forces  would  then  have 
been  equal. 

D.  H.  Hill's  division  and  the  Confederate  cavalry 
were  in  Turner's  Gap  to  bar  the  way  to  the  west, 
and  Longstreet  between  Turner's  Gap  and  Boons- 
borough  and  up  to  Hagerstown  and  Pennsylvania. 


84  ANTIETAM 

At  any  time  before  McClellan  had  attacked  and 
held  fast  the  enemy  at  Turner's  Gap  ( South  Moun 
tain)  and  fully  occupied  their  attention,  it  was 
easily  possible  for  a  Confederate  force  (Long- 
street's)  to  move  down  Pleasant  Valley  from  the 
north,  covered  by  D.  H.  Hill,  and  in  rear  of  Frank 
lin,  shut  him  up  in  a  cul-de-sac  and  crush  him  be 
tween  Longstreet  in  his  rear  and  McLaws  in  his 
front,  each  superior  in  force  and  position.  It  was 
a  neat  trap.  McClellan  did  not  direct  Franklin  to 
wait  till  the  pass  was  carried,  but  only  till  the  firing 
became  heavy.  After  that,  McClellan  intended  to 
take  care  of  Hill  and  Longstreet  himself,  and  also, 
after  that,  if  either  of  these  had  ventured  down 
Pleasant  Valley  in  Franklin's  rear,  we  would  have 
had  a  sort  of  four-ply  arrangement,  for  McClellan 
would  have  followed  down  and  in  turn  shut  these 
forces  up  between  Franklin  now  in  their  front  and 
himself  in  their  rear. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Longstreet  (see  his  Official 
Report)  did  march  his  whole  force  back  nearly  or 
quite  into  Turner's  Gap,  to  D.  H.  Hill's  support,  in 
the  afternoon.  He  could  just  as  easily  have  de 
flected  it  down  behind  Franklin  had  he  not  been 
kept  busy  above,  and  afterward  forced  to  retreat, — 
to  save  himself, — back  part  way  to  Hagerstown, 
and  then  to  Sharpsburg  for  a  final  stand. 

In  fact,  Lee  wrote  McLaws,  then  in  Pleasant  Val 
ley,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  I4th,  and  before  he 
knew  that  Longstreet  was  needed  at  Turner's  Gap : 


LEE'S  LOST  ORDER  85 

"General  Longstreet  moves  down  this  morning  to 
occupy  the  Boonsborough  Valley  (which  town  is  at 
the  head  of  Pleasant  Valley),  so  as  to  protect  your 
flank  from  attacks  from  forces  coming  from  Fred 
erick  until  the  operations  at  Harper's  Ferry  are 
completed."  But  Longstreet  did  not  occupy  that 
Boonsborough,  or  Upper  Pleasant,  Valley;  as  Ten 
nyson  says, 

"He  saw  the  snare,  and  he  retired." 

Had  Miles  held  Maryland  Heights  in  force,  noth 
ing  could  have  saved  McLaws'  whole  command, 
consisting  of  forty-two  regiments  and  nine  batteries. 
They  could  not  have  reached  the  Potomac,  en 
filaded  by  all  the  guns  which  would  then,  under 
Miles,  have  crowned  Maryland  Heights  for  three 
miles,  and  a  strong  infantry  force  in  the  only  access 
thereto,  Solomon's  Gap,  the  well-protected  Solo 
mon's  Gap,  and,  with  Franklin  and  Couch  driving 
them  on.  The  Potomac  being  unfordable  there  by 
reason  of  its  rocky  bottom,  there  was  no  possible 
egress  to  the  east;  so  that  while  Harper's  Ferry 
might  have  been  gutted  by  Jackson  at  night,  all  its 
men,  all  its  artillery,  and  all  its  horses  and  wagons 
and  movable  property  would  have  been  saved,  and 
the  20,000  men  of  McLaws  and  Anderson  would 
have  been  inevitably  taken,  while  the  three  Fates, 
Stanton,  Wool,  and  Halleck,  down  at  Washington 
and  Baltimore,  sat  and  span.  And  then  Miles  would 
have  been  court-martialed  and  shot,  for  abandoning 


86  ANTIETAM 

what  he  was  ordered  to  hold  "to  the  last  extremity." 
Well,  he  was  shot,  anyhow,  but  that  was  in  battle, 
before  he  surrendered. 

What  McClellan  got  out  of  Lee's  order  was  no 
tice  that  Lee  had  actually  embarked  on  a  side  enter 
prise  full  of  peril  for  himself,  which  would  require 
five  days  to  accomplish  and  wasn't  worth  a  picayune 
to  him  afterward  ( for  the  prisoners  he  took  at  Har 
per's  Ferry  were  in  large  part  short-term  men,  and 
they  were  all  paroled  at  once),  excepting  that  it 
opened  a  back-door  road  which  would  have  enabled 
him  to  reach  McClellan's  rear,  and  threaten  or  cap 
ture  Washington,  and  which  McClellan  himself  took 
care  of  very  promptly.  McClellan  saw,  therefore, 
that  this  loss  of  five  days  would  enable  him  to  at 
tack  Lee  in  Maryland,  instead  of  following  and 
fighting  him  up  through  Pennsylvania,  and  would 
preserve  our  own  State  from  the  desolation  and 
horror  of  invasion,  to  which  McClellan's  subsequent 
removal  subjected  it  the  next  year. 


VIII 

M'CLELLAN'S  SWIFT  ADVANCE 

MCCLELLAN  read  Lee's  order  on  the  afternoon 
of  September  13.  That  forenoon  he  had  already 
ordered  Pleasonton  and  Burnside  to  the  Catoctin 
passes  and  the  Catoctin  Valley,  seven  miles  on  the 
way  from  Frederick  to  Boonsborough.  That  same 
evening  and  night  he  ordered  his  whole  force,  which 
was  at  or  nearing  Frederick,  forward;  ordered 
Franklin  to  Pleasant  Valley,  and  Couch  to  follow, 
and  on  the  i4th,  next  day,  fought  and  won  the  bat 
tle  of  South  Mountain  and  the  battle  of  Crampton's 
Gap,  and  forced  down  McLaws,  Hill,  and  Long- 
street  against  the  Potomac,  with  Walker  and  Jack 
son  on  the  opposite  side.  McClellan's  army  now 
passed  through  Turner's  Gap  on  the  night  of  the 
1 4th  and  morning  of  the  i5th,  brought  its  trains 
through  the  mountains,  and  on  the  i6th,  in  a  fog, 
closed  up  on  Sharpsburg.  McClellan  reconnoitered 
the  ground,  established  his  lines,  planted  his  bat 
teries,  supplied  his  troops  from  his  trains,  and 
opened  the  battle  of  Antietam  by  a  fierce  infantry 
attack  for  position  in  the  afternoon  of  the  i6th,  on 
the  right,  and  a  heavy  bombardment  from  estab- 

87 


88  ANTIETAM 

lished  positions  all  along  the  line,  the  same  positions, 
in  fact,  which  the  artillery  occupied  during  the  bat 
tle  of  the  next  day.  Next  morning  at  daybreak  he 
attacked  along  his  whole  front,  drove  back  Lee's 
left  and  center,  and  killed,  wounded,  scattered,  and 
captured  more  than  25,000  of  the  enemy.  Next 
day,  while  Couch  and  Humphreys  were  coming  up, 
and  while  McClellan's  nearly  fifty  heavy  guns  were 
able  only  to  "fire  blank  cartridges  to  draw  the 
enemy's  fire  from  the  infantry,"  (see  vol.  xix, 
part  i,  page  436),  and  were  waiting  in  a  feverish 
suspense  for  the  heavy  ammunition  which  had 
been  ordered  and  sent,  and  should  have  been 
there  early  in  the  morning,  but  did  not  (for  rea 
sons  known  at  Washington;  see  Wilson's  book, 
cited  later)  arrive  till  the  afternoon ;  and  while  Lee's 
broken,  dispirited,  and  defeated  men  in  groups  and 
squads,  men  and  officers  (see  Lee's  reports,  cited 
later),  were  sneaking  away  across  the  river  and  fly 
ing  far,  far  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  up  beyond 
Winchester,  many  thousand  of  them  throwing  away 
their  shoes,  as  General  Jones  reported,  lest  they  be 
sent  back  into  that  hell  again,  the  i8th  passed.  Lee 
in  the  silence  of  the  night  gathered  his  shattered  and 
defeated  remnants  about  him,  and  ere  the  morning 
star  had  arisen  on  that  field  the  invaders  found 
themselves  driven  off  Northern  soil,  out  of  Mary 
land,  and  far  away  from  Pennsylvania;  and  the 
greatest  battle  of  the  war  had  been  fought,  and  the 
grandest  victory  of  the  war  had  been  won.  McClel- 


McCLELLAN'S  SWIFT  ADVANCE      89 

Ian,  the  patriot  and  victor,  the  savior  of  his  country, 
now  awaited  his  crown  of  martyrdom.  All  this  was 
within  less  than  ten  days  after  the  time  when  Lin 
coln  ordered  and  McClellan  took  command. 

And  that  is  the  story  of  Lee's  lost  order,  and  of 
what  McClellan  did  about  it;  but  not,  alas!  of  what 
the  War  Department  strategists  did  about  it.  That, 
as  Kipling  says,  "is  another  story/'  Meade  was 
pretty  nearly  served  the  same  way  after  Gettysburg, 
and  Grant,  also,  before  Vicksburg. 


IX 

LEE'S  PROJECTED  TURNING  MOVEMENT 

WHEN  Harper's  Ferry  had  fallen,  a  new  and  most 
serious  problem  presented  itself,  and  one  which  Mc- 
Clellan's  orders  show  that  he  very  fully  appreciated, 
and  met  at  once,  but  which  the  historians  have 
strangely  overlooked.  I  would  like  to  say  that  much 
of  the  data  relating  to  these  events  will  be  found 
only  in  the  Supplemental  Volume  LI,  published  in 
1897,  1898,  and  1899,  of  the  Official  War  Records, 
and  not  at  all  in  Volume  xix,  to  which  they  properly 
belong.  I  shall  refer  again  to  these  concealments, 
mutilations,  or  omissions,  (much  like  those  which 
Pope  charged  on  Halleck),  in  examining  McClellan's 
subsequent  advance  to  Culpeper;  but  I  cannot  ex 
plain  why  they  had  been  removed  from  their  proper 
files  in  the  War  Department,  and  why  they  were  not 
discovered  until  ten  years  afterward.  Where,  and 
by  whom,  were  they  suppressed  and  hidden  ? 

Why  did  McClellan,  early  on  the  morning  of  Sep 
tember  15,  and  before  Harper's  Ferry  had  been  sur 
rendered,  order  Franklin,  then  in  Pleasant  Valley, 
to  "push  on  with  your  whole  command  to  Sharps- 
burg,"  and  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  when  the 

90 


LEE'S  PROJECTED  MOVEMENT       91 

ominous  silence  at  Harper's  Ferry  (see  McClel- 
lan's  Report)  had  told  him  that  that  place  had  sur 
rendered,  countermand  this  order  and  direct  Frank 
lin  to  "keep  the  enemy  in  your  front  without  any 
thing  decisive  until  the  Sharpsburg  affair  is  set 
tled"?  McClellan's  report  says:  "The  cessation  of 
the  firing  at  Harper's  Ferry  indicated  [on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1 5th]  the  surrender  of  that  place."  And 
at  once  all  three  roads  from  the  Confederate  rear 
at  Sharpsburg  were  opened  for  a  great  turning 
movement  down  along  the  Potomac,  through  Vir 
ginia  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  thence  still  down  along 
the  Potomac,  and  up  through  Maryland,  directly  to 
McClellan's  rear,  so  as  to  plant  Lee  in  the  mountain 
passes,  squarely  on  McClellan's  communications, 
and  bar  the  way  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  Washington,  with  Washington  at  his  mercy. 

And  this  is  why,  September  16,  when  a  scout 
brought  McClellan  direct  word  of  the  surrender, 
McClellan  cautioned  Franklin  again  "to  watch 
Knoxville  and  Berlin,  so  that  no  enemy  can  get  in 
your  rear."  Franklin's  rear  was  now  on  the  Poto 
mac;  he  was  fronting  north  to  McClellan. 

Knoxville  and  Berlin  are  on  the  great  Potomac 
River  road,  along  its  northern  bank,  which  follows 
the  railroad  and  canal  down  across  the  mountains 
to  eastern  Maryland,  sending  great  arteries  up 
through  the  State  all  along  its  course.  No  enemy 
could  have  gotten  in  Franklin's  rear  unless  he  had 
come  down  the  river  from  Harper's  Ferry.  Had 


92  ANTIETAM 

an  enemy,  however,  gotten  there,  he  would  not  only 
have  been  in  Franklin's  rear,  but  in  the  rear  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  whole  army,  with  not  a  Union  division  be 
tween  him  and  Washington,  and  planted  directly 
across  McClellan's  communications  and  lines  of  sup 
ply.  With  the  gaps  of  the  South  Mountain  then 
closed  by  the  enemy  from  the  east  in  the  rear  of 
McClellan,  with  Maryland  Heights  in  possession  of 
the  Confederates,  and  with  a  Confederate  force  any 
where  between  Frederick  and  the  mountains  to  hold 
these  gaps,  McClellan's  only  supplies  must  have 
come  down  from  Harrisburg,  and  his  retirement 
north,  into  Pennsylvania,  would  have  been  inevita 
ble,  thus  opening  Washington  and  Baltimore  to  cap 
ture,  and  eastern  Maryland  and  all  Virginia  to  per 
manent  Confederate  occupation.  These  States 
would  both  have  been  lost  for  the  time  at  least. 
Nay,  the  Northern  Central  railroad,  from  Harris- 
burg  to  Baltimore,  would  have  also  gone  in  the 
wreck. 

Stonewall  Jackson's  route  map  for  the  Gettysburg 
campaign  was  prepared  by  that  great  soldier  in  the 
following  winter,  1862,  and  shows  the  topograph> 
and  roads  of  this  region  very  well.  It  is  sheet  cxvi, 
part  24,  of  the  Atlas  to  the  Official  Records.  From 
Knoxville,  just  below  Pleasant  Valley,  a  splendid 
paved  turnpike  sweeps  up  from  the  Potomac 
through  Petersville  and  Jefferson  to  Frederick  City. 
I  know  this  road,  because  while  Lee  occupied  Fred 
erick  myself  and  a  comrade  were  sent  on  a  cavalry 


LEE'S  PROJECTED  MOVEMENT      93 

scout  to  the  hills  just  overlooking  Frederick,  and 
within  rifle-shot  of  Lee's  pickets,  whence,  from  the 
gable  window  of  a  barn,  we  observed  the  whole 
Confederate  army  spread  out  before  us,  and  indeed 
on  the  march.  Had  it  not  been  that  Walker's 
movement  from  and  to  Point  of  Rocks  cut  us  off 
on  the  east,  we  could  then  have  communicated  di 
rectly  with  McClellan.  We  returned  by  night,  run 
ning  the  gauntlet  of  Walker's  men,  then  across  the 
river,  and  reported  at  daybreak  to  Colonel  Miles 
what  we  had  discovered. 

From  Berlin,  Knoxville,  Weverton,  and  Sandy 
Hook,  on  the  Potomac,  fine  roads  also  run  up  north 
through  Catoctin  Valley  and  Pleasant  Valley,  to 
Middletown,  Burkittsville,  Turner's  Gap,  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap,  and  Rohrersville.  In  fact,  merely  re 
versing  the  direction  of  the  march,  Walker  could 
have  marched  back  toward  Frederick  just  as  he 
marched  down  to  Loudon  Heights  from  Frederick; 
McLaws  and  Anderson  could  have  marched  up 
Pleasant  Valley,  or,  east  of  the  South  Mountain, 
up  the  Catoctin  Valley,  just  as  they  marched  south 
to  Maryland  Heights  from  Frederick;  and  the 
same  route  that  afterward  took  Jackson,  A.  P.  Hill, 
Ewell,  Walker,  McLaws,  and  Anderson  from  Har 
per's  Ferry  up  to  Shepherdstown  and  Antietam, 
would  have  brought  them  down  to  and  through 
Harper's  Ferry  from  the  Shepherdstown  Ford. 
These  routes  were  not  only  feasible,  but  they  were 
actually  marched  over  by  the  bulk  of  Lee's  army 


94  ANTIETAM 

in  this  campaign,  but  only  in  the  opposite   direc 
tion. 

From  Boteler's  Ford,  below  Shepherdstown,  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  by  the  Virginia  road,  is  14  miles; 
from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Burkittsville,  screened  from 
McClellan's  army  behind  Maryland  Heights,  is  12 
miles  further;  and  from  Burkittsville  to  Turner's 
Gap,  on  McClellan's  line  of  supply,  is  10  miles  more. 
This  march  would  have  closed  from  the  rear  every 
practical  pass  for  McClellan  from  the  Pennsylvania 
line,  40  miles  above,  far  down  into  Virginia,  and 
McClellan  would  have  had  to  force  the  passage 
from  the  west  against  Lee's  whole  army  on  the  east, 
instead  of  against  one  or  two  divisions.  Lee's  com 
munications  with  Virginia  would  have  been  intact, 
nay,  even  improved  (since  he  had  come  up  from 
Leesburg),  while  McClellan's  would  have  been 
severed,  towards  the  east,  from  below  the  line  of 
the  Potomac  River  along  the  mountains  nearly  or 
quite  up  to  Harrisburg,  Penn.,  a  distance  of  150 
miles. 

Now,  let  us  suppose  that  McClellan,  without  sup 
plies  or  reconnaissance,  on  Monday,  September  15, 
had  rushed  his  whole  force  forward  (had  it  been 
possible,  which  it  was  not)  upon  such  parts  of  Lee's 
army  as  had  fallen  back  to  the  heights  at  Sharps- 
burg,  and  this  part  of  Lee's  army,  comprising  the 
divisions  of  Longstreet,  Hood,  Jones,  and  D.  H. 
Hill,  with  the  cavalry  and  reserve  artillery,  as  a  for- 


LEE'S  PROJECTED  MOVEMENT      95 

lorn  hope,  had  withstood  McClellan's  attack  for  but  a 
few  hours  even,  and  then  been  driven  in  more  or  less 
disorder  across  the  river,  which  was  barely  knee 
deep;  and  suppose  then  that  McClellan  had  pursued 
them  rapidly  across  the  river,  leaving  his  trains  scat 
tered  along  from  Middletown,  and  across  the  moun 
tains,  and  leaving  Sharpsburg  directly  in  his  rear, 
and  across  the  Potomac.  Simultaneously  with  this 
we  may  be  sure  that  McLaws,  Anderson,  Walker, 
Jackson,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  comprising  twenty- 
two  brigades,  one  hundred  regiments  of  infantry,  be 
sides  the  heavy  artillery  for  the  reduction  of  Har 
per's  Ferry,  would  have  rapidly  marched  down  the 
river  road  to  Knoxville,  Sandy  Hook,  and  Berlin, 
and  thence  up  by  a  number  of  excellent  roads  to 
the  north,  sealing  the  whole  South  Mountain  range 
on  the  east  against  McClellan's  army.  With  Long- 
street,  Hood,  D.  H.  Hill,  Jones,  and  Lee's  other 
fragments  following  Jackson  down  to  the  Potomac, 
and  with  Harper's  Ferry  and  Maryland  Heights 
firmly  held  by  the  Confederates  against  pursuit, 
what  would  have  been  the  certain  fate  of  Washing 
ton,  what  the  state  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
what  the  just  fate  of  McClellan? 

This  was  the  great  turning  movement  which  Lee 
had  so  successfully  used  on  Pope  a  month 
previously,  and  on  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville,  and 
again  on  the  march  to  Gettysburg  the  next  spring 
and  summer;  but  it  didn't  work  on  McClellan;  he 
wasn't  that  kind  of  a  commander. 


96  ANTIETAM 

Yet  this  is  what  we  are  asked  to  believe  it  was 
McClellan's  bounden  duty  to  have  done;  and  we 
are  told  that  he  was  slow  and  negligent  in  not 
doing  it. 

Lee  understood  this  problem  perfectly  well.  He 
had  no  reason  in  the  world  excepting  this  to  turn 
two-thirds  of  his  army  out  of  its  way  and  spend 
priceless  days  in  reducing  Harper's  Ferry,  for  Har 
per's  Ferry  would  have  done  him  no  harm.  It  was 
utterly  useless  for  any  purpose  of  aggression.  The 
next  year  he  marched  by  it,  on  his  way  to  Gettys 
burg,  in  disdain. 

But  it  was  necessary  now  for  Lee  to  have  the 
river  road,  and  Harper's  Ferry  barred  the  river 
road  right  across  its  middle.  Lee  didn't  want  to 
besiege  and  capture  Harper's  Ferry.  He  says  in 
his  report :  "It  had  been  supposed  that  the  advance 
upon  Fredericktown  would  lead  to  the  evacuation 
of  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  thus  opening 
the  line  of  communication  through  the  valley.  This 
not  having  occurred,  it  became  necessary  to  dislodge 
the  enemy  from  those  positions  before  concentrating 
the  army  west  of  the  mountains."  This  line  of  com 
munication  through  the  valley  was  from  east  of  the 
mountains,  not  from  west  of  them,  for  Shepherds- 
town,  Sharpsburg,  and  Williamsport  are  the  actual 
gateways  to  the  Shenandoah,  which  is  a  mere  south 
ern  extension  of  the  Cumberland  Valley  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  about  twenty-five  miles  wide.  Before 
Antietam  Lee  had  sent  his  trains  across  the  river, 


LEE'S  PROJECTED  MOVEMENT      97 

where  they  would  have  been  at  hand  and  in  proper 
position  for  the  great  turning  movement  described, 
and  could  have  proceeded  without  the  knowledge  of 
our  forces,  which  were  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
river  and  out  of  sight  behind  the  mountains  below 
the  Antietam  creek. 

General  Wool  reported  to  Halleck,  September 
5  :  "Reliable  persons  say  the  Potomac  can  be  forded 
at  almost  every  point." 

Captain  Winslow,  September  24,  reported  that  his 
regiment,  the  Fifth  New  York,  on  Saturday,  Sep 
tember  20,  "crossed  the  river  in  line  of  battle  at  10 
A.  MV  and  took  up  position  on  top  of  bluff."  (See 
War  Records,  vol.  xix,  part  i,  p.  367.) 

So  we  need  not  feel  surprised  that  at  7.30  P.  M.  on 
September  16,  the  very  eve  of  the  battle  of  Antie 
tam,  the  following  order  was  sent  to  Franklin : 
"General  McClellan  directs  me  to  say  that  he  still  de 
sires  you  to  occupy  Maryland  Heights.  If,  however, 
this  should  prove  impracticable,  he  thinks  you  had 
better  leave  a  small  force  at  your  present  position 
and  join  him  with  the  remainder  of  your  com 
mand." 

In  General  Franklin's  official  report  he  says: 
"During  the  night  of  the  i6th  I  received  orders  to 
move  toward  Keedysville  in  the  morning  [the 
1 7th],  with  two  divisions,  and  to  dispatch  General 
Couch's  division  to  occupy  Maryland  Heights." 
Couch's  splendid  veteran  division,  of  fifteen  regi- 


98  ANTIETAM 

ments  of  infantry  and  four  batteries,  remained  in 
Pleasant  Valley  facing  the  south,  through  the  great 
battle,  and  at  midnight,  after  the  battle  and  when 
Lee,  broken  and  shattered,  had  more  than  he  could 
do  to  even  take  care  of  himself,  Couch  received  the 
following  order :  "General  McClellan  desires  you  to 
march  with  your  whole  command  to-morrow  morn 
ing  [September  18]  in  time  to  report  with  it  to 
Major  General  Franklin  as  soon  after  daylight  as 
you  can  possibly  do  so.  Franklin  is  on  the  left  of 
General  Sumner." 

Yet  this,  historians  tell  us,  was  one  of  McClellan's 
errors;  although  Couch's  division  alone  stood  be 
tween  Lee's  army,  McClellan's  army  supply,  and 
Washington. 

But  even  afterward  McClellan  kept  his  eye  on 
these  open  roads.  September  18  he  ordered 
Pleasonton  to  scout,  with  his  cavalry,  down  each  side 
of  Elk  Mountain  (Maryland  Heights)  from 
Rohrersville  to  the  Potomac.  On  the  iQth  he  or 
dered  Sumner  to  send  Banks'  whole  corps  "by  way 
of  Rohrersville  and  Brownsville  toward  Harper's 
Ferry,  with  instructions  to  occupy  Maryland 
Heights." 

McClellan  was  then  satisfied;  the  door  had  been 
closed  and  barred,  but  the  Washington  authorities 
were  not,  for  when  his  chief  quartermaster  asked 
that  small  supply  steamers  then  at  hand  should  be 
sent  up  the  canal,  Quartermaster  General  Meigs 


LEE'S  PROJECTED  MOVEMENT       99 

(whose  record  it  would  repay  anyone  to  look  up)  re 
plied  by  "raising  objections  on  the  score  of  want  of 
protection  to  the  canal"  between  Washington  and 
Harper's  Ferry. 

McClellan  replied :  "I  do  not  require  suggestions 
of  this  kind.  I  shall  be  responsible  that  full  pro 
tection  is  afforded  it." 


THE  EVE  OF  ANTIETAM 

SEPTEMBER  16  was  a  day  of  fog.  McClellan 
writes  Franklin  on  that  day:  "I  think  the  enemy 
has  abandoned  the  position  in  front  of  us,  but  the 
fog  is  so  dense  that  I  have  not  yet  been  able  to 
determine." 

To  Halleck,  same  date:  "This  morning  a  heavy 
fog  has  thus  far  prevented  us  from  doing  more  than 
to  ascertain  that  some  of  the  enemy  are  still  there. 
Do  not  know  in  what  force.  Will  attack  as  soon 
as  situation  of  enemy  is  developed.  I  learn  Miles 
surrendered  8  A.  M.  yesterday,  unconditionally. 
Had  he  held  the  Maryland  Heights  he 
would  inevitably  have  been  saved.  The  time  lost 
on  account  of  the  fog  is  being  occupied  in  getting 
up  supplies,  for  the  want  of  which  many  of  our  men 
are  suffering." 

Same  date,  Seth  Williams  writes  McClellan : 
"Lieutenant  Shunk  has  gone  back  to  hurry  up 
ordnance  supplies  of  ammunition,  &c.  He  in 
formed  me  that  he  had  no  supply  of  musket  ammu 
nition,  but  that  there  was  plenty  throughout  the 
various  division  trains." 

100 


THE  EVE  OF  ANTIETAM  101 

The  afternoon  of  September  16  McClellan  had 
completed  the  examination  of  the  enemy's  position 
and  his  arrangements  for  battle,  and  his  troops  were 
generally  in  their  assigned  position  for  attack  at 
daybreak. 

The  Confederate  line  extended  from  a  prominent 
hill  abutting  on  the  Potomac,  a  half  mile  south  of 
Mercersville,  down  the  line  of  bluffs  on  which 
Sharpsburg  stands  overlooking  the  Antietam  Valley, 
which  then  was  bent  around  in  a  sort  of  hook  on  the 
enemy's  right,  the  hook  following  down  behind  the 
right  bank  of  the  Antietam  Creek,  but  not  entirely 
to  the  river.  The  Confederates'  only.  available  line 
of  retreat  was  by  way  of  Boteler's  Ford,  below 
Shepherdstown,  where  the  river,  from  the  wash  of 
the  dam  above,  was  broad,  sandy,  and  shallow,  and 
was  directly  in  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  right. 
By  this  ford  his  troops  coming  up  from  Harper's 
Ferry  crossed  the  river  to  take  their  places  in  the 
line  of  battle,  and  by  it  Lee's  whole  army  retreated 
the  night  of  the  i8th.  The  Potomac  was  three  hun 
dred  yards  wide  and  three  feet  deep.  (See  General 
Griffin's  Report,  War  Records,  vol.  xix,  part  i,  p. 

350-) 

When  Lee  took  position,  September  15,  in  front 
of  Sharpsburg,  he  had  with  him  the  infantry  divi 
sions  of  Hood,  Longstreet,  Jones,  and  D.  H.  Hill, 
with  Stuart's  cavalry,  and  nearly  all  his  artillery, 
numbering  eighty  regiments,  with  forty  batteries. 
Jackson  and  Walker  came  up  from  Harper's  Ferry 


102  ANTIETAM 

and  took  position  during  the  i6th.  The  divisions  of 
McLaws  and  Anderson  arrived  early  in  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1 7th,  but  A.  P.  Hill  did  not  reach  the 
field  of  battle  until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day. 
Hill  says  the  head  of  his  column  arrived  at  2  130, 
but  his  brigade  and  regimental  commanders  fixed 
their  arrival  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  variously 
at  about  3,  3  140,  and  4.  ( See  reports. ) 

September  16  was  not  passed  in  quietness  by  Mc- 
Clellan.  Lee  says,  in  his, report:  "On  the  i6th  the 
artillery  fire  became  warmer,  and  continued  through 
out  the  day.  The  enemy  crossed  the  Antietam  be- 
yontf,  the  reach  of  our  batteries  and  menaced  our 
left.  ...  As  evening  approached,  the  enemy 
opened  more  vigorously  with  his  artillery,  and  bore 
down  heavily  with  his  infantry  upon  Hood,  but 
the  attack  was  gallantly  repelled." 

McClellan's  plan  was,  in  his  own  words,  and 
which  are  fully  corroborated  by  the  field  orders  and 
reports  of  that  day,  "to  attack  the  enemy's  left  with 
the  corps  of  Hooker  and  Mansfield,  supported  by 
Sumner's,  and,  if  necessary,  by  Franklin's,  and  as 
soon  as  matters  looked  favorably  there  to  move  the 
corps  of  Burnside  against  the  enemy's  extreme 
right,  upon  the  ridge  running  to  the  south  and  rear 
of  Sharpsburg;  and  having  carried  their  position, 
to  press  along  the  crest  toward  our  right,  and  when 
ever  either  of  these  flank  movements  should  be  suc 
cessful,  to  advance  our  center  with  all  the  forces 
then  disposable." 


THE  EVE  OF  ANTIETAM  103 

At  daylight,  the  i7th,  Hooker's  First  corps  at 
tacked  the  Confederate  left;  Mansfield's  Twelfth 
corps  was  then  ordered  in  and  became  engaged  at 
7  A.  M.  This  was  followed  by  Stunner's  Second 
corps,  which  became  engaged  at  nine  o'clock. 

By  comparing  the  four  maps,  on  sheets  xxvm 
and  xxix,  part  6,  Atlas  to  the  Official  War  Records, 
the  plan  and  execution  can  be  clearly  understood. 
The  Confederate  map  shows  the  routes  followed  by 
the  troops  coming  up  from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  also 
the  hooking  backward  of  the  Confederate  right,  op 
posite  what  has  become  known  as  the  Burnside 
Bridge  across  the  Antietam. 


XI 
M'CLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE — BURNSIDE 

MCCLELLAN'S  tactical  plan,  in  brief,  was  to  throw 
a  series  of  very  heavy  attacks  on  the  Confederate 
left,  extending  down  nearly  one-half  Lee's  line, 
and  thus  draw  heavily  from  Lee's  right  to  sustain 
his  overwhelmed  left.  When  Lee's  right  had  been 
thus  denuded,  Burnside,  on  McClellan's  extreme 
left,  and  directly  opposite  Lee's  deflected  right,  was 
to  cross  the  Antietam  Creek,  by  the  different  fords 
and  by  the  bridge,  and  drive  his  attack  along  Lee's 
right  rear,  between  the  Confederate  line  and 
Boteler's  Ford  and  the  Potomac.  When  Lee  had 
thus  been  cut  off  from  his  line  of  retreat,  Fitz  John 
Porter's  Fifth  corps,  supported  by  such  parts  of 
Franklin's  Sixth  corps  as  were  not  engaged  else 
where,  and  by  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  were  to  strike 
the  Confederate  center  directly  in  front,  crossing 
the  Antietam  in  front  of  Sharpsburg.  Pleasonton 
was  already  across.  Had  these  operations  been 
successfully  carried  out,  Lee  would  have  been  forced 
north,  along  the  Potomac,  and  by  way  of  Mercers- 
ville  up  toward  Falling  Waters.  By  Burnside's 
movement,  between  Lee's  rear  and  Boteler's  Ford, 

104 


McCLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE    105 

any  belated  troops  coming  up  from  Harper's  Ferry 
would  have  been  prevented  from  crossing,  or  even 
approaching,  the  river.  As  events  transpired,  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  of  twenty-three  regiments  of  infan 
try, — two  having  been  left  at  Harper's  Ferry, — 
and  seven  batteries  of  artillery,  would  thus  have  been 
cut  off,  for  they  did  not  reach  the  field  till  late  in 
the  afternoon,  and  did  not  reach  the  ford  till  after 
2  P.  M. 

Any  military  man  will  see  at  a  glance  that,  even 
without  any  specific  orders  except  to  attack  in  force, 
Burnside's  duty  was  plain.  It  was  not  a  question  of 
strategy  or  tactics;  it  was  merely  a  headlong  drive 
across  the  length  of  the  creek  in  front,  in  the  brief 
est  time  and  irrespective  of  loss,  and  by  every  avail 
able  ford,  road,  and  passage,  and  the  fate  of  Lee's 
army  was  sealed.  But  Burnside  undertook  to  fight 
a  strategical  and  tactical  battle,  and  this,  under  any 
circumstances,  was  what  Burnside  was  not  capable 
of  doing.  He  sent  his  men  in  by  driblets,  never 
went  near  the  creek  himself,  never  saw  the  ground 
except  from  a  distance,  and  a  few  Confederate  rifle 
men,  and  very  few,  practically  without  any  de 
fenses,  picked  his  men  off  as  they  maneuvered  and 
deployed,  and  halted  and  marched,  and  counter 
marched  up  and  down  in  full  view  of  the  enemy, 
until,  counting  the  afternoon,  when  A.  P.  Hill,  who 
was  not  across  the  river  then,  attacked  him,  he  lost 
more  than  2000  men.  It  is  a  solemn  fact  that  every 
Confederate  on  Burnside's  front  bagged,  that  day, 


io6  ANTIETAM 

three,  or  perhaps  four,  of  these,  and  then  they  them 
selves  walked  off,  more  than  half  of  them,  when 
their  ammunition  ran  out,  as  the  reports  show. 

General  Hooker,  in  an  impassioned  letter  to  Stan- 
ton,  April  23,  1863,  speaks  of  Burnside's  "blunder 
ing  sacrifice  of  life  at  the  bridge  at  Antietam."  In 
the  recently  published  volume,  Volume  LI  of  the 
Official  War  Records  (1897),  we  have  for  the  first 
time  the  official  reports  of  the  Confederate  brigade 
commanders,  made  at  the  time,  and  of  the  com 
manders  of  all  the  regiments  which  took  part  in  the 
Confederate  defense  of  the  line  of  the  Antietam 
against  Burnside's  attack. 

Colonel  Benning's  brigade,  or  rather  two  regi 
ments  of  his  brigade, — the  others  having  on  the 
morning  of  the  I5th  been  sent  elsewhere, — had 
occupied  the  right  bank  of  the  Antietam,  both  above 
and  below  the  Burnside  bridge,  since  daylight  Mon 
day  morning,  September  15,  and  picketed  this  line 
and  afterward  defended  it  against  Burnside's  forces. 
"For  a  long  distance  below  the  bridge,"  Benning 
says,  "and  for  some  distance  above  it,  the  ground 
rose  very  steeply  from  the  creek  for  fifty  or  sixty 
yards."  This  was  on  the  Confederate  side,  where, 
he  says,  "the  face  of  this  slope  was  clothed  with 
rather  thinly  scattered  trees,  and  in  one  place,  on  the 
left,  it  had  a  sort  of  pit,  large  enough  to  hold 
twenty  or  thirty  men.  Behind  the  trees,  at  the  top 
of  the  steep  slope,  ran  a  rail  fence. 

"The  creek  was  fordable  everywhere  above  and 


McCLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE    107 

below  the  bridge ;  in  most  places  was  not  more  than 
knee-deep.  Pickets  and  skirmishers  were  soon 
[September  15]  thrown  across  the  creek  several 
hundred  yards  to  the  front,"  and  remained  there 
until  driven  back  across  the  Antietam  by  Burnside's 
approach.  Across  the  creek,  on  Burnside's  side, 
about  two  hundred  yards'  distant,  was  a  sharp  ridge, 
and  there  were  good  positions  for  cannon  at  from 
five  hundred  to  six  hundred  yards  beyond  the  creek, 
and  fully  commanding  the  thinly  wooded  slope  occu 
pied  by  Benning's  two  regiments,  the  Twentieth  and 
the  Second  Georgia.  The  Second  Georgia  was 
along  the  slope  below  the  bridge  and  the  Twentieth 
opposite  and  above  the  bridge.  I  know  personally 
that,  when  the  water  on  the  bar  in  the  river  below 
Shepherdstown  is  not  more  than  knee-deep,  the 
Antietam  above  its  mouth  is  equally  shallow.  The 
banks  are  not  especially  difficult.  General  Toombs 
described  them  as  descending  gently  to  the  margin 
of  the  creek.  Boys  go  bathing  all  along  this  part 
of  the  creek  in  summer,  as  I  know. 

It  was  almost  the  keynote  of  McClellan's  plan 
that,  as  soon  as  the  battle  on  the  Union  right  was 
under  full  headway,  Burnside  should  sweep  across 
the  shallow  creek  by  the  various  fords  as  well  as  by 
the  bridge,  driving  everything  out  of  his  way,  forc 
ing  his  way  behind  the  Confederate  lines  and  be 
tween  them  and  the  river.  For  this  purpose  he  was 
provided  with  an  enormous  force,  far  in  excess  of 
that  required  to  carry  the  passage,  and  with  an 


io8  ANTIETAM 

undue  amount  of  artillery,  much  specially  provided 
and  of  large  caliber.  There  was  practically  nothing 
in  his  way  to  stop  such  an  advance. 

But  no  advance  was  made.  Time  wore  on  until, 
at  9:10,  McClellan  ordered  Burnside  to  open  his 
attack,  saying  that  Franklin's  corps  was  only  a  mile 
and  a  half  away,  and  that  Burnside  would  be  sup 
ported,  "and,  if  necessary,  on  your  own  line  of 
attack."  This  meant  that  Franklin's  Sixth  corps 
would  be  added  to  Burnside's  Ninth  corps  and  to 
the  Kanawha  division  in  moving  along  the  rear  of 
Lee's  whole  line.  Benning  was  entirely  justified  in 
closing  his  report  by  saying  of  his  two  regiments : 
"The  service  they  rendered  was,  I  think,  hardly  to 
be  overestimated.  If  General  Burnside's  corps 
had  once  got  through  the  long  gap  in  our  line  it 
would  have  been  in  the  rear  of  our  whole  army, 
and  that,  anybody  can  see,  would  have  been  disas 
trous." 

McClellan  sent  his  9:10  order  to  Burnside  by 
General  Sackett,  afterward  Inspector-General  of  the 
United  States  army,  who,  in  a  letter  to  McClellan 
after  the  war,  said :  "I  started  at  once,  and  as  fast 
as  my  horse  could  carry  me."  He  gave  Burnside 
the  order  "which,"  says  General  Sackett,  "seemed 
to  annoy  him  somewhat,  as  he  said  to  me :  'Mc 
Clellan  appears  to  think  I  am  not  trying  to  carry 
this  bridge ;  you  are  the  third  or  the  fourth  one  who 
has  been  to  me  this  morning  with  similar  orders.5 ' 

Now  what  were  the  opposing  forces  contesting 


McCLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE    109 

this  three-quarters  of  a  mile  stretch  along  the  creek? 
Burnside's  force,  consisting  of  the  Ninth  corps, 
with  the  independent  Kanawha  division  attached  to 
it,  comprised  twenty-nine  regiments  of  infantry  and 
four  companies  of  cavalry,  with  seven  batteries,  be 
sides  a  battery  of  boat  howitzers,  of  which  artillery 
one  battery  was  of  2O-pounder  Parrotts,  and  an 
other,  in  part  at  least,  of  the  same  heavy  guns. 

A  few  of  Burnside's  regiments  report  their  num 
bers  in  the  line  of  battle,  indicating  that  the  average 
strength  was  in  excess  of  that  of  the  army  as  a 
whole,  and  more  than  thirty  per  cent,  above  the 
average  Confederate  regimental  strength.  Every 
one  of  Burnside's  regiments  showed  losses  in  the 
battle,  so  that  there  was  no  question  of  soldiership 
among  the  men. 

The  troops  opposing  Burnside  along  the  creek 
we  are  now  able  to  determine  with  accuracy,  and 
also  their  numbers  and  positions.  A  careful 
examination  of  all  the  Confederate  reports — regi 
mental,  brigade,  and  divisional,  for  all  Lee's  army — 
shows  that  no  other  troops  than  those  referred  to 
in  General  D.  R.  Jones'  report  had  anything  to  do 
with  this  line  until  A.  P.  Hill  came  up  late  in  the 
afternoon  and  occupied  the  high  plateau  a  mile  in 
rear  of  the  creek.  Jones'  division  nominally  con 
sisted  of  six  brigades,  with  four  batteries,  but, 
practically,  nearly  all  of  them  had  been  taken  away 
from  him  on  the  i6th  or  earlier.  Four  of  these 
brigades  composed  the  right  of  Lee's  main  line, 


no  ANTIETAM 

and  were  not  within  reach  or  engaged  at  all  in 
resisting  Bnrnside  at  the  creek.  Of  the  remaining 
two  brigades,  that  of  Dray  ton,  excepting  the 
Fiftieth  Georgia  during  a  part  of  the  forenoon, — 
as  stated  in  the  report  of  Jenkins'  brigade,  Colonel 
Walker, — was  with  Jones'  other  brigades  and  only 
Toombs'  brigade  was  actually  in  action  at  the 
bridge. 

Of  Toombs'  brigade  two  regiments  had  been  de 
tached  the  morning  of  the  I5th  to  pursue  the  Union 
cavalry  to  Williamsport  and  take  care  of  the  Con 
federate  train,  and  did  not  rejoin  the  army  until  the 
afternoon  of  the  i/th,  and  were  then  placed  in  the 
main  front  line  of  battle  in  the  rear  of,  and  not 
near  the  bridge. 

Jones  says  that  his  entire  six  brigades  on  the 
morning  of  the  I7th  numbered  only  2430  men,  but 
he  evidently  underestimated  those,  for  in  the  Con 
federate  report  of  losses  they  are  credited  with  1312, 
which  is  far  more  than  fifty  per  cent.  As  they  took 
no  part  in  the  Harper's  Ferry  operations,  they  could 
not  have  straggled  down  there,  and  as  they  had  had 
twro  days'  rest  in  position,  before  the  battle,  they 
must  have  had  their  men  well  up. 

The  Second  Georgia  faced  the  Antietam  to  the 
right  of  the  bridge.  Its  commanding  officer,  Cap 
tain  Lewis,  states  that  it  had  in  line  107  men  and 
officers;  Benning  says,  97  men.  The  Twentieth 
Georgia  faced  the  bridge  and  extended  to  the  left 
Its  commander,  Colonel  Cummings,  says  it  was 


McCLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE    in 

about  200  strong;  Banning  says  250.  At  all  events, 
both  regiments  together  did  not  number  400. 

On  their  right  was  the  Fiftieth  Georgia,  "num 
bering,"  as  Benning  says,"  scarcely  100  muskets." 

One  company  from  Jenkins'  brigade  was  also 
placed  one-half  between  the  Second  and  Fiftieth 
Georgia  and  the  remaining  half  near  a  lower  ford 
beyond  the  Fiftieth.  The  only  battery  on  this  front 
was  Richardson's,  back  on  the  high  ground  far  in 
the  rear.  Longstreet  sent,  on  request,  Eubank's 
battery;  but,  Benning  says,  about  nine  o'clock  this 
battery  was  ordered  away.  He  also  says  that  he 
was  thus  left  "without  any  artillery  supports  what 
ever,"  which  indicates,  as  does  the  report  of 
Toombs,  that  Richardson's  battery  was  at  least  a 
mile  in  the  rear,  since  Eubank  was  halfway,  Toombs 
says,  between  Richardson  and  the  creek.  He  says 
that  Richardson  also  was  too  far  in  the  rear  to 
render  efficient  service  against  Burnside. 

Summing  up,  then,  we  have  a  Confederate  force 
defending  the  bridge,  and  the  ford,  and  the  stream 
on  the  Antietam  Creek  consisting  of  not  more  than 
five  hundred  men  at  the  outside,  composed  of  three 
regiments  and  an  extra  company,  with  a  single 
battery  in  the  rear  too  distant  to  be  of  much  ser 
vice,  and  another  battery  withdrawn  early  in  the 
day. 

These  five  hundred  men  and  officers,  and  probably 
only  four  hundred  of  them,  inflicted  a  loss  on 
Burnside's  force  of  nearly  two  thousand  men,  and 


112  ANTIETAM 

most  of  this  was  accomplished  by  less  than  four 
hundred  Confederates. 

It  seems  actually  incredible,  and  can  only  be 
accounted  for  on  the  ground  that  Burnside  had 
not  looked  at  the  stream,  and  fought  his  battle 
stragetically,  and  not  as  directed.  General  Sackett 
says  that  he  remained  with  Burnside  to  see  Mc- 
Clellan's  last  order  executed,  and  advised  Burnside, 
who  was  back  with  the  heavy  artillery,  "to  go  down 
near  the  bridge,"  and  he  then  started  to  do  so,  but 
soon  returned,  saying  that  "the  bridge  had  been 
carried  and  the  troops  were  crossing  over  as  rapidly 
as  possible."  This  was  at  or  after  i  o'clock  p.  M. 
(See  Ferrero's  report.) 

Benning  says  his  troops  were  withdrawn  by 
reason  of  an  enfilading  fire  from  our  batteries  on 
their  right,  and  also  from  the  exhaustion  of  their 
ammunition.  This  latter  is  a  fact,  for  these  two 
regiments  were  immediately  sent  back  to  the  wagons 
for  ammunition,  as  we  see  by  the  reports. 

That  Burnside  frittered  away  the  whole  forenoon 
in  desultory  shooting  is  also  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  his  men  were  out  of  ammunition  when  the 
bridge  was  crossed,  and  the  Confederates  had  also 
shot  away  all  theirs,  without  actual  contact.  What 
had  10,000  or  12,000  men  to  do  with  shooting  at 
400  across  the  creek  a  whole  half  day,  with  more 
than  forty  cannon,  and  many  of  them  2O-pounders, 
firing  at  point-blank  range,  or  enfilading  these  400 
Confederates  behind  a  few  fence  rails  in  a  strip  of 


McCLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE    113 

wood  not  one  hundred  feet  from  the  "gently-rising" 
bank  of  a  creek  fordable  anywhere  for  infantry? 
(See  General  Upton's  official  "Military  Policy  of 
the  U.  S.,"  page  389.  "Before  being  placed  in  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General  Burn- 
side  had  repeatedly  informed  the  President  and  Sec 
retary  of  War  that  he  did  not  feel  qualified  for  the 
position,  an  opinion  which  the  battle-field  of  Antie- 
tam  had  sufficiently  corroborated.") 

But  the  bridge  was  not  necessary  even  for  the 
passage  of  artillery.  The  Kanawha  division  had 
passed  the  creek  in  force  long  before  the  bridge 
was  taken.  Colonel  Crook  reports  that  he  had 
received  orders  in  the  morning  to  cross  the  bridge 
after  Sturgis  had  taken  it,  but,  finding  that  Sturgis 
had  not  arrived,  in  General  Crook's  characteristic 
way  he  divided  his  brigade  and  arranged  his  guns 
to  command  the  bridge,  and  got  five  companies 
across  the  stream.  "I  then  intended  taking  the 
bridge,"  he  says,  "but  soon  after  my  battery  opened 
on  the  bridge  General  Sturgis'  command  crossed  the 
bridge."  Colonel  Harland,  of  the  Eighth  Con 
necticut,  also  crossed  by  another  ford.  Colonel 
Curtis,  of  the  Fourth  Rhode  Island,  reports  that  his 
division,  "the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  crossed  at 
a  ford  under  fire  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  who 
were  sheltered  behind  a  stone  wall ;  one  brigade  then 
moved  up  stream  to  the  right,  the  other  to  the  left." 
Ewing's  brigade  "crossed  the  ford  of  the  Antietam 
under  a  shower  of  grape,"  Colonel  White,  of  this 


H4  ANTIETAM 

brigade,  describes  the  operation.  On  the  morning 
of  the  1 7th  "we  moved  with  the  brigade  to  a  ford 
about  one  mile  down  the  stream.  While  fording  the 
stream  the  enemy  opened  on  the  column  with  artil 
lery,  fortunately  inflicting  but  little  injury.  After 
crossing  the  stream  we  moved  up  along  its  bank, 
to  the  left  and  front  of  the  bridge  over  Antietam, 
to  within  supporting  distance  of  General  Rodman's 
division.  While  lying  in  this  position  the  enemy 
shelled  us  severely  for  about  two  hours." 

After  gaining  the  bridge,  however,  about  i  p.  M., 
there  was  a  long  delay.  During  this  delay  the 
biographer  of  the  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania  Regi 
ment,  the  first  to  cross,  says  they  stacked  arms  and 
kindled  fires,  which  the  Confederate  artillery  ob 
jected  to.  "Regiments  began  pouring  over  the 
bridge  after  this,"  he  says,  "but  like  the  two  regi 
ments  that  first  crossed,  they  were  all  totally  out 
of  ammunition ;  but  after  a  considerable  lapse  of 
time  a  quantity  of  all  kinds  of  cartridges,  both  heavy 
and  small,  arrived  and  was  issued." 

And  during  these  precious  but  belated  hours 
A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  tearing  its  heart  out,  seven 
miles  away,  to  reach  the  field  and  close  this  open 
door.  And  he  closed  it.  Burnside  must  have 
thought  that  McClellan  wanted  the  Antietam  bridge 
for  a  specimen.  At  all  events,  that  is  all  that  Burn- 
side  got  out  of  it,  and  he  nearly  lost  that  in  the  ap 
proaching  dusk  of  the  evening. 

With  more  than  forty  guns  in  position,  many  of 


McCLELLAN'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE    115 

them  of  the  heaviest  field  calibers,  fully  command 
ing  the  opposite  creek  bank  and  the  slopes  behind 
at  point-blank  distance,  or  enfilading  the  whole 
creek  bank  behind  natural  heights  at  from  one-third 
to  a  half-mile  range,  and  nearer,  if  preferred,  it 
was  not  necessary  for  Burnside's  infantry  to  have 
fired  a  shot;  they  had  far  better  protection  than 
their  own  rifles.  With  fixed  bayonets  they  could 
have  crossed  where  the  Kanawha  division  had 
crossed,  or  anywhere  else,  in  fact,  at  any  time  after 
eight  in  the  morning,  and  in  ten  minutes  after  the 
line  of  assault  had  uncovered  itself,  and  without 
losing  150  men,  they  would  have  sent  Toombs'  400 
or  500  men  whirling  up  the  slopes.  Our  own 
artillery  would  have  followed  across  the  bridge, 
the  slope  in  rear  of  Lee's  fighting  line  would  have 
been  occupied,  his  whole  right  enveloped,  the 
Potomac  ford  cut  off,  with  A.  P.  Hill  still  ten 
miles  or  more  away,  and  then  the  Union  center 
would  have  struck  Lee's  salient  in  front  of  Sharps- 
burg,  and  that  event  would  have  then  occurred 
which  McClellan  had  planned  should  occur.  Our 
army  won  a  great  victory,  but  Burnside's  thousands, 
with  all  their  losses  and  all  their  gallantry,  did  not 
help  to  win  it.  They  might  nearly  as  well  have  been 
back  in  North  Carolina  or  out  in  West  Virginia. 


XII 


ANTIETAM FORCES    ENGAGED 

IT  will  be  found  that  McClellan's  plan  of  attack 
at  Antietam  was  closely  followed  by  Lee  at  Gettys 
burg,  and  this  was  the  plan  also  followed  by  Mar 
shal  Oyama  in  his  great  battle  of  Mukden,  which 
ended  so  successfully  for  the  Japanese. 

First  to  assault  the  enemy's  left  with  a  real  at 
tack  in  heavy  force,  keeping  up  a  heavy  artillery  fire 
on  the  center;  then,  when  reinforcements  have  been 
drawn  from  the  enemy's  opposite  flank  and  his  de 
fense  weakened,  to  throw  in  another  heavy  attack, 
without  regard  to  immediate  cost,  to  envelop  the 
enemy's  right  and  threaten  his  rear  and  his  com 
munications  ;  and  finally,  by  a  heavy  frontal  attack 
by  the  reserve  in  front,  to  crush  the  enemy's  center. 

This  was  carried  out  at  Mukden ;  but  at  Antietam 
Burnside  failed  to  realize  the  work  he  had  to  do, 
and  this  prevented  the  frontal  attack  on  Lee's  cen 
ter,  by  the  Fifth  and  part  of  the  Sixth  corps  and 
Pleasonton's  massed  cavalry,  already  across  the 
Antietam.  In  the  same  manner,  at  Gettysburg, 
Early's  sending  off  part  of  his  force  on  a  wild-goose 
chase  toward  York  against  a  mythical  enemy,  so 

116 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     117 

broke  up  Lee's  combinations  that  the  attack  on 
Meade's  right  on  the  evening  of  July  2,  after  Long- 
street  had  driven  in  his  left,  even  with  the  aid  of 
part  of  Hill's  corps  in  the  center,  failed  to  achieve 
more  than  a  partial  success,  the  troops  having  been 
put  in  in  disconnected  parts. 

Lee's  frontal  attack  at  Gettysburg  on  the  3rd  was 
thereby  made  another  partial  attack,  and  was  re 
pulsed.  Meade's  position  at  Gettysburg  was  also 
much  like  Lee's  at  Antietam,  and,  substituting  the 
Battle  of  South  Mountain  for  Lee's  attack  in  front 
of  Gettysburg  on  Reynolds  on  the  ist,  and  the  long 
march  of  the  Sixth  corps  to  Gettysburg  for  the  cor 
responding  march  of  A.  P.  Hill  from  Harper's 
Ferry  to  Sharpsburg,  the  parallel  becomes  complete, 
excepting  that  Mansfield  and  Sumner  did  make 
their  attack  early  in  the  morning,  while  Longstreet, 
at  Gettysburg,  dawdled  away  most  of  the  day  in 
keeping  out  of  sight,  and  only  attacked  after  the 
Sixth  corps  had  reached  the  field. 

We  now  come  to  the  question  of  forces  engaged 
at  Antietam.  I  have  cited  the  regiments  on  both 
sides  at  the  Seven  Days,  and  in  Pope's  Second 
Manassas,  and  I  will  now  give  the  same  statistics 
for  Antietam.  Here  also  McClellan's  force  was 
greatly  overrated  and  Lee's  underrated,  as  in  the 
Seven  Days,  while  in  the  Pope  campaign  the  exact 
reverse  was  the  case;  and  popular  histories  still 
perpetuate  the  error.  A  simple  comparison  will  at 
once  demonstrate  the  truth.  The  same  armies  which 


n8  ANTIETAM 

fought  at  the  Second  Manassas  fought  also  at  An- 
tietam,  and  the  losses  at  Manassas  were  not  greatly 
in  excess,  one  with  the  other,  on  either  side,  the 
Union  losses  exceeding  the  Confederate,  as  usual 
when  McClellan  was  not  present. 

A  reference  to  the  reports  in  volume  xix  of  the 
Official  Records  compared  with  volume  xn,  shows 
that  every  Confederate  regiment  engaged  at  the 
Second  Bull  Run  was  engaged  at  Antietam,  except 
ing  one.  In  addition  to  these  Lee,  at  Antietam,  had 
received,  after  the  Second  Bull  Run,  forty-eight 
regiments  of  infantry,  eighteen  batteries  of  artil 
lery,  and  five  regiments  of  cavalry  direct  from 
Richmond.  These  regiments  consisted  of  the  divi 
sions  of  McLaws,  Walker,  and  D.  H.  Hill,  and 
Hampton's  cavalry  brigade,  which  came  up  after 
the  Pope  battle  was  over.  None  of  these  are  to  be 
found  in  the  Confederate  roster  of  the  Second  Bull 
Run  campaign,  in  volume  xn,  War  Records,  and 
all  are  found  at  Antietam,  and  the  reports  of  cas 
ualties  at  the  latter  battle  show  that  all  these  were 
very  heavily  engaged  against  McClellan. 

In  McClellan's  army,  at  Antietam,  there  were 
twenty-nine  new  regiments,  mostly  of  new  nine 
months'  infantry,  just  enlisted,  and  which  had 
never  fired  a  gun  off  at  an  enemy,  or  even  been 
drilled  or  instructed.  These  were  nearly  full  regi 
ments.  The  old  regiments  were  sadly  depleted,  for 
while  Stanton's  order  of  April  3,  to  close  all  the 
recruiting  offices  and  sell  the  furniture  at  auction, 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     119 

had  been  rescinded  June  6,  yet  on  August  4,  before 
recruiting  officers  had  begun  to  bring  in  any  con 
siderable  number  of  recruits,  the  draft  for  300,000 
nine  months'  men  had  been  ordered,  and  those  who 
would  have  become  recruits  waited  to  become  sub 
stitutes  with  high  bounties.  The  same  order  of 
August  4  described  the  States  as  still  deficient  in 
their  quota  of  volunteers. 

These  twenty-nine  new  regiments  not  only  lacked 
the  first  elements  of  soldiery,  but  many  of  them  had 
worthless  arms.  General  Humphreys,  referring  to 
one  of  his  brigades,  3600  strong,  says  "all  its  arms 
wrere  unserviceable" ;  the  arms  of  another  of  his 
regiments  were  unserviceable.  There  were  nine 
hundred  stand  of  arms  in  one  brigade  with  nipples 
or  hammers  broken.  Humphreys  wouldn't  move 
from  Washington  until  these  worthless  arms  were 
replaced,  for  there  were  plenty  of  good  arms  there, 
by  which  delay  he  did  not  reach  Antietam  until  the 
day  after  the  battle.  But  Colonel  Gwyn,  whose 
regiment,  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Penn 
sylvania,  \vas  so  badly  cut  up  at  Shepherdstown, 
reports  :  "Owing  to  the  worthlessness  of  our  pieces 
[condemned  Enfield],  not  more  than  fifty  per  cent, 
of  which  could  be  discharged,  the  line  began  to 
waver." 

The  Confederates  had  on  the  battle-field  of  An 
tietam,  September  17,  1862,  179  regiments  of  in 
fantry,  all  veterans,  14^/2  regiments  of  cavalry,  and 
71  batteries  of  artillery. 


120  ANTIETAM 

Deducting  Couch's  division,  absent  in  Pleasant 
Valley,  watching  the  Harper's  Ferry  outlet,  and 
Humphreys'  division,  which  did  not  arrive  till  the 
1 8th,  McClellan  had  under  his  command  at  Antie- 
tam  184  regiments  of  infantry  (including  21  of  the 
new  regiments),  15  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  50 
batteries  of  artillery.  It  will  be  seen  that  Lee  had 
21  batteries  in  excess  of  McClellan.  Franklin's 
Sixth  Corps  did  not  reach  the  battle-field  until  be 
tween  nine  and  eleven  o'clock  Wednesday,  and  he 
had  with  him  27  of  the  above  184  infantry  regi 
ments  and  7  of  the  above  50  batteries. 

It  may  be  interesting,  now,  to  compare  the  regi 
ments  and  the  numbers  engaged,  with  those  at 
Gettysburg  a  year  later,  when  there  was  no  object 
in  belittling  our  own  numbers  and  exaggerating 
those  of  the  enemy. 

The  marches  to  these  battle-fields  had  been  nearly 
the  same,  the  marching  time  nearly  the  same,  the 
same  country  was  invaded  at  nearly  the  same  time 
of  the  year,  and,  in  each  case  the  Confederate  army 
came  from  a  great  victory,  the  Second  Manassas 
and  Chancellorsville,  and  the  Union  army  from  a 
great  defeat.  All  historians  concede  that  at  Gettys 
burg  the  opposing  forces  were  nearly  equal,  with, 
if  anything,  a  slight  preponderance  in  favor  of  the 
Confederates. 

At  Gettysburg  Lee  had  i68j^  regiments  of  in 
fantry  (ioy2  less  than  at  Antietam),  26l/2  regi- 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     121 

ments  of  cavalry  (12  more  than  at  Antietam),  and 
60  batteries  of  artillery  (n  less  than  at  Antietam). 

At  Gettysburg  the  Union  army  had  228  regi 
ments  of  infantry  (38  more  than  at  Antietam), 
34^  regiments  of  cavalry  (19^  more  than  at 
Antietam),  and  72  batteries  of  artillery  (22  more 
than  at  Antietam). 

If  Lee  did  not  have  his  men  with  him  at  Antie 
tam,  it  is  difficult  to  discover  where  he  had  them. 
He  claims  to  have  fought  the  battle  of  Antietam 
with  less  than  35,000  men;  but  doubtless  he  left  out 
A.  P.  Hill's  division,  which  came  late  in  the  after 
noon,  but  quite  in  time  to  do  a  great  work.  And  he 
doubtless  estimated  his  men  after  the  battle.  His 
first  army  return,  dated  only  five  days  after  the  bat 
tle,  and  described  as  very  imperfect,  gives  36,418 
officers  and  men  present  for  duty  (which  is  several 
thousand  more  than  he  claims  to  have  had  in  the 
battle),  besides  the  cavalry  and  reserve  artillery. 
These  numbered  7000.  Adding  these  and  his  losses, 
not  less  than  25,000  men,  makes  a  total  accounted 
for  of  68,418.  To  these  must  be  added  the  fugi 
tives  from  the  battle-field,  who  never  stopped  after 
they  had  fled  across  the  Potomac,  and  whom  Lee 
had  provost  guards  gathering  up  from  the  valley  for 
nearly  a  month  afterward.  They  figure  up  at  least 
7000,  as  reported  (see  Jones'  Report),  making  a 
total  taken  into  the  battle  of  more  than  75,000 
officers  and  men,  as  battle-strength  goes. 

These  figures  correspond  very  closely  with  a  total 


122  ANTIETAM 

independent  count  made  while  the  Confederates 
were  marching  out  of  Frederick,  and  which  I  have 
never  heretofore  seen  quoted.  Dr.  Lewis  H.  Steiner, 
of  Frederick,  Md.,  was  an  inspector  in  the  United 
States  Sanitary  Commission.  He  was  at  the  Second 
Bull  Run,  and  September  5,  when  the  invasion  of 
his  home  was  threatened,  he  made  his  way,  by  per 
mission,  on  the  last  railroad  train  which  reached 
Frederick,  where  he  remained  until  McClellan's 
army,  which  he  accompanied,  moved  out  of  that 
city. 

During  this  interval  he  kept  a  diary,  and  this  was 
afterward  published  in  pamphlet  form  in  the  fall 
of  the  same  year  by  permission  of  the  Sanitary 
Commission.  It  was,  by  the  way,  from  this  diary 
that  the  poet  Whittier  derived  his  material  for  his 
poem  of  "Barbara  Fritchie."  Dr.  Steiner,  in  his 
diary,  writes:  " Wednesday,  September  10. — At 
four  o'clock  this  morning  the  Rebel  army  began  to 
move  from  our  town,  Jackson's  force  taking  the 
advance.  The  movement  continued  until  8  o'clock 
p.  MV  occupying  sixteen  hours.  The  most  liberal 
calculation  could  not  give  them  more  than  64,000 
men.  Over  3000  negroes  must  be  included  in  this 
number.  .  .  .  Some  of  the  Rebel  regiments 
have  been  reduced  to  150  men;  none  number  over 
500.  Their  marching  is  very  loose.  They  marched 
by  the  flank  through  the  streets  of  Frederick."  The 
description  which  follows  shows  that  Dr.  Steiner 
gave  his  estimate  from  personal  inspection,  and  his 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     123 

position  as  inspector  made  such  estimates  a  prin 
cipal  part  of  his  duties  in  the  Sanitary  Commission. 

Dr.  Steiner  describes  these  negroes  as  to  all  in 
tents  soldiers.  They  were  clothed  and  fed  like  the 
Confederate  soldiers.  Most  of  the  negroes,  he  says, 
"had  arms,  rifles,  muskets,  sabers,  bowie-knives, 
dirks,  etc.  They  were  supplied,  in  many  instances, 
with  knapsacks,  haversacks,  canteens,  etc.,  and  they 
were  manifestly  an  integral  portion  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy  army.  They  were  seen  riding  on 
horses  and  mules,  driving  wagons,  riding  on  cais 
sons,  in  ambulances,  with  the  staff  of  generals  and 
promiscuously  mixed  up  with  all  the  Rebel  horde. 
The  fact  was  patent,  and  rather  interesting,  when 
considered  in  connection  with  the  horror  Rebels  ex 
press  at  the  suggestion  of  black  soldiers  being  em 
ployed  for  national  defense." 

Next  day,  September  1 1 ,  his  diary  contains  this 
entry:  "General  Hill's  division,  numbering  about 
8000  men,  marched  through  the  streets  on  their 
route  westward  this  morning;  the  men  marched  in 
better  order,  had  better  music,  and  were  fairly 
clothed  and  equipped."  This  was  D.  H.  Hill's 
division,  which  had  just  come  up  from  Richmond 
and  had  not  been  in  the  Second  Bull  Run  campaign 
at  all.  If  this  force  was  included  in  his  estimate 
the  day  before,  it  must  have  been  by  a  subsequent 
alteration  in  the  original  entry.  The  same  is  true  of 
Stuart's  cavalry,  which  passed  through  Frederick 
later,  and  noted  in  his  entry  of  September  13. 


124  ANTIETAM 

In  any  case  he  could  not  have  included  General 
John  G.  Walker's  division,  also  fresh  from  Rich 
mond, — largely  by  rail,  as  was  D.  H.  Hill's  divis 
ion, — for  Walker's  division  did  not  reach  Frederick 
at  all,  but  was  marched  back  to  Point  of  Rocks  and 
across  the  Potomac  to  seize  Loudon  Heights. 

As  Walker's  division — consisting  of  nine  regi 
ments  of  infantry  and  two  batteries — is  reported, 
in  Guild's  defective  estimate,  with  losses  of  1052, 
and  in  Lee's  returns  of  September  22  as  having 
3871  present,  its  strength  then  could  not  have  been 
less  than  5000.  General  Walker,  with  whom  I  be 
came  very  well  acquainted  after  the  war,  told  me 
that  it  was  considerably  in  excess  of  this  figure. 

General  Upton,  in  his  "Military  Policy,"  p.  370, 
puts  Lee's  army  in  the  Second  Manassas  campaign 
against  Pope  at  60,000.  As  Lee  had  but  134^ 
regiments  of  infantry  (only  120  of  which  were 
actually  engaged),  14^  of  cavalry  (only  9^  of 
which  were  engaged),  and  61  batteries  of  artillery 
(not  all  of  which  were  in  action),  it  will  be  seen 
that  Lee's  regimental  strength  on  the  field  aver 
aged  (after  the  Seven  Days'  losses)  more  than  400. 

All  the  above  regiments,  excepting  one,  were  pres 
ent  and  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Antietam;  and  in 
addition  there  were  48  regiments  of  infantry — con 
sisting  of  McLaws's  division,  16  regiments;  Walk 
er's  division,  9  regiments ;  and  D.  H.  Hill's  division, 
23  regiments — which  had  not  fired  a  shot  since  the 
Seven  Days,  but  had  been  conscripted  up  to  full 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     125 

strength  and  brought  from  Richmond  by  rail,  after 
Pope's  campaign;  5  regiments  of  cavalry,  Hamp 
ton's  brigade,  which  reached  Manassas  after  the 
battle;  and  10  batteries  of  artillery  additional,  be 
sides  10  left  at  Leesburg.  Lee's  entire  losses  in  the 
Second  Manassas  campaign  were  less  than  9000,  in 
cluding  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

The  casualties  in  Pope's  army  during  the  same 
campaign  were  14,462,  the  excess  of  which  of  course 
tended  relatively  to  weaken  McClellan  during  the 
Antietam  campaign. 

The  forces  opposed  to  McClellan,  in  his  various 
battles,  were  so  minimized  by  the  authorities  at 
Washington — designedly — that  history  even  to  this 
day  has  accepted  these  false  statements  as  truth,  and 
it  is  only  by  the  most  painstaking  and  careful 
analysis  that  anything  like  the  exact  facts  can  be 
obtained.  Fortunately  for  the  truth  of  history, 
however,  this  process  of  depreciation  was  not  re 
sorted  to  in  general, — excepting  in  the  case  of  Mc 
Clellan, — so  that  we  can,  by  taking  the  official  army 
returns  from  the  month  succeeding  the  first  Con 
federate  conscription  (that  is  to  say,  April,  1862) 
up  to  the  close  of  1863,  when  the  Confederate  con 
scription  had  nearly  spent  its  force,  and  the  process 
of  consolidation  of  two  or  more  Confederate  regi 
ments,  especially  in  the  West,  into  a  single  com 
mand  had  become  general,  will  accurately  determine 
the  facts. 

Commencing  with   the  battle   of   Shiloh,   April 


126  ANTIETAM 

6-7,  1862,  there  were  in  Grant's  army,  prior  to 
Buell's  arrival  after  the  first  day's  battle,  75  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  5  of  cavalry,  and  22  batteries,  a 
total  present  for  duty,  officers  and  men,  and  exclu 
sive  of  the  cavalry,  of  32,314,  making  the  average 
regimental  strength  about  400. 

On  the  Confederate  side  were  74  regiments  of 
infantry,  i  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  18  batteries, 
giving  an  effective  total  of  officers  and  men  of 
35,649,  making  an  average  regimental  strength  of 
more  than  480.  (See  War  Records,  vol.  x,  part  i.) 

The  forces  thus  were  almost  equal,  but  Grant's 
position  on  the  defensive  gave  him  some  advantage. 
When  Buell  joined  Grant  he  brought  with  him  37 
regiments  of  infantry,  2  of  cavalry,  and  4  batteries, 
giving  to  Grant  in  the  battle  of  April  7  a  dispro 
portion  of  10  to  6.  Grant  was  always  fortunate  in 
having  superior  forces,  which  was  the  exact  reverse 
of  McClellan's  case,  excepting  at  the  great  battle 
of  Culpeper,  in  November,  1862,  which  was  never 
fought,  having  only  gone  so  far  as  Longstreet's 
despairing  order  for  battle  and  afterward  Burn- 
side's  for  retreat,  so  as  to  make  a  fresh  start  else 
where. 

Fredericksburg  was  the  next  great  battle  succeed 
ing  the  Antietam  campaign.  Lee's  return  for 
December  20,  1862  (see  W.  R.,  vol  xxi).  after  the 
battle,  gives  180  regiments  of  infantry;  present  for 
duty,  officers  and  men,  65,970.  Adding  Lee's  loss 
in  the  previous  battle,  5309,  his  infantry  strength 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     127 

was  71,279  officers  and  men  present  for  duty.  This 
gives  an  average  regimental  strength  of  400. 

At  the  battle  of  Murfreesborough,  or  Stone 
River,  December  31,  1862- January  2,  1863.  the  Con 
federate  force  numbered  98  regiments  of  infantry, 
of  which  1 6  had  been  consolidated  into  8,  making 
an  actual  infantry  force  of  90  regiments.  The  in 
fantry  present  for  duty,  including  artillery,  num 
bered  33,475;  average  per  regiment,  381. 

The  Union  army  in  the  same  battle  comprised  126 
regiments  of  infantry,  having  an  average  strength 
of  319  per  regiment. 

The  next  important  battle  was  Chancellorsville, 
at  the  beginning  of  May,  1863.  ^n  tms  battle  Lee 
had  127  regiments  of  infantry.  The  aggregate, 
officers  and  men,  present  for  duty  April  i,  was 
52,714.  This  gives  an  average  regimental  strength 
of  415. 

Hooker  had  177  regiments  of  infantry  which  re 
ported  losses  in  this  batttle. 

At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  July  1-3,  1863,  Lee 
had  1 68f/2  regiments  of  infantry.  This  was  10^/2 
regiments  fewer  than  he  had  at  Antietam.  The  field 
returns  for  June  10,  20,  and  30  are  not  on  file,  but 
by  adding  his  losses  to  his  present  for  duty  on  field- 
returns  of  July  20,  and  31 — we  can  reach  an  ap 
proximate  estimate. 

The  return  for  July  20,  immediately  after  Lee's 
broken  passage  into  Virginia,  with  many  of  his 
troops  scattered,  gave  37,103  infantry  present  for 


128  ANTIETAM 

duty.  His  losses  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg  (see 
addenda  War  Record,  vol.  xxvn,  part  2,  p.  346), 
exclusive  of  cavalry,  were  20,211,  making  a  total 

of  57,314. 

The  next  return,  that  of  July  31,  was  more  com 
plete,  giving,  inclusive  of  the  battle  losses,  58,607. 
This  would  give  an  average  regimental  strength 

of  350- 

It  is  inconceivable  that  after  the  heavy  losses  at 
Antietam,  Fredericksburg,  Chancellorsville,  and  the 
preliminaries  of  Gettysburg,  Lee's  strength  per  regi 
ment  should  have  been  as  great  as  on  the  morning 
of  Antietam,  before  these  losses  occurred.  It  is  cer 
tain  also  that  Lee's  infantry  strength  at  Gettysburg 
was  in  excess  of  the  figures  above  given. 

His  army  was  full  of  enthusiasm,  after  the  vic 
tories  of  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville,  just 
as  the  year  before  it  was,  after  the  victory  of  the 
Second  Manassas. 

But  even  taking  Lee's  infantry  strength  at  An 
tietam  at  350  per  regiment,  which  is  certainly  under 
rated,  as  it  was  a  year  earlier  than  Gettysburg,  we 
will  have  a  total  infantry  alone  opposed  to  McClel- 
lan  at  Antietam  of  62,650,  exclusive  of  cavalry  and 
artillery;  or  a  grand  total  of  at  least  75,000  en 
gaged. 

At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  Meade  had  228  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  38  more  than  McClellan  had  at 
Antietam,  which  will  indicate  that  the  actual  average 
infantry  strength  of  McClellan's  regiments  at  An- 


ANTIETAM— FORCES  ENGAGED     129 

tietam  was  really  much  lower  than  that  with  which 
I  have  credited  him.  Meade's  field  return  for  June 
30,  1863,  gives  a  total  of  infantry,  officers  and  men, 
present  for  duty  equipped,  at  Gettysburg,  of  76,986. 
This  makes  an  average  regimental  strength  of  337. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  McClellan,  only  ten  days 
after  he  took  command,  with  constant  marching  and 
maneuvering,  and  considering  the  state  of  the 
debris  which  had  flowed  back  to  him  from  Pope's 
defeats,  could  in  regimental  strength  have  averaged 
much  better.  Whatever  better  it  was  was  due  alto 
gether  to  the  personality  of  McClellan. 

In  the  above  estimates  I  have  dealt  entirely  with 
the  infantry,  as  the  artillery  always  possessed 
enough  men  to  work  the  guns,  while  the  cavalry, 
by  its  functions,  was  a  variable  quantity,  and  not 
estimable  in  the  direct  shock  of  great  battles.  Other 
armies  could  be  cited,  but  the  above  averages,  taken 
between  April  i,  1862,  and  the  fall  of  1863,  during 
which  period  the  Confederate  organization  was  at 
its  best,  will  give  the  fairest  results  in  comparison 
with  McClellan  and  his  armies  during  the  period  of 
his  command. 


XIII 

MARCHING FIGHTING STRAGGLING LOSSES 

TAKING  the  above  summaries  together,  it  is  clear 
that  Lee's  army,  when  it  left  Frederick,  September 
10,  n,  and  12,  numbered  in  officers  and  men  not 
less  than  75,000;  and  may  have  numbered  con 
siderably  more,  if  statistics  of  other  battles  besides 
those  of  McClellan's  are  to  be  accepted  as  of  any 
value. 

If  these  men  were  not  at  Antietam  excepting 
those  left  dead  or  wounded  at  South  Mountain  and 
Harper's  Ferry,  which  were  relatively  few,  what 
had  become  of  them? 

Lee  says  they  straggled.  There  is  straggling  in 
all  marching  armies.  We  all  know  the  "coffee- 
boilers,"  and  those  who  like  to  take  a  little  rest;  but 
before  Lee's  army  reached  Frederick,  and  after  it 
had  left  Manassas,  straggling  was  not  complained 
of  by  Lee,  nor  was  Confederate  straggling  allowed 
for  by  the  Washington  authorities  in  estimating  the 
enemy  in  Pope's  campaign. 

The  Confederates  must  have  done  what  no  coffee- 
boilers  ever  do — they  straggled  away  from  pro 
visions  and  plenty  back  into  a  land  of  poverty  and 

130 


MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES     131 

famine.  Four  armies  had  just  marched  over  the 
only  part  of  Virginia  which  the  stragglers  could 
reach  if  they  had  straggled  back,  while  right  in 
front,  two  days'  march  away,  lay  virgin  Maryland 
and  golden  Pennsylvania,  right  after  harvest,  and 
with  the  fields  rich  with  corn  and  the  orchards 
filled  with  fruit. 

As  Whittier  truly  says : 

"Up  from  the  meadows  rich  with  corn, 
Clear  in  the  cold  September  morn, 
Round  about  them  orchards  sweep, 
Apple  and  peach  tree  fruited  deep; 
Fair  as  a  garden  of  the  Lord 
To  the  eyes  of  the  famished  rebel  horde." 

But  Lee  says  they  were  worn  out  with  marching. 
They  marched  farther  next  year,  and  in  a  shorter 
time,  to  reach  Gettysburg,  and  in  a  rather  worse 
marching  month ;  but  when  they  passed  through  the 
villages  of  Franklin  County,  Pennsylvania,  where 
I  was  born,  my  friends  tell  me  that  there  were  few, 
if  any,  stragglers  then;  those  left  behind  were  run 
ning  to  catch  up. 

Lee's  army  had  from  August  16  to  September  17, 
1862,  to  go  from  Richmond  to  Antietam.  Except 
Jackson's  force,  which  had  a  month  more  to  march 
in,  all  the  Confederates  went  to  Gordonsville  by  rail. 

I  have  made  careful  measurement  examination 
on  the  maps  of  the  number  of  miles  actually 
marched  by  the  different  armies,  Union  and  Con- 


1 32  ANTIETAM 

federate,  during  the  above  period,  excluding  all  rail 
and  water  transport,  and  I  find  that,  taking  all  the 
different  corps  of  McClellan's  army,  Burnside's 
North  Carolina  and  West  Virginia  forces,  and  the 
different  corps  under  Pope,  the  Union  army 
actually  marched,  on  foot,  during  the  same  period, 
more  than  twenty  miles  further  than  did  Lee's  army. 

So  that  will  not  account  for  it.  Then  Lee  says, 
in  his  dispatch  to  Richmond,  under  date  September 
24:  "The  enemy  has  suffered  from  straggling  as 
well  as  ourselves  (I  believe  to  a  greater  extent), 
but  his  numbers  are  so  great  he  can  afford  it;  we 
cannot."  (War  Records,  vol.  xix,  part  2,  page  625.) 

I  have  already  shown  what  the  relative  strengths 
were,  and  that  the  Confederate  strength  fully 
equaled,  or  even  exceeded,  that  of  McClellan.  There 
was  fearful  straggling  in  our  own  army  up  from 
Washington,  as  there  had  been  in  Pope's  army.  It 
was  marching  after  a  great  defeat  under  Pope,  and 
to  meet  a  victorious  and  largely  reinforced  enemy, 
and  it  included  many  regiments  which  knew  noth 
ing  of  marching  or  taking  care  of  themselves.  It 
was  being  reorganized,  also,  the  broken  fragments 
of  three  armies  being  consolidated  into  one,  in  ten 
days,  and  on  the  march. 

McClellan's  circular  of  September  9  says :  "The 
general  commanding  entreats  all  general  officers  to 
lend  every  effort  to  the  eradication  of  the  military 
vice  of  straggling.  He  feels  assured  that  their 
united  determination  can  break  up  the  practice  in  a 


MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES     133 

single  week."  Within  that  week  the  three  battles 
were  all  fought. 

General  Pope  testified  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  (see  Upton's  "Military 
Policy")  :  "At  least  one-half  of  this  diminution 
of  our  forces  was  occasioned  by  skulking  and  strag 
gling  from  the  army.  .  .  .  Thousands  of 
men  straggled  away  from  their  commands  and  were 
not  in  any  action.  I  had  posted  several  regiments 
in  rear  of  the  field  of  battle  on  the  29th  of  August, 
and  although  many  thousands  of  stragglers  and 
skulkers  were  arrested  by  them,  many  others  passed 
around  through  the  woods  and  did  not  rejoin  their 
commands  during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign." 
(See  Upton's  U.  S.  Publication,  "Military  Policy," 
page  370.) 

This  was  the  material  for  which  McClellan  had 
just  seven  days  allowed  him  to  make  over  again, 
before  starting  for  Antietam. 

Amid  all  the  discouraging  and  demoralizing  cir 
cumstances  which  pervaded  and  surrounded  the 
Union  army,  there  was  a  single  one  only  which 
enabled  that  army  to  do  its  great  work ;  every  other 
factor  had  been  part  and  parcel  of  the  general  dis 
aster — there  was  but  one  new  factor,  and  that  was 
the  heart,  brain,  loyalty,  duty,  and  organizing  and 
fighting  power  of  a  single  individual. 

As  Dr.  Steiner  says,  in  concluding  his  diary: 
"On  Wednesday  the  great  Battle  of  Antietam  was 
fought,  with  such  a  display  of  strategy  and  power 


i34  ANTIETAM 

on  the  part  of  our  general,  and  of  heroism  and  dar 
ing  from  our  men,  that  the  enemy  was  glad  to  re 
sign  all  hopes  of  entering  Pennsylvania  and  to  with 
draw  his  forces  across  the  Potomac.  A  great  vic 
tory  had  been  gained;  the  enemy  had  been  driven 
from  loyal  soil,  and  McClellan  had  shown  himself 
worthy  of  the  love  (amounting  almost  to  adoration) 
which  his  troops  expressed  on  all  sides." 

There  was  indeed  much  straggling  on  the  part 
of  Lee's  army;  but  it  was  not  until  the  evening  of 
September  17  had  closed  down,  and  Lee's  great 
army  was  forced  back,  defeated,  as  every  private 
soldier  in  that  army  well  knew.  They  knew,  too, 
that  behind  them  lay  a  broad  river,  now  only  knee- 
deep,  but  which  the  floods  usually  following  a  great 
battle  might  make  at  once  impassable,  as  they  did  a 
year  later  after  Gettysburg.  They  now  slunk  away 
from  the  shattered  ranks,  and  fled,  by  ones  and 
twos,  officers  and  men,  across  the  river  and  back 
to  Winchester — and  to  safety. 

Where  is  the  proof?  Lee  writes,  September  23, 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  asking  for  a  law  to  de 
grade  regimental  and  company  officers  for  bad  con 
duct  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  and  for  leaving 
their  posts  in  time  of  battle.  To  President  Davis  he 
writes,  the  same  day,  that  the  main  causes  of  his 
retiring  from  Maryland  were  the  casualties  and 
desertion  and  straggling  connected  with  the  battle. 

September  27  General  Jones,  who  had  been  sent 
to  Winchester  to  gather  in  the  stragglers,  reported 


MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES     135 

that  he  had  already  sent  back  between  5000  and 
6000,  besides  1200  who  had  thrown  away  their 
shoes,  and  of  these  he  says  "the  number  of  officers 
back  here  was  most  astonishing."  His  efforts 
created  quite  a  stampede,  he  says,  back  to  the  army. 
This  \vas  after  Lee's  returns,  already  cited,  had  been 
made  up. 

Now  these  stragglers  were  up  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  How  did  stragglers  from  the  Bull  Run, 
Leesburg,  or  Frederick  regions  get  across  the 
mountains,  and  fifty  miles  west,  and  why  did  they 
go  there  anyway?  They  evidently  fled  up  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  after  Lee  had  been  defeated  at 
Sharpsburg,  for  they  would  have  shown  little  sense 
in  running  away  if  it  were  not  clear  to  themselves 
that  Lee  was  disastrously  and  hopelessly  defeated. 
Victors  do  not  run  away;  it  is  the  vanquished  who 
run. 

And  so  closed  the  full  fourteen  hours'  battle  of 
Antietam,  that  greatest  single  battle  of  the  war — 
greatest  in  losses  for  the  enemy  and  relatively  in 
the  smaller  losses  to  ourselves.  That  was  McClel- 
lan's  way;  it  was  because  he  understood  artillery, 
for  it  will  be  found  that  in  every  one  of  McClel- 
lan's  battles  his  own  losses  were  far  below  those 
of  the  enemy,  not  only  relatively  but  in  actual  num 
bers,  which  quite  reversed  the  usual  rule  during  the 
war.  This  was  largely  due  to  McClellan's  excellent 
tactics,  which  both  Grant  and  Lee  commended,  and 
to  his  perfect  mastery  of  artillery,  which  he  loved 


136  ANTIETAM 

and  used  just  as  Napoleon  did  in  his  great  battles. 
A  battery  well  placed  had  the  power  of  a  regiment, 
but  could  only  suffer  the  loss  of  a  company. 

In  General  Alexander's  Confederate  article  in 
the  Century  Company's  "Battles  and  Leaders,"  vol. 
in,  "The  Great  Charge  and  the  Artillery  Fighting 
at  Gettysburg,"  he  says  the  Confederates  always 
called  Antietam  "Artillery  hell." 

Major  Nelson  H.  Davis,  assistant  inspector  gen 
eral,  in  whose  charge  the  interments  were,  reported 
about  2700  Confederate  dead  buried  by  himself 
on  the  field  of  Antietam.  The  trophies  consisted  of  1 3 
cannon,  39  colors,  more  than  15,000  stand  of  arms, 
and  more  than  6000  prisoners.  Hancock,  in  a  let 
ter  to  Adjutant-General  Bowers,  September  28, 
1864,  savs  :  "I  saw  myself  nine  colors  in  the  hands 
of  one  division  at  Antietam." 

McClellan  estimates,  in  his  letter  to  Halleck  of 
September  29,  that,  including  South  Mountain, 
Crampton's  Gap,  Antietam,  Shepherdstown,  and 
Confederate  prisoners  and  deserters,  the  total  Con 
federate  loss  was  not  less  than  30,000  men.  A 
careful  collation  of  the  returns  of  the  different  Con 
federate  organizations  fully  supports  this  estimate. 

The  report  of  Medical  Director  Guild,  in  War  Rec 
ords,  vol.  xix,  pt.  2,  pp.  810-813,  is  grossly  defective. 
He  confounds  all  the  brigades  and  divisions,  under 
estimates  Ewell's  losses  by  more  than  300,  A.  P. 
Hills  by  more  than  100,  and  entirely  omits  16  regi 
ments  of  infantry  which  were  in  the  thick  of  the 


MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES     137 

fight,  and  all  the  cavalry  and  artillery  losses.  Many 
of  Guild's  other  figures  show  large  discrepancies, 
and  the  losses  in  prisoners  are  not  included  at  all. 
McClellan  claims  to  have  captured  more  than  6000 
prisoners.  I  have  examined  the  individual  reports 
of  all  the  Union  commands  reporting  prisoners 
taken,  and,  omitting  all  duplications,  I  find  that 
there  were  accounted  for  in  these  few  reports  5060 
prisoners,  while  the  First,  Fifth,  Sixth,  and  Twelfth 
corps,  and  one  division  of  the  Second  and  one  of 
the  Ninth,  make  no  specific  reports  for  prisoners 
at  all,  although  they  took  many. 

Correcting  the  Confederate  casualty  returns  from 
the  battle-field  reports,  their  recorded  losses,  all  told, 
so  far  as  definitely  stated,  and  adding  a  propor 
tionate  average  for  the  sixteen  omitted  regiments, 
and  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  including  the 
6000  prisoners,  make  a  conceded  aggregate,  by  the 
Confederates  themselves,  of  between  20,000  and 
21,000.  Adding  the  6000  or  7000  who  fled  up  the 
Valley  during  and  on  the  heels  of  the  battle  and 
before  Lee's  retreat,  and  the  1200  more  who,  Jones 
says,  threw  away  their  shoes  to  avoid  being  sent 
back  to  Lee,  we  have  an  aggregate  Confederate  loss 
of  more  than  29,000.  Even  this  is  understated, 
especially  in  the  number  of  the  dead,  since  these 
Confederate  reports  include  less  than  2000  killed, 
while  Inspector  Nelson  reported  burying  2700,  and 
stated  that  before  Lee's  flight  the  Confederates  had 
buried  many  of  their  own  inside  their  lines.  "The 


138  ANTIETAM 

Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  War"  reports 
3500  Confederates  killed.  These  estimates  of  mine 
of  Confederate  losses  are  based  on  investigations  of 
my  own  among  the  confused  and  incomplete  reports 
of  the  different  Confederate  organizations  which 
took  part  in  the  battle.  Every  one  of  these,  from 
general  to  captain,  has  been  carefully  studied  and 
collated,  probably  for  the  first  time.  General  Emory 
Upton,  in  his  "Military  Policy  of  the  United 
States,"  states,  on  the  authority  of  the  "Medical  and 
Surgical  History  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion," 
Lee's  losses  at  3500  killed,  16,399  wounded,  and 
6000  prisoners.  This  is  undoubtedly  correct.  He 
says  that  most  of  these  prisoners  were  stragglers; 
but  in  this  he  is  altogether  mistaken.  The  5060 
prisoners  I  have  taken  from  the  reports  filed  were 
practically  battle-field  prisoners,  and  are  so  noted  on 
my  memoranda,  excepting  some  of  those  gathered 
up  by  Pleasonton's  cavalry.  Hooker  reported,  at 
South  Mountian,  1000  prisoners  taken,  and  Burn- 
side's  whole  command,  1500.  Hancock,  at  Antie- 
tam  proper,  400.  The  Fifty-seventh  New  York  re 
ports :  "We  took  the  colors  of  the  Twelfth  Ala 
bama  and  many  prisoners.  I  am  unable  to  form  any 
very  correct  estimate  of  the  number  of  the  latter, 
but  they  considerably  exceeded  the  number  of  men 
in  the  ranks  of  my  regiment."  This  was  in  the 
charge  through  the  cornfield.  Colonel  Brooke, 
Fifty-third  Pennsylvania,  commanding  brigade,  and 
afterward  Major-General  Brooke,  U.  S.  A.,  says: 


MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES    139 

"About  200  stand  of  arms  were  captured,  as  also  a 
great  number  of  prisoners,  who  were  sent  through 
the  ranks  to  the  rear."  The  Sixty-sixth  New  York 
reports :  "The  battalion  pressed  forward  and  com 
pletely  routed  the  enemy.  It  was  here  that  we  cap 
tured  a  rebel  lieutenant  of  the  Fifth  Florida  regi 
ment,  together  with  his  whole  company  and  a  stand 
of  colors."  General  Kimball  reports:  "In  this 
charge  my  command  captured  about  300  prisoners, 
the  enemy  leaving  on  the  field  several  stand  of 
colors." 

Colonel  Wilcox  reports  of  the  Irish  Brigade: 
"They  drove  the  enemy  from  their  stronghold  and 
captured  some  300  prisoners,  including  a  number  of 
officers,  among  them  Lieutenant-Colonel  Nisbet,  of 
Macon,  Ga.,  all  of  whom  were  sent  to  the  rear." 
Colonel  Morris,  Second  Brigade,  French's  division : 
"My  brigade  captured  2  stand  of  colors,  2  captains, 
7  lieutenants,  and  about  400  privates.  We  also  took 
400  stand  of  arms.  In  front  of  the  last  position 
held  by  the  Fourteenth  Connecticut  more  than  1000 
of  the  enemy  lie  slain."  The  First  Delaware  re 
ports  :  "We  captured  about  300  prisoners  and  sent 
them  to  the  rear.  The  command  continued  fighting 
until  their  ammunition  was  expended."  General 
Franklin  reports :  "Four  hundred  prisoners  from 
17  different  organizations,  700  stand  of  arms,  one 
piece  of  artillery,  and  3  stand  of  colors  were  cap 
tured." 

The  First  Brigade  of  the  Kanawha  division  sent 


140  ANTIETAM 

to  the  rear  a  number  of  prisoners  fully  equal  to  its 
loss  (255).  Colonel  Crane,  commanding  a  brig 
ade  in  Green's  division,  reports  :  "We  charged  them 
in  a  heavy  piece  of  woods,  driving  them  out  of 
it,  capturing  a  large  number  of  prisoners  [among 
them  was  a  lieutenant-colonel  and  a  lieutenant] ,  and 
made  terrible  havoc  in  their  ranks,  covering  the 
ground  with  slain."  General  Hancock  reports: 
"Nine  regimental  colors  and  battle  flags  were  taken 
from  the  enemy.  .  .  .  About  400  prisoners 
were  captured  and  4000  muskets  collected  on  the 
field  in  front  of  the  division,  and  piled."  And  such 
extracts  could  be  multiplied.  The  purposed  ob 
scurity  cast  over  these  facts,  which  even  misled  so 
profound  a  student  as  General  Upton,  is  the  excuse 
for  their  recapitulation  here. 

William  Bender  Wilson,  the  War  Department 
telegrapher,  who  was  present,  says  of  this  battle : 
"Heroism,  patriotism,  and  valor  wrote  their  names 
on  history's  page  all  over  the  sanguinary  field, 
which  was  strewn  with  nearly  21,000  dead  and 
wounded  men — 3620  dead  bodies  and  17,365 
wounded  men." 

The  Union  losses  at  Antietam  were  12,500,  and 
in  all  the  battles,  South  Mountain,  Crampton's  Gap, 
Antietam,  and  Shepherdstown,  15,000. 

Of  this  aggregate  of  the  four  battles  noo  were 
reported  as  missing.  As  the  Confederates  claimed 
no  prisoners,  except  at  Shepherdstown,  September 
20,  many  of  these  missing  ones  were  deserters  from 


MARCHINGS-FIGHTING— LOSSES     141 

the  substitutes  and  bounty  men  of  the  new  regi 
ments.  Of  these  there  were  many,  and  in  the  gen 
eral  cleaning  up  after  the  battle — the  first  since 
leaving  Washington — all  those  who  had  disappeared 
on  the  march  or  slipped  away  in  the  silence  of  the 
night  were  charged  up  to  the  loss  account  of  An- 
tietam. 

For  example,  I  find  that  the  One  Hundred  and 
Eighteenth  Pennsylvania  (the  Corn  Exchange  Regi 
ment)  reported  losses  of  269  at  the  Shepherdstown 
Ford,  September  20,  of  which  105  were  reported 
captured  or  missing.  But  on  examining  the  muster- 
out  roster  of  this  celebrated  regiment  I  find  that  the 
correct  total  was  211,  instead  of  269.  The  cap 
tured  and  missing  amounted  to  70,  instead  of  105, 
and  of  these  70  twelve  had  deserted  before  the  battle, 
And  of  the  66  un wounded  men  captured,  16  de 
serted  when  afterward  returned.  Doubtless  in  other 
new  regiments,  in  which  there  was  no  time  to  clean 
up  their  rolls  on  the  march,  many  who  were  reported 
as  "missing"  had  disappeared  before  the  fighting 
commenced. 

To  illustrate  McClellan's  command  of  artillery, 
it  may  be  interesting  to  compare  the  losses  during 
the  three  days  of  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  with  those 
of  the  one-day  battle  of  Antietam. 

At  Antietam  the  Union  losses  were  2108  killed, 
9549  wounded,  and  753  missing;  total,  12,410.  The 
Confederate  losses  were  3500  killed,  16,399 
wounded,  6000  captured;  total,  25,899. 


142  ANTIETAM 

At  Gettysburg  the  Union  losses  were  3155 
killed,  14,529  wounded,  and  5365  captured;  total, 
23,049.  The  Confederate  losses  were  2,592  killed, 
12,709  wounded,  and  5150  captured;  total,  20,451. 
See  War  Records,  vol.  xix,  part  i,  p.  200;  xxvn, 
part  i,  p.  193;  part  2,  p.  346;  and  Upton's  "Mili 
tary  Policy,"  p.  382. 


XIV 

SEPTEMBER    18-19 AMMUNITION 

MCCLELLAN  has  been  censured  because  "he  did 
not  attack  early  the  next  morning  (the  i8th)  and 
complete  the  work."  This  "completing  the  work"  is 
a  very  vague  idea  among  civilians  and  new  soldiers. 
Meade  was  nearly  removed  from  command  by  the 
civilians  because  he  did  not  "complete  the  work" 
in  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  Such  men  imagine 
that  armies  can  be  whirled  around  like  a  club,  and 
that  a  hundred  thousand  men  can  be  destroyed  as 
Samson  destroyed  the  three  thousand  Phillistines. 
And  "trap"  is  another  favorite  word  with  the  civilian 
war  critics.  In  the  examination  of  some  such  pom 
pous  officer,  newly  drawn  into  the  service,  and  whom 
I  recall  as  testifying  in  the  winter  of  1861  before 
the  civilian  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
he  filled  their  souls  with  admiration  by  describing 
how  an  army  should  be  maneuvered  and  fought. 
There  was  to  be  no  halting  nor  hesitation  with  him ; 
he  would  hurl  his  army  right  into  the  face  of  the 
enemy.  But  suppose,  he  was  asked,  the  enemy 
should  appear  on  your  flank.  "Then,"  he  replied, 
"I  would  throw  two  or  three  divisions  over  there." 

143 


144  ANTIETAM 

"And  if  your  rear  were  attacked?"  "Then,"  he 
replied,  "I  should  fling  a  few  divisions  back  there." 
And  against  anything  threatening  his  lines  of  com 
munication  he  would  whirl  a  sufficient  number  of 
divisions  there,  too,  still  keeping  his  army  driving 
everything  before  him  in  his  front.  It  was  meat 
and  drink  to  the  civilians,  and  it  is  a  pity  that  he 
was  not  promoted;  but  he  wasn't;  he  disappeared. 

McClellan  generally  got  out  of  a  situation  all 
there  was  in  it.  The  Rebels  used  to  complain  of 
other  Union  commanders,  and  among  them  some 
subsequent  ones  in  the  same  army,  that  "they  didn't 
clean  up  as  they  went,  as  McClellan  did."  It  is  a 
curious  fact  that  no  ground  that  McClellan  ever 
fought  his  army  over  and  won, — in  West  Virginia, 
Maryland,  or  Virginia  proper, — ever  again  fell  into 
regular  Confederate  occupation.  And  the  same  is 
true  of  those  greater  movements  which  McClellan 
had  previously  directed  as  general-in-chief — New 
Orleans,  North  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Missouri,  New 
Mexico;  and,  had  all  his  orders  been  carried  out  at 
New  Orleans  by  Butler,  Vicksburg,  Jackson, 
Meridian,  and  all  Southern  Tennessee  and  all  Mis 
sissippi  could  be  included.  But  that  was  not  to  be; 
the  Secretary  of  War,  an  excellent  lawyer,  filed  a 
brief  and  took  command  himself. 

McClellan  did  not  attack  the  next  morning,  for 
the  best  of  reasons.  Not  only  was  Couch's  splendid 
division  absent  guarding  the  river  roads  to  the  rear 
of  McClellan's  army,  but  he  could  not  be  withdrawn 


SEPTEMBER  18-19  145 

until  Lee  had  been  so  paralyzed  as  to  be  incapable 
of  using  them.  At  midnight,  after  the  battle,  Mc- 
Clellan  ordered  Couch's  division  back ;  and  it  reached 
his  front  after  a  hard  march  during  the  next  fore 
noon.  Humphreys'  very  full  division  (of  new 
troops,  it  is  true,  but  it  was  under  Humphreys ;  and 
he  himself  bluffed  the  Washington  authorities  and 
had  its  worthless  arms  replaced)  reached  the  field 
only  after  an  all-day  and  all-night  twenty-two  mile 
march,  at  ten  o'clock  on  the  i8th.  A.  P.  Hill's  Con 
federate  division  was  nearly  fresh,  and  had  suffered 
but  little  loss  when  he  drove  back  Burnside  at 
nightfall,  as  he  reported  only  a  loss  of  a  thousand 
out  of  his  six  brigades — less  a  few  men  left  at  Har 
per's  Ferry — after  Burnside's  whole  corps  and  a 
half  had  been  forced  back  to  the  hills  above  the 
creek. 

But  the  controlling  factor  was  that,  while  Lee 
had  all  the  artillery  ammunition  he  wanted, — all  he 
obtained  at  Harper's  Ferry,  a  large  proportion  of 
General  Pope's,  and  the  remainder  which  had  come 
with  the  new  troops,  half  the  way  by  train  from 
Richmond, — McClellan  had  little  ammunition  at  all 
left,  and  none  at  all  for  his  heavy  guns,  of  which 
he  had  at  least  seven  or  eight  full  batteries — nearly 
fifty  guns  in  all.  McClellan  says  "a  large  number 
of  our  heaviest  and  most  efficient  batteries  had  con 
sumed  all  their  ammunition  on  the  i6th  and  i/th, 
and  it  was  impossible  to  supply  them  until  late  the 
following  day." 


146  ANTIETAM 

That  this  statement  is  not  overdrawn,  we  may 
learn  from  the  report  of  Benjamin,  of  Benjamin's 
United  States  battery  of  2O-pound  Parrotts.  After 
the  firing  on  the  i6th  he  replenished  his  caissons  on 
the  morning  of  the  I7th,  or  tried  to  do  so,  for  he 
received  only  forty  rounds,  that  being  all  that  there 
was  in  the  Antietam  supply-train.  At  5 . 30  p.  M., 
the  1 7th,  he  fired  his  last  six  rounds  at  the  enemy. 
After  that,  he  says,  "by  order  of  General  Burn- 
side  I  fired  blank  cartridges  to  draw  the  enemy's 
fire  from  the  infantry." 

McClellan  was  pushing  the  Washington  authori 
ties  for  heavy  ammunition  from  i  o'clock  p.  M.  on 
the  1 7th ;  he  was  urging  them  almost  constantly 
from  that  time  on :  "Force  some  2O-pounder  Par- 
rott  ammunition  through  to-night,  via  Hagerstown 
and  Chambersburg."  The  railroads  came  in  with 
a  hearty  swing;  General  Ripley,  chief  of  ordnance 
at  Washington,  joined  in;  Governor  Curtin,  our 
splendid  War  Governor,  did  all  that  man  could  do ; 
Watson,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  always 
loyal  and  faithful,  did  his  best;  President  Garrett 
of  the  B.  &  O.  pushed  his  end  along  with  his  great 
est  vigor;  and  even  the  Secretary  of  War,  at  mid 
night  of  the  1 7th,  sent  word  that  everything  must 
be  cleared  ahead  for  this  ammunition,  the  life-blood 
for  the  palpitating  heart  and  arteries  throbbing 
against  the  enemy  at  the  front. 

At  12.30  A.  M._,  September  18,  General  Ripley, 
chief  of  ordnance,  telegraphed  McClellan :  "A  spe- 


SEPTEMBER  18-19  147 

cial  train  consisting  of  2500  rounds  of  2O-pounder 
ammunition  left  last  night  for  Hagerstown,  in 
charge  of  Lieutenant  Bradford,  Ordnance  Depart 
ment."  Field  and  small  arm  ammunition  was  to  go 
later,  and  it  went  a  great  deal  later — late  next  day, 
in  fact.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ramsey,  in  charge  of 
the  arsenal  at  Washington,  sent  to  General  Ripley, 
September  18,  the  statement:  "The  shipment  of  the 
ammunition  for  2O-pounders  went  last  night  by  way 
of  Hagerstown,  with  Lieutenant  Bradford." 

So  it  seems  pretty  well  established  that  2400  or 
2500  rounds  of  2O-pounder  ammunition — 60  rounds 
for  each  gun — started  to  McClellan  from  Washing 
ton  by  way  of  Baltimore,  Harrisburg,  and  Hagers 
town  before  midnight  on  the  I7th  of  September. 
\Vhat  became  of  it?  William  Bender  Wilson,  the 
special  and  confidential  military  telegrapher  of  the 
War  Department,  whose  services  were  so  conspicu 
ous  that  Pennsylvania  has  recently  placed  him  upon 
her  honored  pension  roll, — a  very  rare  distinction, — 
tells  us  in  his  little  book,  published  in  1892,  "A  Few 
Acts  and  Actors  in  the  Tragedy  of  the  Civil  War," 
the  inside  history  of  the  shipment  of  this  vital 
2O-pounder  ammunition.  This  ammunition  started 
from  Washington  before  midnight  on  the  i/th  and, 
with  all  the  tracks  open,  with  absolute  right  of  way, 
and  with  express  speed,  never  reached  Hagerstown 
even — still  a  six  or  eight  mile  wagon-haul  distance 
from  McClellan — until  one  o'clock  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  1 8th. 


148  ANTIETAM 

Wilson  says  it  was  ready  at  the  Washington 
arsenal  at  i  A.  M.,  September  18.  Both  Colonel 
Ramsey  and  General  Ripley  said  it  left  the  arsenal 
before  midnight.  Wilson  did  all  the  telegraphic 
work  regarding  this  shipment,  and  followed  its 
course  to  Hagerstown.  It  is  forty  miles  from 
Washington  to  Baltimore.  "Why,"  he  says,  "it  did 
not  reach  the  Northern  Central  Railway  at  Balti 
more  until  after  seven  o'clock  that  morning  has 
always  been  a  mystery."  Lieutenant  Bradford  was 
aboard;  the  train  consisted  of  an  engine,  tender, 
and  four  B.  &  O.  cars.  How  and  where  these  seven 
hours  were  passed  will  never  be  known.  The  train, 
Wilson  says,  left  Baltimore  at  7.27;  was  delivered  to 
the  C.  V.  R.  R.  at  Harrisburg  at  10.20  A.  M.  The 
run,  eighty-four  miles,  was  made  in  two  hours  and 
fifty-five  minutes.  It  arrived  at  Chambersburg  at 
12,  noon,  and  at  Hagerstown  at  12.42,  making  a 
run  from  Harrisburg  of  seventy-four  miles  in  one 
hour  and  fifty-eight  minutes.  The  running  time  was 
shorter,  for  at  two  stations  on  the  C.  V.  ten  min 
utes  each  were  lost  from  hot  boxes.  He  says  that 
when  the  train  ran  into  the  Hagerstown  station  "all 
the  journal  boxes  on  the  four  B.  &  O.  cars  were 
ablaze;  of  this  fact  I  was  an  eye-witness." 

This  ammunition,  with  the  running  time  given 
it,  should  have  reached  Hagerstown,  Mr.  Wilson 
says,  at  7.20  A.  M.,  and  would  then  have  "been  of 
some  avail  to  McClellan  on  that  day" — Septem 
ber  1 8. 


SEPTEMBER  18-19  H9 

Mr.  Wilson  had  his  theory,  which  he  gives  on 
page  71  of  his  book,  and  those  who  care  to,  may  see 
how  he  accounts  for  that  fatal  seven  hours'  delay 
which  exposed  McClellan,  not  only  to  attack  by  Lee, 
but  to  the  charge  of  slowness,  which  word  (used 
instead  of  "preparedness")  acted  on  the  people  like 
a  red  rag  flashed  in  the  face  of  an  excited  bull. 


XV 


LEE  S    FLIGHT    TO    VIRGINIA M  CLELLAN  S    VICTORY 

BUT  what  of  this  failure  to  attack  on  the  i8th? 
One  might  understand  that  on  the  i8th  itself  people 
might  say,  "Why  does  he  delay?"  "Lee  may  attack, 
himself."  But  after  the  i8th,  when  Lee  had  fled  in 
the  night  from  Northern  soil,  with  his  crushed  and 
shattered  army,  why  was  it  important  that  McClel- 
lan  should  have  attacked  on  the  i8th?  Least  of  all, 
why  of  importance  to  a  military  man?  All  that 
could  possibly  have  been  gained  by  an  attack  was 
gained;  all  that  an  attack  could  have  accomplished 
was  to  drive  Lee  across  the  river ;  after  Burnside's 
failure  to  envelop  Lee's  right  and  cut  him  off  from 
his  ford,  only  a  mile  in  his  rear,  and  to  cut  off 
A.  P.  Hill's  approach,  Lee  could  have  retreated  pre 
cisely  as  he  did,  battle  or  no  battle,  for,  as  I  have 
quoted,  the  next  morning,  September  igth,  a  Union 
regiment, — the  Fourth  Michigan, — marched  across 
the  Potomac  by  the  same  ford  in  line  of  battle,  and 
Lee's  trains  were  already  across  the  river,  even  be 
fore  the  battle  of  the  i7th  occurred.  See  War 
Records,  vol.  xix,  part  i,  pp.  339  and  349-35°- 

It  is  true  that  we  might  have  destroyed  ten  or  a 
150 


LEE'S  FLIGHT  TO  VIRGINIA        151 

dozen  thousand  more  of  Lee's  men,  but  at  a  cost  of 
ten  or  a  dozen  thousand,  more  or  less,  of  our  own 
men.  That  process  of  mere  attrition  is,  however,  a 
sort  of  game  called  swapping  to  a  loss,  in  the  game 
of  checkers,  which  reputable  players  do  not  usually 
approve  of.  So,  in  1863,  Lee  lay  one  day  also,  after 
the  battle,  in  front  of  Gettysburg.  Who  now  re 
proaches  Meade  that  he  did  not  then  attack?  The 
victory  was  no  less — it  was  greater,  and  Meade's 
reputation  has  not  been  dimmed,  but  has,  on  the  con 
trary,  been  brightened  thereby.  Great  victories 
crystallize  out  slowly  from  a  great  battle;  at  first, 
sometimes,  no  one  knows  who  has  been  successful. 
Like  a  hunter,  struggling  body  to  body  with  a  griz 
zly  bear,  it  takes  some  time,  even  when  the  final 
blow  has  been  given,  for  the  grip  to  relax,  for  the 
jaws  to  fall  apart,  for  the  muscles  to  unclasp,  and 
for  the  great  dying  hulk  to  fall  to  the  ground  in  the 
convulsion  of  death.  But  the  victory  is  no  less 
great;  the  result  no  less  inevitable. 

If  Antietam  was  not  a  great  crowning  victory, 
then  why  was  Gettysburg?  The  forces  were  sub 
stantially  the  same.  At  Gettysburg  we  were  on  the 
defensive,  and  Lee  attacked  and  failed ;  at  Antietam 
Lee  was  on  the  defensive,  and  McClellan  attacked 
and  succeeded.  When  it  comes  to  losses,  it  is  true 
that  at  Antietam  we,  the  attackers,  only  lost  one- 
half  as  many  as  we  did  at  Gettysburg,  while  Lee, 
the  defender,  lost  from  5000  to  7000  more.  At 
Antietam  we  took  six  thousand  prisoners  from  Lee. 


152  ANTIETAM 

At  Gettysburg  he  took  six  thousand  prisoners  from 
us.  In  both  cases  Lee  lost  his  campaign,  and  was 
driven  back  to  the  wasted  places  of  Virginia;  and 
in  both  cases  he  was  driven  from  Pennsylvania,  for, 
as  I  have  shown,  Lee's  invasion  of  1862  was  an  in 
vasion  of  Pennsylvania  just  as  much  as  was  that 
of  1863.  He  was  broken  to  pieces  sooner  in  1862, 
that  was  all. 

It  is  time  that  history  should  clearly  realize  the 
fact  that  Antietam  was  our  greatest  day  of  battle, 
the  bloodiest  battle  for  the  South  and  the  most  glori 
ous  for  the  Union  arms  in  all  that  wondrous  four 
years'  war  which  gave  to  the  world  new  examples 
of  patriotism  and  higher  lessons  of  heroism. 

During  the  night  of  the  i8th  Lee  withdrew  his 
shattered  and  depleted  remnants  across  the  river, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  iQth  the  invasion  and  the 
invaders  had  passed  into  history. 

General  Charles  Griffin,  commanding  brigade  in 
Morell's  division,  Fifth  Corps,  describes  this  broad 
and  shallow  ford,  on  September  19,  as  follows: 
"By  direction  of  Major-General  Porter  the  Fourth 
Michigan  was  ordered  to  cross  the  river  and  take 
some  guns  which  our  artillery  fire  had  caused  to 
be  abandoned.  This  duty  was  handsomely  per 
formed,  the  regiment,  about  three  hundred  strong, 
fordng  the  river  [some  three  hundred  yards  in 
width,  and  three  feet  in  depth]  in  face  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  fire."  War  Records,  vol.  xix, 
part  i,  p.  350. 


LEE'S  FLIGHT  TO  VIRGINIA        153 

General  Porter,  in  his  report  (page  338),  says 
that  parts  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth 
Pennsylvania  and  Eighteenth  and  Twenty-second 
Massachusetts  regiments  volunteered  and  accom 
panied  the  Fourth  Michigan  in  the  crossing  and 
return. 


XVI 

SHEPHERDSTOWN SEPTEMBER  2O 

A  MUCH  misunderstood  episode  is  what  is  com 
monly  called  the  Shepherdstown  battle,  on  the  2Oth 
of  September.  This,  while  popularly  described  as 
a  slaughter,  was  in  reality  a  very  creditable  affair; 
and,  had  it  not  been  for  the  abominable  arms  put 
into  the  hands  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth 
Pennsylvania  Regiment,  and  for  which  the  Wash 
ington  authorities  were  alone  responsible,  would 
have  been  considered  a  very  successful  and  neces 
sary  reconnaissance.  Many  like  it  were  subse 
quently  pushed  across  the  Potomac  and  up  the  val 
ley  by  McClellan  during  his  occupancy  of  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  between  September  20  and  Octo 
ber  25,  1862. 

Immediately  after  Lee's  flight  McClellan  sent 
Couch  up  to  Williamsport  and  directed  Pleasonton, 
with  the  cavalry,  not  to  cross  the  Potomac  "unless 
you  see  a  splendid  opportunity  to  inflict  great  dam 
age  upon  the  enemy  without  loss  to  yourself."  And 
he  was  to  send  half  his  force,  with  two  batteries, 
to  the  Shepherdstown  front,  where  Fitz  John  Porter 
had  advanced  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  with  the 
Sixth  Corps  in  support. 


SHEPHERDSTOWN  155 

On  the  morning  of  the  2Oth  General  Sykes  was 
ordered  to  send  a  brigade  of  his  regulars  across  the 
Potomac  on  a  reconnaisance.  After  coming  in  con 
tact  with  the  rear  of  the  retreating  enemy,  he  sent 
back  for  another  of  his  regular  brigades.  With  this 
latter  brigade  was  sent  the  old  First  Brigade  of 
Morell's  division.  This  First  Brigade  was  com 
posed  of  six  veteran  regiments,  which,  in  the  Seven 
Days,  had  lost  900  men,  with  one  of  its  regiments 
detailed  away  elsewhere ;  and  in  the  Pope  campaign 
it  had  lost  nearly  600  more,  with  another  one  of  its 
regiments  detailed  away.  Such  regiments  as  the 
Twenty-second  Massachusetts,  First  Michigan, 
Thirteenth  New  York,  and  Second  Maine  speak  for 
themselves,  and  could  always  take  care  of  them 
selves.  But  brigaded  with  these  veterans  was  the 
entirely  new  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Penn 
sylvania,  which  knew  nothing  of  war  nor  of  how 
to  take  care  of  itself.  To  crown  all,  this  regiment 
had  been  supplied  by  the  War  Department,  when  it 
left  Washington  (see  Colonel  Gwyn's  Report), 
with  condemned  Enfield  pieces,  not  more  than  fifty 
per  cent,  of  which  could  be  discharged.  A  very 
gallant  sergeant  of  that  regiment  told  me  that  they 
had  to  beat  down  the  hammers  with  a  stone  to  make 
them  go  off,  and  many  of  the  nipples  were  broken 
off  besides.  Then  Colonel  Prevost,  the  commander, 
was  shot  down  as  soon  as  he  himself  took  the  colors 
to  the  front ;  and  the  whole  regiment,  we  may  know 
from  this  circumstance  alone,  had  become  balled  up, 


156  ANTIETAM 

part  of  it  being  caught  by  the  enemy  while  still 
in  fours.  They  could  neither  advance  nor  retire, 
and  lingered  there,  irresolute  and  confused,  while 
the  remainder  of  the  brigade,  under  orders,  safely 
retired  to  and  across  the  river,  with  a  loss  of  less 
than  nine  men  to  a  regiment — the  purpose  of  the 
reconnaissance  having  been  accomplished  and  the 
question  of  the  enemy's  movement  toward  Williams- 
port  settled.  About  two  hundred  men  of  the  regi 
ment  thus  left  behind  were  gotten  together  and  the 
enemy  heroically  charged,  but  these  few  were  soon 
driven  back,  and  then  the  only  thing  to  do  was  to 
try  to  escape.  High  rocky  bluffs  and  lime-kilns 
were  in  their  rear  along  the  river,  and  down  these 
they  slid  and  tumbled,  hid  under  the  bluffs  or 
tried  to  ford  the  river;  finally  most  of  them  got 
away. 

The  official  casualty  returns  of  all  the  Union 
troops  on  both  sides  of  the  river  for  September  19 
and  20  make  the  losses  363 ;  the  losses  for  the  One 
Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania  alone  are 
stated  at  269.  Colonel  Gwyn  in  his  report,  dated 
September  30,  puts  them  at  277.  But  an  examina 
tion  of  the  muster-out — and  corrected — roster  of 
this  regiment  shows  that  the  actual  losses  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  on  that  day  were  71 
killed  or  died  of  wounds,  71  wounded  and  saved, 
4  wounded  and  captured,  and  63  captured  un- 
wounded,  making  a  total  of  209.  As  before  stated, 
some  of  those  captured  doubtless  allowed  them- 


SHEPHERDSTOWN  157 

selves  to  be  taken,  for  16  of  these  deserted  after 
they  had  been  returned  to  their  regiment. 

The  actual  losses  of  the  Union  troops  across  the 
river  on  September  20  were  279,  for  the  whole  of 
the  eleven  regiments  engaged.  The  magnitude  of 
the  enemy's  forces  which  engaged  these  regiments 
seems  startling.  A.  P.  Hill  reports  that  he  had  in 
the  battle  itself,  in  the  first  line,  the  brigades  of 
Pender,  Gregg,  and  Thomas,  consisting  of  13  regi 
ments;  in  the  second  line,  the  brigades  of  Lane, 
Archer,  and  Brockenbrough,  consisting  of  14  regi 
ments;  and  (see  Early 's  Report)  in  supporting  line 
of  battle,  in  rear,  the  brigades  of  Early,  Hays,  and 
Trimble,  consisting  of  i6l/2  regiments,  making  an 
opposing  total  of  9  brigades,  comprising  43^  regi 
ments,  besides  all  their  artillery.  The  commanding 
officer  was  Stonewall  Jackson. 

Their  losses  in  this  little  engagement  were  262,  a 
difference,  compared  with  the  actual  Union  losses, 
of  only  17.  But  they  got  glory  out  of  it,  for  A.  P. 
Hill,  in  his  report,  told  those  at  Richmond — and 
those  at  Washington,  also — that  "then  commenced 
the  most  terrible  slaughter  that  this  war  has  yet 
witnessed.  The  broad  surface  of  the  Potomac  was 
blue  with  the  floating  bodies  of  our  foe.  But  few 
escaped  to  tell  the  tale.  By  their  own  account  they 
lost  3000  men,  killed  and  drowned,  from  one  brig 
ade  alone.  Some  200  prisoners  were  taken.  My 
own  loss  was  30  killed  and  231  wounded ;  total  261." 
To  which  are  to  be  added  Early's  losses  (p.  975, 


158  ANTIETAM 

War  Records,  vol.  xix,  part  i,  page  975),  making 
the  total,  as  stated,  262.  It  would  have  taken  a  life- 
preserver  to  float  a  body  in  the  Potomac  at  that 
time,  and  A.  P.  Hill  knew  it,  for  with  his  foot-sore 
tatterdemalions  he  had  footed  it  across  that  river 
both  ways,  back  and  forth,  twice  within  the  previous 
three  days.  Poor  McClellan!  Poor  Fitz  John 
Porter!  Poor  History!  The  tale  went;  all  hands 
were  willing. 


XVII 

STUART'S  USELESS  CAVALRY  RAIDS — THE  RAIDS  OF 

FORREST THE   UNION   RAID  I 

FERRY,  SEPTEMBER  14-15,  1 862 


FORREST THE     UNION     RAID    FROM     HARPER^S 


ANOTHER  misfortune  befell  the  Confederate 
army  a  few  days  later.  It  was  "Stuart's  ride 
around  McClellan,"  also  heralded  as  a  great  "Rebel 
success."  It  certainly  did  frighten  the  Pennsylvania 
farmers — of  whom  my  own  folks  were  a  part — for 
the  safety  of  Nell  and  Dobbin.  However,  Stuart 
merely  wore  out  his  cavalry  horses  and  had  to  re 
mount  his  men  on  Pennsylvania  farm-horses  to  es 
cape — which  broke  down  and  went  to  pieces,  as  his 
reports  show — as  soon  as  McClellan's  great  move 
ment  began  at  the  end  of  October.  This  very 
expedition  paved  the  way  for  our  own  cavalry's 
triumphant  advance,  and  made  Stuart's  resistance 
useless.  The  "glory,"  which  Stuart  so  loved,  gave 
him  the  added  theatrical  eclat  to  "do  it  again"  next 
year,  when  "he  rode  around"  Meade  so  far  that  he 
lost  Lee  entirely,  and  so  destroyed  Lee's  sole  oppor 
tunity  for  a  successful  invasion  or  of  winning  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg.  Stuart  did  no  more  "riding 
around"  after  that  campaign,  you  may  be  sure.  He 

159 


160  ANTIETAM 

was  a  brilliant  soldier,  but  theatrical  and  boastful, 
and  he  did  not  understand  war  in  its  larger  aspects. 

We  have  the  type  of  a  scientifically  correct  "rid 
ing  around,"  or  riding  through,  by  cavalry  in  the 
operations  of  Forrest, — who  was  a  born  general, — 
and  of  Van  Dorn,  when  they  rode  around  Grant 
in  the  late  fall  of  1862  while  Grant  was  moving 
down  to  Meridian,  and  Jackson,  and  Central  Mis 
sissippi,  to  strike  Vicksburg  in  the  rear.  They 
reached  and  struck  Holly  Springs,  Grant's  base  of 
supplies,  destroyed  it  and  tore  up  the  railroads  north 
from  Jackson  and  north  from  Tallahatchie,  and,  as 
Grant  graphically  says,  December  23,  1862,  "have 
cut  me  off  from  supplies,  so  that  farther  advance  by 
this  route  is  perfectly  impracticable.  The  country 
does  not  afford  supplies  for  troops  and  but  a  limited 
supply  of  forage."  And  so  Grant's  great  army, 
then  far  south,  was  sucked  back,  as  it  were,  and  the 
movement  was  never  undertaken  again. 

Or,  take  the  cavalry  expedition  from  Harper's 
Ferry  on  the  night  of  September  14  and  morning 
of  September  15,  just  before  the  Battle  of  Antietam, 
of  which  it  was  a  part,  and  which  it  so  powerfully 
influenced.  I  was  one  of  this  expedition,  and  can 
confirm  Colonel  Voss'  unofficial  report,  for,  by  the 
scattering  of  these  temporarily  joined  organizations, 
after  Antietam,  no  full  report  was  ever  sent  in. 
The  cavalry  at  Harper's  Ferry,  on  Sunday,  Sep 
tember  14,  demanded  that  they  be  allowed  to  go  out, 
first,  to  escape  surrender,  and  second,  to  strike  and 


CAVALRY  RAIDS  161 

damage  the  Confederates  by  a  night  attack,  if  pos 
sible.  There  were  about  1500  to  2000  cavalry,  in 
four  or  five  different  organizations — the  Twelfth 
Illinois  cavalry,  Seventh  squadron  Rhode  Island 
cavalry  (to  which  I  was  attached),  the  First  Mary 
land  cavalry  (two  organizations),  and  the  Eighth 
New  York  cavalry,  the  whole  placed  under  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Voss,  who  says  :  "The  commanding 
officers  of  the  several  cavalry  organizations  held  a 
meeting  to  discuss  the  feasibility  of  escape  by  cutting 
their  way  through  the  enemy's  lines.  Present  at 
this  meeting  were  Colonel  Davis,  commanding 
Eighth  New  York  cavalry;  Major  Corliss,  com 
manding  the  Rhode  Island  Squadron;  Lieutenant 
Green,  commanding  detachments  from  First  Mary 
land  cavalry;  myself,  and  my  second  in  command, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Hasbrouck  Davis.  It  was  unani 
mously  agreed  that  the  plan  was  feasible,  and  a  com 
mittee  was  appointed  to  obtain  the  consent  of  Col 
onel  Miles,  the  commander  of  the  fort.  At  first 
he  would  not  listen  to  such  a  proposition  at  all,  de 
nouncing  it  as  wild  and  impracticable,  imperiling 
the  lives  of  the  whole  command;  but  he  finally 
yielded,  and  assented  to  the  expedition." 

At  this  time  Stonewall  Jackson,  Ewell,  and  A. 
P.  Hill  lay  across  the  angle  in  rear  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  on  the  Virginia  side,  from  the  Potomac  to 
the  Shenandoah;  General  Walker,  with  his  division 
and  his  heavy  guns,  occupied  Loudon  Heights, 
across  the  Shenandoah,  looking  down  on  Harper's 


162  ANTIETAM 

Ferry,  and  the  two  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Ander 
son  occupied  the  Maryland  side  of  the  river  below 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  had  crowned  Maryland 
Heights  with  artillery;  while  two  of  McLaws'  brig 
ades,  having  penetrated  Solomon's  Gap,  lay  along 
the  northern  slopes  of  Maryland  Heights  above 
Harper's  Ferry.  During  Sunday  afternoon  the 
town  was  under  bombardment  from  all  three  posi 
tions,  and  Jackson  had  attacked  for  position  with 
his  infantry  also. 

The  place  surrendered  at  8 . 30  next  morning,  but 
without  the  cavalry,  or  their  1500  trained  cavalry 
horses.  On  Sunday,  also,  the  battles  of  South 
Mountain  and  Crampton's  Gap  had  been  fought, 
within  hearing.  In  the  night,  D.  H.  Hill,  from 
the  former,  and  Longstreet,  from  Boonsborough 
and  Hagerstown,  were  moving  down  to  Sharps- 
burg,  and  Anderson  and  McLaws  had  been  driven 
by  Franklin  down  Pleasant  Valley,  and  were  occu 
pying  both  sides  of  Maryland  Heights  to  the 
Potomac. 

The  expedition  crossed  the  river,  commencing 
at  8.30  o'clock  P.  M._,  in  darkness,  by  the  single, 
slight,  pontoon  bridge  in  place  there,  turned  up 
the  north  bank,  and  almost  at  once  climbed  a  very 
steep  log  road  to  the  summit  of  the  mountainous 
belt  between  Elk  Ridge  and  the  Antietam  Creek. 
One  company  turned,  by  mistake,  to  the  right,  and 
in  a  few  moments  came  upon  the  enemy.  The  night 
was  very  dark;  the  first  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  was 


CAVALRY  RAIDS  163 

through  the  mountains  by  rough  mountain  roads, 
and  not  till  the  Antietam  was  nearly  reached  did 
we  emerge  from  this  almost  impassable  kind  of 
country.  McLaws'  pickets  were  encountered  on 
this  mountain  road,  and  the  Confederate  camp-fires 
were  smoldering  everywhere ;  but  by  a  curious  coin 
cidence  (see  McLaws)  just  as  the  night  came  on 
the  brigades  of  Kershaw  and  Barksdale,  excepting 
one  regiment,  \vere  withdrawn  from  the  top  and 
western  slopes  of  Maryland  Heights,  to  form  a  line 
of  battle  across  Pleasant  Valley,  to  the  east,  and  this 
accidental  evacuation  left  the  road  nearly  clear  for 
the  cavalry.  At  Sharpsburg  we  struck  the  main 
Boonsborough-Shepherdstown  pike,  along  which 
lay,  by  this  time — which  was  after  midnight — • 
Longstreet's  just-arriving  forces.  At  the  north  end 
of  Sharpsburg,  near  an  old  church,  a  strong  Con 
federate  picket  \vas  encountered,  wrhich  fired  upon 
the  closed  up  head  of  our  column — Colonel  Voss 
says  "a  sheet  of  flame  from  at  least  a  hundred 
rifles."  The  column  turned  up  toward  Hagerstown, 
and  the  fence-bars  opening  into  a  field  on  the  left 
of  the  pike  were  let  down,  beyond  Sharpsburg,  and 
below  Jones's  cross-roads,  and  the  route  deflected 
across  country  to  strike  the  Hagerstown  and 
Williamsport  road  where  it  connects  at  right  angles 
with  the  Williamsport  and  Greencastle  road  leading 
up  into  Pennsylvania.  Lee  describes  this  action 
with  his  advance  post  at  Sharpsburg. 

Here  on  the  Hagerstown  pike,  just  before  we  left 


1 64  ANTIETAM 

it,  occurred  another  coincidence.  Right  in  front 
of  us,  marching  down  from  Hagerstown  to  Sharps- 
burg,  Benning's  brigade  (see  Benning's  report) 
was  approaching;  we  had  hardly  cleared  the  pike 
when  it  reached  that  point,  and  marched  by,  on  its 
way  to  Sharpsburg.  There  it  heard  of  the  cavalry 
raid,  and  two  of  its  regiments  were  at  once  turned 
back,  without  a  halt,  to  pursue  the  cavalry  and  pro 
tect  Longstreet's  threatened  wagon  trains.  They 
did  not  overtake  the  cavalry,  however,  which 
marched  more  than  fifty  miles  that  night,  mostly 
over  abominable  roads,  and  much  of  it  in  impene 
trable  darkness.  But  these  two  Confederate  regi 
ments,  by  reason  of  this  pursuit,  did  not  reach 
Antietam  till  near  noon  on  the  1 7th,  were  then  worn 
out,  and  could  not  take  their  place  with  the  Second 
and  Twentieth  Georgia  in  defending  the  Antietam 
Creek  and  the  bridge  against  Burnside,  but  were 
put  into  the  general  line  of  battle,  the  Confederates 
thus  being  able  to  oppose  only  two  regiments  in 
stead  of  four  against  Burnside's  attack. 

And  see  also  General  Pendleton's  report  (chief 
of  artillery),  who  passed  Jones'  cross-roads  almost 
immediately  afterward  from  Boonsborough  to  Wil- 
liamsport,  which  fixes  the  route  of  the  cavalry. 
War  Records,  vol.  xix,  part  i,  pp.  829-830. 

After  leaving  the  pike,  says  Colonel  Voss,  "we 
were  also  guided  in  choosing  our  path  by  the  faint 
glimmer  of  their  bivouac  fires."  (See  report  of 
Confederate  General  Pendleton,  War  Records,  vol. 


CAVALRY  RAIDS  165 

xix,  part  i,  page  830,  "I  immediately  posted  guns 
to  the  front  and  on  the  flank,  sent  messengers  to 
General  Toombs,  understood  to  be  at  Sharpsburg, 
for  a  regiment  or  two  of  infantry,  set  to  work  col 
lecting  a  band  of  armed  stragglers,  and  sent  scouts 
to  the  front.")  These  stragglers  were  those  who 
brought  the  information  to  General  Pendleton,  and 
through  whom,  in  the  cornfields,  we  had  been, 
riding.  These  were  ridden  through  headlong, 
as  it  was  now  moonlight,  and  our  columns  were 
closed  up.  We  then  emerged  on  the  Hagers- 
town  and  Williamsport  road,  when  a  third  coin 
cidence  occurred.  Lee  was  sending  his  trains 
across  the  river,  by  Williamsport,  and  Longstreet's 
ammunition  train  had  already  left  Hagerstown  and 
was  pushing  down  toward  Williamsport,  but  had 
not  yet  reached  the  point  where  we  now  struck  the 
road,  in  the  first  gray  dawn  of  the  morning.  The 
rumble  of  many  wagons  came  from  the  right  and 
clouds  of  yellow  dust  were  there  seen  rising.  His 
train  consisted  of  "85  army  wagons,"  says  Colonel 
Voss,  "each  drawn  by  six  fine  mules,  and  loaded 
with  munitions  of  war  and  provisions,  and  followed 
by  thirty  or  forty  head  of  fat  young  steers."  In 
addition,  many  of  the  wagons  had  wounded  men 
piled  upon  their  loads,  175  in  all,  I  believe,  who  be 
came  prisoners,  including  a  brigadier-general.  The 
train  was  captured  entire.  Our  troopers  went  with 
it,  and  turned  each  of  the  wagons  to  the  right,  at  the 
intersection  with  the  Greencastle  road,  just  below, 


1 66  ANTIETAM 

and  took  them  on  a  dead  run  up  toward  Pennsyl 
vania  while  the  main  force  remained  behind  to  head 
off  and  occupy  the  wagon  guard,  said  to  have  con 
sisted  of  a  brigade  of  infantry.  We  soon  got  out 
of  their  reach,  with  some  desultory  firing,  blew  up 
with  their  own  ammunition  sixteen  of  the  wagons 
which  broke  down  in  the  rush,  and  entered  Green- 
castle,  covered  with  dust,  and  hungry,  at  9  o'clock 
A.  M.,  Monday,  September  15.  Next  day  the  com 
mand  was  ordered  to  Antietam,  and  posted  on  the 
extreme  right,  below  Jones'  cross-roads,  near  the 
pike.  See  War  Records,  vol.  LI,  part  i,  Supple 
mental,  p.  851.  Colonel  Voss  reported  more  than 
600  prisoners  taken  in  this  operation. 

Now  this  was  a  good  cavalry  expedition.  We 
saved  1500  to  2000  good  cavalry  horses  from  fall 
ing  into  Jackson's  hands,  we  put  two  Confederate 
regiments  out  of  four  out  of  the  Antietam  fight, 
just  where  they  were  most  needed,  and  we  captured 
one-third,  or  even  more,  of  Longstreet's  whole  am 
munition  train,  all  his  reserve  ammunition,  and  a  lot 
of  prisoners  and  beef  on  the  hoof.  This  was  one 
of  those  humorous  occasions  concerning  which  the 
President  asked  General  McClellan,  October  24 : 
"Will  you  pardon  me  for  asking  what  the  horses 
of  your  army  have  clone  since  the  battle  of  Antietam 
that  fatigues  anything?"  He  ought  to  have  read 
General  Pleasonton's  reports  and  dispatches;  per 
haps  he  had  no  opportunity. 

It  is  doubtful  indeed  whether  they  ever  learned 


CAVALRY  RAIDS  167 

of  this  expedition  at  all  at  Washington;  but  Long- 
street  wrote,  more  than  fifteen  years  after  the 
event :  "The  service  you  refer  to  was  very  credita 
ble,  and  gave  us  much  inconvenience.  The  command 
being  in  retreat,  and  in  more  or  less  apprehension 
for  its  own  safety,  seems  to  have  exercised  more 
than  usual  discretion  and  courage." 

General  John  G.  Walker,  who  was  upon  Long- 
street's  right  and  held  the  Confederate  center  in  the 
battle  of  Antietam,  told  me,  after  the  war,  that  the 
loss  to  Longstreet  was  very  serious,  and  that  the 
exploit  itself  was  looked  upon  by  the  Confederates 
as  a  most  remarkable  achievement.  One  of  our 
regular  army  officers  at  Vicksburg  afterward  told, 
in  my  hearing,  that  he  had  chanced  to  be  in  Green- 
castle,  Pa.,  on  some  duty  at  that  time,  and  said  that 
"he  never  was  so  proud  of  American  soldiers  as  one 
morning  in  September,  1862,  when  he  saw  the 
Union  cavalry  coming  up  out  of  Lee's  army  with 
his  long  train  of  ammunition  and  a  lot  of  prisoners 
in  their  possession."  When  I  told  him  that  I  was 
one  of  that  party,  he  came  over  and  congratulated 
me  again  and  again.  Alas !  he  was  soon  afterward 
himself  killed,  so  that  even  he  could  not  report  it. 
McClellan  alone  speaks  of  it.  In  his  despatch  to 
Halleck,  September  23,  he  recommended  Colonel 
B.  F.  Davis — dear  old  Grimes  Davis — for  promo 
tion  in  the  regular  army,  from  captain  to  brevet- 
major,  "for  conspicuous  conduct"  on  this  occasion. 
He  received  his  promotion,  and  the  next  June,  at 


i68  ANTIETAM 

Beverly  Ford,  says  Pleasonton's  report,  "the  brave 
and  accomplished  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis,  while  com 
manding  a  brigade,  charged  at  the  head  of  his 
column  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy  and  was  shot 
through  the  head."  He  would  have  reached  high 
rank  had  he  survived. 


XVIII 


ATTACK  UP  THE  VALLEY 

AFTER  Lee's  flight  across  the  river,  and  his  pre 
cipitate  sending  back  of  the  divisions  of  A.  P.  Hill 
and  Early  to  meet  a  threatened  advance  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  army,  McClellan  bent  all  his  energies  to 
preparing  to  cross  the  Potomac  directly  in  his  front 
and  attack  Lee  in  the  lower  Shenandoah  Valley. 
To  determine  whether  Lee  would  stand  for  a  fight 
to  a  finish  or  retire  up  the  valley,  to  return  when 
the  pressure  was  relieved,  it  was  necessary  to  make 
repeated  reconnaissances  in  force,  with  bodies 
strong  enough  to  fight  a  battle,  if  necessary.  To  attack 
Lee  successfully,  or  to  so  move  as  to  avoid  the  neces 
sity  of  giving  up  the  whole  movement  halfway,  and 
turning  back  to  follow  Lee  again  to  Pennsylvania,  it 
was  necessary  to  have  either  the  Potomac  rise  so 
as  to  make  it  possible  to  cut  him  off  if  he  crossed,  or 
else  to  cross  and  attack  him  in  front,  behind  the 
Potomac.  A  move  by  McClellan  up  east  of  the 
mountains  at  this  time  would  inevitably  have 
brought  Lee  north  again,  and  with  terrific  conse 
quences  down  at  Washington. 

.169 


170  ANTIETAM 

This  direct  attack  was  the  plan  McClellan  urged, 
and  it  took  all  the  power  and  influence  of  the  Gov 
ernment  to  force  McClellan  to  adopt  the  slower  and 
less  direct  method  of  moving  up  east  of  the  moun 
tains,  and  so  "threaten  Richmond,"  as  it  was  called, 
nearly  two  hundred  miles  away.  They  offered  him 
the  splendid  bribe  of  a  whole  added  army  from 
Washington  to  aid  him  if  he  would  adopt  this  plan. 
And  they  did  much  more ;  they  so  retarded  his  sup 
plies  that  he  could  not  attack,  defeat,  and  afterward 
pursue  Lee  up  the  valley,  as  I  shall  describe.  Mc 
Clellan  well  knew — and  Lee  knew  it  as  well  as  Mc 
Clellan,  for  his  dispatches  are  full  of  it — that  as 
soon  as  McClellan  passed  up  east  of  the  mountains 
Jackson  would  cross  the  still  shallow  Potomac  into 
Pennsylvania,  with  Longstreet  guarding  the  passes 
south  of  the  Potomac,  to  prevent  McClellan's  direct 
interference.  (See  Lee's  reports.) 

No  one  need  doubt  what  would  have  happened 
then  in  Washington,  in  the  North,  and  to  McClel 
lan  and  his  army,  and  to  himself  personally.  So 
McClellan's  only  attack  was  a  direct  frontal  attack, 
provided  Lee  would  stand  and  take  it  rather  than 
give  up  the  still  comparatively  rich  lower  Shenan- 
doah  Valley,  where  his  army  was  now  feeding  and 
recuperating  as  well  as  getting  reinforcements,  for 
the  new  conscription  law,  taking  in  all  under  forty- 
live  (instead  of  thirty-five),  had  gone  into  effect 
just  previously. 

September  26  McClellan   sent  a  cavalry   recon- 


McCLELLAN'S  FRONTAL  ATTACK    171 

naissance  from  Shepherdstown  toward  Martinsburg, 
and  found  the  enemy  in  force  two  miles  back  of 
Shepherdstown.  October  2  a  reconnaissance  in 
force  was  made  to  Martinsburg.  The  enemy  were 
found  in  force  near  Bunker  Hill.  Pleasonton,  in 
his  report  of  October  14,  details  these  actions;  Lee, 
October  2,  gives  a  graphic  account  of  this  fight. 
General  Kimball,  with  his  brigade,  and  the  Sixth 
United  States  cavalry  and  two  batteries,  advanced 
from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Leesburg,  October  3.  After 
the  pursuit  of  Stuart,  and  the  return  from  his  fruit 
less  raid,  October  10,  General  Humphreys,  with  a 
force  of  6000  infantry,  500  cavalry,  and  6  pieces 
of  artillery,  crossed  at  Shepherdstown  and  advanced 
to  Charlestown  and  Leetown.  The  Confederates 
lost  24  men  in  resisting  this  advance.  At  the  same 
time  General  Hancock,  with  the  whole  of  his  division 
and  1500  men  of  other  divisions,  and  a  force  of 
cavalry  and  artillery,  advanced  on  Charlestown  also, 
and  General  McClellan  accompanied  the  force  and 
directed  its  operations  in  general.  October  20  a 
reconnaissance  was  made  by  General  Geary,  to 
Lovettsville,  across  from  Berry ville,  and  on  the 
mountain.  The  Confederate  army  had  retired  to 
near  Winchester.  The  fall  rains  were  at  hand,  and 
both  armies  were  being  refitted,  as  best  they  could, 
for  the  next  movements.  So  the  month  of  October 
was  passing  away,  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
starving  for  supplies  or  fed  from  hand  to  mouth, 
and  clothed  scarcely  at  all. 


172  ANTIETAM 

It  was  not  till  October  16  that  Lee  (see  letter 
to  General  Loring,  W.  R.)  gave  up  his  idea  of 
entering  Pennsylvania  if  McClellan's  movements 
gave  him  the  opportunity. 

No  army  during  the  whole  war  needed  supplies 
more  than  McClellan's  army  at  this  time,  unless  it 
was  the  army  of  Lee,  who  says,  in  his  letter  to 
President  Davis,  September  28 :  "History  records 
but  few  examples  of  a  greater  amount  of  labor  and 
fighting  than  has  been  done  by  this  army  during 
the  present  campaign."  Of  course,  what  was  true 
of  Lee's  army  was  true  of  McClellan's,  with  this 
proviso,  that  the  next  move  must  be  an  aggressive 
advance  by  McClellan  away  from  his  supplies  and 
a  defensive  retirement  by  Lee  upon  his  supplies. 
See  Grant's  statement  about  his  pursuit  of  Lee  in 
1865,  chapter  xxix,  in  this  narrative. 


XIX 

DOCTORED    SYSTEM    OF    SUPPLIES    FOR    M^CLELLAN's 

ARMY 

BUT  McClellan's  army  on  the  upper  Potomac  was 
not  supplied.  Lee  knew  this  very  well.  Lee  writes, 
October  i :  "I  think  it  probable  that  as  yet  Gen 
eral  McClellan  is  able  only  to  procure  supplies  from 
day  to  day."  Again :  "I  think  he  is  yet  unable  to 
move,  and  finds  difficulty  in  procuring  provisions 
from  day  to  day."  October  9 :  "I  do  not  think  that 
he  is  able  to  make  any  move  yet."  October  n: 
"Notwithstanding  the  assertions  of  the  Northern 
papers,  I  think  this  [McClellan's]  army  is  not  yet 
sufficiently  recuperated  from  its  campaign  in  Mary 
land  to  make  a  vigorous  forward  move." 

The  components  of  McClellan's  army  had 
marched  and  fought  since  spring  over  all  eastern 
Virginia  and  over  a  large  portion  of  North  Caro 
lina  and  Maryland.  A  family  of  school  children 
would  want  a  couple  of  new  outfits  in  that  time.  The 
Cumberland  Valley,  Northern  Central,  and  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  railroads  delivered  their  trains  right 
into  the  camps  of  McClellan's  army,  and  the  Chesa 
peake  and  Ohio  canal  came  up  to  its  very  doors. 

Now  the  most  ingenious  contrivance  was  put 
173 


174  ANTIETAM 

into  operation,  of  which  you  may  be  sure  that 
neither  President  Lincoln  nor  Secretaries  Seward 
and  Welles  had  any  knowledge,  whereby  the  whole 
country  would  feel  that  McClellan's  army  in  the 
field  was  having  supplies  flooded  in  upon  it  in  al 
most  unexampled  quantities,  and  which  yet  left  his 
army  to  sit  down  to  a  veritable  Barmecide  feast,  in 
which  everything  was  snatched  away  when  almost 
within  its  grasp.  We  need  not  necessarily  suppose 
that  this  was  deliberately  done  by  any  high  military 
officers,  for,  as  Napoleon  said,  "Generals  are  always 
asking  for  more,  and  never  have  enough."  But  it 
robbed  McClellan's  army  of  its  supplies  just  the 
same. 

It  will  be  recollected  that,  after  President  Lin 
coln  had,  in  a  personal  interview,  September  i, 
directed  McClellan  to  take  charge  of  the  fortifica 
tions  and  troops  in  Washington,  when  Pope's 
routed  army  was  streaming  back,  Halleck,  on  be 
half  of  the  War  Department,  issued  general  orders 
No.  122,  dated  September  2:  "Major  General 
McClellan  will  have  command  of  the  fortifications 
of  Washington  and  of  all  the  troops  for  the  de 
fense  of  the  capital."  This  order  had  not  been  re 
voked,  and,  indeed,  so  far  as  the  public  was  con 
cerned,  was  the  only  actual  authority  under  which 
General  McClellan  was  doing  any  work  at  all, 
either  in  Washington  or  elsewhere. 

How  McClellan  took  command  in  the  field  is 
most  graphically  told  in  the  Report  of  the  Commit- 


DOCTORED  SYSTEM  OF  SUPPLIES  175 

tee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  (see  General  Up 
ton's  "Military  Policy,"  p.  376).  "Bragg  in  the 
West  had  begun  his  march  toward  the  Ohio  River, 
while  Lee  with  renewed  confidence  was  crossing 
into  Maryland.  For  two  or  three  days  the  Presi 
dent  consulted  his  advisers,  but  with  no  satisfactory 
result.  At  last,  assuming  all  the  responsibility,  he 
took  the  general-in-chief  with  him,  turned  his  back 
on  the  War  Department,  and,  without  disclosing 
his  purpose,  proceeded  to  the  home  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  where,  for  the  moment,  he  brought  the 
long  controversy  to  a  close  by  saying:  'General, 
you  will  take  command  of  the  forces  in  the  field.' ' 
This  command  was  verbal  only,  and  was  in  contra 
diction  of  the  still  standing  official  orders  of  the 
War  Department  of  September  2.  And  the  War 
Department  then  turned  its  back  on  both  the  Presi 
dent  and  General  McClellan,  issued  no  new  orders, 
and  did  not  revoke  or  modify  the  previous  one. 

As  a  result,  everything  that  went  to  the  eighty 
thousand  men  lying  around  Washington,  or  fear 
lessly  riding  through  its  streets  and  suburbs,  and 
whatever  was  required  for  all  the  needs  of  society 
and  recreation,  "went  to  McClellan's  army,"  and 
the  people  everywhere  believed  that  it  actually  did. 
It  was  on  the  principle  by  which  the  husband  com 
pelled  his  wife  to  take  the  castor-oil  prescribed  for 
him,  since  they  were  married  and  were  really  both 
the  same.  And  that  is  why  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  sat  down  to  a  Barmecide  feast  from  the  I7th 


176  ANTIETAM 

of  September  to  the  I5th  of  October,  and  then  for 
the  next  two  weeks  had  such  a  flood  of  clothing, 
food,  and  supplies  poured  in  upon  its  hapless  head 
that  they  could  not  be  distributed,  but  were  left  in 
great  piles  at  the  depot  or  on  the  dumps  when  the 
army  marched  away  from  them,  picking  up  what 
they  could  as  they  passed. 

The  following  statement  from  the  Chief  Quarter 
master  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  will  show  the 
comparative  numbers  of  the  most  essential  supplies 
received  at  the  different  depots  of  the  army  actually 
in  the  field,  and  which  could  have  been  of  any  pos 
sible  use  only  to  the  army  in  the  field,  for  two  dif 
ferent  periods,  the  first  up  to  October  15,  from  Sep 
tember  i,  a  period  of  forty-two  days  (six  weeks) ; 
the  second  from  October  15  up  to  October  31,  a 
period  of  sixteen  days  (two  weeks  and  two  days)  : 

AGGREGATE,  FIRST  42  DAYS.  AGGREGATE,  SECOND  16  DAYS. 

Coats  and  jackets.  17,500  Coats  and  jackets. 33,000 

Pairs    stockings. .  .28,000  Pairs    stockings. .  .95,000 

Pairs    drawers. ..  .27,700  Pairs    drawers. ..  .70,000 

Flannel     and    knit  Flannel    and    knit 

shirts     27,000  shirts     36,000 

Trousers    16,000  Trousers    77,5oo 

Blankets    20  Blankets     1 1,000 

Boots  and  bootees .  19,000  Boots  and  bootees .  77,000 

Aggregate  per  day,  3220  Aggregate  per  day,  25,210 

But  Lee's  army  fared  a  little  better.  He  got 
5000  pairs  of  shoes  while  in  Maryland;  6400  on 


DOCTORED  SYSTEM  OF  SUPPLIES  177 

October  2.  Jackson  was  getting  400  pairs  per 
week,  and  Lee  8150  pairs  when  McClellan  moved, 
while  October  28,  the  Confederate  Secretary  of 
War  reported  nearly  enough  clothing  to  supply  the 
army  for  the  winter. 

Colonel  Ingalls,  the  chief  quartermaster,  says 
of  this  extreme  slowness  in  supplying  McClellan : 
"From  this  cause  we  were  very  late  in  receiving 
clothing,  and  much  of  it  arrived  at  Berlin  too  late 
for  issue,  as  the  army  was  already  on  its  march  to 
White  Plains,  Warrenton,  etc."  Fifty  thousand 
suits  of  clothing  were  left  at  Harper's  Ferry,  partly 
on  the  cars  and  partly  in  store. 

General  Meigs  stated  to  Halleck,  October  14, 
that  9254  horses  had  been  "issued"  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  since  the  battles  in  front  of  Wash 
ington;  but  the  report  of  Quartermaster  Myers, 
October  31,  shows  that  only  3813  of  these  came  to 
McClellan's  own  army;  while,  during  the  same 
period  3000  had  been  turned  over  to  the  Quarter 
master's  Department,  from  that  army,  as  worn 
out;  and  1500  more  were  unfit  and  diseased. 


XX 

THE   GREAT   MOVEMENT   ON    CULPEPER 

THERE  is  no  military  movement  in  the  art  of  war 
so  fraught  with  danger,  and  almost  certain  disas 
ter,  as  to  endeavor  to  pass  across  the  front  of  a 
vigilant  and  well-commanded  enemy,  even  inferior 
in  strength,  by  the  flank.  This  is  what  McClellan 
accomplished  in  this  great  movement  on  Culpeper, 
in  spite  of  all  that  Stonewall  Jackson  and  Lee,  with 
urgent  orders,  and  Longstreet,  attempted  to  pre 
vent.  Jackson,  at  Winchester,  in  the  valley,  faced 
McClellan's  advance  across  his  front,  directly;  but 
the  gaps  in  the  Blue  Ridge  were  his  only  line,  and 
McClellan,  by  a  swift  right-wheel  in  force,  closed 
them,  one  by  one,  and  left  Jackson  helpless  and 
useless.  As  the  Potomac  was  now,  from  lateness 
of  season,  unavailable  to  Lee,  McClellan  accepted 
the  President's  preference,  to  move  up  the  east 
side  of  the  mountains,  and  crossed  the  Potomac  by 
pontoons,  one  at  Berlin,  just  below  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  the  other  at  Harper's  Ferry  itself. 

The  movement  commenced  October  26, — five 
weeks  after  the  last  gun  was  fired  at  Antietam, — 
by  a  brigade  of  Pleasonton's  cavalry  and  two 

178 


MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER         179 

divisions  of  Burnside's  Ninth  Corps  crossing  at 
Berlin  and  taking  the  advance.  Next  day  the  other 
division  of  Burnside's  Corps  and  the  rest  of 
Pleasonton's  cavalry  crossed,  and  the  First  and 
Sixth  Corps  followed.  The  Second  and  Fifth 
Corps  crossed  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  by  the  2nd 
of  November  the  entire  army  was  across,  and 
started  on  the  march.  A  day,  in  a  heavy  rain,  was 
lost  in  supplying  the  army  with  what  it  could 
hastily  pick  up  from  the  supplies  just  arriving. 
On  the  first  of  November  the  First  Corps  moved  to 
Purcellsville,  the  Second  to  Woodgrove,  the  Fifth 
to  Hillsborough,  and  the  Sixth  was  marching  out 
from  Berlin.  Pleasonton's  cavalry  occupied  Philo- 
mont  and  Bloomfield.  The  army  marched  along  the 
eastern  slopes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  closing  the  gaps 
by  cavalry  and  infantry  as  it  advanced.  The 
Twelfth  Corps,  with  General  Slocum  and  General 
Morell,  were  left  to  guard  the  north  bank  of  the 
Potomac,  from  Harper's  Ferry  up  to  Sharpsburg 
and  Williamsport. 

The  moment  McClellan  started.  Lee  started,  with 
Longstreet's  corps,  up  the  Valley  through  Chester 
Gap  to  Ctilpeper,  leaving  Jackson  near  Winchester, 
with  orders,  of  October  28,  to  that  officer:  "Should 
you  find  that  the  enemy  is  advancing  from  the 
Potomac  east  of  those  mountains,  you  will  cross  by 
either  gap  that  will  bring  you  in  the  best  position  to 
threaten  his  flank  and  cut  off  his  communications." 
But  Jackson  was  not  able  to  do  either.  McClellan 


i8o  ANTIETAM 

advanced  with  such  rapidity  that  Jackson  was 
totally  unable  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  enemy's  com 
munications  or  to  penetrate  the  gaps,  or  even  save 
himself;  so  that  when  later  on  McClellan's  army 
had  advanced  to  within  less  than  six  miles  of  Cul- 
peper,  and  was  about  to  attack, — had  begun  the 
attack,  in  fact, — and  Longstreet  was  forced  to 
order  battle  with  his  own  corps  alone  against  Mc 
Clellan's  whole  army,  Jackson  had  been  bottled  up 
in  the  Valley,  and  was  still  back  at  Winchester,  125 
miles  away  from  Longstreet,  by  the  nearest  route 
he  could  take  to  rejoin  him. 

Stonewall  Jackson  won  many  laurels,  and  he  de 
served  them  all;  but  he  never  won  any  from  Mc- 
Clellan.  Against  McDowell,  at  the  First  Bull  Run, 
he  won  his  badge  of  knighthood.  In  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley  and  beyond,  against  many  com 
manders,  his  army  became  known  as  the  foot- 
cavalry,  and  swept  the  valley  up  and  down,  at  their 
pleasure.  He  played  with  Pope  as  a  cat  plays  with 
mice,  at  Cedar  Mountain  and  the  Second  Manassas, 
and  when  ready  seized  and  shook  him  out  of  his 
skin.  At  Harper's  Ferry  against  Miles — poor 
handicapped,  broken-hearted,  and  syndicate-sacri 
ficed  Miles — he  counted  his  loot  like  an  Eastern 
potentate.  At  Fredericksburg,  against  Burnside, 
he  held  the  Confederate  right,  and  broke  and  baf 
fled  all  who  tried  to  touch  him;  and  at  Chancel- 
lorsville  he  was  the  incarnate  spirit  of  victory 
against  Hooker. 


MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER         181 

But  when  he  touched  McClellan  the  tale  was  dif 
ferent.  When  he,  with  Lee's  great  army  of  vet 
erans  to  aid  him,  struck  McClellan's  right  at 
Games'  Mill,  though  outnumbered  three  to  one, 
Fitz  John  Porter  held  him  at  bay  under  McClel 
lan's  eye  and  command  until  the  night  had  fallen, 
and  then  marched  across  the  Chickahominy  to  join 
the  great  movement  already  in  progress  to  the 
James,  leaving  far  fewer  dead,  and  no  wounded, 
than  the  Confederates  left.  At  White  Oak  Swamp 
McClellan  so  fixed  it  that  Jackson  stood  gazing,  and 
could  not  attack  at  all;  and  when  he  could  and  did 
attack,  at  Malvern  Hill,  he  sorely  wished  that  he 
had  not  done  so.  At  Antietam  historians  scarcely 
know  of  his  place  or  his  deeds;  he  was  merely  "one 
of  those  who  also  fought/'  And  when  McClellan, 
on  his  last  grand  movement  up  east  of  the  moun 
tains  made  him  helpless  to  carry  out  his  instruc 
tions  to  aid  Longstreet's  out-numbered  and  out- 
maneuvered  corps,  or  even  to  save  himself,  Mc 
Clellan  swiftly  and  securely  bottled  him  up  at  Win 
chester,  while  his  own  splendid  army  swept  onward 
to  victory. 

Lee  speaks  of  McClellan's  moving  with  more 
activity  than  usual.  Colonel  Ingalls  says  in  his  re 
port:  "The  march  from  the  Potomac  at  Berlin  to 
Warrenton,  where  General  McClellan  left  the 
army,  was  a  magnificent  spectacle  of  celerity  and 
skill." 

The  public  has  always  believed,  or  has  been  taught 


182  ANTIETAM 

to  believe,  that  McClellan  was  removed  from  the 
command  because  he  was  slow.  He  certainly  was 
not  slow  in  getting  Lee  out  of  Maryland,  eighty 
miles  away  and  eight  days  after  he  was  given  com 
mand  of  the  army;  but  this  march  of  his  army  from 
the  Potomac  to  Culpeper,  by  way  of  Warrenton, 
was  one  which  has  never  been  looked  into,  or  com 
pared,  in  the  light  of  what  has  been  called  "the 
deadly  parallel." 

On  October  25  the  pontoon  bridge  was  con 
structed  at  Berlin.  At  Harper's  Ferry  there  was 
one  across  the  Potomac  and  another  was  thrown 
across  the  mouth  of  the  Shenandoah,  to  connect. 
Two  of  Burnside's  divisions  were  sent  over  at  Ber 
lin,  October  26.  Burnside  wrote  McClellan  a 
friendly  letter  on  the  morning  of  October  27,  pro 
testing  against  McClellan's  rush;  that  the  passage 
was  already  protected,  and  that  he  didn't  want  to 
move  his  other  division  during  the  storm,  because 
the  advance  might  be  reduced  by  sickness  by  the 
time  its  supports  got  up.  McClellan  consented. 
October  28  McClellan  wrote  Lincoln  that  head 
quarters  were  at  Berlin;  that  Franklin's  troops 
were  all  over ;  that  Reynolds  was  massed  at  Berlin, 
completing  his  supplies  of  clothing  "to-day  and 
early  to-morrow" ;  and  that  McClellan  was  about 
starting  for  Lovettsville. 

But  to  learn  from  original  sources  the  dis 
positions  and  movements  of  the  units  of  McClel 
lan's  army  from  this  time  on  until,  and, — at  Burn- 


MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER         183 

side's  request, — for  a  few  days  subsequent  to,  his 
removal,  volume  LI  of  the  Official  Records  must  be 
consulted.  Most  of  these  papers  had  been  removed 
from  the  files,  or  for  some  reason  had  disappeared, — 
possibly  by  the  means  which  Pope  so  fiercely 
charged  against  Halleck  in  the  West  (see  Chap 
ter  xxxv ),  so  that  nearly  all  of  the  most  important 
of  these  papers  could  not  be  included  at  all  in 
volume  xix,  where  they  belonged.  They  were  sub 
sequently  discovered,  and  have  been  inserted  in  the 
Supplemental  Volume,  which  was  not  published 
until  1897,  ten  years  after  the  publication  of  the 
volume  in  which  they  chronologically  belong.  By 
means  of  these  dispatches  and  other  papers  we  are 
now  enabled  to  determine  precisely  what  McClel- 
lan  was  doing  each  day,  where  he  was  operating, 
and  what  means  he  was  employing  to  accomplish 
his  purposes.  In  fact,  all  the  significant  papers  will 
be  found  only  in  the  Supplemental  (LI)  Volume. 
McClellan's  orders  to  Pleasonton,  of  1.30  A.  M., 
Sunday,  October  26,  are  very  explicit.  He  was  to 
cross  the  bridge  at  9  A.  MV — one  of  Burnside's 
divisions  to  precede  and  another  to  follow  him, — 
and  was  to  move  the  same  day  to  Lovettsville,  and 
next  day  to  Purcellsville,  there  to  be  reinforced  by 
Devens.  He  was  to  leave  everything  behind  which 
would  impede  his  movements  for  the  next  three 
days.  Next  day  Sturgis  with  his  division  (of  the 
Ninth  Corps)  was  ordered  to  move  at  twelve 
o'clock  to  Lovettsville.  The  same  day  McClellan 


184  ANTIETAM 

orders  Franklin  to  send  Averell  with  a  strong  cav 
alry  force  to  make  a  reconnaissance  toward  Mar- 
tinsburg.  If  Franklin  finds  that  the  enemy's  in 
fantry  has  moved  toward  Winchester,  then  Frank 
lin  was  to  move  to  Berlin  and  cross  at  once,  "pre 
pared  to  march  next  morning."  October  29  Couch's 
Corps  moved  from  Harper's  Ferry  around  Loudon 
Heights,  and  on  the  morning  of  October  30  Rey 
nolds  crossed  his  corps  at  Berlin,  Meade's  division 
at  7.30,  Rickett's  at  9,  and  Doubleday's  at  n 
o'clock.  October  29  Sturgis  was  ordered  to  move 
at  daylight  next  morning  to  Purcellsville,  to  com 
municate  with  Whipple  near  Hillsborough.  He 
was  to  avoid  interfering  with  Getty  and  Whipple 
marching  on  the  same  road.  Getty  was  then,  the 
same  day,  ordered  to  Bolington,  and  from  thence  to 
Wheatland,  starting  at  daylight.  Stoneman's  cav 
alry  was  ordered  to  connect  with  Getty. 

October  30  Fitz  John  Porter's  Fifth  Corps 
marched  at  i  P.  M.  from  Sharpsburg  to  Weverton, 
in  Pleasant  Valley,  on  the  Potomac.  Same  day 
Franklin's  Corps  moved  from  Hagerstown  by  way 
of  Keedysville,  to  Berlin.  The  same  day  the  Ninth 
Corps  was  far  in  advance,  with  Sturgis  at  the  inter 
section  of  four  roads  near  Hillsborough,  and  with 
artillery  on  the  flank,  Getty  in  reserve  one  mile  in 
rear  to  the  left,  in  position  to  support  Sturgis. 
Pleasonton  was  holding  back  Jackson's  advance 
from  the  valley,  in  Snicker's  Gap.  Next  day,  No 
vember  i, — on  orders  of  the  preceding  day, — Rey- 


MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER         185 

nolds  with  the  First  Corps  moved  by  the  front, 
passing  Burnside  by  the  flank,  and  took  up  posi 
tion  between  Snickersville  and  Hamilton.  Couch 
with  the  Second  Corps  moved  forward  between 
Woodgrove  and  Snickersville,  and  Pleasanton  to 
Philomont,  picketing  the  Snickersville  and  Aldie 
Road,  and  on  to  Upperville. 

By  these  maneuvers  Jackson  was  shut  off  from 
forcing  Snicker's  Gap  and  striking  McClellan's 
communications  opposite  Berryville  and  twenty 
miles  up  from  the  Potomac. 

Meantime  Sykes,  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  on  the 
night  of  October  31  was  ordered  to  march  past 
Humphreys'  division  and  camp  near  Couch.  The 
order  reads :  "While  continuing  to  supply  your, 
command  with  what  it  needs,  you  will  hold  it  in 
readiness  for  active  operations." 

It  will  also  be  seen  from  these  maneuvers,  that  a 
great  army  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  does  not 
march  like  a  gentleman  taking  a  morning  walk  or 
a  commercial  traveler  trying  to  catch  a  train,  but 
by  a  series  of  co-operative  moves,  like  those  of  the 
pieces  of  a  chessboard,  the  combined  result  being 
some  important  point  in  strategy  which  will  call 
"check"  to  the  enemy  in  one  direction,  then  in  an 
other,  and  finally,  if  properly  carried  out,  "check 
mate." 

Battles,  in  a  properly  conducted  war,  are  only 
accidents.  In  the  great  Ulm  campaign  of  Napoleon, 
a  type  of  the  highest  war,  there  was  no  battle  to 


i86  ANTIETAM 

be  called  a  battle  at  all,  yet  Napoleon  captured  three 
separate  armies  outnumbering  his  own,  crushed 
Austria,  captured  her  capital,  and  drove  away  a 
Russian  army.  Says  the  historian:  "Fifty-four 
thousand  prisoners,  12,000  killed  and  wounded,  200 
guns,  80  standards,  and  5000  horses  were  the 
trophies  of  the  campaign."  The  entire  French  loss 
was  6000  men. 

It  has  been  seen  that  by  reason  of  the  woeful 
demoralization  of  the  three  combined  armies  in  the 
Pope  campaign,  McClellan  had  to  reorganize  his 
army  on  the  march  to  Antietam;  and  so,  here,  he 
had  to  supply  his  army  on  the  march  to  Culpeper. 
The  army  was  now  glutted.  For  the  previous  six 
weeks  it  had  been  starved;  for  the  previous  six 
weeks  it  had  been  naked  and  shoeless;  now  on  the 
march  it  had  more  clothing  and  shoes  than  it  had 
strength  to  carry  or  time  to  put  on. 

To  Pleasonton  McClellan  writes  on  the  evening 
of  October  31  :  "Burnside  will  advance  beyond 
Reynolds  on  the  2nd.  I  think  we  shall  continue  to 
advance  from  to-morrow." 

November  i  he  orders  Couch  with  his  Second 
Corps  to  enter  Snicker's  Gap  and  attack  and  carry 
it  at  once.  "General  F.  J.  Porter  will  follow  you 
with  his  corps."  Should  there  be  no  enemy  there, 
he  was  to  leave  a  force  and  push  on,  which  he  did. 
General  Pleasonton  was  at  the  same  time  ordered  to 
advance  and  seize  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad  at 
Springfield.  November  2  the  Fifth  Corps  passed 


MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER         187 

the  Second  Corps,  General  Porter  asking  Couch  to 
see  that  his  wagons  should  not  interfere  with  Por 
ter's  marching.  On  the  night  of  November  i 
Averell  with  his  cavalry  was  ordered  to  leave  off 
observing  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  beyond  the  moun 
tains,  and  join  Pleasonton  by  a  forced  march. 

The  concerted  movements  then  went  on  to  close 
Ashby's  Gap  or  fight  the  enemy,  if  he  appeared 
there.  November  2  Hancock  held  Snicker's  Gap, 
and  dispersed  with  his  artillery  a  Confederate  force 
of  5000  or  6000  that  advanced  to  retake  it.  No 
vember  3  Couch's  Second  and  Burnside's  Ninth 
corps  were  ordered  to  Upperville,  the  entrance  to 
Ashby's  Gap.  November  4  Ashby's  Gap  was  occu 
pied  in  force,  and  held,  and  the  cavalry  was  pushed 
on  to  Piedmont.  The  same  day  the  First  Corps 
was  pushed  forward  to  Rectortown,  on  the  Manas- 
sas  Gap  railroad,  between  that  point  and  White 
Plains.  Couch  still  held  Ashby's  Gap,  now  in  rear, 
with  orders  to  be  ready  to  march  south.  The  same 
day  the  Sixth  Corps  was  ordered  to  Upperville,  and 
Burnside  was  ordered  to  push  on  next  morning  to 
Salem,  beyond  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad. 

At  the  same  time  Pleasonton  was  ordered  to  move 
on  with  his  cavalry  toward  Chester  Gap  and  down 
the  road  thence  to  Culpeper  Court  House.  Averell 
had  had  a  heavy  engagement  with  Stuart,  and 
Pleasonton  was  asked  to  find  out  and  report  his 
losses.  November  5  Reynolds  with  his  First  Corps 
was  ordered  to  move  next  morning  as  far  in  the 


1 88  ANTIETAM 

direction  of  Warrenton  as  possible,  by  way  of 
Salem,  and  Bayard's  cavalry  was  sent  in  rear  of 
Warrenton.  Sigel — from  Washington — was  now 
at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  in  the  Bull  Run  Mountains. 

On  the  night  of  November  5  Pleasonton  was 
ordered  to  concentrate  Averell's  brigade  with  his 
own  force  and  move  upon  Little  Washington  and 
Sperryville.  Chester  Gap  had  already  been  sealed, — 
the  gap  through  which  Longstreet  had  passed 
south, — and  Pleasonton's  move,  when  supported  by 
infantry,  would  close  Thornton's  Gap,  the  last 
available  gap  which  Jackson  could  use  down  to 
Swift  Run  Gap  thirty  miles  behind  Lee  and  Long- 
street,  who  were  then  at  Culpeper. 

November  6  McClellan  occupied  Warrenton  in 
force,  with  the  First  Corps.  Couch,  with  the  Second 
Corps,  was  ordered  to  follow  Burnside's  Ninth 
Corps  to  Waterloo;  Pleasant  on  to  Little  Washing 
ton  and  Sperryville;  and  Franklin  to  White  Plains, 
with  Fitz  John  Porter  moving  to  the  same  point. 
The  same  day  Burnside  was  ordered  to  push  on  to 
Waterloo,  occupying  that  place  by  that  night  with  at 
least  a  division.  Sigel  was  ordered  forward  from 
Thoroughfare  Gap  to  New  Baltimore. 

At  night,  November  6,  Sickles  was  ordered  to 
push  a  portion  of  his  force  to  Warrenton  Junction, 
from  Manassas  Junction,  and  repair  the  railroad 
as  he  advanced. 

Bayard's  cavalry  was  at  the  same  time  ordered  to 
turn  Warrenton  and  reach  the  upper  Rappahan- 


MOVEMENT  ON  CULPEPER         189 

nock,  keeping  in  touch  with  Burnside  on  his  right. 
November  7  Bayard  was  ordered  to  scout  the  Rap- 
pahannock  from  Waterloo  to  the  crossing  of  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad.  Sumner  was 
ordered  to  Cedar  Run,  Franklin  to  New  Baltimore, 
Reynolds  in  front  of  Warrenton,  Bayard  across  the 
Rappahannock,  and  Pleasonton  to  near  Sperryville ; 
general  headquarters  to  move  next  morning  to 
Warrenton.  The  Ninth  Corps  was  directed  to 
Miller's  Ford  and  Orleans,  with  Sturgis  in  front, 
on  the  direct  road  to  Culpeper,  where  Longstreet's 
corps  lay.  The  same  date  Sturgis  was  ordered  to 
Amissvitte  and  Jefferson.  "The  general  command 
ing,"  the  order  reads,  "relies  upon  your  prompt  and 
efficient  services  in  this  matter,  a?  an  important 
movement  is  impending."  Pleasonton  at  the  same 
time  was  notified  that  Sturgis  was  at  Amissville, 
with  his  other  brigade  and  two  batteries,  as  he  was 
directed  to  assume  command  of  the  division  and 
co-operate  with  Pleasonton,  "so  as  to  enable  you  to 
carry  out  your  instructions.  He  will  send  the  two 
regiments  at  Amissville  to  Jefferson.  Should  you 
need  further  assistance,  send  a  despatch  to  me  [the 
corps  commander]  through  General  Stoneman  at 
Waterloo,  who  has  thrown  a  bridge  over  the  river 
at  that  place." 

We  are  now  able  to  locate  and  determine  the  posi 
tions,  distances,  and  movements  of  all  the  compo 
nents  of  McClellan's  army,  and  to  determine  what 
McClellan's  plan  was  with  such  certainty  that  the 


190  ANTIETAM 

record  will  stand  against  any  denial,  even  if  he 
himself  had  denied  it.  Comparing  the  above  with 
Longstreet's  paper,  cited  in  Chapter  xxin,  it  will 
be  seen  that  Longstreet's  proposition  had  been  en 
tirely  anticipated  and  neutralized. 

The  order  relieving  McClellan  was  issued  on  the 
5th,  but  was  not  received  until  late  on  Thursday, 
November  7.  Burnside  asked  McClellan  to  con 
tinue  in  charge  for  a  couple  of  days,  until  he  could 
get  his  plans  perfected.  McClellan  did  so,  and  ar 
ranged  the  movements  so  that  they  continued  even 
after  McClellan  had  left  the  army,  on  the  loth,  for 
Burnside  did  not  assume  active  command,  or  issue 
any  orders,  or  interfere  with  any  movements,  until 
November  15.  (See  Halleck's  report,  War  Records, 
vol.  xxi,  p.  47,  and  Burnside's  report,  p.  101.) 

Halleck  says  "General  Burnside  did  not  com 
mence  his  movement  from  Warrenton  until  the 
1 5th."  Burnside  says  that,  on  receipt  of  a  telegram 
from  Halleck  informing  him  that  the  President  ap 
proved  his  plan,  sent  November  14,  "arrangements 
for  a  move  zvere  commenced  by  drawing  in  the 
extreme  right  to  the  neighborhood  of  Warrenton." 
The  extreme  right  was  at  that  time  in  the  imme 
diate  front  of  Longstreet  at  Culpeper  Court  House, 
and  in  battle  contact,  so  that  all  the  movements  up 
to  this  time,  November  15,  were  McClellan's,  and 
the  coming  battle  had  been  already  established — 
"The  Battle  of  Culpeper  Court  House,"  as  it  would 
have  been  known  in  history. 


XXI 

CELERITY  OF  ARMY^S  ADVANCE COMPARISON   WITH 

OTHER  MOVEMENTS 

Now  we  are  in  a  position  to  consider  the  question 
of  McClellan's  celerity  or  slowness,  on  which, 
ostensibly  at  least,  depended  his  retention  or  re 
moval. 

This  route  now  traversed  by  McClellan — for  the 
first  time  by  any  Union  army — was  afterward  tra 
versed  by  other  armies.  For  example,  Meade,  after 
Lee  had  recrossed  the  Potomac  in  July,  1863, 
passed  up  to  Culpeper  over  the  same  route  precisely ; 
and  Lee,  on  his  great  flanking  movement  toward 
Centerville  in  the  fall  of  the  same  year,  did  so  like 
wise;  and  Lee  also,  in  his  march  to  Gettysburg, 
moved  over  pretty  nearly  the  same  route  north  to 
the  Potomac,  except  that  he,  with  Longstreet's 
corps,  entered  the  Shenandoah  Valley  from  Upper- 
ville. 

The  distance  in  an  air-line  from  the  bridges  at 
Harper's  Ferry  and  Berlin,  to  Culpeper  Court 
House  is  sixty-five  miles;  by  the  roads  one-third 
more.  McClellan  commenced  his  crossing  of  the 
Potomac  by  two  pontoon  bridges  October  26.  A 

191 


192  ANTIETAM 

delay  of  a  day  occurred — on  Burnside's  protest — on 
account  of  a  severe  storm  and  to  supply  his  troops 
with  delayed  clothing.  On  November  8  Pleasonton 
was  at  Amissville,  seven  miles  in  front  of  Culpeper 
Court  House,  with  his  whole  division,  and  with  his 
advance  near  Culpeper;  and,  calling  for  the  in 
fantry,  Sturgis's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  with 
artillery,  moved  up  to  his  support  and  attacked  the 
enemy  next  day,  November  9. 

From  the  report,  November  6,  of  Colonel  Alex 
ander,  Lee's  chief  of  artillery,  we  find :  "Long- 
street's  corps  in  position  about  Culpeper.  Large 
force  of  enemy  advancing  toward  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  and  continued  hot  skirmishing  of  the  cavalry 
in  front." 

From  Pleasonton's  report :  "From  the  7th  instant 
my  advance  pickets  were  at  Hazel  River,  within 
six  miles  of  Culpeper." 

Sickles  reports,  November  8 :  "General  Bayard 
occupies  Rappahannock  station." 

Willcox,  with  the  Ninth  Corps,  reports  same  day : 
"Ferrero's  brigade  started  across  Miller's  Ford  at 
1.40;  took  with  him  Dickenson's  battery.  Two 
regiments  were  ordered  to  Amissville,  and  then  to 
Jefferson.  Stoneman  has  commenced  building  a 
bridge  at  Waterloo." 

Same  date,  November  8,  Lee  writes  to  Jackson, 
in  the  valley,  near  Winchester:  "Since  my  letter 
to  you  of  the  6th  the  enemy  has  occupied  Warren- 
ton  and  reached  Amissville  from  Salem,  via  Orleans. 


CELERITY  OF  ARMY'S  ADVANCE    193 

There  is  said  to  be,  in  the  vicinity  of  Amissville, 
a  large  force,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery.  There 
is  also  a  large  force  of  cavalry  at  Jefferson,  and  his 
cavalry  last  night  was  at  Rappahannock  Station. 
Stuart  has  fallen  back  to  Hazel  River." 

Willcox,  corps  commander,  writes  November  9 : 
"I  have  ordered  General  Sturgis  to  Amissville  with 
his  other  brigade  and  two  batteries.  He  is  directed 
to  assume  command  of  the  division  and  co-operate 
with  you,  so  as  to  enable  you  to  carry  out  your 
instructions." 

So  now  we  have,  on  November  9,  at  least  a  whole 
division  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry  at  Amiss 
ville,  in  front  of  Culpeper,  with  their  own  divisional 
artillery  and  extra  batteries,  and  all  ready  to  ad 
vance  at  once,  according  to  instructions  already 
given.  The  remainder  of  the  army  was  bivouacked 
within  supporting  distance,  the  most  of  it  within 
less  than  a  day's  marching  distance,  and  Pleas- 
onton's  cavalry  and  part  of  the  infantry  were  at 
Hazel  River  in  front,  and  in  contact  with  Long- 
street's  corps. 

General  Lee  reports,  November  10,  that  the 
Union  advanced  forces  were  attacked  by  Stuart  with 
a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  two  regiments  of  infantry, 
and  driven  back  upon  Amissville ;  and  that  at  Amiss 
ville  three  brigades  of  infantry  advanced  upon 
Stuart  and  drove  him  back. 

McClellan's  time  consumed  in  reaching  Amiss 
ville  and  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  pass- 


194  ANTIETAM 

ing  it  with  his  cavalry,  and  bridging  it,  with  his  in 
fantry,  and  with  his  whole  army  prepared  for  bat 
tle  and  within  easy  supporting  distance,  was  from 
October  26,  when  two  divisions  crossed,  or  Novem 
ber  2,  when  all  were  across,  to  November  8,  or 
November  9  at  the  latest.  The  extreme  time  is 
therefore  thirteen  days,  and  the  actual  time  from  the 
completion  of  the  crossing  to  the  infantry  occupa 
tion  of  Amissville  is  seven  days. 

The  marching  distance  is  ninety  miles;  air-line 
distance,  sixty. 

Now  Meade,  in  July,  1863,  crossed  by  the  same 
bridges,  with  an  extra  one,  however,  at  Berlin.  He 
marched  over  the  same  roads,  seized  and  held  the 
same  passes  in  the  same  way,  followed  Longstreet 
as  McClellan  did,  and  moved  by  Warrenton  and  the 
mountain  slope  to  Amissville  and  the  Upper  Rap- 
pahannock. 

Meade's  itinerary  is  given  in  Volume  xxvn  of 
the  Official  Records.  The  crossing  commenced 
July  17,  the  last  corps,  the  Sixth  and  Eleventh, 
crossing  July  19.  All  were  across  July  20.  July 
30  the  cavalry  reached  Amissville. 

General  Howard  reports,  July  30 :  "Culpeper 
Court  House,  Brandy  Station,  and  Stevensville  be 
ing  occupied  by  the  Rebel  army;  Longstreet's  and 
Stuart's  cavalry  are  said  to  be  there;  all  the  fords 
along  the  Rappahannock  guarded." 

Scouts  were,  however,  out  toward  the  Rappahan 
nock,  and  at  noon,  July  30,  engineers  reached  the 


CELERITY  OF  ARMY'S  ADVANCE    195 

river  and  were  at  the  station,  and  a  point  for  throw 
ing  a  bridge  was  being  selected. 

We  have,  therefore,  the  time  for  Meade's  move 
ment, — from  July  17  to  July  30  as  the  extreme 
time, — thirteen  days,  the  same  as  McClellan;  and 
actual  time  from  completion  of  the  crossing  to  the 
cavalry  occupation  of  Amissville,  and  of  infantry 
at  the  Rappahannock  below,  ten  days,  which  is  three 
days  in  excess  of  the  time  consumed  by  McClellan. 

In  R.  H.  Anderson's  report  of  the  Gettysburg- 
campaign  he  gives  the  itinerary  of  the  Confederate 
march  from  Culpeper  to  Shepherdstown,  which  is 
much  the  same  distance  as  McClellan  and  Meade 
covered  from  the  Potomac  to  Culpeper.  Anderson's 
was  a  simple  march  of  his  own  division,  with  no 
maneuvering,  no  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  no 
considerations  except  those  of  the  ordinary  service- 
marching  of  a  large  organization.  His  division  left 
Culpeper  June  17  and  reached  Shepherdstown  June 
23,  too  late  to  cross  it  that  day.  This  gave  the 
marching  time  of  seven  days,  which  is  precisely  the 
number  of  days  occupied  by  McClellan  in  marching, 
maneuvering,  and  fighting  his  entire  army  over  sub 
stantially  the  same  ground. 

General  Kershaw's  actual  marching  time  from 
the  Potomac  to  Culpeper,  on  his  return  march  from 
Gettysburg,  is  given  in  his  official  report  as  seven 
days,  arriving  July  24.  This  was  the  same  time 
for  Kershaw's  brigade  as  for  McClellan's  whole 
army. 


196  ANTIETAM 

In  Lee's  foot-race  with  Meade,  in  October,  1863, 
for  Centerville,  Lee  marched  from  Culpeper  to  near 
Broad  Run, — commencing  his  march  October  9  and 
ending  his  advance  in  the  evening  of  October  14, — 
and  occupied  six  days.  Meade's  parallel  movement 
occupied  the  same  time.  The  distance  was  just  one- 
half  that  from  the  Potomac  to  Culpeper. 

In  the  Pope  campaign  Longstreet's  force  was 
sent  from  Richmond  to  Gordonsville  by  rail,  Au 
gust  1 6.  Longstreet  thence  commenced  his  infantry 
movement  against  Pope.  Time  was  everything  to 
Lee,  because,  while  Longstreet  was  moving  from 
Richmond  to  Jackson's  aid  and  against  Pope,  Mc- 
Clellan  was  moving  from  Richmond  to  Pope's  aid, 
and  against  Lee.  It  was  a  foot-race  also.  But 
Longstreet  did  not  reach  Jackson's  hard-pressed 
lines  until  three  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  by  a  longer  foot-march  reached  the  field — on 
August  29,  a  period  of  thirteen  days.  Yet  by  the 
route  taken  by  Longstreet  from  Gordonsville  the 
distance  was  ten  miles  shorter  than  that  from  the 
Potomac  to  Culpeper. 

And  to  cite  a  historic  example,  when  there  was  no 
enemy  to  oppose,  and  beautiful  broad  fields  and  roads 
to  march  over,  in  the  inspiring  Southern  atmosphere 
of  December,  and  when  in  their  enthusiasm  it  is 
said  that  the  sweet  potatoes  even  started  from  the 
ground — I  refer  to  Sherman's  march  from  Atlanta 
to  the  sea.  Colonels  Bowen  and  Irwin,  in  their 
Military  Biography  of  that  splendid  soldier,  say: 


CELERITY  OF  ARMY'S  ADVANCE    197 

'Thus,  on  the  loth  of  December,  1864,  the  enemy's 
forces,  under  Hardee,  were  driven  within  the  im 
mediate  defenses  of  Savannah,  and  Sherman's  en 
tire  army,  having  leisurely  marched  over  three  hun 
dred  miles  in  twenty-four  days  with  trifling  oppo 
sition  through  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  country, 
was  massed  in  front  of  the  city." 

Sherman's  march  may  have  been  leisurely,  but  a 
great  many  people,  including  Grant  and  Lincoln, 
were  "almighty  anxious  to  know  where  he  was  at." 
Had  Sherman  kept  up  the  gait  that  McClellan  did, 
on  the  march  when  the  latter  was  removed  for 
"slowness,"  Grant  and  Lincoln  and  all  the  rest  of 
us  would  have  heard  from  Sherman,  at  Savannah, 
a  number  of  days  before  the  loth  of  December; 
for  a  little  calculation  will  show  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  covered  more  ground  per  day  than 
the  men  who  proudly  nicknamed  themselves  "Sher 
man's  Bummers" ;  of  whom,  for  a  couple  of  years, 
I  myself  was  one. 

In  the  Vicksburg  campaign  of  1863  Sherman's 
force  marched  on  Jackson,  Miss.,  and  assaulted  and 
captured  the  place.  Celerity  here  also  was  vital,  in 
view  of  separating  Johnston  from  Pemberton.  Sher 
man  marched  from  Grand  Gulf  (see  Grant's 
"Memoirs")  May  6,  and  reached  the  works  in 
front  of  Jackson  May  14,  a  period  of  nine  days. 
The  marching  distance  was  ten  miles  shorter  than 
from  the  Potomac  to  the  Rappahannock,  where  Mc 
Clellan  reached  the  river. 


198  ANTIETAM 

Another  historic  case  of  rapid  marching  is  cited 
in  Major  Adams'  "Great  Campaigns"  (from  1796), 
a  work  which  no  military  student  can  afford  to  over 
look.  In  the  Friedland  campaign  of  1807,  Benning- 
sen  attempted  to  surprise  Napoleon's  left  (Berna- 
dotte)  by  rapid  marching.  After  marching  seventy 
miles  in  ten  days,  he  failed  in  his  attempt,  and 
halted  for  the  following  three  days  on  account  of 
fatigue  and  want  of  food.  Bernadotte  did  not  know 
that  such  a  movement  w7as  even  under  way. 

On  the  pursuit  of  Lee's  army  from  Petersburg 
to  Appomattox,  the  pursuit  was  under  full  head 
way  on  the  morning  of  April  3,  and,  considering 
Sheridan's  move  from  Five  Forks,  earlier.  The 
surrender  took  place  on  the  forenoon  of  the  9th, 
giving  a  marching  time  of  a  little  less  than  seven 
days.  The  distance  from  Five  Forks  to  Appomat 
tox,  where  Sheridan  passed  Lee  and  closed  on  his 
front,  is  almost  precisely  the  distance  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  or  Berlin,  to  Culpeper.  And  yet  the  speed 
was  so  great  that  Grant's  forces  had  long  out 
marched  his  wagons,  and  even  his  ammunition,  and 
Grant,  in  one  of  his  conversations  with  John  Rus 
sell  Young  (which  Grant  himself  revised  before 
publication)  said  :  "My  pursuit  of  Lee  was  hazard 
ous.  I  was  in  a  position  of  extreme  difficulty.  You 
see,  I  was  marching  away  from  my  supplies,  while 
Lee  was  falling  back  on  his  supplies.  If  Lee  had 
continued  his  flight  another  day  I  should  have  had 
to  abandon  the  pursuit,  fall  back  on  Danville,  build 


CELERITY  OF  ARMY'S  ADVANCE    199 

the  railroad,  and  feed  my  army.  So  far  as  sup 
plies  were  concerned,  I  was  almost  at  my  last  gasp 
when  the  surrender  took  place."  (See  "Around  the 
World  with  General  Grant,"  vol.  ii,  page  460.) 

In  Adams'  "Great  Campaigns,"  p.  606,  criticizing 
the  projected  march,  from  Dijou  to  Blesme,  of 
Bourbaki,  with  an  army  of  nearly  200,000  men,  to 
cut  the  transportations  of  the  Germans,  then  be 
sieging  Paris,  and  with  no  enemy  along  the  line, 
the  distance  being  94  miles,  he  gives  for  this  urgent 
advance  a  marching  rate  of  8^2  miles  per  day.  This 
chapter,  and  also  "Comments  on  Bourbaki's  Opera 
tions,"  explains  Grant's  anxiety,  in  the  Appomat- 
tox  campaign,  to  settle  his  advance  there  without 
penetrating  further  southwest. 

Such  examples  can  be  multiplied,  from  the  Offi 
cial  Records,  to  any  extent  desired.  In  fact,  I  took 
the  daily  itinerary  of  a  three  years'  regiment  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  entered  the  service 
early  in  1861,  and  added  up  all  its  marches  under 
different  army  commanders  and  divided  the  total  for 
each  commander  by  the  number  of  days  of  service, 
and  used  the  official  intineraries  of  other  organiza 
tions  from  1864  to  the  end  of  the  war  to  complete 
the  record,  and  compared  with  them  the  correspond 
ing  itineraries  of  the  troops  of  McClellan  and  other 
commanders,  and  the  results  were  so  startling  to  me 
that  I  refrain  from  giving  them.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that,  after  counting  as  a  whole  McClellan's  entire 
period  of  command  in  Eastern  Virginia  and  Mary- 


200  ANTIETAM 


land,  —  1^/2  months,  —  and  including  in  the  count 
all  his  periods  of  rest,  march,  recuperation,  organi 
zation,  and  reorganization,  his  average  daily  army 
march  for  all  these  months  taken  together  was  in 
excess  of  that  of  any  other  army  commander  East 
or  West  for  equal  periods.  He  fought  more  pitched 
battles,  won  more  victories,  inflicted  greater  losses 
on  the  enemy,  and  at  less  cost  to  his  own  army,  for 
the  same  period  than  any  other  commanding  gen 
eral  during  the  whole  four  years  from  April,  1861, 
to  the  end  of  the  war.  Any  one  can  verify  these 
facts  who  chooses  to  take  the  pains  ;  which,  with  con 
siderable  labor  and  a  careful  study  and  grouping 
of  the  intineraries  of  all  our  armies  and  all  separate 
parts  of  those  armies,  I  have  done,  from  the  Official 
War  Records. 


XXII 

LONGSTREET     ISOLATED JACKSON     CUT     OFF LEE 

BEWILDERED THE       CAMPAIGN       WON THE 

ARMIES   FACE  TO   FACE    AT    CULPEPER,    PROPOR 
TION  3  TO  i 

WE  are  now  in  a  position  to  take  a  broad  view 
of  the  final  epoch  of  the  Maryland  campaign  of 
1862,  that  is,  of  the  movement  from  the  Potomac 
along  the  eastern  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Sperry- 
ville  and  Culpeper,  and  also  along  the  Orange  and 
Alexander  railroad  to  the  upper  Rappahannock. 
This  whole  movement  forced  Longstreet  back  to 
Culpeper  Court  House  and  cut  off  Jackson,  far  be 
hind  at  Winchester,  from  entering  the  Gaps,  and 
compelled  him  to  rejoin  Longstreet,  if  at  all,  by  a 
movement  from  Winchester  up  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  to  Swift  Run  Gap,  and  thence  back  to  Cul 
peper,  an  air-line  distance  of  100  miles  and  a  march 
ing  distance  of  about  125  or  130.  We  shall  find 
that  at  the  culmination,  when  Longstreet  issued  his 
order  of  battle  on  the  morning  of  November  16, 
Longstreet  was  at  Culpeper  and  Jackson  at  Win 
chester,  with  McClellan's  army  squarely  interposed 
between  the  two,  and  within  infantry  and  artillery 

201 


202  ANTIETAM 

firing-contact  with  Longstreet.  The  battle  had,  in 
fact,  actually  commenced. 

The  forces  on  the  opposite  sides  (see  Volume 
xxi,  Official  War  Records)  were  at  this  moment, 
just  before  Burnside  took  active  command,  as  fol 
lows  : 

McClellan's  army  consisted  of  268  regiments  of 
infantry,  18  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  73  batteries 
of  artillery,  the  largest  force  by  far  which  McClel- 
lan  ever  carried  into  battle,  and  which  a  few  weeks 
afterward  Burnside  broke  and  shattered  to  pieces 
against  the  heights  of  Freclericksburg. 

Against  this  force  of  McClellan's  stood  Long- 
street's  corps,  including  all  the  forces  with  him, 
which  consisted  of  89^2  regiments  of  infantry,  15 
regiments  of  cavalry,  and  45  batteries,  which  latter 
comprised  also  all  the  reserve  artillery  of  Lee's 
army. 

McClellan's  preponderance  was  in  the  proportion 
of  nearly  or  quite  3  to  I. 

Jackson's  force,  near  Winchester,  and  entirely  cut 
off  and  eliminated  by  McClellan's  swift  advance, 
and  the  holding  of  all  the  mountain  passes  by  heavy 
bodies  of  infantry  and  artillery,  consisted  of  91 
regiments  of  infantry,  3  regiments  and  2  battalions 
of  cavalry,  and  23  batteries,  comprising  about  one- 
half  of  the  whole  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
This  latter,  in  all,  counted  180  regiments  of  in 
fantry,  19  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  68  batteries  of 
artillery.  For  the  first  time  McClellan's  artillery 


LONGSTREET  ISOLATED  203 

exceeded  all  that  of  Lee,  while  previously  it  had 
always  been  very  much  less  than  Lee's.  The  pro 
portion  of  all  McClellan's  organizations,  regiments 
and  batteries,  to  all  of  Lee's,  including  both  the  di 
vided  halves,  was  a  little  less  than  2  to  i. 

And  this  was  the  proportion,  also,  when  Burn- 
side  fought  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  At  Chan- 
cellorsville  Lee  had  one-third  less. 

McClellan's  advance  did  what  had  never  been 
done  before,  so  far  as  the  official  records  reveal, 
with  reference  to  Lee  himself.  It  paralyzed  and 
bewildered  him,  and  his  official  despatches  show  this 
bewilderment  so  clearly  that  no  amount  of  expla 
nation  can  affect  the  facts  disclosed. 

Within  forty-eight  hours,  from  November  7, 
Lee  issued  four  different  written  orders  for  action 
against  McClellan,  all  incompatible  with  one  an 
other,  and  not  one  capable  of  being  carried  out,  and 
not  one  of  which  was  even  attempted  to  be  carried 
out;  while  the  final  order  of  battle,  early  on  the  i6th, 
was  issued  by  Longstreet  alone,  and  was  contrary 
to  all  the  other  orders. 

November  7  Lee  wrote  Stuart:  "Should  we  be 
pressed  back  from  here  [Culpeper  Court  House], 
rny  design  is  to  retire  through  Madison,  while  Jack 
son  ascends  the  valley,  so  that  a  junction  can  be 
made  through  Swift  Run  Gap,  and  we  hold  our 
selves  on  the  enemy's  right  flank  if  he  attempts  to 
proceed  southward." 

November  8  he  writes  to  Jackson:     "It  is  more 


204  ANTIETAM 

necessary  than  ever  that  you  should  move  up  the 
valley,  since  Swift  Run  Gap  is  now  the  nearest  one 
open  to  you,  unless  the  road  through  Fisher's  is 
practicable." 

November  9  he  writes  to  Jackson :  "The  enemy's 
object  may  be  to  seize  upon  Strasburg  with  his  main 
force,  to  intercept  your  ascent  of  the  valley.  This 
would  oblige  you  to  cross  into  the  Lost  River  Val 
ley  [into  the  Alleghanies],  or  west  of  it,  unless  you 
could  force  a  passage  through  the  Blue  Ridge ;  hence 
my  anxiety  for  your  safety.  If  you  can  prevent 
such  a  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  operate  strongly 
upon  his  flank  and  rear  through  the  gaps  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  you  would  certainly,  in  my  opinion, 
effect  the  object  you  propose.  A  demonstration  of 
crossing  into  Maryland  would  serve  the  same  pur 
pose,  and  might  call  him  back  to  the  Potomac." 

November  9,  at  night,  he  writes  to  Stuart :  "Can 
you  ascertain  what  he  is  doing  in  your  front ;  if  he  is 
stationary,  or  what  he  is  about?  If  he  moves  into 
the  valley,  I  will  advance  Longstreet's  corps  to  cut 
off  his  communication  with  the  railroad." 

November  10  he  writes  to  Jackson :  "As  soon  as 
you  think  that  your  presence  in  that  portion  of  the 
valley  will  not  retard  or  prevent  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  I  wish  you  to  ad 
vance  with  all  celerity  to  unite  with  Longstreet's 
corps." 

Jackson  was  still  at  the  same  place,  however,  even 
a  week  later. 


LONGSTREET  ISOLATED  205 

The  same  day,  November  10,  Lee  writes  the  War 
Department:  " Should  the  enemy  descend  into  the 
valley,  General  Longstreet  will  attack  his  rear  and 
cut  off  his  communications.  The  enemy  is,  appar 
ently,  so  strong  in  numbers  that  I  think  it  preferable 
to  attempt  to  baffle  his  designs  by  maneuvering 
rather  than  to  resist  his  advance  by  main  force." 

As  a  result  of  all  these  orders,  and  all  these 
maneuverings,  nothing  at  all  was  done.  Jackson's 
half  of  Lee's  army  lay  idle  at  Winchester,  and 
Longstreet's  half,  at  Culpeper,  confronted  McClel- 
lan,  who  was  more  than  three  times  as  strong  as 
Longstreet,  and  twice  as  strong  as  Lee's  whole  army 
had  it  been  united. 

Meantime,  however,  the  inspiring  spirit  of  the 
whole  had  passed  away.  McClellan  was  removed 
from  the  command  and  Burnside  put  in  his  stead, 
and  the  movements  instituted  by  McClellan  and  car 
ried  on  at  Burnside's  request  even  after  McClellan's 
removal,  had  spent  their  force.  The  army  and, 
visibly  to  Lee,  its  cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery, 
opposite  Longstreet  at  Culpeper,  became  gradually 
quiescent.  Lee  was  more  bewildered  than  ever. 
Stuart,  on  the  loth,  was  ordered  to  penetrate  this 
mysterious  screen,  and  he  drove  back  our  advance, 
but  was  met  by  the  Ninth  Corps  and  forced  to  retire, 
and  the  mystery  in  front  became  deeper  than  ever. 

During  this  interval  Burnside  had  evolved  his 
plan :  to  abandon  Lee  and  Longstreet  and  Jackson 
to  their  own  devices,  and  march,  by  the  left  flank, 


206  ANTIETAM 

thirty  miles  away  to  Falmouth.  Here  the  river,  so 
little  where  he  now  was,  had  become  a  mighty 
stream,  with  Nature's  own  fortifications  beyond, 
far  stronger  defenses  than  man  could  build, — de 
fenses  which  frowned  from  their  impregnable 
heights  over  the  town  and  over  the  deep  and  wide 
Rappahannock,  and  confronted  the  heights  at  Fal 
mouth  on  the  northern  bank,  too  far  away  from 
the  Confederate  lines  to  be  dangerous  to  the  defend 
ing  Confederate  army. 

And  this  plan  was  carried  by  Halleck  to  Wash 
ington  on  the  Qth,  and  there  the  wiseacres  sat  in 
judgment  upon  it,  and  Burnside  waited.  November 
13  Burnside  could  not  wait  longer,  and  urged  Hal 
leck,  if  possible,  to  send  him  a  definite  answer.  And 
then,  November  14,  Halleck  sent  him  an  approval,  in 
the  name  of  the  President ;  but  given  with  such  Hal- 
leckian  conditions  that,  if  Burnside  should  succeed, 
the  credit  would  belong  to  Halleck,  and  if  he  should 
fail  the  blame  would  fall  upon  Burnside.  All  the 
official  reports  establish  this. 

Then  on  the  I5th,  and  not  till  then,  the  new  com 
mander  of  the  army  waked  up,  and  ordered  the  re 
tirement  to  Fredericksburg.  An  unwonted  activity 
prevailed  along  Longstreet's  front;  our  troops  of 
all  arms  were  in  motion.  The  military  eye  and  mind 
of  Lee  and  Longstreet  could  not  conceive  that  an 
advantage  such  as  Napoleon  at  Boulogne  had 
worked  many  months  to  achieve  could  be  thrown 
away  merely  to  discredit  its  author,  and  the  crisis 


LONGSTREET  ISOLATED  207 

of  the  campaign  was  felt  to  be  upon  them.  There 
was  now  to  be  no  movement  to  Swift  Run  Gap  to 
join  Jackson  and  "hang  on  McClellan's  flank,"  if 
he  tried  to  move  south;  there  was  to  be  no  march  of 
Jackson  up  the  valley  to  unite  before  the  battle  with 
Longstreet;  there  was  to  be  no  falling  upon  Mc 
Clellan's  rear,  to  cut  his  communications  with  the 
railroad;  there  was  to  be  no  advance  of  Jackson  into 
Maryland  to  call  back  McClellan  to  the  Potomac. 

There  was  to  be  a  battle  then  and  there,  at  Cul- 
peper  Court  House,  on  the  i6th  day  of  November, 
to  be  known  to  history  as  the  "Battle  of  Culpeper," 
in  which  McClellan's  whole  army,  three  to  one,  was 
to  be  hurled  straight  forward  upon  one-half  of  Lee's 
army.  The  other  half  was  125  miles  in  the  rear 
across  a  sealed-up  range  of  mountains,  with  Mc 
Clellan  squarely  between,  so  that  McClellan,  after 
Longstreet  had  been  disposed  of  and  his  beaten 
fragments  pursued  and  scattered  or  destroyed  by  an 
overwhelming  force  of  one-half  McClellan's  army, 
could  with  the  remaining  half  of  his  men  himself 
turn  back  through  the  coveted  gaps  south  of  Jack 
son,  close  in  upon  him,  and  defeat  and  destroy  his 
other  half  of  Lee's  army,  or  drive  it,  as  Lee  had 
said,  across  the  western  mountains  into  "Lost  River 
Valley,  or  west  of  it,"  and  then  turn  to  follow  up 
the  debris  of  Longstreet.  Longstreet  must  stand 
fast  and  fight  where  he  was,  or  else  lose  either 
Richmond,  or  Jackson,  or  both,  and,  in  any  case 
his  own  army,  as  an  army.  At  this  moment  Long- 


2o8  ANTIETAM 

street's  corps  lay  in  front  of  Culpeper  Court  House. 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac  stretched  from  Hazel 
River,  four  miles  in  front  of  Longstreet's  position 
(commencing  several  miles  west,  with  the  Ninth 
Corps  in  front  of  Thornton's  Gap),  and  extending 
in  a  continuous  series  of  positions  to  the  front  of 
Warrenton — with  our  left  near  the  Rappahannock 
River,  at  the  Station.  Our  entire  army  was  concen 
trated — the  two  projecting  flanks  excepted,  and  they 
connected — along  an  air-line  of  fiftten  miles.  Our 
right  covered,  by  a  short  extension,  Milan's  and 
Swift  Run  Gaps,  with  Madison  Court  House  mid 
way,  and  in  front,  on  the  Rapidan.  Jackson's  Con 
federate  corps  lay  to  the  north,  distant  50  miles  in 
an  air-line,  across  the  mountains,  and  by  the  gaps  a 
march  of  125  miles. 


XXIII 


LONGSTREET'S      BATTLE-ORDER  —  BURNSIDE'S      RE 
TREAT LEE'S  GREAT  RELIEF 


So  on  November  16,  on  or  before  the  morning 
dawn,  we  may  be  sure,  Longstreet  issued  his  battle- 
order  for  that  day,  to  be  found  only  in  Volume 
LI,  part  2,  pp.  645-6,  Official  War  Records. 

GENERAL  ORDERS  HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

No.  49.  November  16,  1862. 

The  troops  of  this  command  will  be  held  in  readiness  for 
battle  upon  a  moment's  notice.  Commanders  will  see  that  pro 
visions,  ammunition,  and  transportation  are  at  hand  and  in 
such  quantities  as  may  be  wanted  to  meet  their  necessities. 
The  Commanding  General  relies  upon  the  valor  and  patriotism 
of  these  well-tried  troops  to  sustain  them  in  the  struggles 
that  they  may  be  called  upon  to  encounter.  Officers,  be  cool 
and  take  care  of  your  men.  Soldiers,  remain  steady  in  your 
ranks,  take  good  aim,  and  obey  the  orders  of  your  officers. 
Observe  these  injunctions,  and  your  general  will  be  responsi 
ble  for  the  issue. 

By  command  of  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  LONGSTREET. 

I  find  no  similar  order  from  Longstreet  during  the 
whole  course  of  the  war;  it  was  like  a  last  will  and 
testament. 

209 


210  ANTIETAM 

General  Pleasonton  was  entirely  right  when  he 
wrote  back,  from  Corbin's  Cross-roads,  to  his  corps 
commander,  November  10:  " Jackson  has  no  cav 
alry  except  some  few  for  scouts.  Leave  a  strong 
force  to  face  Jackson,  covering  Warrenton  and  its 
junction,  with  a  corps  of  observation  at  Barbee's; 
push  your  forces  down  to  Culpeper  vigorously,  in 
clining  to  the  right,  to  take  in  Woodville  and  Madi 
son.  Give  us  ten  days  more  of  good  weather  and 
wind  up  the  campaign  in  a  blaze  of  glory" 

Yes.  these  were  the  "carrying  out  of  his  instruc 
tions"  in  the  Ninth  Corps  commander's  letter  of 
November  9;  the  infantry  of  Sturgis,  and  Stone- 
man's  cavalry,  and  the  artillery  had  come  on,  on 
that  same  day,  to  Amissville  and  Jefferson ;  Pleason 
ton  was  extended  away  over  west  to  Sperryville  on 
the  foot-hills  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  He  was  carrying 
out  McClellan's  instructions.  Poor  man !  He  knew, 
to  his  heart's  sorrow,  that  McClellan  was  lost  to  the 
army;  but  he  did  not  know,  he  could  not  believe, 
that  everything  else  was  for  years,  in  that  day,  lost 
with  McClellan. 

By  referring  to  map  i,  sheet  LXXIV,  of  the  atlas 
accompanying  the  Official  War  Records,  the  posi 
tions  of  the  respective  armies  can  be  clearly  under 
stood.  The  successive  gaps  in  the  Blue  Ridge  from 
the  Potomac  to  far  beyond  Swift  Run  Gap  are  all 
laid  down,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  Snicker's,  Ash- 
by's,  Manassas,  Thoroughfare,  Chester,  and  Thorn 
ton's  gaps  were  all  closed  and  sealed  by  McClellan, 


LONGSTREET'S  BATTLE-ORDER     211 

while  Longstreet,  at  Culpeper  Court  House,  was 
more  than  twenty  miles  southeast  of  the  nearest  of 
them  in  the  flat  country  between  the  Rapidan  and 
the  Rappahannock.  The  intervening  country  was 
covered  by  McClellan's  army,  so  that  for  either 
Longstreet  or  Jackson  to  reach  the  other  the  entire 
Army  of  the  Potomac  must  first  have  been  attacked 
and  defeated  by  either  half  of  Lee's  army. 

Of  Pleasonton's  ability  to  perceive  and  understand 
a  military  situation  I  cite  the  following  opinion 
of  General  Sickles,  in  the  North  American  Review 
for  March,  1891 : 

"Pleasonton,  chief  of  the  cavalry  corps,  made  his 
arm  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy  in  every  equal 
combat  Besides,  he  was  gifted  with  rare  military 
intuitions.  He  sent  Buford.  with  our  strongest  cav 
alry  division,  to  Gettysburg  when  nobody  had  di 
vined  the  place  chosen  by  Lee  to  concentrate  his 
army  for  the  battle.  He  sent  Gregg  to  our  right 
to  encounter  Stuart  and  thwart  his  movement  to  our 
rear;  on  the  third  day,  the  day  of  Pickett's  assault, 
he  sent  Kilpatrick  on  our  left,  where  the  enemy  at 
tempted  a  similar  diversion,  but  was  defeated." 

Regarding  McClellan's  plans  and  operations,  we 
have  a  powerful  corroboration  from  the  principal 
Confederate  actor  in  the  events  described,  except 
that  when  he  made  his  statement  he  was  not  aware 
that  McClellan's  plans  and  operations,  at  Burnside's 
request,  were  being  fully  carried  out  for  some  days 
after  McClellan's  removal  from  command,  no  active 


212  ANTIETAM 

part  having  been  taken  by  Burnside  until  consent 
to  act  in  another  direction  had  been  received  from 
Washington,  November  14-15. 

General  Longstreet,  in  his  article  on  the  Battle 
of  Fredericksburg  ("Battles  and  Leaders,"  vol.  in, 
p.  84;  Century  Company),  written  long  before  the 
publication  of  the  Supplemental  Volume  LI,  of  the 
War  Records,  which  first  published  the  facts,  cor 
rectly  states  what  McClellan — at  the  time  of  his 
removal — had  purposed  to  do.  Longstreet  never 
knew  that  McClellan's  plans  had  been  already  prac 
tically  accomplished  before  Burnside  took  command, 
and  that  the  gaps  which  Longstreet  refers  to  as 
possibly  open,  were  by  November  9  hermetically 
sealed  by  the  Ninth  Corps  and  all  McClellan's  cav 
alry,  under  Pleasonton,  down  past  Hazel  River,  and 
well  on  to  Madison  Court  House  and  beyond. 

The  following  is  the  extract  from  Longstreet's 
article  above  referred  to  : 

"Burnside  made  a  mistake  from  the  first.  He 
should  have  gone  from  Warrenton  to  Chester  Gap. 
He  might  then  have  held  Jackson  and  fought  me, 
or  have  held  me  and  fought  Jackson,  thus  taking 
us  in  detail.  The  doubt  about  the  matter  was 
whether  or  not  he  could  have  caught  me  in  that 
trap  before  we  could  concentrate.  At  any  rate,  that 
was  the  only  move  on  the  board  that  could  have 
benefited  him  at  the  time  he  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  By  inter 
posing  between  the  corps  of  Lee's  army  he  would 


LONGSTREET'S  BATTLE-ORDER     213 

have  secured  strong  ground  and  advantage  of  posi 
tion. 

"With  skill  equal  to  the  occasion  he  should  have 
had  success. 

"This  was  the  move  about  which  we  felt  serious 
apprehension,  and  we  were  occupying  our  minds 
with  plans  to  meet  it  when  the  move  toward  Fred- 
ericksburg  was  reported.  General  McClellan,  in  his 
report  of  August  4,  1863,  speaks  of  this  move  as 
that  upon  which  he  was  studying  when  the  order  for 
Burnside's  assignment  to  command  reached  him." 

There  was  no  battle;  it  turned  out  to  be  a  huge 
but  very  pleasant  joke  on  Longstreet,  and  he  found 
it  out  as  soon  as  his  battle-order  was  sent  out;  and 
when  he  and  Lee  saw  the  great  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  marching  off  as  if  in  retreat,  the  snappy  orders 
came  from  Lee  like  whip-cracks,  to  McLaws,  and 
Ransom,  and  Anderson,  and  Pickett,  and  Alexan 
der,  who  went  gaily  trooping  away,  on  interior 
lines,  to  Fredericksburg,  and  Jackson,  with  McClel 
lan  and  all  his  troublesome  attentions  out  of  the 
way,  was  making  those  long-legged  tracks  of  his 
up  the  valley,  not  away  up  to  Swift  Run  Gap  this 
time,  but  anywhere,  all  the  gaps  open,  to  join  Long- 
street  and  have  a  good  time.  (See  orders,  in  the 
War  Records,  to  each  of  the  above  commanders.) 

McClellan  left  the  army.  General  Emory  Upton, 
then  commanding  a  volunteer  regiment,  tells  of  the 
army's  "demonstrations  and  applause,"  and  how  he 
and  his  own  regiment  stood,  by  his  orders,  cold  and 


214  ANTIETAM 

silent  because  he  was  the  son  of  an  Abolitionist, 
and  an  Abolitionist  himself.  But  when  afterward 
confronted  with  the  true  facts  he  learned  to  know 
McClellan ;  he  vindicated  him ;  and  his  later  and  bet 
ter  judgment  found  vent:  "Twice  I  destroyed  all 
that  I  had  finished,  because  it  fell  short  of  carrying 
conviction.  It  may  astonish  you  that  I  now  regard 
McClellan  in  his  military  character  as  a  much  abused 
man" ;  that  "the  differences  of  opinion  between  him 
and  the  Administration  would  probably  never  have 
arisen  but  for  the  interference  of  Stanton.  He  was 
at  the  bottom  of  all  the  disasters  of  the  year  1862." 
(See  General  Michie's  biography  and  letters  of 
Upton.) 


XXIV 

WAR    DEPARTMENT    STRATEGY,     CONFEDERATE    AND 
\JNION 

To  show  the  almost  irresistible  power  of  the 
malific  civilian  cabal  at  Washington,  to  which  Lin 
coln  himself  was  subjected,  I  cite  an  incident  show 
ing  General  Meade's  extreme  peril  many  months 
even  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  from  which  peril 
Lincoln  was  able  to  save  him,  and  probably  the 
army,  and  the  cause  of  the  Union,  only  by  strategy, 
by  fighting  fire  with  fire.  Lincoln  had  once  half- 
jestingly  said:  "You  must  understand  that  I  have 
very  little  influence  with  this  Administration" ;  and 
again,  without  any  jest,  had  cried :  "I  am  so  borne 
upon.''  And  indeed,  in  the  extremity  of  his  em 
barrassment,  had  offered  to  resign  the  Presidency 
to  obtain  relief.  The  incident  I  quote  is 
taken  from  the  authorized  biography  of  Zachariah 
Chandler,  a  senator  who  was  all-powerful  in  the 
cabal  to  which  I  refer,  and  the  origin  of  which  I 
have  referred  to  elsewhere  in  this  volume. 

"At  the  War  Department  Mr.  Chandler  was  as  well 
known  (and  was  reputed  to  be  scarcely  less  power 
ful  than)  as  the  Secretary  himself."  See  "The 

215 


2i6  ANTIETAM 

Detroit  Post  and  Tribune  [his  own  newspaper] 
Biography,  1880." 

"The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  did 
not  believe  that  the  selection  of  General  Meade  for 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  a 
fortunate  one.  .  .  .  It  is  a  fact  that  they 
recommended  the  removal  of  General  Meade  from 
the  command,  and  the  reinstatement  of  Hooker. 
On  the  4th  of  March,  1864,  Mr.  Chandler  and  Mr. 
Wade  called  upon  the  President,  and  told  him  that 
they  believed  it  to  be  their  duty,  impressed  as  they 
were  with  the  testimony  the  Committee  had  taken, 
to  lay  a  copy  of  it  before  him,  and  in  behalf  of  the 
army  and  the  country  demand  the  removal  of  Gen 
eral  Meade  and  the  appointment  of  some  one  more 
competent  to  command.  The  President  asked  what 
general  they  could  recommend.  They  said  that  for 
themselves  they  would  be  content  with  General 
Hooker,  believing  him  to  be  competent. 

"They  said  that  Congress  had  appointed  the  Com 
mittee  to  watch  the  conduct  of  the  war;  and  unless 
the  state  of  things  should  be  soon  changed,  it  would 
become  their  duty  to  make  the  testimony  public 
which  they  had  taken,  with  such  comments  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  seemed  to  require."  (See 
Biography  of  Senator  Chandler,  page  245.) 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  threat  is  almost  verbatim 
the  threat  which  Pope  made  to  Halleck  on  October 
30,  1862,  and  which  was  sufficiently  powerful  to 
cause  the  removal  of  McClellan  as  soon  as  the  letter 


WAR  DEPARTMENT  STRATEGY     217 

reached  Washington,  November  4-5,  and  while  our 
final  victory  was  already  in  hand,  and  which  re 
moval  gave  us  two  more  years  of  war  besides  count 
less  treasure  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  brave 
men  lost.  (See  statement  of  General  Upton.) 

Lincoln  had  yielded  then,  but  he  had  had  fifteen 
months'  experience  since,  and  while,  even  now,  he 
was  not  strong  enough  to  force  the  cabal,  he  was 
strong  or  skillful  enough  to  force  their  hand. 

The  Chandler  biography  says :  "Meade  was  not 
removed,  but  General  Grant  was,  within  a  week, 
given  command  as  general-in-chief." 

Grant  was  too  strong  for  the  cabal,  and  for  Stan- 
ton  and  Halleck.  Meade  was  safe. 

It  was  not  only  in  the  Union  army  that  this  inter 
ference  of  the  Secretay  of  War  appeared.  In  the 
Confederate  army  it  manifested  itself.  It  is  true 
in  only  a  modified  form,  for  it  came  by  indirect 
authority  of  the  President,  but  it  could  not  be  tol 
erated  in  any  form,  and  it  was  instantly  seized  and 
crushed  and  a  barrier  erected  to  make  its  repetition 
impossible  ever  afterward.  Well  would  it  have 
been  for  the  cause  of  the  Union  and  the  success  of 
its  armies  had  the  like  treatment  been  accorded  a 
usurping  Secretary  here,  for  license  grows  by  what 
it  feeds  upon,  and  it  is  but  a  step  from  the  exercise 
of  delegated  authority  to  the  assumption  of  the 
authority  itself. 

January  31,  1862,  just  before  the  depletion  and 
disorganization  of  McClellan's  army  began,  and  just 


218  ANTIETAM 

when  Jefferson  Davis  had  written,  "Events  have 
cast  on  our  arms  and  hopes  the  gloomiest  shadows," 
Stonewall  Jackson  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  the  Secretary's  order  requiring  him  to  direct 
General  Loring  to  return  with  his  command  to  Win 
chester  immediately  had  been  received  and  promptly 
complied  with.  Jackson  then  adds:  "With  such 
interference  in  my  command  I  cannot  expect  to  be 
of  much  service  in  the  field,  and  accordingly  respect 
fully  request  to  be  ordered  to  report  for  duty  to  the 
superintendent  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute  at 
Lexington.  Should  this  application  not  be  granted, 
I  respectfully  request  that  the  President  will  accept 
my  resignation  from  the  army." 

This  communication  of  Jackson's  was  endorsed 
by  General  J.  E.  Johnston :  "Respectfully  forwarded 
with  great  regret.  I  don't  know  how  the  loss  of  this 
officer  can  be  supplied." 

Secretary  Benjamin  then  wrote  to  Johnston,  stat 
ing  substantially  the  excuse  made  to  McClellan  for 
ordering  away  his  First  Corps  and  Blenker's  divi 
sion  while  the  movement  was  in  progress :  that 
Loring's  command  had  been  ordered  away  because 
he  and  Davis  had  news  of  some  contemplated  move 
ment  up  at  Winchester  by  McClellan,  and  volun 
teering,  in  true  Stantonesque  language,  the  opinion 
that  Jackson  had  scattered  his  forces  "quite  too  far 
apart  for  safety,"  but  concluded  by  saying  that  these 
suggestions  were  merely  his  own  opinions,  "the 
decision  being  left  to  yourself." 


WAR  DEPARTMENT  STRATEGY     219 

General  Johnston  begged  Jackson  to  reconsider. 
"Under  ordinary  circumstances,"  he  said,  "a  due 
sense  of  one's  own  dignity,  as  well  as  care  for  pro 
fessional  character  and  official  rights,  would  de 
mand  such  a  course  as  yours;  but  the  character  of 
this  war,  the  great  energy  exhibited  by  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  the  danger  in  which  our 
very  existence  as  an  independent  people  lies,  requires 
sacrifices  from  us  all  who  have  been  educated  as 
soldiers/' 

The  Governor  of  Virginia  wrote  Jackson  an  im 
passioned  appeal.  Johnston  wrote  the  President 
earnestly  to  prevent  such  a  catastrophe  from  oc 
curring  again,  saying:  "On  a  former  occasion  I 
ventured  to  appeal  to  your  Excellency  against  such 
exercise  of  military  command  by  the  Secretary  of 
War.  Permit  me  now  to  suggest  the  separation  of 
the  Valley  District  from  my  command,  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  public  interest. 
A  collision  of  the  authority  of  the  honorable  Secre 
tary  of  War  with  mine  might  occur  at  a  critical 
moment.  In  such  an  event  disaster  would  be  in 
evitable.  The  responsibility  of  the  command  has 
been  imposed  upon  me.  Your  Excellency's  known 
sense  of  justice  will  not  hold  me  to  that  responsi 
bility  while  the  corresponding  control  is  not  in  my 
hands.  .  .  .  What  I  propose  is  necessary  to 
the  safety  of  our  troops  and  cause." 

Jackson  authorized  the  Governor  to  withdraw  his 
resignation,  stating  that  his  views  remained  un- 


220  ANTIETAM 

changed,  and  adding :  "If  the  Secretary  persists  in 
the  ruinous  policy  complained  of,  I  feel  no  officer 
can  serve  his  country  better  than  by  making  his 
strongest  possible  protest  against  it,  which,  in  my 
opinion,  is  done  by  tendering  his  resignation,  rather 
than  be  a  willful  instrument  in  prosecuting  the  war 
upon  a  ruinous  principle." 

The  Secretary's  wings  were  clipped.  On  March 
13  Executive  General  Orders  were  issued:  "Gen 
eral  Robert  E.  Lee  is  assigned  to  duty  at  the  seat 
of  government;  and,  under  the  direction  of  the 
President,  is  charged  with  the  conduct  of  military 
operations  in  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy." 

General  Huger  afterward  complained  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  was  nothing  but  a  clerk,  so  far 
as  troops  were  concerned. 


XXV 

M'CLELLAN'S  STRATEGY  FOR  TURNING  THE  CONFED 
ERATE  POSITIONS  ON  THE  PENINSULA  MADE 
IMPOSSIBLE  BY  INTERFERENCE  FROM  WASHING 
TON 

THIS  case,  on  a  small  scale,  was  precisely  what 
befell  McClellan  on  a  large  scale,  when  Blenker's 
division  and  then  the  First  Army  Corps  were  taken 
away  from  him  at  a  time  when  most  of  his  army, 
and  the  commanding  general  himself,  had  already 
landed  on  the  Peninsula  and  the  First  Corps  was 
absolutely  necessary,  and  its  cooperating  destination 
and  movements  had  been  prepared  and  ordered. 
But  the  stake  was  too  great  for  McClellan  to  have 
resigned ;  a  hundred  thousand  of  his  men  at  Wash 
ington  and  on  the  Peninsula,  and  the  fate  of  the 
nation,  depended  on  his  continuance  in  command, 
even  as  best  he  could,  for  the  people  at  Washing 
ton  were  children  in  the  art  of  war. 

When  McClellan's  army,  in  March,  1862,  was 
drawn  back  from  the  Warrenton  front  and  rapidly 
moved  by  water  to  its  new  base  at  Fort  Monroe 
and  the  Peninsula,  he  left  more  than  55,000  men, 
the  heavy  artillery,  and  the  works  on  which  he  had 

221 


222  ANTIETAM 

expended  the  labor  of  thousands  of  contrabands  for 
months. 

At  a  council  of  all  the  corps  commanders  held 
March  13,  the  Peninsula  movement  was  unani 
mously  recommended,  provided  the  Merrimac 
(Rebel  ironclad)  could  be  neutralized,  which  was 
most  effectually  done  by  the  Monitor,  which  Mc- 
Clellan  rushed  forward.  (See  War  Records.) 

Heintzleman,  Keyes,  and  McDowell  agreed  that, 
besides  the  garrisoned  works,  a  force  of  25,000 
would  suffice  to  render  Washington  secure ;  Sumner 
put  it  at  40,000.  McClellan  left  more  than  50,000, 
besides,  of  course,  those  afterward  detained. 

The  movement  commenced.  Hamilton,  Fitz  John 
Porter,  Heintzleman,  Couch,  the  regulars  and  cav 
alry,  had  landed  on  the  Peninsula.  Then,  March 
31,  Stanton  notified  McClellan:  "The  President 
directs  that  Blenker's  division  be  sent  forward  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  there  to  await  orders,  instead  of 
being  sent  to  Fort  Monroe."  General  Sumner 
wrote,  March  31,  from  Warrenton  Junction,  that 
his  two  principal  divisions  had  been  removed.  Then, 
April  4,  came  the  crowning  blow.  "The  President, 
deeming  the  force  to  be  left  in  front  of  Wash 
ington  insufficient  to  assure  its  safety,  has  directed 
that  McDowell's  force  [the  First  Corps]  should  be 
detached  from  the  forces  operating  under  your  im 
mediate  direction."  Did  these  men  know  what  they 
were  doing? 

Magruder  had  been  fortifying  across  the  Penin- 


MCCLELLAND  STRATEGY,  ETC.    223 

sula,  on  the  Yorktown  line,  for  many  months,  em 
ploying  all  the  negroes  he  could  hire  or  impress, 
from  one  thousand  to  two  thousand  in  number. 
McClellan's  main  move  must  be  against  these  works, 
because  the  James  River  was  still  in  possession  of 
the  Confederates,  and  the  heavy  forts  at  Yorktown, 
and  at  Gloucester  immediately  opposite, — only  at 
short  cannon  range  apart, — forbade  the  passage 
of  wooden  transports  up  the  York  River  while 
Gloucester  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  (See 
Magruder's  elaborate  dispatches  in  the  War 
Records. ) 

McClellan's  plan  was  to  break  this  blockade  by 
using  McDowell's  corps  in  a  great  turning  move 
ment  on  the  north  side  of  the  York  River.  It  was 
fashionable  to  sneer  in  those  days  at  fortifications; 
and,  indeed,  the  only  possible  means  of  even  keep 
ing  the  public  quiet  after  McClellan  was  deprived 
of  McDowell  corps  was  to  iterate  and  reiterate, — 
to  have  the  press  teem  with  these  innuendoes  and 
charges, — that  McClellan  didn't  need  McDowell's 
corps  and  that  Washington  City  needed  it  badly; 
that  McClellan  lay  in  the  mud  with  more  than 
100,000  men  in  front  of  a  line  of  works  that  even 
an  energetic  cow  could  climb  over  in  most  places; 
and  that  if  he  had  had  McDowell's  corps  to  put  into 
the  mud  also  it  would  have  been  all  the  same,  or 
worse.  Even  Grant  had  not  yet  been  educated  up  to 
the  value  of  fortifications.  August  23,  1861,  he 
wrote  from  Jefferson  City,  Mo. :  "I  am  not  fortify- 


224  ANTIETAM 

ing  here  at  all.  .  .  .  With  the  picket  guard 
and  other  duty  coming  upon  the  men  of  this  com 
mand,  there  is  but  little  time  left  for  drilling.  Drill 
and  discipline  are  more  necessary  for  the  men  than 
fortification.  Another  difficulty  in  the  way  of  forti 
fying  is  that  I  have  no  engineer  officer  to  direct  it; 
no  time  to  attend  to  it  myself,  and  very  little  dis 
position  to  gain  a  Tillow  notoriety'  from  a  branch 
of  service  that  I  have  forgotten  all  about." 

But  after  that  period  Grant  learned, — at  Vicks- 
burg,  Spotsylvania,  Cold  Harbor,  and  Petersburg,— 
quite  a  different  lesson,  and  the  branch  of  service 
that  he  had  forgotten  all  about  came  back  to  him 
with  a  vividness  that  left  all  along  the  trail  of  his 
armies  fortifications  of  a  class  and  scope  which 
America  had  never  seen  before;  and  he  so  taught 
his  soldiers,  that  the  first  thing  they  did,  when  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy,  was  to  take  to  digging  with 
sticks,  bayonets,  spoons,  and  tin  cups. 

Grant  wrote  to  Meade,  July  30,  1864:  "Our 
experience  to-day  proves  that  fortifications  come 
near  holding  themselves  without  troops.  If,  there 
fore,  the  enemy  should  attempt  to  turn  your  posi 
tion,  do  not  hesitate  to  take  out  nearly  every  man 
to  meet  such  attack.  .  .  .  With  a  reasonable 
amount  of  artillery  and  one  infantryman  for  six 
feet,  I  am  confident  either  party  could  hold  its  lines 
against  a  direct  attack  of  the  other." 

July  5,  1864,  General  Warren  proposed  the  with 
drawal  of  two  corps  from  his  left,  provided  he  could 


McCLELLAN'S  STRATEGY,  ETC.     225 

construct  or  have  two  small  redoubts  with  a  battery 
and  500  men,  and  another  along  the  road  that  would 
hold  1500  men.  He  counted  these  2000,  with  their 
batteries  and  works  for  defensive  purposes,  as  equal 
there  to  two  army  corps  for  offensive  purposes, 
and  added :  "It  gives  you  an  idea  how  important 
I  regard  the  similar  works  now  held  by  the  enemy 
in  our  front." 

July  12,  1864,  Grant  writes  Meade:  "I  would 
not  permit  any  attack  against  the  enemy  in  an  in 
trenched  position." 

July  27 :  "I  do  not  want  Hancock  to  attack  in 
trenched  lines." 

October  2,  to  Meade :  "Intrench  and  hold  what 
you  can,  but  make  no  attack  against  defended  forti 
fications." 

October  24 :  "Parke  should  be  instructed  that  if 
he  finds  the  enemy  intrenched  and  their  works  well 
manned,  he  is  not  to  attack,  but  confront  him,  and 
be  prepared  to  advance  promptly  when  he  finds  out 
by  the  movement  of  the  other  two  columns  to  the 
right  and  rear  of  them  that  they  begin  to  give  way." 

This  is  so  accurate  a  description  of  McClellan's 
proposed  turning  movement  by  McDowell,  while 
Heintzleman  and  Fitz  John  Porter  held  the  front, 
that  it  could  have  been  incorporated  verbatim  in 
McClellan's  report. 

Grant  tells  Butler,  October  24 :  "I  do  not  want 
any  attack  made  by  you  against  intrenched  and  de 
fended  positions." 


226  ANTIETAM 

Again :  "Let  it  be  distinctly  understood  by  corps 
commanders  that  there  is  to  be  no  attack  made 
against  defended,  intrenched  positions." 

December  7,  1864,  General  Humphreys  wrote 
Meade  that,  as  directed,  he  had  withdrawn  13,300 
men  for  a  movement  elsewhere,  leaving  "the  lines 
held  by  a  minimum  force,"  which  he  described  as 
"total  six  miles  of  line,  4600  men." 

December  8  Meade  wrote  Grant  that  he  proposed 
to  hold  all  the  intrenched  lines  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  "with  about  11,000  men,  leaving  about 
22,000  men  and  30  guns  available  for  any  move 
ment." 

So  evident,  even  to  the  enemy,  was  Grant's  re 
vised  opinion  of  the  extreme  value  of  fortifications, 
that  in  1864  Lee  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War,  Au 
gust  22 :  "I  think  it  evident  that  the  enemy  has 
abandoned  the  effort  to  drive  us  from  our  present 
position  by  force,  and  that  his  purpose  now  is  to 
compel  us  to  evacuate  by  cutting  off  our  supplies.  I 
think  his  intention  in  the  late  demonstration  north 
of  the  James  River  was  not  only  to  cause  the  re 
moval  of  troops  from  Petersburg,  but  also  to  try  to 
break  through  to  Richmond." 

If  one  will  substitute  York  for  James,  and  York- 
town  for  Petersburg,  he  will  have,  exactly,  Mc- 
Clellan's  plan,  just  before  McDowell  was  with 
drawn. 

While  General  Grant  had  learned  these  lessons 
at  great  expense  from  the  Confederates,  and  the 


McCLELLAN'S  STRATEGY,  ETC.     227 

Administration  had  learned  it  from  Grant,  and  the 
people  were  left  in  the  opinion  that  Grant  was  still 
banging  away  and  charging  the  works,  McClellan 
had  learned  his  lessons,  at  a  very  small  expense, 
from  the  Russian  works  in  the  Crimea,  and  the 
Allied  assaults  and  their  results,  where  the  United 
States  Government  had  sent  him  during  the  Crimean 
War  for  that  very  purpose.  ( See  McClellan's  great 
report  on  the  Armies  of  Europe,  republished  in 
1 86 1,  which  Appleton's  Cyclopaedia  of  American 
Biography  describes  as  "a  model  of  fullness,  ac 
curacy,  and  system.") 

As  for  our  men  lying  in  the  mud  and  water  so 
long  before  the  Rebel  works,  I  will  later  on  cite  the 
testimony  of  General  D.  H.  Hill,  an  eye-witness, 
who  will  tell  us  that  the  condition  of  the  Confed 
erates  was  so  much  worse,  and  that  our  own  men 
were  so  much  more  healthy  and  comfortable,  that 
they  used  to  pity  the  poor  Johnnies,  as  good  Chris 
tians  ought  to  have  done. 

McClellan's  plan  (see  his  letter  of  April  4,  dated 
at  Fort  Monroe,  the  very  day  McDowell's  force 
was  taken  away  from  him,)  was  that,  with  one 
division  of  the  First  Corps  he  should  land  on  the 
Severn  River,  up  the  Bay,  and  assault  the  Glouces 
ter  works  from  the  rear.  The  fort  at  Gloucester 
Point  was  on  much  higher  ground  and  commanded 
the  wrorks  at  Yorktown  at  short  cannon  range,  but 
was  open  in  the  rear. 

General  Magruder  had  written  of  the  defenses 


228  ANTIETAM 

at  Gloucester  on  September  7,  1861 :  "The  landing 
of  the  [Union]  army  in  rear  of  Gloucester  Point 
can  be  effected  easily,  and  without  opposition,  an 
extensive  shore  and  many  navigable  rivers  affording 
every  opportunity." 

McClellan's  movement  of  McDowell  was  to  be 
extremely  prompt;  in  fact,  he  had  already  tele 
graphed — when  he  wrote  McDowell,  April  4 — to 
Franklin  and  Rucker  to  get  this  division  embarked 
at  once. 

Now  Magruder  states,  as  to  his  own  forces,  in 
his  report  of  April  n,  that  "some  1500  are  over 
the  York  River,  at  Gloucester  Point" 

McClellan's  next  directions,  April  4,  to  Mc 
Dowell  were  that  he  should  hold  the  other  two 
divisions  to  move  up  the  York  River  immediately 
upon  the  fall  of  Yorktown.  The  captured  works 
at  Gloucester  and  the  navy,  under  Goldsborough, 
who  was  ready  and  anxious  to  attack,  would  have 
silenced  the  Yorktown  works,  so  that  McDowell's 
force  could  have  gone  up  protected  by  the  navy, 
while  his  other  division  marched  up  the  excellent 
sandy  roads  along  the  north  bank  of  the  York 
River.  This  force,  moving  to  the  head  of  York 
River,  would  have  been  in  rear  of  Magruder,  who 
would  have  had  to  abandon  his  works  and  retire 
on  Richmond  or  else  cross  the  James  River, — as 
occurred  in  a  like  case  during  the  Revolutionary 
War, — to  save  themselves. 

July  6,  1781,  Cornwallis  lay  with  his  army  near 


McCLELLAN'S  STRATEGY,  ETC     229 

Williamsburg.  Lafayette  and  Wayne  appeared  on 
the  Peninsula,  north  of  him,  and  attacked.  Al 
though  the  attack  was  repulsed,  yet  the  Americans 
still  hung  near  the  Chickahominy  above  him,  and 
Cornwallis,  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Green 
Springs,  retreated  across  the  James  River  by  boats 
and  abandoned  the  Peninsula.  (See  Johnston's 
"Yorktown  Campaign  of  1781.") 

McClellan  would  now  have  been  at  liberty  to  use 
water  transport  to  establish  his  new  base  at  the 
White  House  and  present  himself  in  front  of  Rich 
mond  before  the  bulk  of  General  J.  E.  Johnston's 
army,  then  upon  the  upper  Rappahannock,  could 
have  arrived  there. 

The  effect  of  this  movement,  if  carried  out,  is 
clearly  shown  in  Lee's  letter,  to  General  Magruder 
at  Yorktown,  dated  April  9 :  "I  intended  to  call 
your  attention  to  the  possibility  of  the  enemy's  forc 
ing  a  passage  by  the  batteries  on  the  York  and  James 
rivers,  below  your  lines  at  Yorktown  and  Williams- 
burg.  It  was  not  my  intention  to  advise  the  aban 
donment  of  the  Williamsburg  lines,  even  if  you 
should  be  compelled  to  fall  back  from  Yorktown, 
unless  the  movements  of  the  enemy  by  water  should 
place  him  in  the  rear  of  the  former  as  well  as  the 
latter  position.  In  that  event  you  would  be  com 
pelled  to  place  the  Chickahominy  between  you  and 
the  enemy." 

He  was  advised  to  destroy  the  wharves  on  the 
York  and  James  rivers,  "in  the  rear  of  your  present 


23o  ANTIETAM 

lines,  as  the  enemy  would  be  most  likely  to  use  them 
for  landing  their  troops." 

This,  of  course,  meant  the  abandonment  of  the 
whole  Peninsula  and  the  concentration  of  Magruder 
in  front  of  Richmond,  to  defend  that  city  alone, 
no  other  considerable  part  of  the  Confederate  army 
having  yet,  at  that  time  or  for  many  days  after 
ward,  reached  Richmond  or  Yorktown. 


XXVI 

POSITIONS  AND  NUMBERS  OF  CONFEDERATE  FORCES 
WHEN  M'CLELLAN  OCCUPIED  THE  YORKTOWN 
FRONT  ON  THE  PENINSULA 

LET  us  try  to  see  where  Johnston's  army  of 
Northern  Virginia  actually  was  located  while  Mc- 
Clellan's  investment  of  Yorktown,  and  the  opera 
tions  on  the  Peninsula  were  in  progress. 

In  the  "Summary  of  Events"  at  the  beginning 
of  Volume  XL,  Official  War  Records,  we  find: 
"March  17,  1862,  Embarkation  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  commenced  at  Alexandria,  Va."  "April 
2,  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac  transferred 
to  vicinity  of  Fort  Monroe."  "April  12,  Command 
of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  C.  S.  Army,  ex 
tended  over  the  Departments  of  Norfolk  and  the 
Peninsula." 

McClellan  had  sent  his  forces  down  by  divisions, 
as  the  transport  service  was  slow. 

The  condition  of  the  country  roads  at  this  time 
at  Warrenton,  and  thence  to  Richmond,  is  shown 
by  numberless  dispatches.  General  G.  W.  Smith 
reports;  March  10,  from  Warrenton  Springs:  "I 
am  fairly  launched  on  a  sea  of  mud." 

231 


232  ANTIETAM 

McClellan's  movements  were  not  known  until 
after  the  end  of  March.  General  Johnston  on 
March  27  was  encamped  on  the  Rapidan,  125  miles 
in  an  air-line  from  Yorktown.  Ewell's  division 
was  on  the  Rappahannock,  near  the  bridge;  the 
divisions  of  Longstreet,  Jones,  Early,  and  D.  H. 
Hill  were  near  Johnston,  on  the  Rapidan. 

Lee  had  just  ordered  10,000  men  to  Richmond. 
Huger,  south  of  the  James,  had  been  ordered  to 
Magruder,  who  was  holding  the  Yorktown  line,  and 
the  Peninsula,  against  McClellan.  By  April  5 
(Magruder's  report  on  that  date)  McClellan's  forces 
had  reached  the  Confederate  works,  and  had  begun 
firing,  Magruder's  force  was  about  11,500.  This 
was  a  small  force,  relatively,  but  it  was  much  larger, 
and  of  better  quality,  than  the  force  which  defeated 
Grant  in  his  attempt  to  break  the  merely  temporary 
works  held  largely  by  militia,  in  front  of  Peters 
burg  in  June,  1864. 

March  28  the  divisions  of  Early  and  Toombs 
were  ordered  South  to  Richmond,  but  did  not  get 
away  until  April  4.  Ewell  was  in  command  at 
Williamsburg  April  6;  Rodes'  brigade  arrived 
April  7,  without  transportation,  the  other  regiments 
reporting  in  the  same  condition.  General  McLaws' 
command  arrived  about  the  same  time  and  Early's 
brigade  April  8. 

March  28  the  public  property  was  ordered  from 
Gordonsville,  but  Lee  forbade  its  being  sent  to 
Richmond.  March  28,  also,  Huger  was  ordered  by 


POSITIONS  AND  NUMBERS,  ETC.     233 

Lee  to  hold  his  few  troops  at  Norfolk,  across  the 
James.  "The  move  on  the  Peninsula  may  be  a 
feint,  and  the  real  attack  be  on  Norfolk." 

The  same  date,  the  28th,  Lee  wrote  Johnston  on 
the  Rapidan,  to  hold  his  lines  there,  as  it  would  be 
better  to  give  up  the  Peninsula  and  Norfolk  than 
lose  the  Central  Railroad  and  connection  with  the 
valley  at  Staunton. 

It  was  not  until  April  4  that  Johnston  was  ordered 
to  move  to  Richmond  from  the  Rapidan. 

Johnston  wrote  Lee,  still  from  the  Rapidan,  April 
6,  that  "the  railroad  is  operating  so  slowly  that 
there  is  abundant  time  to  instruct  me  further." 

April  ii  Magruder  reported  the  arrival  of  D.  H. 
Hill,  bringing  his  total  force  up  to  20,000  men. 

April  13  Hill  took  command  at  Yorktown,  and 
reported  only  sixty-five  rounds  of  ammunition  per 
gun  for  the  heavy  artillery.  General  Magruder  had 
removed  five  8-inch  guns  to  the  land  side  of  the 
works,  adding  that  "General  Johnston's  presence 
and  General  Johnston's  army  may  save  us;  other 
wise  the  contest  will  be  hopeless." 

April  15  Hill  reported  that  Goldsborough  has 
been  bombarding  Yorktown  with  two  gunboats  for 
two  days,  and  that  he  had  but  two  guns  which 
could  reach  the  gunboats ;  "the  other  shells  are 
worthless."  He  says,  "I  am  much  troubled  about 
the  river."  "If  the  enemy  get  a  position  in  rear  of 
us  [that  is,  across  the  York  River]  our  men  cannot 
stand  to  their  guns  on  the  land  side.  Every  day  is 


234  ANTIETAM 

a  gain  to  the  enemy."  It  was  only  on  April  20 
that  Johnston's  army  had  reached  the  Yorktown 
lines. 

April  21  D.  H.  Hill  wrote  the  War  Department: 
"As  far  as  the  defense  of  our  position  is  concerned, 
we  are  immeasurably  the  losers.  The  enemy  keeps 
beyond  the  range  of  our  guns  and  pelts  us  all  day 
long.  It  is  true  that  but  few  are  killed  daily,  but 
our  men  are  kept  in  the  wet  trenches  and  are 
harassed  day  and  night.  Disease  will  destroy  a 
hundred-fold  more  than  the  Yankee  artillery.  Pro 
tected  by  these  guns,  however,  he  can  retire  to  his 
comfortable  tents  and  fires  while  our  poor  fellows 
are  in  the  wet  and  cold.  This  is  a  sad  but  true  pic 
ture  of  our  situation." 


XXVII 


THE  DETRACTORS  OF  M^CLELLAN HIS  FRIENDS  AND 

SUPPORTERS  —  LINCOLN'S     VINDICATION     OF 
M'CLELLAN 


THOSE  who  witnessed  the  scene  at  Warrenton, 
when  McClellan,  stripped  of  all  authority  and  or 
dered  to  report  himself  at  Trenton,  N.  J.,  rode 
through  the  ranks  of  that  magnificent  and 
triumphant  army,  as  he  left  it,  to  that  army's  woe 
and  to  his  country's  needless  and  irreparable  loss, 
will  never  forget  it.  Those  who  have  read  the  de 
scription  of  eye-witnesses  will  ever  be  thrilled  by  its 
recollection;  and  those  who  have  done  neither,  but 
have  traced  during  the  Rebellion  the  parallel  careers 
of  McClellan  and  the  army  he  created, — for  while 
the  Government  furnished  money  and  men,  it  was 
McClellan  himself  who  created  and  made  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac, — will  know  what  must  have  hap 
pened  on  that  wonderful  occasion.  I  need  not  de 
scribe  it,  save  to  quote  a  sentence  from  a  private  let 
ter  of  General  Hancock  to  his  wife,  on  that  occa 
sion  :  "The  Army  are  not  satisfied  with  the  change, 
and  consider  the  treatment  of  McClellan  most  un 
gracious  and  inopportune." 

235 


236  ANTIETAM 

It  is  true  that  there  were  men  in  the  army  at  one 
time  or  another  who  did  not  like  McClellan,  and 
who  eagerly  came  before  the  civilian  strategists,  in 
cluding  the  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  and  testified  most  bitterly  and 
recklessly  against  him.  But  the  history  of  the  army 
careers  of  these  witnesses  themselves  vindicated 
McClellan  more  triumphantly  than  the  strongest 
testimony  from  these  men  could  have  done,  if  in  his 
favor.  It  was  not  Grant,  Meade,  Sherman,  Sheri 
dan,  Thomas,  Hancock,  Reynolds,  Couch,  Slocum, 
Wright,  Buell,  Ingalls,  Williams,  Hunt.  Humph 
reys,  Warren,  Pleasonton,  and  soldiers  of  this  stamp 
and  eminence,  that  were  to  be  found  in  the  ranks 
of  those  detractors,  but  men  that  belonged  to  the 
bread-and-butter  brigades  who  sought  to  curry  favor 
with  the  powers  that  were,  and  who,  as  a  reward, 
lost  caste,  influence,  and  command.  Many  of  those 
in  power  at  Washington  who  loved  the  prejudiced 
information,  despised  the  prejudiced  informer,  so 
that  the  inexorable  law  of  the  "survival  of  the 
fittest,"  long  before  the  war  ended  eliminated  these 
men  from  command  more  effectually  than  McClel 
lan  himself  could  have  done,  had  he  been  all-power 
ful  and  so  disposed.  You  will  search  the  records 
of  1864  and  1865  'm  vain  f°r  tne  names  of  these 
men;  nearly  all  are  missing,  and  justly  so. 

And  that  great  Lincoln,  not  himself  a  soldier, 
and  slow  to  learn  the  principles — and  never  to  learn 
the  practice — of  the  art  of  war,  but  a  few  months 


THE  DETRACTORS  OF  McCLELLAN  237 

after  McClellan's  removal  lived  to  vindicate  in  the 
following  letter  McClellan's  previous  career  and  all 
his  teachings  and  practices;  to  legitimatize  all  Mc 
Clellan's  repudiated  requests ;  to  confirm  all  his  argu 
ments;  and  to  establish  all  that  McClellan  had  so 
vainly  sought  to  have  accepted  and  to  disestablish 
all  that  he  had  so  vainly  urged  the  authorities  not 
to  do. 

The  remarkable  letter,  cited  below,  from  Mr.  Lin 
coln  to  General  Halleck,  written  September  19, 
1863  (vol.  xxix,  part  2,  pp.  207-208),  should  have 
a  place  in  history  alongside  that  other  celebrated 
letter  he  wrote  to  Hooker  on  the  question  of  a 
dictatorship,  and  that  other  noble  letter  in  which  he 
declared  that  he  would  save  the  Union  with  slavery, 
or  he  would  save  the  Union  without  slavery,  his 
sole  object  being  to  save  the  Union.  This  letter  was 
written  by  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  unknown  to  Hal 
leck  or  to  anyone  else: 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
WASHINGTON,  September  19,  1863. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK:  By  General  Meade's  dispatch 
to  you  of  yesterday,  it  appears  that  he  desires  your  views 
and  those  of  the  Government  as  to  whether  he  shall  advance 
upon  the  enemy.  I  am  not  prepared  to  order  or  even  advise 
an  advance  in  this  case,  wherein  I  know  so  little  of  the  par 
ticulars,  and  wherein  he,  in  the  field,  thinks  the  risk  is  so 
great  and  the  promise  of  advantage  so  small.  And  yet  the 
case  presents  matter  for  very  serious  consideration  in  an 
other  aspect.  These  two  armies  confront  each  other  across 
a  small  river,  substantially  midway  between  the  two  capitals, 
each  defending  its  own  capital  and  menacing  the  other.  Gen- 


238  ANTIETAM 

eral  Meade  estimates  the  enemy's  infantry  in  front  of  him 
at  not  less  than  40,000.  Suppose  we  add  fifty  per  cent,  to 
this  for  cavalry,  artillery,  and  extra-duty  men,  stretching  as 
far  as  Richmond,  making  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy 
60,000.  General  Meade,  as  shown  by  his  returns,  has  with 
him,  and  between  him  and  Washington,  of  the  same  classes  of 
well  men,  over  90,000.  Neither  can  bring  the  whole  of  his 
men  into  a  battle,  but  each  can  bring  as  large  a  percentage 
as  the  other.  For  a  battle,  then,  General  Meade  has  three 
men  to  General  Lee's  two.  Yet,  it  having  been  determined 
that  choosing  ground  and  standing  on  the  defensive  gives  so 
great  advantage  that  the  three  cannot  safely  attack  the  two, 
the  three  are  left  simply  standing  on  the  defensive  also.  If 
the  enemy's  60,000  are  sufficient  to  keep  our  90,000  away 
from  Richmond,  why,  by  the  same  rule,  may  not  40,000  of 
ours  keep  their  60,000  away  from  Washington,  leaving  us 
50,000  to  put  to  some  other  use?  Having  practically  come  to 
the  mere  defensive,  it  seems  to  be  no  economy  at  all  to  em 
ploy  twice  as  many  men  for  that  object  as  are  needed.  With 
no  object,  certainly,  to  mislead  myself,  I  can  perceive  no 
fault  in  this  statement  unless  we  admit  we  are  not  the  equal 
of  the  enemy,  man  for  man.  I  hope  you  will  consider  it. 

To  avoid  misunderstanding,  let  me  say  that  to  attempt  to 
fight  the  enemy  slowly  back  into  his  entrenchments  at  Rich 
mond,  and  there  to  capture  him,  is  an  idea  I  have  been  trying 
to  repudiate  for  quite  a  year.  My  judgment  is  so  clear 
against  it  that  I  would  scarcely  allow  the  attempt  to  be 
made,  if  the  General  in  command  should  desire  to  make  it. 
My  last  attempt  upon  Richmond  was  to  get  McClellan,  when 
he  was  nearer  there  than  the  enemy  was,  to  run  in  ahead 
of  him.  Since  then  I  have  constantly  desired  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  to  make  Lee's  army,  and  not  Richmond,  its 
objective  point.  If  our  army  cannot  fall  upon  the  enemy  and 
hurt  him  where  he  is,  it  is  plain  to  me  it  can  gain  nothing 
by  attempting  to  follow  him  over  a  succession  of  intrenched 
lines  into  a  fortified  city." 


THE  DETRACTORS  OF  McCLELLAN  239 

Where  now  was  the  vaunted  march  on  Center- 
ville  ?  Where  the  "On  to  Richmond"  ?  Where  was 
the  great  garrison  of  80,000  men,  besides  all  the 
fortifications,  to  guard  Washington?  Where  now 
was  the  condemnation  of  McClellan's  move  to  the 
Peninsula,  to  reach  the  communications  and  Lee's 
army  by  the  back  and  side  doors,  and  strike  there 
first?  and  where  the  robbing  of  McClellan  to  keep 
his  troops  back  at  Washington  and  so  render  suc 
cess  impossible?  And  where  was  Lincoln's  urging 
for  McClellan  to  move  east  of  the  mountains  and 
take  40,000  from  Washington's  90,000,  or  west  of 
the  mountains  and  get  15,000? 

Mr.  Lincoln's  reference  to  McClellan's  run 
ning  into  Richmond  when  he  was  nearer  there,  and 
so  getting  ahead  of  Lee's  army,  refers  to  the  very 
part  of  the  1862  campaign  during  which  McClellan 
was  removed,  and  shows  that  Mr.  Lincoln  did  not 
yet  understand  war  or  topography. 

For  McClellan  to  pass  by  his  own  flank  across  the 
front  of  Longstreet  and  Jackson,  to  "run  into  Rich 
mond,"  was  the  very  plan  employed  by  Grant  the 
next  year,  which  began  at  the  Wilderness,  where 
his  whole  front  half  in  the  advance  had  to  be  called 
back,  when  it  had  gotten  twenty  miles  ahead,  to 
save  the  rear  half  from  total  destruction,  and  which 
ended  at  Cold  Harbor,  where  the  Confederates  lost, 
substantially,  but  as  many  hundreds  as  we  lost  thou 
sands. 

Mr.  Lincoln  never  thought  of  Lee's  suggestion 


24o  ANTIETAM 

to  Jackson,  when  he  was  in  his  direst  strait,  Novem 
ber  9,  1862,  to  cross  the  Potomac,  so  as  to  draw 
back  McClellan's  army  to  that  river.  But  if  Jack 
son  had  been  able  to  make  the  movement, — which, 
however,  McClellan  had  fully  provided  against,— 
the  yell  from  Washington  and  the  North  would 
have  hurried  McClellan  back,  as  it  nearly  did  Grant 
in  August,  1864,  even  if  at  the  very  gates  of  Rich 
mond,  and  practically  "moving  in" ;  and  Mr.  Lin 
coln  would  have  been  the  first  to  utter  it.  And  so 
he  ought  to  have  been.  For  Grant's  dispatch,  scare 
at  Washington  July  26,  1864,  see  W.  R.,  vol.  xl, 
part  3,  page  484 :  For  removal  of  all  Grant's  heavy 
guns  and  ammunition  to  be  sent  north,  in  urgent 
haste,  and  all  in  our  works,  see  from  page  641  to 
page  727;  orders,  dispatches  and  reports.  See  also 
General  Hunt's  report,  vol.  xl,  part  i,  pages  658- 
660.  For  Lincoln's  visit  to  meet  Grant  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  part  3,  page  636.  Everything  on  board 
transports  for  sailing,  at  City  Point  and  Broadway 
Landing,  July  31.  Page  721.  For  Grant's  letter  to 
Halleck,  of  August  15,  1864,  "My  withdrawal  now 
from  the  James  River  now  would  insure  the  defeat 
of  Sherman,"  vol.  xlii,  part  2,  page  193;  and  Lin 
coln's  reply  of  August  17,  1864,  "Hold  on  with  a 
bull-dog  grip,  and  chew  and  choke  as  much  as  pos 
sible,"  vol.  xlii,  part  2,  page  243. 

Besides,  McClellan  was  not  nearer  Richmond 
than  Lee  was,  but  directly  the  reverse,  for  from 
Sharpsburg  to  Richmond  is  150  miles  in  an  air- 


THE  DETRACTORS  OF  McCLELLAN  241 

line;  while  from  Longstreet's  position,  near  Front 
Royal,  with  Jackson  immediately  behind  him,  is 
only  105  miles.  By  marching  routes  the  difference 
in  favor  of  Lee  was  enormously  greater.  Then, 
Mr.  Lincoln  obviously  believed  that  McClellan  could 
slip  past  a  Confederate  front  of  60  miles,  in  full 
view  from  the  mountains,  "unbeknownst"  to  Lee; 
and  that  the  preparations  for  and  initiation  of  a 
great  military  movement  does  not  betray  itself  at 
once,  of  necessity,  to  the  military  eye  and  mind 
of  the  enemy. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  day  McClellan  began  to 
move  Lee  began,  and  with  Longstreet's  corps  passed 
the  southern  gaps,  which  McClellan  had  not  yet 
reached,  and  was  at  Culpeper  Court  House  before 
McClellan  was  at  Warrenton.  Lee's  mistake  was 
in  leaving  Jackson  in  the  valley  too  long;  he  took 
the  chances,  for  military  reasons,  but  miscalculated 
McClellan's  speed,  and  Jackson  was  caught,  and 
held  fast  there,  in  spite  of  all  that  could  be  done 
to  relieve  him  or  bring  him  to  Longstreet's  aid. 


XXVIII 

THE   CAUSE   OF    M^CLELLAN^S   REMOVAL 

THE  question  recurs :  Why  was  McClellan  re 
moved,  and  ordered  to  Trenton?  As  a  last  ditch, 
many  have  fallen  back  on  what  is  called  McClellan's 
attitude  on  the  slavery  question.  But  McClellan's 
attitude  was  precisely  that  of  Lincoln,  but  not  at  all 
that  of  Stan  ton  and  some  of  the  members  of  Con 
gress  with  whom  the  Secretary  of  War  was  in  close 
and  secret  contact.  And  these  matters  ought  to  be 
made  clear,  because  they  have  affected  the  judgment 
of  military  men  who  ought  to  have  learned  better — 
Grant  and  Upton,  for  example. 

Early  in  the  war — May  17,  1861 — McClellan 
wrote  to  Adjutant  General  Townsend,  at  Washing 
ton,  from  his  Headquarters,  Department  of  the 
Ohio,  at  Cincinnati,  that  Garrett  Davis  had  told 
him  that  the  Union  men  of  Kentucky  had  resolved 
that  "we  will  remain  in  the  Union  by  voting,  if  we 
can;  by  fighting,  if  we  must;  and  if  we  cannot  hold 
our  own  we  will  call  on  the  General  Government 
to  aid  us."  And  he  asked  McClellan  what  he  would 
do,  from  Ohio,  if  they  called  upon  him  for  assist 
ance.  He  replied  that  if  there  were  time  he  would 
refer  to  General  Scott  for  orders;  if  there  were  not 

242 


CAUSE  OF  McCLELLAN'S  REMOVAL  243 

time,  he  replied,  "I  would  cross  the  Ohio  with 
20,000  men.  If  that  were  not  enough  with  30,000, 
and  if  necessary  with  40,000;  but  I  would  not  stand 
by  and  see  the  loyal  Union  men  of  Kentucky 
crushed."  (Official  War  Records,  Supplemental 
Volume  li,  part  i,  pp.  381,  383.) 

To  Buell  he  wrote,  while  general-in-chief,  No 
vember  7,  1861  :  "It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  we 
shall  hold  all  the  State  of  Kentucky.  Not  only  that, 
but  that  the  majority  of  its  inhabitants  shall  be 
warmly  in  favor  of  our  cause.  .  .  .  You  will 
please  constantly  bear  in  mind  the  precise  issue  for 
which  we  are  fighting.  That  issue  is  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  Union  and  the  restoration  of  the  full 
authority  of  the  General  Government  over  all  por 
tions  of  our  territory.  We  shall  most  readily  sup 
press  this  rebellion,  and  restore  the  authority  of  the 
Government,  by  religiously  respecting  the  constitu 
tional  rights  of  all.  I  know  that  I  express  the  feel 
ings  and  opinions  of  the  President  when  I  say  that 
we  are  fighting  only  to  preserve  the  integrity  of 
the  Union  and  the  constitutional  authority  of  the 
General  Government. 

"The  inhabitants  of  Kentucky  may  rely  upon  it 
that  their  domestic  institutions  will  in  no  manner  be 
interfered  with,  and  that  they  will  receive  at  our 
hands  every  constitutional  protection."  (War 
Records,  vol.  v,  page  38.) 

That  this  was  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Lincoln's 
views  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  Kentucky 


244  ANTIETAM 

was  excepted  in  the  Emancipation  Proclamation. 
That  McClellan's  views  of  the  protection  of  slaves 
did  not  extend  beyond  the  loyal  boundaries  is  shown 
by  his  general  plan  of  army  movements  throughout 
the  Rebel  States,  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  for  the  President,  February  3,  1862:  "We 
should  then  be  in  a  condition  to  reduce  at  our  leisure 
all  the  Southern  seaports,  to  occupy  all  the  avenues 
of  communication;  to  use  the  great  outlet  of  the 
Mississippi;  to  re-establish  our  government  and 
arms  in  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and  Texas;  to  force 
the  slaves  to  labor  for  our  subsistence  instead  of 
that  of  the  Rebels;  to  bid  defiance  to  all  foreign 
interference." 

McClellan  was  the  very  first  to  use  fugitive  slaves 
in  a  large  way. 

General  Butler,  down  at  Fortress  Monroe,  in 
May,  1 86 1,  was  wonderfully  pestered  with  the  slave 
question.  On  May  25  three  slaves  ran  away  from 
the  plantation  of  the  commander  of  the  secession 
forces  of  the  district  and  gave  themselves  up  to  his 
picket  guard.  Butler  examined  the  negroes  sepa 
rately,  and  "determined  for  the  present,  and  until 
better  advised,  to  avail  myself  of  their  services," 
which  were  much  needed,  and  that  "I  would  send  a 
receipt  to  Colonel  Mallory  that  I  had  so  taken  them, 
as  I  would  for  any  other  property  of  a  private 
citizen  which  the  exigencies  of  the  service  seemed 
to  require." 

General   Scott  and   Secretary  of  War  Cameron 


CAUSE  OF  McCLELLAN'S  REMOVAL  245 

both  endorsed  this  report  as  having  "much  to  praise 
and  nothing  to  condemn.  It  is  highly  interesting 
in  several  aspects,  particularly  in  its  relation  to  the 
slave  question." 

In  July  Butler  made  a  complaint  against  Colonel 
Duryea,  that  he  took  nine  of  these  escaped  slaves 
to  Washington  with  him,  against  his  express  orders, 
and  after  a  portion  of  them  had  been  detained  by 
Butler's  provost-marshal.  He  wanted  instructions, 
but  he  doesn't  seem  to  have  gotten  any  until  Mc- 
Clellan  got  to  Washington,  and  he  was  not  so 
squeamish.  General  Wool  was  then  in  command 
at  Fort  Monroe,  and  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
September  22,  1861 :  "I  have  called  for  an  imme 
diate  report  from  the  proper  officers  as  to  the 
negroes  here,  in  reference  to  General  McClellan's 
request,  and  I  shall  then  forward  as  many  as  can 
be  spared." 

General  Wool  had  written,  September  18:  "I 
would  be  much  gratified  if  you  would  tell  me  what 
I  am  to  do  with  the  negro  slaves  that  are  almost 
daily  arriving  at  this  post  from  the  interior.  Am 
I  to  find  food  and  shelter  for  the  women  and  chil 
dren,  who  can  do  nothing  for  themselves?" 

McClellan  cried  "Yes,"  and  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Cameron,  at  once  wrote  to  General  Wool 
from  Washington :  "You  will,  as  early  as  prac 
ticable,  send  to  General  McClellan  at  this  place  all 
negro  men  capable  of  performing  labor,  accompanied 
by  their  families." 


246  ANTIETAM 

Who  is  so  silly  as  to  imagine  that  General  Mc- 
Clellan  had  temporarily  "borrowed"  the  women  and 
babies  from  their  Rebel  owners  ? 

September  26,  1861,  McClellan  requested  the 
general-in-chief  "to  send  contrabands  to  Harper's 
Ferry  to  perform  the  labor  required,  if  there  are 
any  disposable  in  Washington." 

And  McClellan  saw  that  these  men  were  paid 
fifty  cents  per  day  and  board,  and  that  government 
supplies  were  issued  to  feed  and  clothe  the  women 
and  children. 

The  amount  of  misrepresentation  regarding  Mc 
Clellan  is  so  great  everywhere  that  it  is  almost  im 
possible  to  run  these  clues  out,  in  every  case;  but 
whenever  they  are  laboriously  and  persistently  run 
out,  misrepresentation,  false  suggestion,  and  false 
hood  will  be  found  as  thick  as  blackberries. 

McClellan's  main  purpose,  as  was  Lincoln's,  was 
to  save  the  Union ;  others  had  different  views  and 
purposes  connected  with  conquering  and  subduing; 
and  Lincoln,  to  avoid  divided  counsels,  was  obliged 
to  use  these  factors  as  well,  and  they  in  turn  were 
constantly  endeavoring  to  use  Mr.  Lincoln  also. 

There  were  two  diametrically  opposing  views  at 
Washington,  both  in  favor  of  suppressing  the  Re 
bellion,  but  outside  that  dominating  purpose  one 
view  was  to  conquer  the  South  absolutely,  to  rule  it 
as  conquered  territory,  and  to  ignore  State  lines, 
and  the  States  themselves.  This  view  was  a  real 
view,  and  had  something  in  its  favor;  but  it  con- 


CAUSE  OF  McCLELLAN'S  REMOVAL  247 

ceded  the  right  of  secession,  as  well  as  that  of  con 
quest,  and  neither  Lincoln  nor  McClellan  accepted 
this  view  at  all.  To  them  it  was  a  Union  of  in 
divisible  States. 

Secretary  Chase  expressed  the  radical  view  in  his 
letter  to  Mellen,  of  March  26,  1862  :  "While  I  think 
that  the  government,  in  suppression  of  rebellion, 
in  view  of  the  destruction  by  suicide  of  the  State 
governments  with  the  actual  or  strongly  implied 
consent  of  the  majority  of  the  citizens  of  the  seven 
Rebel  States,  have  so  far  forfeited  all  right  to  be 
regarded  as  States,"  etc.  (see  Warden's  "Life 
of  Chase")  ;  and  also  in  his  conversation  of  Decem 
ber  10,  1 86 1,  with  Senator  Wade  and  Representa 
tive  Ashby,  Chairmen  of  the  Territorial  Committees 
of  their  respective  houses,  and  who  concurred  with 
Chase  in  his  statement,  that  when  a  State  govern 
ment  attempted  to  withdraw  from  the  Union  "the 
State  organization  was  forfeited,  and  it  lapsed  into 
the  condition  of  a  Territory,  with  which  we  could 
do  as  we  pleased." 

This  was  in  accordance  with  President  Johnson's 
phrase,  "To  make  treason  odious,"  and  also  with  the 
spirit  of  the  Reconstruction  period. 

But  these  men,  even  in  the  darkest  days  of  the 
Rebellion,  did  not  represent  the  people  for  whom 
they  claimed,  or,  in  fact,  often  did  not  even  claim, 
to  act.  They  possessed  speech,  and  they  often 
suborned  the  press,  they  worked  in  secret,  and 
sought  by  every  art  and  device  to  bring  the  people 


248  ANTIETAM 

up  to  their  plane  of  action.  But  they  never  suc 
ceeded;  the  great  Northern  people  never  endorsed 
them,  and  the  army  repudiated  them  with  indigna 
tion.  It  was  only  the  lamentable  tragedy  of  Lin 
coln's  assassination  which,  even  for  the  moment, 
swept  the  American  people  off  their  feet,  and  gave 
this  coterie  of  active  theorists  their  power  success 
fully  to  interfere.  The  great  mass,  even  of  the 
strenuous  Abolitionists,  always  belonged  to  that 
class  to  which  the  poet  Whittier  belonged,  of  whom 
his  biographer  says :  "After  the  war  was  over  he 
would  have  made  the  terms  of  settlement  liberal  and 
conciliatory.  He  was  too  wise  and  too  humane 
to  stir  the  still  living  embers  of  passion  and  re 
sentment  for  any  political  end,  however  dear  to 
him." 

Lincoln,  during  the  war,  kept  on  organizing 
States  in  the  Confederate  territory  wherever  he 
could  find  a  loyal  nucleus, — in  West  Virginia, 
Louisiana,  and  in  Virginia, — and  he  represented 
those  more  enlightened  views  which,  after  Recon 
struction  had  demonstrated  the  futility,  the  danger, 
and  the  unpopularity  of  the  radical  plan,  were  uni 
versally  accepted. 

McClellan,  in  his  letter  of  instructions  to  Buell, 
in  Kentucky,  November  12,  1861,  clearly  put  forth 
his  views  on  this  subject.  "Bear  in  mind,"  he 
said,  "that  we  are  fighting  only  to  preserve  the 
Union,  and  to  uphold  the  power  of  the  General  Gov 
ernment.  As  far  as  military  necessity  will  permit, 


CAUSE  OF  McCLELLAN'S  REMOVAL  249 

religiously  respect  the  constitutional  rights  of  all. 
Preserve  the  strictest  discipline  among  the  troops, 
and  while  employing  the  utmost  energy  in  military 
movements,  be  careful  to  so  treat  the  unarmed  in 
habitants  as  to  contract,  not  widen,  the  breach  exist 
ing  between  us  and  the  Rebels." 

Since  the  war  we  have  tried  both  plans;  and  I 
feel  satisfied  that  the  views  of  Lincoln  and  McClel- 
lan  will  now  find  almost  universal  endorsement, 
and  the  theory  of  "State  suicide"  almost  universal 
dissent. 

As  regards  emancipation,  this  proclamation  was 
regarded  by  McClellan,  as  well  as  by  Lincoln,  as 
purely  a  war  measure,  and  McClellan  believed  that 
it  would  prove  ineffective  in  hostile  regions  wherever 
our  armies  did  not  penetrate,  and  could  not  reach; 
while,  without  it,  in  hostile  regions  where  our  armies 
did  penetrate,  the  slaves  were  already  free  to  aban 
don  their  masters,  and  we  would  protect  them, — 
would,  as  McClellan  said,  "force  the  slaves  to  labor 
for  our  subsistence  instead  of  that  of  the  Rebels." 
By  ceasing  to  be  rebels,  and  surrendering,  in  all  our 
territory,  under  McClellan's  plan,  they  could  avoid 
the  penalty;  by  ceasing  to  be  rebels,  and  surrender 
ing,  in  rebel  territory,  under  Mr.  Lincoln's  plan, 
they  must  still  suffer  the  penalty.  One  plan  invited 
early  submission ;  the  other,  resistance  to  death,  for 
it  was  the  slaves  who  supported  the  armies  in  the 
field  and  the  women  and  children  at  home.  One 
said  to  the  boy  in  the  tree,  "I  will  punish  you  if  you 


250  ANTIETAM 

don't  come  down" ;  the  other,  "I  will  punish  you  as 
soon  as  you  do  come  down." 

It  is  true  that,  almost  under  any  circumstances, 
the  system  of  human  bondage  must  have  received 
its  death-blow  with  the  success  of  our  arms.  It  was 
a  "peculiar  institution,"  and  was  rapidly  growing 
out  of  harmony  with  the  age,  and  even  with  the 
mass  of  the  Confederate  soldiers.  (See  what  Dr. 
Steiner  said  of  the  negroes  in  the  Confederate 
ranks  at  Frederick,  and  the  fact  that  negro  soldiers 
were  afterward  enlisted  in  1865  in  the  Confederate 
armies.)  But  there  was  a  far  greater  question  at 
issue,  and  one  involving  even  emancipation  itself, 
and  that  was  the  preservation  of  the  Union ;  for  the 
success  of  the  Confederacy  meant  not  only  the  de 
struction  of  our  great  Republic,  but  the  failure  of 
emancipation  also.  If  we  could  not  conquer  the 
Rebels  when  they  were  a  part  of  our  own  popula 
tion,  much  less  could  we  have  found  men  and  means 
to  invade  and  conquer  the  South  when  an  inde 
pendent  foreign  country.  It  will  be  seen  a  little 
later  on  into  how  grave  peril  the  Union  cause  fell 
from  political  mismanagement,  even  in  the  very 
closing  months  of  the  war. 

No  one  now  believes  that  the  Emancipation 
Proclamation  legally  freed  any  slaves,  except  tem 
porarily  by  martial  law.  Lincoln  knew  that  him 
self,  or  he  would  not  have  insisted,  in  his  confer 
ence  with  the  Rebel  Commissioners  at  City  Point 
at  the  end  of  January,  1865  (see  Grant's 


CAUSE  OF  McCLELLAN'S  REMOVAL  251 

"Memoirs"),  that  they  must  concede  the  surrender 
of  slavery  as  a  prerequisite  to  any  peace.  (See 
Volume  XLVI,  part  2,  p.  509,  Official  War  Records.) 
Mr.  Lincoln's  demands  were  that  three  things  were 
indispensable :  "First,  the  restoration  of  a  national 
authority  throughout  all  the  States.  Second,  no 
receding,  by  the  Executive  of  the  United  States,  on 
the  slavery  question,  from  the  position  assumed 
thereon  by  him  in  the  late  annual  message  to  Con 
gress  and  in  preceding  documents.  Third,  no  ces 
sation  of  hostilities  short  of  an  end  of  the  war  and 
the  disbanding  of  all  forces  hostile  to  the  Gevorn- 
ment"  The  first  and  third  were,  of  course,  subject 
to  acceptance  or  rejection;  but  if  the  second  had 
become  a  "res  adjudicate?'  in  1862,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  any  amount  of  "receding"  could  put  these 
negroes  back  into  slavery  again  in  1865. 

The  slaves  were  already  free,  slavery  was  already 
abolished,  if  the  proclamation  was  legally  effective 
when  issued ;  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  of  the  States  themselves,  forbade  already 
the  reduction  to  slavery  of  any  legal  freeman.  We 
all  now  know  what  freed  the  slaves  and  abolished 
slavery  in  the  United  States;  it  was  not  the  Proc 
lamation;  it  was  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  was  not  adopted  till 
after  the  war  had  ended. 

But  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Proclamation  in 
creased  the  hostility  of  the  South,  enforced,  will 
ingly,  universal  conscription,  silenced  the  Southern 


252  ANTIETAM 

Unionists,  and  prolonged  the  war.  Everyone  agrees 
to  that.  The  sole  excuse  of  its  issuance  was  that 
it  was  worth  the  price,  especially  for  political  effect 
upon  other  nations,  as  defining  the  attitude  of  our 
Government  on  the  question  of  slavery  in  so  far 
as  the  States  in  rebellion  were  concerned.  The 
validity  and  strength  of  this  position  may  be  fully 
conceded.  But  a  shorter  war  would  have  afforded 
the  same  advantage,  with  less  loss  and  far  less  risk. 
But  historians  in  general,  and  the  public  as  well, 
do  not  clearly  understand  what  that  price  was,  and 
how  we  were,  at  last,  and  almost  by  a  miracle,  saved 
from  paying  some  such  fearful  price. 


XXIX 

OUR   GRAVEST   PERIL   IN   THE    CLOSING  YEAR   OF 
THE  WAR 

MCCLELLAN  could  have  preserved  the  Union,  en 
listed  home  aid  in  every  Rebel  State,  ended  the  war, 
and  brought  peace  and  fraternity  in  1862,  as  Upton 
categorically  declares,  and  as  Jefferson  Davis  prac 
tically  conceded,  when  he  wrote  on  the  very  eve  of 
McClellan's  spring  campaign,  February  19,  1862: 
"Events  have  cast  on  our  arms  and  our  hopes  the 
gloomiest  shadows." 

In  July,  1861,  Mr.  Davis  again  wrote:  "Every 
body  disappoints  me  in  their  answers  to  my  re 
quisitions  for  troops,  and  the  last  hope  of  a  large 
force  of  militia  coming  to  your  aid  seems  doomed 
to  add  another  to  past  disappointments."  Up  to  this 
time  the  Southern  heart  was  not  fully  enlisted  in  the 
cause. 

September  5,  1861,  he  wrote:  "We  have  been 
disappointed  in  our  efforts  to  get  arms.  Lee  is  still 
in  the  mountains  of  Virginia.  My  means  are  short 
of  the  wants  of  each  division  of  the  wide  frontier 
I  am  laboring  to  protect.  One  shipload  of  small 
arms  would  enable  me  to  answer  all  demands,  but 

253 


254  ANTIETAM 

vainly  have  I  hoped  and  waited."  The  Confederate 
correspondence  during  all  this  period,  up  to  the 
assumption  of  generalship  and  command  by  our 
new  Secretary  of  War,  and  his  active  interference 
with  our  armies,  betrays  the  hopelessness  of  the 
Confederate  cause  in  the  East,  and  gives  ample 
intimations  of  equal  peril  in  the  West. 

Then  McClellan's  comprehensive  plan  was  sub 
mitted  (vol.  v,  Official  Records,  p.  44),  describing 
his  proposed  Peninsula  campaign  and  its  expected 
results,  dated  February  3,  1862,  as  follows:  "The 
second  base  of  operations  available  for  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  is  that  of  the  lower  Chesapeake  Bay, 
which  affords  the  shortest  possible  land  route  to 
Richmond  and  strikes  directly  at  the  heart  of  the 
enemy's  power  in  the  East. 

"The  roads  in  that  region  are  passable  at  all  sea 
sons  of  the  year.  The  country  now  alluded  to  is 
much  more  favorable  for  offensive  operations  than 
that  in  front  of  Washington  (which  is  very  un 
favorable),  much  more  level,  more  cleared  land, 
the  woods  less  dense,  the  soil  more  sandy,  and  the 
spring  some  two  or  three  weeks  earlier.  A  move 
ment  in  force  on  that  line  obliges  the  enemy  to 
abandon  his  entrenched  position  at  Manassas  in 
order  to  hasten  to  cover  Richmond  and  Norfolk. 
He  must  do  this ;  for  should  he  permit  us  to  occupy 
Richmond,  his  destruction  can  be  averted  only  by 
entirely  defeating  us  in  battle,  in  which  he  must  be 
the  assailant.  This  movement,  if  successful,  gives 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         255 

us  the  capital,  the  communications,  the  supplies  of 
the  Rebels,  Norfolk  would  fall,  all  the  waters  of 
the  Chesapeake  would  be  ours,  all  Virginia  would 
be  in  our  power,  and  the  enemy  forced  to  abandon 
Tennessee  and  North  Carolina.  The  alternative  pre 
sented  to  the  enemy  would  be  to  beat  us  in  a  posi 
tion  selected  by  ourselves,  disperse,  or  pass  beneath 
the  Caudine  Forks." 

This  extract  is  a  capital  essay  on  the  principles 
of  war.  It  disposes  of  the  boastful  notion  that  the 
point  of  attack  should  have  been  the  intrenched 
armies  of  the  enemy,  and  dissipated  the  allegation 
that  McClellan  had  some  other  dilatory  scheme  of 
his  own.  Grant  started  in  to  "buck  the  tiger"  at 
the  Wilderness,  and  expended  an  army  and  a  whole 
summer  in  getting  to  where  McClellan  went  by 
water  without  losing  a  man  or  a  week.  Grant  then 
spent  nine  months  more  in  facing  and  flanking  the 
works  at  Petersburg, — and  it  was  necessary  work, 
and  capitally  done, — but  as  soon  as  he  could  extend 
his  left  far  enough  away  from  the  armies  in  front 
of  Richmond  and  Petersburg  to  cut  the  sole  line 
of  Confederate  communication  (as  Richmond  was 
the  sole  line  in  1862),  lines  more  than  sixty  miles 
to  the  west,  Petersburg  fell,  Richmond  was  aban 
doned,  and  the  whole  Confederate  government  and 
archives  were  in  hopeless  flight,  and  ended  in  a  final 
and  early  surrender.  As  I  have  shown  elsewhere — 
which  is  substantially  the  view  of  Napoleon — bat 
tles  in  war  ought  to  be  in  the  nature  of  unpreventa- 


256  ANTIETAM 

ble  accidents,  occurring  only  where  strategy  fails 
or  is  resisted.  A  perfectly  conducted  war  would 
be  one  of  positions,  communications,  flankings,  turn 
ings,  and  the  like,  in  which  hostile  armies  are  com 
pelled  to  move  thus  and  so  under  penalty  of  anni 
hilation  or  surrender;  in  which  case  sensible  men 
who  understand  war,  finding  a  battle  hopeless,  would 
move  themselves  and  their  men  accordingly.  Bat 
tles,  of  course,  occur;  so  do  railroad  accidents  and 
street  fights,  but  these  are  evidences  of  miscal 
culation  on  one  side,  or  on  both. 

In  the  fall  campaign,  the  so-called  Bristoe  cam 
paign,  of  1863,  Meade  got  to  Centerville  first. 
Lee  was  balked,  and  retreated  without  an  attack. 
In  the  Mine  Run  movement  the  conditions  were 
exactly  reversed,  and  Meade  retreated  without  an 
attack.  In  the  Pope  campaign,  if  Pope  had  fallen 
back  to  Centerville,  instead  of  moving  around,  be 
wildered,  out  among  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  Lee 
would  not  have  attacked;  or,  if  he  had,  he  would 
have  been  defeated.  Strategy  is  by  far  the  superior 
and  more  powerful  agency  of  the  two  in  war.  It 
is  all  a  question  of  "Where  you  are  at,"  if  you  have 
anything  available  by  means  of  which  to  "be  at," 
when  the  time  and  opportunity  arrive. 

By  one  blow  McClellan  would  have  cleared  three 
States.  The  proof  is  that  the  same  blow  did  the 
same  thing  three  years  later ;  but  during  those  three 
years — alas ! 

McClellan  continues  to  unfold  his  plan :    "Should 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         257 

we  be  beaten  in  battle,  we  have  a  perfectly  secure 
retreat  down  the  Peninsula  upon  Fort  Monroe,  with 
our  flank  perfectly  covered  by  the  fleet.  During 
the  whole  movement  our  left  flank  is  covered  by  the 
water.  Our  right  is  secure,  for  the  reason  that  the 
enemy  is  too  distant  to  reach  us  in  time.  He  can 
only  oppose  us  in  front.  We  bring  our  fleet  into 
full  play. 

"After  a  successful  battle  our  position  would 
be:  Burnside  forming  our  left,  Norfolk  held  se 
curely;  our  center  connecting  Burnside  with  Buell, 
both  by  Raleigh  and  Lynchburg;  Buell  in  eastern 
Tennessee  and  North  Alabama;  Halleck  at  Nash 
ville  and  Memphis.  The  next  movement  would  be 
to  connect  with  Sherman  [not  William  T.]  on  the 
left  by  reducing  Wilmington  and  Charleston ;  to  ad 
vance  our  center  into  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  ; 
to  push  Buell  either  toward  Montgomery  or  to  unite 
with  the  main  army  in  Georgia;  to  throw  Halleck 
southward  to  meet  the  naval  expedition  from  New 
Orleans.  We  should  then  be  in  a  condition  to  reduce 
at  our  leisure  all  the  Southern  seaports;  to  occupy 
all  the  avenues  of  communication;  to  use  the  great 
outlet  of  the  Mississippi;  to  re-establish  our  Gov 
ernment  and  arms  in  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and 
Texas;  to  force  the  slaves  to  labor  for  our  sub 
sistence  instead  of  that  of  the  Rebels;  to  bid  defi 
ance  to  all  foreign  interference." 

A  comprehensive  plan!  Was  it  simply  ideal? 
Then  trace  the  history  of  the  war  of  the  Rebellion 


258  ANTIETAM 

from  the  day  that  McClellan  stated  these  proposals, 
and  you  will  find  that  every  part  of  his  plan  was  not 
only  feasible,  but  that  it  was  carried  out  to  the  letter 
(by  others).  Not  one  was  missed;  but  the  time  of 
accomplishment  was  sadly  postponed.  Even  the  re- 
establishment  of  Southern  State  governments,  which 
Lincoln  carried  out,  was  in  the  plan. 

After  what  pain,  what  cost,  what  blood  and  tears 
did  it  come!  After  what  heart-breakings  at  home 
and  in  the  field!  And  after  what  long  years,  still 
hoping  and  praying  for  the  day, 

"When  the  cruel  war  is  over." 

And  all  the  South  was  sprinkled  with  blood,  and 
scattered  over  it  everywhere  are  the  national  ceme 
teries  of  gallant  soldiers  who  perished  that  this  na 
tion  might  live.  Was  the  War  Department  strategy 
worth  what  it  cost  us  ?  We  could  have  had  all  this 
salvation  in  1862,  almost  "without  money  and  with 
out  price." 

It  was  ours  to  take,  or  to  leave;  and  we  left  it. 
And,  after  all,  we  won  only,  as  it  were,  by  a 
scratch — by  almost  a  miracle,  in  fact. 

The  inside  history  of  the  winter  of  1864  and  the 
spring  of  1865  has  never  been  written,  and  has 
never  been  appreciated.  Our  armies  were  melting 
away.  It  is  true  that  the  Confederate  armies  were 
melting  away  also,  but  that  was  by  the  casualties  of 
battle,  and  the  dead  in  battle  are  but  a  small  portion 
of  those  who 

"Live  to  fight  another    day." 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         259 

They  deserted,  too,  but  that  was  from  starvation ; 
and  their  armies  could  have  even  then  gone  where 
supplies  were  abundant.  (See  later  on  in  this 
chapter. ) 

But  the  time  of  our  regiments  expired,  and  the 
men  marched  home,  as  they  had  a  right  to  do.  Piled 
up  bounties,  which  Upton  has  so  strenuously  con 
demned  in  his  history,  created  a  new  profession; 
the  purlieus  were  drained,  foreign  supplies  of  rag 
tag  and  bobtail  were  imported  at  great  cost;  skill 
ful  emissaries  even  searched  the  South  and  supplied 
substitutes  to  fill  their  Northern  State  quotas  from 
the  ignorant  and  degraded  field-hands  of  Southern 
plantations;  and  the  recruits  were  a  sad  lot. 

Major  O.  C.  Bosbyshell,  of  the  Loyal  Legion, 
in  his  history  of  the  Forty-eighth  Pennsylvania 
veteran  regiment,  describing  the  battle .  of  Poplar 
Spring  Church,  in  the  Petersburg  front,  September 
29-October  2,  1864,  says: 

"Some  of  the  Massachusetts  regiments  in  the 
front  line,  having  large  numbers  of  Germans  in  their 
ranks,  many  of  whom  had  not  been  in  the  country 
over  six  weeks,  and  were  utterly  ignorant  of  the 
English  language,  were  thrown  into  great  disorder 
by  the  savage  charge  of  the  Rebel  regiments.  These 
Germans  ran  pell-mell  through  the  ranks  of  the  sup 
porting  regiments.  Pleasants  was  greatly  enraged 
at  these  fleeing  soldiers  as  they  dashed  blindly  to 
the  rear,  pushing  and  shoving  their  way  between 
the  ranks  of  the  Forty-eighth,  and  with  drawn  sword 


260  ANTIETAM 

slashed  to  the  right  and  left  among  them  with  the 
strength  of  an  athlete,  staying  the  flight  effectually 
anywhere  near  his  sweeping  saber.  Many  a  sore 
head  and  stinging  rib  resulted  from  the  blows  well 
laid  on  by  him." 

That  Massachusetts  should  have  so  filled  her 
quotas  is  evidence  of  exhaustion  of  her  own  better 
material.  If  so  patriotic  a  State  had  to  resort  to 
such  means,  the  other  States  must  have  suffered 
also.  Perhaps  I  exaggerate.  Read  General  Grant's 
testimony.  He  writes  to  Stanton  as  early  as  Sep 
tember  n,  1864:  "I  hope  it  is  not  the  intention  to 
postpone  the  draft  to  allow  time  to  fill  up  with  re 
cruiting.  The  men  we  have  been  getting  in  this  way 
nearly  all  desert,  and  out  of  five  reported  North 
as  being  enlisted,  we  don't  get  more  than  one  effec 
tive  soldier." 

At  the  same  time  Halleck  wrote  Grant  from 
Washington :  "Had  not  the  new  infantry  regiments 
now  coming  in  [these  were  drafted,  not  recruited] 
better  be  sent  to  City  Point?  Facilities  for  deser 
tion  here  and  with  General  Sheridan  are  so  great 
that  we  shall  soon  lose  large  numbers." 

Stanton,  referring  to  the  drafts,  says,  September 
n,  1864,  that  candidates  try  to  keep  back  the  men 
till  after  election,  especially  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  and 
Illinois.  Not  a  regiment,  or  even  company,  has 
been  organized  in  Illinois.  "A  special  call  from  you 
would  aid  the  department  in  overcoming  the  local 
inertia  and  personal  interests  that  favor  delay." 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         261 

Grant  writes :  "The  enforcement  of  the  draft 
and  prompt  filling  up  of  our  armies  will  save  the 
shedding  of  blood  to  an  immense  degree." 

September  20  he  writes :  "The  ease  with  which 
our  men  of  late  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy 
would  indicate  that  they  are  rather  willing  pris 
oners." 

January  5,  1865,  Stanton  wrote:  "If  you  do 
not  guard  against  straggling  and  desertion  you  will 
lose  many  men,  as  the  facilities  at  Baltimore  are 
great,  and  the  business  vigorously  conducted  by 
bounty  brokers." 

Sheridan  writes  January  6:  "We  have  lost  a 
great  many  men  by  desertion." 

January  8  he  writes  that  Grover  was  obliged  to 
lie  over  a  day  in  camp;  "this  gives  the  bounty- 
brokers  a  chance  to  work  on  the  men,  and  I  am 
afraid  will  cause  desertion." 

January  10  the  quartermaster  wrote  to  Washing 
ton  that  "Grant  could  not  move  his  army  if  he 
would,  for  want  of  forage;  that  the  animals  had 
been  on  half  rations  since  January  3." 

February  15,  1862,  Halleck  wrote  a  remarkable 
letter  to  Grant  from  which  I  make  the  following 
extracts : 

"In  reply  to  your  telegram  in  regard  to  the  pay 
ment  of  the  troops  before  Richmond,  I  would  re 
mark  that  these  troops  have  been  paid  generally  to 
a  later  period  than  those  in  the  West  and  South. 
Some  are  unpaid  for  seven  or  eight  months.  The 


262  ANTIETAM 

fault  is  not  in  the  Pay  Department,  but  a  want  of 
money  in  the  treasury. 

"I  understand  that  the  Quartermaster's  Depart 
ment  is  already  $180,000,000  in  debt,  and  that  until 
a  part,  at  least,  of  this  is  paid  it  will  be  almost  im 
possible  to  purchase  and  transport  supplies.  The 
manufacturers  cannot  furnish  cloth,  or  the  tailors 
make  clothes,  or  the  shoemakers  make  shoes,  or  the 
railroads  transport  troops  and  supplies,  much  longer, 
unless  paid  a  part,  at  least,  of  their  claims.  Some 
of  the  Western  roads  cannot  pay  their  employes 
and  threaten  to  stop  running  their  trains  if  they 
cannot  be  paid  what  the  Government  owes  them. 
Serious  difficulties  also  exist  with  the  New  York 
Central,  Hudson  River,  Harlem,  and  other  roads. 

"What  is  here  said  of  the  Quartermaster's  De 
partment  also  applies  to  the  Commissary,  Medical, 
Ordnance,  and  other  departments. 

"If  we  pay  the  troops  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
other  creditors  of  the  Government,  supplies  must 
stop,  and  our  armies  must  be  left  without  food, 
clothing,  or  ammunition. 

"What  we  want  is  some  more  great  victories  to 
give  more  confidence  in  our  currency  and  to  con 
vince  financial  men  that  the  war  is  near  its  close. 
In  money  matters  these  are  the  darkest  days  we 
have  yet  had  during  the  war." 

During  the  closing  month,  in  front  of  Petersburg, 
President  Lincoln  was  with  Grant  almost  con 
stantly.  During  this  period  both  Admiral  Porter 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         263 

and  General  Sherman  testify  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  great 
anxiety  to  have  the  war  ended  at  once,  if  it  could 
possibly  be  done,  and  far  preferably  without  serious 
fighting. 

Says  General  Grant,  in  one  of  his  conversations 
with  John  Russell  Young,  on  his  Eastern  tour,  which 
conversations  Grant  personally  revised:  "He  was 
very  anxious  about  the  war  closing;  was  afraid  we 
could  not  stand  a  new  campaign." 

Grant  himself  says :  "Rich  as  we  were,  I  do  not 
see  how  we  could  have  endured  it  another  year, 
even  from  a  financial  point  of  view." 

Speaking  of  this  great  fear,  General  Grant  says : 
"There  was  no  time  in  the  war  when  it  was  more 
critical  than  after  the  battle  of  Five  Forks,  when 
Lee  abandoned  Richmond.  It  was  President  Lin 
coln's  aim  to  end  the  whole  business  there.  He  was 
most  anxious  about  the  result.  He  desired  to  avoid 
another  year's  fighting,  fearing  the  country  would 
break  down  financially  under  the  terrible  strain  on 
its  resources.  I  know  when  we  met  it  was  a  stand 
ing  topic  of  conversation.  If  Lee  had  escaped  and 
joined  Johnston  in  North  Carolina,  or  reached  the 
mountains,  it  would  have  imposed  on  us  continued 
armament  and  expense.  The  entire  expense  of  the 
government  had  reached  the  enormous  cost  of  four 
millions  of  dollars  a  day.  It  was  to  put  an  end  to 
this  expense  that  Lee's  capture  was  necessary." 

He  tells  us  by  what  a  hair's-breadth  Lee  was  cap 
tured,  how  narrowly  his  junction  was  prevented, 


264  ANTIETAM 

either  with  Johnston  in  North  Carolina,  or  John 
ston's  junction  with  him  in  the  great  valley  of 
southwest  Virginia,  reaching  down  by  way  of 
Bristol,  east  Tennessee,  into  Georgia  and  Ala 
bama. 

Grant  says :  "My  pursuit  of  Lee  was  hazardous. 
I  was  in  a  position  of  extreme  difficulty.  You  see,  I 
was  marching  away  from  my  supplies,  while  Lee 
was  falling  back  on  his  supplies.  If  Lee  had  con 
tinued  his  flight  another  day  I  should  have  had  to 
abandon  the  pursuit,  fall  back  to  Danville,  build  the 
railroad,  and  feed  my  army.  So  far  as  supplies  were 
concerned,  I  was  almost  at  the  last  gasp  when  the 
surrender  took  place."  (See  conversations  with 
Grant,  revised  by  himself,  in  John  Russell  Young's 
"Around  the  World  With  General  Grant,"  volume 
n,  page  460,  copyright  1879.) 

Had  Lee  known  this,  he  could  easily  have  gained 
another  day.  At  Amelia  Court  House  he  lost 
thirty-six  hours  in  foraging  over  an  exhausted 
country  for  supplies,  when  his  railroad  trains  had 
by  a  mistake  carried  his  own  supplies  to  Richmond, 
and  left  them  there.  He  had  thousands  of  horses 
and  other  animals  in  his  commissary  and  quarter 
master's  supply  train,  which  had  no  supplies  to  haul, 
and  which  were  afterward  captured  or  broken  down 
before  his  army  reached  Farmville.  There  was  plenty 
of  such  meat,  to  be  driven  on  the  hoof,  to  get  his 
army  out  of  their  emergency.  At  Appomattox  Sta 
tion  there  arrived  from  Lynchburg,  on  the  night 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         265 

before  the  surrender,  five  heavily  loaded  trains  rilled 
with  hams,  cornmeal,  and  all  sorts  of  foods,  shoes, 
and  clothing.  I  can  speak  personally  of  this,  as  I  sup 
plied  my  command,  and  all  the  rest  of  us  infantry 
and  cavalry  officers  did  the  same,  from  these  trains, 
after  their  capture  on  the  morning  of  the  Qth,  and 
the  piled  up  food  looked  about  as  abundant  when  we 
left  it  as  it  did  when  we  found  it.  We  captured  and 
emptied  these  moving  trains  only  four  miles  from 
Lee's  advance,  while  he  was  halted  at  Appomattox 
Court  House,  and  only  six  hours  before  the  sur 
render  took  place. 

General  Grant  says,  and  he  ought  to  have  known : 
"Nor  have  I  ever  felt  that  the  surrender  at  Appo 
mattox  was  an  absolute  military  necessity,  I  think 
that  in  holding  Richmond,  and  even  in  consenting 
to  that  surrender,  Lee  sacrificed  his  judgment  as  a 
soldier  to  his  duty  as  a  citizen  and  a  leader  of  the 
South." 

His  love  for  Virginia  and  for  his  Virginia  sol 
diers  and  their  families  doubtless  influenced  him 
greatly;  but  had  he  abandoned  Virginia  with  his 
army,  even  temporarily,  and  joined  Johnston,  or 
not  joined  Johnston,  boundless  supplies  awaited 
him.  His  railroads  were  worthless  and  worn  out, 
but  they  would  have  been  as  worthless  for  carrying 
our  supplies  as  for  carrying  his;  and  by  marching 
his  army  to  the  supplies,  instead  of  trying  to  haul 
them  to  his  army  over  railroads  that  couldn't  haul, 
he  might  have  solved  the  problem  and  given  our 


266  ANTIETAM 

national  Government  certainly  another  campaign, 
another  year,  and  perhaps  more. 

The  official  report  of  the  Confederate  Bureau 
of  Subsistence,  dated  March  10,  1865,  says:  "The 
crops  south  of  North  Carolina,  in  Georgia  Alabama, 
and  Mississippi,  were  never  so  large."  "From  North 
Carolina  7,500,000  bread  rations,  6,000,000  meat 
rations;  from  Virginia,  5,000,000  bread  rations, 
5,500,000  meat  rations;  from  east  Tennessee  and 
its  communications  15,000,000  bread  rations, 
5,000,000  meat  rations."  These  were  all  predicated 
on  the  railroads.  Beyond  these,  in  central  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  and  Georgia,  the  supplies  were  illimita 
ble,  as  the  Confederates  had  ceased  planting  cotton 
and  gave  their  time  to  food  supplies. 

There  was  nothing  at  all  in  front  to  prevent 
Lee  or  Johnston  from  going  there ;  Sherman's  army 
was  on  the  Atlantic  Coast;  most  of  Thomas'  army 
had  just  joined  him,  and  Grant  was  on  the  James 
River.  We  practically  had  no  others. 

But  this  had  not  been  the  Confederates'  only 
chance,  of  late.  When  Sherman  abandoned  the 
pursuit  of  Hood's  army,  leaving  it  intact,  to  make 
his  march  to  the  sea,  it  was  the  same  army  which 
had  just  baffled  Sherman  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta, 
with  more  than  six  months  of  continuous  fighting. 

Among  all  the  fatuous  things  ever  done  by  a 
Confederate  army,  one  of  the  worst  was  that  of 
Hood's  planting  himself  down  in  front  of  Nash 
ville,  doubtless  a  part  of  some  occult  War  Depart- 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC         267 

ment  strategy  at  Richmond,  and  lying  there  for 
long  weeks  while  all  the  North  was  open  to  his 
invading  columns.  Sherman  had  left  no  army  be 
hind  to  take  the  place  of  that  which  he  marched 
across  to  the  Atlantic;  he  left  behind  his  sick, 
wounded,  and  worn-out,  whatever  was  not  fit  for 
the  march  before  him,  and  all  this  debris  was  scat 
tered  over  thousands  of  square  miles  of  territory. 
Hood's  was  the  only  compact  and  efficient  army  in 
the  field  in  the  West.  And  Hood  lay  down  before 
Nashville  and  waited,  while  Thomas  set  himself  to 
work  to  make  an  army.  With  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  as  a  nucleus,  under  Schofield,  and  the  Fourth 
Corps,  under  Wood,  he  armed  and  drilled  all  that 
he  could  find  or  gather — wagoners,  mechanics,  any 
and  everybody.  He  gathered  a  bit  here  and  a  bit 
there ;  he  dragged  out  his  convalescents  and  scoured 
his  scattered  garrisons;  he  sent  up  to  middle  Mis 
souri  and  brought  down  A.  J.  Smith  and  his  men 
(see  War  Records,  vol.  XLV,  part  i,  pp.  31-34),  and 
after  weeks  of  incessant  labor  he  got  together,  De 
cember  15-16,  1864,  a  force  which  attacked  and 
defeated  Hood,  and  drove  him  south  in  scattered 
fragments,  to  be  reunited  only  months  afterward  in 
the  Carolinas. 

Grant's  anxiety  about  Hood  was  natural,  and  it 
was  very  great.  But  it  was  no  part  of  prudence 
for  Thomas  to  have  attacked  before  he  was  fit  to 
attack;  because,  had  Hood,  later  on,  pulled  up 
stakes  and  gone  to  where  he  ought  to  have  gone 


268  ANTIETAM 

in  the  first  place,  Thomas  by  that  time  had  boats 
and  transportation  enough  with  which  to  follow  him 
around  by  water,  and  fight  him.  But  when  Hood 
first  planted  himself  before  Nashville,  after  driv 
ing  back  Schofield  from  Franklin,  there  was  no 
concentrated  force  anywhere  which  could  have  inter 
fered  with  him,  and  none  which  could  have  been 
concentrated  in  time.  Says  General  Grant,  very 
properly:  "My  objection  to  Sherman's  plan  at  the 
time,  and  my  objection  now,  was  his  leaving  Hood's 
army  in  his  rear.  I  always  wanted  the  march  to  the 
sea,  but  at  the  same  time  I  wanted  Hood.  If  Hood 
had  been  an  enterprising  commander  he  would  have 
given  us  a  great  deal  of  trouble.  Probably  he  was 
controlled  from  Richmond.  As  it  was,  he  did  the 
very  thing  I  wanted  him  to  do.  If  I  had  been  in 
Hood's  place,  I  would  never  have  gone  near  Nash 
ville.  I  would  have  gone  to  Louisville,  and  on  north 
until  I  came  to  Chicago.  What  was  the  use  of  his 
knocking  his  head  against  the  stone  walls  of  Nash 
ville?  If  he  had  gone  north  Thomas  would  never 
have  caught  him.  We  should  have  had  to  raise  new 
levies.  I  was  never  so  anxious  during  the  war  as  at 
that  time." 

Yes,  Hood  could  have  marched  through  Illinois, 
Indiana,  and  Ohio,  and  he,  too,  could  have  sung  the 
song: 

"Five  hundred  miles  of  latitude,  five  hundred  to  the  lakes." 

Or  he  could  have  crossed  Ohio  to  Pennsylvania, 


OUR  GRAVEST  PERIL,  ETC.         269 

captured  Pittsburg,  swept  West  Virginia  and  the 
Valley,  threatened  Washington,  or  even  joined  Lee; 
or  he  could  have  done  the  same  by  marching  east 
from  Parkersburg  in  West  Virginia. 

The  "new  levies"  to  which  Grant  referred,  not 
to  speak  of  time, — when  there  was  no  time, — would 
have  been  useless  against  Hood's  veterans.  What 
would  have  been  instantly  wanted,  and  imperatively 
demanded,  were  soldiers.  And  the  only  soldiers 
available,  for  Sherman  was  buried  and  unheard  of  in 
the  depths  of  Georgia,  and  there  were  no  armies  to 
be  had  elsewhere,  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  all  of  it,  to  meet  Hood's  triumphant  sixty  thou 
sand  veterans. 

That  meant  that  the  spring  campaign  of  1865 
would  have  started  from  Washington,  where  the 
spring  campaign  of  1861  had  started,  and  if  Grant 
and  Lincoln  and  Halleck  were  good  judges  of  the 
situation,  it  would  have  been  very  difficult  to  have 
had  it  start  anew  and  continue  very  vigorously,  if 
at  all,  if  it  had  to  start  anew — after  four  years  of 
war — where  it  had  started  at  the  beginning. 

The  statements  above  made  in  this  chapter  show 
a  moral  exhaustion  in  the  loyal  States  almost  equal 
to  the  physical  exhaustion,  especially  in  transporta 
tion,  of  the  South.  Napoleon  said  that  the  moral 
factor  was  far  more  important  in  war  than  brute 
force,  that  war  was  essentially  a  moral  and  not  a 
physical  problem. 

The  loss  to  Great  Britain  of  Cornwallis'  eight 


270  ANTIETAM 

thousand  at  Yorktown  was  of  trifling  moment,  but 
seven  years  of  war  had  brought  an  inertia  in  camp 
and  cabinet,  a  weariness,  and  a  moral  exhaustion 
which  could  not  be  revived ;  and  we  ourselves,  after 
four  years,  found  the  same  difficulties,  the  same 
moral  exhaustion,  the  same  scraping  the  slums  for 
worthless  recruits,  the  same  desertions,  and  the  same 
financial  depletion  and  collapse,  at  hand. 


XXX 

GRANT'S  PICTURE  OF  SECRETARY  STANTON'S  CHARAC 
TERISTICS DANGER  OF  THE  REWARD  OF  M^CLEL- 

LAN'S  SUCCESS — M'CLELLAN'S  QUALITIES  AS  A 
COMMANDING  GENERAL 

i 

So  we  see  that  it  was  not  merely  a  matter  of  a  few 
more  years  of  war,  to  secure  certain  personal  results, 
with  the  conclusion  destined  to  be  the  same  in  the 
end,  that  was  involved  in  preventing  McClellan 
from  finishing  up  the  war  in  1862.  It  was  a  matter 
that  put  to  deadly  peril  the  Union,  the  Government, 
republican  institutions,  and  all  that  for  which  our 
soldiers,  our  young  men,  so  gladly  went  to  fight  and 
so  freely  gave  their  lives.  It  was  one  of  those 
blunders  which  are  said  to  be  worse  than  crimes. 
Said  General  Upton,  writing  in  1879  to  his  friend 
Colonel  Henry  A.  DuPont :  "If  you  want  to  know 
who  was  the  cause  of  a  three  years'  w^.r,  after  we 
created  a  disciplined  army  of  six  hundred  thousand 
men,  it  was  Stanton." 

Grant  in  his  "Memoirs"  clearly  depicts  the  char 
acter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  such  aspects  as 
show  how  he  was  able  to  accomplish  so  much 
actual  injury  in  so  short  a  space  of  time.  He  depicts 

271 


272  ANTIETAM 

him  as  a  man  of  tireless  energy,  personally  timid, 
but  bold  in  action  and  direction  until  called  down 
by  a  higher  authority.  Then,  if  he  saw  that  his 
superior  "meant  business"  and  was  bound  to  have 
things  done  in  his  own  way,  Stanton  subsided  at 
once  and  did  as  he  was  directed,  always,  however, 
furtively  glancing  at  the  bone  from  which  he  had 
been  driven  away,  and  ready  to  seize  it  on  the  slight 
est  relaxation  of  the  master's  attention  or  as  soon  as 
opportunity  offered.  To  translate  Grant's  language 
into  the  vernacular,  he  was  from  tip  to  toe  what  is 
called  "a  bluffer,"  and  one  who  increased  his  power 
by  bullying  and  lacerating  whenever  it  was  safe  to 
do  so.  It  is  not  an  agreeable  task  to  speak  ill  of 
anyone,  and  Stanton  had  high  abilities ;  but  he  was 
backed  up  by  a  secret  clique  of  civilians,  he  repre 
sented  a  powerful  guild  of  politicians,  and  he  felt 
that  he  was  justified  in  carrying  out  his  and  their 
purposes  at  whatever  cost  to  army,  people,  or  coun 
try,  believing  that  the  end  justified  the  means,  and 
that  the  means,  if  boldly  employed,  were  within  his 
compass. 

Says  General  Grant,  who  alone  made  Stanton 
bend  the  knee  to  him,  and  stipulated  for  this  before 
he  would  consent  to  assume  command  in  the  East 
at  all :  "Mr.  Stanton  never  questioned  his  own 
authority  to  command,  unless  resisted.  He  cared 
nothing  for  the  feelings  of  others.  In  fact,  it  seemed 
to  be  pleasanter  to  him  to  disappoint  than  to  gratify. 
He  felt  no  hesitation  in  assuming  the  function  of 


STANTON'S  CHARACTERISTICS     273 

the  executive,  or  in  acting  without  advising  with 
him.  If  his  act  was  not  sustained,  he  would  change 
it — if  he  saw  the  matter  would  be  followed  up  until 
he  did  so."  Consult  Grant's  "Personal  Memoirs," 
vol.  n,  pp.  536-537,  etc. 

"Mr.  Lincoln,"  continues  General  Grant,  "did 
not  require  a  guardian  to  aid  him  in  the  fulfillment 
of  a  public  trust.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  not  timid,  and 
he  was  willing  to  trust  his  generals  in  making  and 
executing  their  plans.  The  Secretary  was  very 
timid,  and  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  avoid  inter 
fering  with  the  armies  covering  the  capital  when  it 
was  sought  to  defend  it  by  an  offensive  movement 
against  the  enemy  guarding  the  Confederate  capital. 
He  could  see  our  weakness,  but  he  could  not  see 
that  the  enemy  was  in  danger.  The  enemy  would 
not  have  been  in  danger  if  Mr.  Stanton  had  been  in 
the  field." 

As  General  Upton  has  so  clearly  shown,  the  Sec 
retary  was  very  much  in  the  field ;  or,  rather,  he 
was  like  that  other  aggressive  creature,  who  does  so 
much  damage  when  he  plants  himself  in  a  china- 
shop,  while  suffering  no  personal  danger  to  himself. 
But  the  bull  does  his  damage  while  ignorantly  try 
ing  to  get  himself  out,  whereas  the  Secretary  did 
his  while  ignorantly  trying  to  get  deeper  in. 

Then,  of  course,  there  was  seen  looming  up,  be 
fore  these  men  at  Washington,  the  ever  present 
danger  that  what  had  been  granted  to  Washington, 
Jackson,  Harrison,  Taylor,  and  Pierce, — and  was 


274  ANTIETAM 

yet  to  be  awarded  to  Grant,  Hayes,  Garfield,  and 
Harrison,  and,  later  on,  Roosevelt, — might  be 
granted  to  McClellan.  A  military  man,  successful 
and  conspicuous,  might  be  chosen  by  the  sovereign 
will  of  the  people  of  the  whole  country  to  be  their 
President;  and  this  was  something  to  be  prevented 
at  all  hazards. 

But  McClellan,  in  his  place  in  the  army,  could 
surely  have  done  nothing  politically  to  ensure  this 
reward  at  the  hands  of  the  people;  none  of  those 
other  soldiers  I  have  mentioned  did  so.  Yet  still, 
if  he  were  the  really  successful  general  I  have  at 
tempted  to  describe,  such  danger  would  doubtless 
exist;  while  on  the  contrary,  if  he  were  the  slow, 
inefficient,  and  useless  general  he  was  depicted  to 
be,  then  the  surest  way  to  ruin  his  chances  of  politi 
cal  preferment  would  have  been  to  allow  him  to 
work  out  his  own  damnation  for  himself,  and  re 
main  in  command  of  that  army  whose  soldiers  wept 
when  he  left  them,  and  whose  great  officers  joined 
in  a  magnificent  tribute  to  him  soon  afterward,  when 
he  was  powerless  and  helpless,  and  which  Stanton, 
on  hearing  of  it  through  General  Carl  Schurz,  inves 
tigated,  and  suppressed  with  a  bang ! 

Then,  was  it  for  his  slowness  that  he  was  re 
moved?  If  so,  his  sloth  must  have  been  recently 
acquired.  General  Scott  wrote  him,  July  13,  1861, 
to  Beverly,  Va. :  "The  General-in-Chief  and,  what 
is  more,  the  Cabinet,  including  the  President,  are 
charmed  with  your  activity,  valor,  and  consequent 


STANTON'S  CHARACTERISTICS     275 

successes  of  Rich  Mountain,  the  nth,  and  of  Bev 
erly  this  morning.  We  do  not  doubt  that  you  will 
in  due  time  sweep  the  Rebels  from  Western  Vir 
ginia,  but  we  do  not  mean  to  precipitate  you,  as  you 
are  fast  enough." 

I  think  I  have  been  able  to  show,  when  Mc- 
Clellan  appeared  slow,  who  it  was  that  slowed  him ; 
and  when  he  was  unsuccessful,  what  it  was  that 
made  him  so ;  and  when  he  was  successful,  that  it 
was  only  in  proportion  as  he  could  get  the  ropes  of 
interference  oft"  which  were  wound  around  him 
from  Washington;  and  that  wrhen  he  was  free  of 
these  he  was  the  most  successful  of  all  our  com 
manding  officers,  the  most  thorough,  and  the  most 
rapid. 

It  was  for  these  qualities  that  Grant — who  had 
then  been  Major-General,  Lieutenant-General,  full 
General,  and  twice  President — said  to  John  Russell 
Young,  when  in  the  Straits  of  Malacca :  "I  knew 
McClellan,  and  had  great  confidence  in  him.  I 
have,  for  that  matter,  never  lost  my  respect  for 
McClellan's  character,  nor  my  confidence  in  his 
loyalty  and  ability.  I  saw  in  him  the  man  who  was 
to  pilot  us  through,  and  I  wanted  to  be  on  his 
staff.  ...  I  should  have  liked  to  have  joined 
McClellan." 

McClellan,  afterward  describing  how  they  came 
to  miss  one  another,  said,  in  his  love  and  admira 
tion  for  Grant :  'This  was  his  good  luck ;  for  had 
I  been  there  I  would,  no  doubt,  have  given  him  a 


276  ANTIETAM 

place  on  my  staff,  and  he  would  probably  have  re 
mained  with  me  and  shared  my  fate." 

And  Grant,  as  well  as  McClellan  and  Meade,  had 
several  close  shaves  of  his  own,  and  from  the  same 
uncanny  source. 

While  McClellan  was  in  command  at  Camp  Den- 
nison,  in  1861,  there  passed  between  him  and  the 
War  Department  the  shortest  and  oddest  corre 
spondence  which  I  have  come  across  in  the  War 
Records,  and  which  throws  a  pleasing  side-light  on 
that  officer  : 

"CINCINNATI,  OHIO,  May  22,  1861. 
HON.  SIMON  CAMERON,  Secretary  of  War: 

Will  you  please  authorize  me  to  use  boards  to  put  up 
places  for  worship  at  Camp  Dennison?  Parties  furnishing 
nails  and  labor.  GEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN,  Major-General" 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  May  22,  1861. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  B.   MCCLELLAN,  Cincinnati: 
The  Lord's  will  be  done. 

SIMON  CAMERON,  Secretary  of  War. 

It  was  for  these  qualities,  also  above  narrated, 
that  General  Long,  Lee's  military  secretary,  after 
ward  Brigadier-General  and  Chief  of  Artillery  of 
the  Second  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  re 
ports  in  his  "Memoirs  of  Lee"  (edited  under  the 
supervision  of  General  Marcus  J.  Wright,  after 
ward  Agent  of  the  United  States  for  Collecting  Con 
federate  Records),  the  following,  which  occurred 


STANTON'S  CHARACTERISTICS     277 

long  after  the  war :  "One  thing  I  remember  hearing 
him  say.  He  asked  General  Lee  which,  in  his 
opinion,  was  the  ablest  of  the  Union  generals;  to 
which  the  latter  answered,  bringing  his  hand  down 
on  the  table  with  an  emphatic  energy,  'McClellan, 
by  all  odds!'"  (See  page  233.) 


XXXI 

WHY   WAS   M'CLELLAN   REMOVED   AND   FITZ   JOHN 

PORTER      COURT-MARTIALED THE      POPE-HAL- 

LECK-STANTON  DISPATCHES 

So  the  question  again  recurs,  What  was  that  which 
we  doctors  call  "the  exciting  cause"  of  McClellan's 
removal  from  command  on  that  most  unfortunate 
occasion? 

We  shall  have  to  look  far  away  for  an  answer 
to  what  was  then  the  scene  of  an  Indian  uprising, 
in  the  wilder  parts  of  Minnesota.  We  shall  take  up 
the  antecedent  features  of  the  astounding  affair, 
and  more  particularly  detail  in  Chapter  xxxili  fol 
lowing  just  what  this  "exciting  cause"  proved  to  be. 

It  was  especially  important  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  strategists  at  Washington  that  someone  at  that 
time  should  turn  up,  somewhere  far  removed  from 
the  wholesome  influence  of  the  loyal  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  its  commander;  and,  like  a  gift  of 
Providence,  carne  forth  the  twin  heroes  Halleck  and 
Pope. 

General  Halleck  sent  to  Secretary  Stanton,  June 
4,  1862,  his  made-up  dispatch: 

278 


McCLELLAN  REMOVED,  ETC.       279 

"HALLECK'S  HEADQUARTERS,  June  4. 
HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War: 

General  Pope,  with  40,000,  is  thirty  miles  south  of  Corinth, 
pushing  the  enemy  hard.  He  already  reports  10,000  prisoners 
and  deserters  from  the  enemy,  and  15,000  stand  cf  arms  cap 
tured.  Thousands  of  the  enemy  are  throwing  away  their 
arms." 

Stanton  telegraphed  back : 

"Your  glorious  dispatch  has  just  been  received,  and  I  have 
sent  it  into  every  State.  The  whole  land  will  soon  ring  with 
applause  at  the  achievement  of  your  gallant  army  and  its 
able  and  victorious  commander." 

And  even  the  President  was  deceived.  He  tele 
graphed  also : 

"Your  dispatch  of  to-day  to  the  Secretary  of  War  re 
ceived.  Thanks  for  the  good  news  it  brings." 

The  fighting  in  the  West,  it  is  true,  had  been 
actually  done  by  others ;  but  Lyon  was  dead,  and 
Grant  in  disgrace,  and  Halleck  and  Pope  emerged 
into  public  view  in  the  very  nick  of  time.  A  vic 
tory  far  beyond  that  of  Fort  Donelson,  or  that  of 
Shiloh,  or  of  anywhere  else,  was  made  to  order 
and  heralded  abroad,  for  it  brought  thousands  of 
prisoners,  and  more  to  come ;  and  the  great,  tender 
hearted  Lincoln  wanted  Rebel  prisoners  far  more 
than  he  wanted  dead  Rebels. 

Pope,  within  one  week  from  the  proclamation 
abroad  of  the  bogus  dispatch,  was  rushed  to  Wash 
ington;  and  within  ten  days  more  he  was  made 


280  ANTIETAM 

commanding  general  of  a  new  army, — the  Army  of 
Virginia, — with  Washington  as  its  very  own,  and  all 
the  rest  of  Virginia  as  its  "hinterland,"  or  sphere 
of  influence.  When  Pope  reached  Washington  he 
must  have  tried  to  explain  matters,  for  Stanton 
telegraphed  Halleck  to  know  why  he  sent  such  a 
dispatch.  Halleck  excused  himself,  like  a  lawyer, 
by  saying  that  he  sent  only  the  reports  the  generals 
made  to  him.  If  anybody  had  lied,  the  inference 
was,  it  must  have  been  Pope. 

Halleck  himself  was  brought  on  next,  imme 
diately  following  Pope.  He  was  a  lawyer,  a  closet- 
strategist,  and  a  compiler  at  second-hand  of  books 
on  strategy,  but  one  who  never  manifested  any 
strategical  skill  of  his  own;  or,  if  he  did,  feared  to 
use  it.  (See  Grant,  "Personal  Memoirs,"  vol.  i, 
p.  578;  vol.  n,  pp.  317,  318,  327,  337.) 

Now,  when  General  Pope  came  to  the  Eastern 
armies  every  officer  in  those  armies  knew  the  truth 
about  the  bogus  victory,  about  Grant,  and  every 
thing  else,  for  the  grapevine  telegraph  among  sol 
diers  always  took  care  of  that  sort  of  thing. 

William  F.  G.  Shanks,  in  his  "Personal  Recollec 
tions  of  Distinguished  Generals,"  relates  an  inci 
dent  which  could  not  have  failed  to  reach  the  armies 
in  the  East,  for  it  brought  Sherman  and  Grant  to 
gether  for  life,  and  Sherman  was  an  Eastern  army 
officer,  and  one  of  McClellan's  generals,  having  been 
sent  by  the  latter  to  command  in  the  West. 

There  is  much  of  romance  in  the  story  of  Grant's 


McCLELLAN  REMOVED,  ETC.        281 

and  Sherman's  friendship.  It  began  in  1862,  and 
ever  afterward  continued  to  grow  in  strength.  When 
the  armies  of  Halleck  were  lying — literally  so, 
indeed — before  Corinth,  Grant  was  to  all  appear 
ance  shelved  in  disgrace.  He  was  second  in  com 
mand,  but  to  be  second  in  command  then  was  to  be 
the  "fifth  wheel  to  the  coach."  Grant  was  much 
chagrined  at  his  position,  and  felt  in  tenfold  degree 
each  petty  indignity  which  Halleck  heaped  upon 
him.  One  day  General  Sherman,  who  commanded 
one  of  the  divisions  of  the  wing  under  the  command 
of  General  George  H.  Thomas,  went  to  General 
Grant's  quarters  and  bolted  with  his  usual  abrupt 
ness  into  Grant's  tent.  They  didn't  stand  on  cere 
mony  in  the  field.  He  found  the  general  actually 
weeping  with  vexation.  Sherman  asked  the  cause, 
and  for  the  first  time  Grant  recounted  the  indig 
nities  which  he  had  endured,  the  troubles  he  had  en 
countered,  and  the  false  position  in  which  he  had 
been  placed  before  the  country.  "The  truth  is, 
Sherman,"  he  said,  "I  am  not  wanted.  The  coun 
try  has  no  use  for  me,  and  I  am  about  to  resign  and 
go  home." 

"No,  you  are  not,"  returned  Sherman  impatiently; 
"you  are  going  to  do  nothing  of  the  sort.  The 
country  does  need  you,  and  you  must  stay  here,  bear 
these  petty  insults,  and  do  your  duty."  And,  the 
author  says,  Sherman  argued  Grant  down,  and  kept 
him  there  until  Halleck's  appointment,  as  general- 
in-chief,  "left  the  command  in  the  West  vacant." 


282  ANTIETAM 

Then  Grant  had  his  chance,  but  neither  he  nor 
Sherman  ever  forgot  Halleck.  Sherman,  in  his 
"Personal  Memoirs,"  relates  this  story  in  much  the 
same  manner. 

Pope's  coming  East  under  these  circumstances 
could  certainly  inspire  no  confidence  in  the  men. 
His  boastful  address  to  his  Virginia  army,  that  in 
the  West  they  had  always  seen  the  backs  of  their 
enemies  while  in  the  East  we  did  the  opposite — when 
every  officer  and  soldier  in  Virginia  knew  that  all 
the  battling  which  Pope  ever  did  in  the  West  did 
not  equal,  in  actual  righting,  Big  Bethel  or  Dranes- 
ville — was  tactless,  to  say  no  worse.  His  order- 
promptly  vetoed  by  the  President — to  remove 
from  their  farms  and  homes  and  send  beyond  our 
lines  all  male  citizens  found  therein,  unless  they 
took  the  oath  of  allegiance,  was  harsh,  ill-timed,  and 
despotic.  An  important  fact,  clearly  set  forth  in 
General  Upton's  "Military  Policy,"  was  that  Pope 
attributed  to  one  day,  in  his  Bull  Run  battle,  the 
events  which  had  really  occurred  on  another  day, 
and  that,  after  assuming  command  on  June  27  he 
never  went  out  to  see  his  army  until  July  30.  There 
fore,  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing  acts,  Pope  could 
not  have  failed  to  produce  an  uneasiness  among  all 
military  bodies,  private  soldiers  and  officers  alike, 
long  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been 
ordered  up  from  the  Peninsula. 

I  can  testify  of  my  own  knowledge  to  the  feeling 
prevalent  among  the  troops  near  Washington  at 


McCLELLAN  REMOVED,  ETC.       283 

the  beginning  of  July,  when  General  Pope  conducted 
a  review  of  a  few  thousand  men  near  Fort  Worth, 
back  of  Alexandria.  A  mere  corporal  in  the  ranks 
then,  I  knew  little  of  General  Pope;  but  a  jest,  with 
a  curse,  went  the  rounds,  after  that  terribly  hot  day 
of  double-quicking  past  the  grandstand  (doubtless 
not  true,  but  it  was  in  everybody's  mouth)  :  "Oh, 
Pa,  twot  'em  'round  again;  they  look  so  pretty." 
The  incident  has  no  value  as  history,  but  it  exempli 
fies  a  popular  feeling  in  the  army  at  the  time,  long 
before  McClellan  or  his  army  was  a  possible  factor 
in  the  case. 

There  is  nothing  that  sifts  out  a  man  like  sol 
diering.  A  man  can  fool  courts  and  cabinets,  news 
paper  reporters  and  editors,  and  even  the  public,  but 
if  he  is  a  military  commander  he  cannot  fool  the 
intelligent  and  square-dealing  veteran  soldiers.  These 
men,  giving  up  their  time,  their  pleasures,  their 
business,  their  wives  and  sweethearts  and  families, 
and  throwing  just  so  much  of  their  actual  lives  away 
like  chaff,  have  offered  themselves  as  living  sacri 
fices  for  their  country,  and  are  ready  to  pay  the 
price  with  life  or  suffering.  And  these  men  want 
to  feel  and  to  know  that  the  commander  into  whose 
hands  they  are  put  for  weal  or  woe  is  a  good  man, 
a  capable  man,  a  powerful  man,  the  best  that  can 
be  obtained ;  and  that  they  are  as  safe  in  his  hands 
as  they  can  be  in  any  human  hands,  and  that  the 
great  cause  for  which  they  have  periled  life  and  all 
that  makes  life  worth  living  is  in  good  hands.  Talk 


284  ANTIETAM 

about  the  fierce  light  which  beats  upon  a  throne! 
It  is  nothing  to  that  searching  light  by  which  among 
soldiers — skilled  soldiers,  true  soldiers,  veterans— 
the  commander  is  observed,  and  felt;  and,  if  worthy, 
tied  fast  to.  and  lived  with,  and  died  for.  When 
they  find  one  such  that  they  can  trust  in  implicitly, 
that  they  can  believe  in  absolutely  and  follow  fear 
lessly,  they  surrender  themselves  and  all  they  have 
to  that  commander  with  a  joyful  self-sacrifice  that 
makes  them  immortal  heroes. 

Of  such  commanders  Emerson  says:  "A  river  of 
command  runs  down  from  the  eyes  of  some  men, 
and  the  reason  why  we  feel  one  man's  presence  and 
not  another's,  is  as  simple  as  gravity;  and  this 
natural  force  is  no  more  to  be  withstood  than  any 
other  natural  force." 

Lord  Wolseley  says  :  ''This  is  the  influence  which 
men,  with  what  I  may  term  great  electrical  power 
in  their  nature,  have  exercised  in  war.  Caesar,  Marl- 
borough,  Napoleon,  Sir  Charles  Napier,  and  many 
others  I  could  name  possessed  it  largely.  The  cur 
rent  passed  from  them  into  all  around,  creating 
great  enthusiasm  in  all  ranks  far  and  near,  and 
often  making  heroes  of  men  whose  mothers  and 
fathers  even  had  never  regarded  them  in  that  light. 
This  feeling  is  an  addition  of  at  least  fifty  per  cent, 
of  strength  and  energy  to  an  army  where  it  exists." 

Bonaparte  said  that  he  often  noticed  the  imme 
diate  electric  effect  of  his  arrival  on  the  battle 
field. 


McCLELLAN  REMOVED,  ETC.       285 

We  all  recollect  what  occurred  when  Sheridan 
reached  his  half -routed  army  in  his  ride  from  Win 
chester  to  the  battle-field  of  Fisher's  Creek,  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley. 

On  the  hurried  march  from  the  Potomac  to 
Gettysburg,  and  especially  on  that  exceedingly  long 
march  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  the  word  passed  in  the 
night  from  rank  to  rank,  "McClellan  is  back  again, 
and  in  command."  The  whole  column  took  on  new 
life  and  energy,  and  enthusiasm  took  the  place  of 
uneasiness  and  despondency,  as  they  marched  on 
in  anticipated  triumph,  to  the  glory  of  a  new  An- 
tietam.  It  was  not  McClellan;  but  it  was  the  next 
best  thing  possible,  it  was  one  of  his  own  chosen 
three — Reynolds,  Meade,  and  Hancock — who  took 
the  army  and  saved  the  country. 

So  the  poor  boy-private  at  Antietam,  with  his 
leg  shot  off  at  the  thigh,  raised  himself  on  his  elbow 
and  cried  out  with  his  dying  breath,  as  McClellan 
was  riding  by  along  the  battle  lines :  "God  bless 
you,  General  McClellan !"  And  the  peerless  Bayard, 
dying  beside  a  tree  on  the  fatal  field  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  sent  this  message:  "Tell  General  McClellan 
that  my  only  regret  is  that  I  do  not  die  while  under 
his  command."  So,  too,  General  Grant  said  to  John 
Russell  Young:  "McClellan  is  to  me  one  of  the 
mysteries  of  the  war.  As  a  young  man  he  was  al 
ways  a  mystery.  He  had  the  way  of  inspiring  you 
with  the  idea  of  immense  capacity,  if  he  would 
only  have  a  chance.  Then  he  is  a  man  of  unusual 


286  ANTIETAM 

accomplishments — a  student,  and  a  well-read  man." 
Grant  thus  separated  this  peculiar  psychical  power 
of  the  commander  from  the  habits,  education,  and 
acquirements  of  the  individual,  while  he  attributed 
both  to  McClellan.  It  is  from  the  universal  recog 
nition  of  this  controlling  factor,  by  his  old  sol 
diers,  that  even  to  this  day  they  have  never  been 
satisfied  with  what  history  professed  to  teach  re 
garding  him.  What  General  Emory  Upton  discov 
ered  by  investigation,  his  old  soldiers  found  out  by 
personal  experience;  and  they  know,  with  General 
Upton,  that  the  military  answer  to  the  McClellan 
problem,  as  so  far  presented  in  current  history, 
"cannot  be  made  to  prove,  and  is  not  correct." 


XXXII 

POPE'S  BATTLE  AND  HIS  DEFEAT SECOND 

MANASSAS 

GENERAL  Upton  traces  the  Second  Bull  Run  bat 
tle  with  a  pen  of  fire,  and  puts  the  blame  where  it 
belongs.  This  is  what  he  says :  "The  criticisms  on 
the  march  of  Franklin's  corps  have  all  been  based 
on  the  assumption  that  there  was  a  broad  pike  from 
Alexandria  to  Centerville,  that  this  highway  was 
all  the  time  open,  and  that  nothing  prevented  a 
junction  with  the  hard-pressed  Army  of  Virginia 
save  the  indifference  of  the  commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

"The  facts  as  subsequently  established  were  that, 
from  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  until  the  afternoon 
of  the  28th,  from  25,000  to  30,000  Confederates 
were  on  the  direct  line  of  communication  with  the 
Army  of  Virginia;  that  from  the  time  General 
Pope  reached  Centerville,  on  the  28th,  till  the  even 
ing  of  the  2Qth,  no  positive  information  had  been 
received  as  to  his  whereabouts ;  that  his  cavalry  was 
so  used  up  that  not  five  horses  per  company  could 
be  forced  into  a  trot ;  that  he  sent  no  dispatch  to  the 
Government  till  the  morning  of  the  3Oth,  and  that 

287 


288  ANTIETAM 

Franklin's  corps,  on  the  information  derived  on  the 
night  of  the  29th,  joined  him  on  the  3Oth,  part  of  it 
having  marched  twenty  miles." 

After  Pope's  defeated  army  began  to  pour  back 
upon  Washington,  and  after  McClellan's  Army  of 
the  Potomac  had  been  entirely  sent  out  to  Pope, 
leaving  himself  in  command  of  only  his  staff  and 
orderlies,  less  than  one  hundred  men,  General  Upton 
says  that,  having  acted  on  the  theory  of  the  War 
Department  strategists,  there  were  only  5989  men 
left  to  garrison  Washington,  "of  whom  2235  were 
militia,  whose  term  of  service  would  expire  before 
the  end  of  the  month." 

As  regards  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  this 
Pope  campaign,  I  quote  General  Upton  again  :  "The 
accusation  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  not 
fight,  will  justify  the  inquiry,  'What  troops  fought 
the  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run?'  The  Army  of  Vir 
ginia,  as  we  know,  consisted  of  the  corps  of  Gen 
eral  Banks,  Sigel,  and  McDowell.  Of  these  General 
Banks'  corps  took  no  part,  being  assigned  to  the 
protection  of  the  trains." 

Sigel  reported  June  30  that  his  corps  was  not  in 
good  condition,  the  organization  not  complete,  and 
the  cavalry  not  more  than  800  effective  men  and 
horses. 

Pope  had  already  complained  of  straggling,  as 
early  as  July  22.  He  stated  afterward,  of  the  battle 
itself,  that  "at  least  one-half  of  this  great  diminu 
tion  of  our  forces  was  occasioned  by  skulking  and 


POPE'S  BATTLE  AND  DEFEAT      289 

straggling  from  the  army.  Thousands  of  men  strag 
gled  away,  and  were  not  in  any  action."  This  corps 
(Sigel's)  was  estimated  at  9000  on  the  26th  of  Au 
gust. 

In  addition,  the  two  divisions  of  King  and 
Ricketts  numbered  13,000;  "these  two  divisions," 
says  Upton,  "about  13,000  men,  and  General  Sigel's 
corps,  9000,  were  all  the  troops  belonging  to  the 
Army  of  Virginia  who  confronted  the  60,000  Con 
federates  on  the  29th  and  3Oth."  To  these  are  to 
be  added  Reno's  division  of  Burnside's  corps — the 
other  two  divisions  being  still  opposite  Fredericks- 
burg.  The  remaining  troops,  says  Upton,  Rey 
nolds,  Kearny,  Hooker,  of  Heintzleman's  corps,  and 
Morell  and  Sykes,  of  Porter's  corps,  in  all  20,500, 
belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Had  Pope  fallen  back  on  Centerville  on  the  24th 
or  25th,  says  Upton, — as  Meade  did  in  October  of 
1863, — Franklin  and  the  remaining  divisions  of 
Burnside  could  have  reached  him  in  time. 

But.  as  Upton  says,  Pope  did  not  understand  his 
own  plan.  He  was  claiming  a  great  victory,  driving 
the  Rebels,  and  he  could  not  understand  the  events 
which  were  taking  place  all  around  him;  and  as 
there  was  later  on  demanded  someone  to  suffer, 
Pope  poured  the  vials  of  his  wrath  on  Porter  and 
McClellan,  and  the  War  Department  strategists 
were  only  too  glad  to  compound,  for  bringing  Pope 
and  Halleck  to  Washington,  by  laying  their  failure 
on  the  men  who  really  saved  them.  That  such  was 


2QO  ANTIETAM 

the  case  Pope,  in  especial,  never  did  and  never  could 
comprehend. 

Porter  was  court-martialed,  as  is  well  known. 
The  evidence  was  cooked.  That  which  was  incon 
venient  wras  suppressed,  exculpating  dispatches  w7ere 
concealed,  the  testimony  of  the  Confederate  officers 
who  knew  the  facts  on  their  own  part  was  ignored, 
and  the  victim  was  cashiered.  But  subsequently, 
when  the  urgent  necessity  of  convicting  him  to  save 
Pope,  Halleck,  and  Stanton  had  passed,  a  new  and 
fairer  tribunal,  composed  of  Schofield,  Terry,  and 
Getty,  went  over  the  whole  case  and  clearly  demon 
strated  that  it  was  Fitz  John  Porter  who  had  saved 
Pope's  army,  instead  of  defeating  it,  \vho  had  saved 
the  capital,  and  that  he  deserved  well  of  his  coun 
try.  (See  War  Records,  vol.  xn,  part  2,  pp.  513- 
536.)  Grant,  too,  in  his  fair-mindedness  and 
breadth  of  character,  promised  to  stand  by  Porter 
forever,  and  he  did  so ;  and  his  article,  published 
in  1883,  "An  Undeserved  Stigma,"  not  only  vindi 
cated  Porter,  but  was  the  noble  act  of  a  fellow- 
soldier  now  too  great  to  be  assailed,  but  who  had 
himself  passed  under  the  same  harrow.  Grant  to 
Porter : 

"As  long  as  I  have  a  voice  it  shall  be  raised  in 
your  support,  without  any  reference  to  its  effect 
upon  me  or  others/'  (North  American  Review, 
December,  1885.) 


XXXIII 

POPE'S   DEMAND    WHICH    HALLECK    DARED    NOT    RE 
FUSE THE     FALSE     DISPATCH     OF     HALLECK/S 

WHICH  BROUGHT  POPE  AND  HALLECK  TO  COM 
MAND  AT   WASHINGTON 

AFTER  Pope's  campaign  in  Virginia  was  over,  he 
was  sent  to  Minnesota  to  command  against  the  sav 
ages — a  position  of  degradation,  as  he  held  it  to  be. 
He  wrote  a  series  of  remarkable  letters  to  Halleck, 
commencing  with  one  of  September  30,  1862.  (See 
War  Records,  vol.  xn,  part  3,  pp.  816-827.)  He 
accused  Halleck  of  not  sustaining  him  against  Mc- 
Clellan;  that  McClellan  would  never  forgive  Hal 
leck  for  superseding  him;  that  Halleck  was  under 
"a  deep  personal  obligation"  to  Pope,  and  that  he 
could  learn  what  it  was  by  consulting  the  President, 
Secretary  of  War,  or  other  members  of  the  Admin 
istration;  that  he  had  besought  the  President,  and 
Halleck  himself,  to  be  allowed  to  go  West  to  his  old 
place  again;  and  that  the  journals,  and  members  of 
the  Cabinet  even,  were  representing  that  McClellan 
was  really  commander,  "while  you  are  but  a  tool  in 
his  hands." 

291 


292  ANTIETAM 

Halleck  replied,  defending  himself  in  his  usual 
manner  by  showing  that  whatever  credit  there  was, 
was  his,  and  whatever  blame  there  was  belonged 
to  the  "President  and  entire  Cabinet." 

But  Pope  came  at  him  again,  under  date  October 
20 :  "The  greatest  criminal  is  McClellan,  and  my 
charge  is  direct  and  plain  against  him.  Your  reason 
for  retaining  him  in  command,  'the  feelings  of  many 
officers  of  the  Potomac  Army,'  is  the  very  strongest 
reason,  in  my  view,  why  he  should  not  be  re 
tained.  ...  He  [McClellan]  should  never 
have  been  placed  in  command  of  anything  under 
such  circumstances. 

"I  wrote  you  because  I  desire  you  to  understand 
fully  my  feelings,  and  the  course  of  action  that  I 
shall  pursue.  I  had  hoped  that  you  would  render 
official  steps  unnecessary. 

"Had  I  imagined  for  a  moment  that  he  would 
be  rewarded  with  his  partisans  for  abandoning  me, 
and  betraying  his  trust,  and  that  you  would,  at  least, 
have  consented  to  his  and  their  advancement  after 
such  an  act,  and  would  have  failed  to  sustain  me,  or 
even  to  do  me  the  barest  justice,  or  to  make  the 
slightest  acknowledgment  in  public  of  my  services, 
I  would  never  have  put  foot  in  Virginia." 

And  now  comes  the  stinger: 

"Your  not  doing  so,  wrhen  the  whole  facts  came 
to  be  known,  cannot  fail  to  be  the  subject  of  remark, 
especially  so  as  the  circumstances  under  which  you 
came  to  Washington  and  I  undertook  the  campaign 


POPE'S  DEMAND,  ETC.  293 

in  Virginia  are  well  known  to  one-half  of  Con 
gress/'  The  italics  are  mine. 

He  adds  that  if  Halleck  cannot  do  justice,  even  in 
words,  to  him,  "No  man  regrets  more  than  I  do  that 
you  occupy  such  a  position,  or  would  more  gladly 
see  you  out  of  it." 

Halleck  evidently  considered  and  consulted.  He 
did  not  reply  so  far  as  publication  shows,  and  Pope 
came  at  him  again.  This  letter  was  dated  at  Saint 
Paul,  Minn.,  October  30,  1862.  It  should  have 
reached  Washington  November  4.  The  very  next 
day,  November  5,  McClellan  was  removed  from 
command,  by  the  following  order: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJ.  GENERAL'S  OFFICE. 
GENERAL  ORDERS  WASHINGTON,  November  5,  1862. 

No.  182. 

By  direction  of  the   President  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
ordered  that  Major-General  McClellan  be  relieved  from  the 
Command  of  the  Army  of  the   Potomac,   and  that   Major- 
General  Burnside  take  the  command  of  that  army. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Then  General  Pope,  and  the  rest,  felt  easier.  Pope 
wrote,  November  20 :  "I  will  wait  the  action  of  the 
Government  with  all  the  patience  that  is  in  my 
nature." 

They  had  not  finished  yet  with  Fitz  John  Porter, 

and,  as  Pope  says,  "My  position  here  is  not  pleasant. 

My  future  command  or  place  I  leave  to 

yourself,   without  uneasiness,   feeling  assured  that 

you  will  do  me  justice." 


294  ANTIETAM 

And  so  the  knowledge  in  the  breast  of  one-half 
of  Congress,  and  in  the  secret  files  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and  in  the  minds  of 
various  others  who  thought  it  the  better  part  of 
valor  to  be  prudent,  slumbered  until  the  war  had 
ended,  and  then,  and  not  till  then,  General  Pope  felt 
free  to  ask  ugly  questions,  and  to  put  them  in  print, 
too,  which  he  did.  (See  War  Records,  vol.  x,  part 
2,  pp.  635-637.) 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C, 

July  3,  1865. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK,  U.  S.  A., 

Washington,  D.  C. 
General: 

The  war  has  now  ended,  and  the  events  and  incidents  con 
nected  with  it  are  passing  into  history.  As  I  do  not  wish  that 
any  report  or  misconception  which  has  been  circulated  to 
my  prejudice,  and  which  is  susceptible  of  explanation,  should 
stand  recorded  against  me,  and  as  the  reasons  which  actuated 
me  in  preserving  silence  until  this  time  no  longer  exist,  I 
desire  to  invite  your  attention  to  a  dispatch  published  in  the 
newspapers,  dated  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  June  4,  1862,  purporting 
to  have  been  sent  by  you  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  con 
taining  substantially  the  following  words,  viz. :  "General 
Pope  is  thirty  miles  south  of  Corinth,  pushing  the  enemy 
hard.  He  already  reports  10,000  prisoners  and  deserters,  and 
15,000  stand  of  arms  captured,"  etc.  I  do  not  know  that 
you  ever  sent  such  a  dispatch ;  but  as  I  do  know  that  I  never 
made  such  a  report,  I  infer  that  if  you  sent  the  dispatch  in 
question,  you  must  have  done  so  under  a  very  great  mis 
apprehension.  I  have  therefore  to  request  that  you  furnish 
me  a  copy  of  any  report  made  by  me  upon  which  such  a  dis 
patch  as  that  in  question  was  sent.  I  have  full  records  of 


POPE'S  DEMAND,  ETC.  295 

all   my   letters,    dispatches,    and   reports   to   you   during  the 
operations  at  Corinth,  and  no  such  report  is  among  them. 
I  am,  General,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  POPE. 

But  Halleck  declined  to  furnish  Pope  a  copy  of 
such  report,  and  said  that  all  his  papers  were  boxed 
up  for  California,  adding:  "I  never  reported  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  dispatches  received  from  you 
which  were  not  so  received." 

This  lawyer's  letter  was  too  much  for  Pope,  and 
he  wrote  Halleck,  July  5,  that  that  officer  was  to 
pass  three  weeks  before  going  to  California,  in  New 
York;  that  only  a  short  time  would  be  required  to 
look  up  this  paper;  that  if  Halleck  meant  to  still  in 
sist  that  the  dispatch  was  a  correct  transcript  of  any 
thing  that  Pope  had  sent  him,  he  was  "altogether 
unsatisfactory," — which  was  certainly  true,  but  that 
was  because  in  this  case  he  had  to  be.  "In  short, 
General,  I  utterly  deny  that  the  dispatch  purporting 
to  have  been  sent  by  you  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
was  based  upon  any  report  from  me  such  as  is 
therein  stated,  and  I  therefore  call  upon  you  to  dis 
avow  this  dispatch  or  to  furnish  me  with  a  copy  of 
the  report  attributed  to  me."  He  says  that  such  a 
question  "in  almost  any  other  case"  could  be  easily 
and  conclusively  settled  by  a  reference  to  the  offi 
cial  files,  "but  I  have  ascertained,  General,  that  when 
you  left  the  West  you  ordered  that  portion  of  the 
dispatches  and  reports  concerning  the  operations 
around  Corinth,  which  bear  upon  this  question,  to  be 


296  ANTIETAM 

cut  out  of  the  official  books,  and  brought  with  you  to 
Washington,  leaving  the  official  records  in  Saint 
Louis  mutilated  and  incomplete." 

Pope  then  sums  up  the  case;  says  that  he  has  all 
the  evidence  requisite;  that  if  Halleck  would  not, 
or  could  not,  clear  it  up, — which,  of  course,  Pope 
knew  that  he  couldn't,  and  which  Pope  himself  had 
not  done  when  it  would  have  been  of  some  use, — he 
would  feel  quite  different  toward  what  one  may  call 
his  old  friend  and  comrade ;  that  Pope  desired  to  still 
maintain  those  relations,  but —  — ! 

Halleck,  however,  believed  that  silence  was 
golden  in  this  case,  and  no  answer  is  recorded  to 
General  Pope's  last  letter.  However,  the  letters 
answered  themselves. 

It  is  somewhat  humiliating,  and  not  creditable  to 
any  of  those  concerned,  to  have  to  record  these 
facts;  but  it  is  a  question  of  either  McClellan  or  of 
his  detractors,  and  the  innocent  should  not  in  such 
a  case,  and  in  so  serious  a  case  particularly,  be  the 
one  to  be  made  to  suffer. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  that  General  Pope,  when  he 
wrote  his  letters  to  Halleck  from  Minnesota  in  1862, 
was  thoroughly  aroused.  He  was  no  hypocrite  in 
believing  that  he  was  a  grossly  abused  man,  and  that 
Halleck  was  responsible  for  it;  and  that  in  his  bogus 
dispatch,  mutilation  of  records,  and  other  conduct 
just  before  he  left  Corinth,  and  when  he  came  to 
Washington  as  General-in-Chief,  Halleck  had  been 
guilty  of  acts  which  would,  if  made  public,  forfeit 


POPE'S  DEMAND,  ETC.  297 

him  his  place  in  the  army  and  degrade  him  as  a 
man,  and  he  offered  to  Halleck  in  categorical  terms 
the  alternative  either  to  dismiss  McClellan  and 
court-martial  and  convict  Fitz  John  Porter,  or  else 
to  be  court-martialed  and  cashiered  himself. 

Halleck  chose  the  former  alternative,  and  at  once, 
through  his  co-partner  Stanton,  had  McClellan  re 
moved  and  Fitz  John  Porter  court-martialed,  and 
the  court  packed  to  cashier  the  latter — if  not  to 
have  him  shot. 


XXXIV 

M'CLELLAN — THE  PRESIDENT — THE  ARMY  OF  THE 

POTOMAC CONCLUSION 

THERE  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  President  ever 
had  the  slightest  cognizance  of  the  circumstances 
and  conditions  surrounding  these  tragical  events. 
Indeed,  it  is  certain  that  Lincoln  not  only  did  not 
know,  but  never  even  dreamed,  of  cabals  and  ma 
chinations.  He  was  surrounded  with  webs  and  en 
tanglements,  and  there  was  absolutely  no  one  to 
whom  he  could  then  turn  whose  words  of  advice, 
if  just  and  true,  would  not  be  drowned  out  or 
silenced,  and  the  adviser  would  have  been  destroyed 
for  doing  his  unselfish  duty.  McClellan  himself 
never  believed  that  Lincoln  was  anything  else  than 
just  and  friendly.  In  the  report  of  his  final  cam 
paign,  dated  August  4,  1863,  ^ong  after  his  removal 
from  command,  he  accords  this  just  and  noble 
tribute  to  the  President : 

"I  cannot  omit  the  expression  of  my  thanks  to 
the  President  for  the  constant  evidence  given  me 
of  his  sincere  personal  regard,  and  his  desire  to  sus 
tain  the  military  plans  which  my  judgment  led  me 
to  urge  for  adoption  and  execution.  I  cannot  at- 

298 


McCLELLAN— THE  PRESIDENT      299 

tribute  his  failure  to  adopt  some  of  these  plans,  and 
to  give  that  support  to  others  which  was  necessary 
to  their  success,  to  any  want  of  confidence  in  me; 
and  it  only  remains  for  me  to  regret  that  other  coun 
sels  came  between  the  constitutional  commander- 
in-chief  and  the  general  whom  he  had  placed  at  the 
head  of  his  armies — counsels  which  resulted  in  the 
failure  of  great  campaigns. 

"If  the  nation  possesses  no  generals  in  service 
competent  to  direct  its  military  affairs  without  the 
aid  or  supervision  of  politicians,  the  sooner  it  finds 
them  and  places  them  in  position  the  better  it  will 
be  for  its  fortunes. 

"I  am  devoutly  grateful  to  God  that  my  last  cam 
paign  with  this  brave  army  was  crowned  with  a  vic 
tory  which  saved  the  nation  from  the  greatest  peril 
it  had  then  undergone.  I  have  not  accomplished 
my  purpose  if,  by  this  report,  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  is  not  placed  high  on  the  roll  of  the  historic 
armies  of  the  world.  Its  deeds  ennoble  the  nation 
to  which  it  belongs.  Always  ready  for  battle,  al 
ways  firm,  steadfast,  and  trustworthy,  I  never  called 
on  it  in  vain ;  nor  will  the  nation  ever  have  cause  to 
attribute  its  want  of  success,  under  myself,  or  under 
other  commanders,  to  any  failure  of  patriotism  or 
bravery  in  that  noble  body  of  American  soldiers." 


XXXV 

SOME  NOTES  OF  M^CLELLAN's  LIFE  AND  PERSONALITY 

WHILE  this  work  is  essentially  a  military  criticism 
based  on  official  data,  much  of  which  is  new  to  the 
public,  and  intended  for  military  students  and  stu 
dents  of  strategy,  it  may  be  well  to  append,  in 
the  briefest  form,  some  personal  data  relating  to 
General  George  B.  McClellan  himself.  Perhaps  this 
can  best  come  from  a  military  man  himself,  one 
who  knew  him  at  West  Point  and  during  the  War 
with  Mexico,  and  who  has  written  important  works 
on  kindred  subjects;  and  yet  one  who1  was  not  em 
ployed  in  the  military  service  during  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion,  having  left  the  army  six  years  before  the 
war,  to  engage  in  literary  pursuits  which  have  made 
his  name  famous  throughout  the  world.  I  refer  to 
Professor  and  President  Henry  Coppee,  whose 
''Conquest  of  Spain"  is  a  monumental  work  which 
could  only  have  been  accomplished  by  one  of  high 
military  judgment. 

The  remarks  on  the  personality  and  history  of 
General  McClellan  I  select  from  his  biographical 
notice  of  McClellan  in  Appleton's  "Cyclopaedia  of 
American  Biography,"  published  in  1888. 

300 


NOTES  ON  McCLELLAN'S  LIFE      301 

Professor  Coppee  entered  the  Military  Academy 
of  West  Point  in  1841,  and  was  graduated  in  1845, 
while  McClellan  entered  the  same  institution  in  1842, 
and  wras  graduated  in  1846.  so  that  they  were  asso 
ciated  as  students  for  three  years. 

Coppee's  life  was  fruitful,  and  gave  him  every 
opportunity  to  measure  men,  and  especially  military 
men,  and  their  qualifications  and  achievements. 

He  served  as  an  officer  of  artillery  during  the 
War  with  Mexico,  and  was  promoted  for  gallantry 
at  Contreras  and  Churubusco;  he  was  principal  as 
sistant  professor  of  geography,  history,  and  ethics 
at  West  Point  for  five  years;  he  resigned  from  the 
army  in  1855,  to  become  professor  of  English  lit 
erature  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  until 
1866;  then  president  of  Lehigh  University,  at  Beth 
lehem,  in  1874;  and  was  one  of  the  Regents  of  the 
Smithsonian  Institution,  at  Washington.  He  was 
twice  a  member  of  the  United  States  Mint  Assay 
Commission;  he  was  editor  of  the  United  Service 
Magazine  in  1864-1866.  In  addition  to  many  works 
not  military,  Professor  Coppee  was  the  author  of 
"Manual  of  Battalion  Drill,"  "Evolutions  of  the 
Line,"  "Manual  of  Court-Martial,"  "Life  and  Ser 
vices  of  General  U.  S.  Grant,"  and  "The  Conquest 
of  Spain  by  the  Arab-Moors,"  and  translator  from 
the  French  of  "La  Guerre  Civile  en  Amerique,"  by 
Count  Paris. 

Says  Professor  Coppee  of  McClellan : 


302  ANTIETAM 

"Born  in  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  December  3,  1826; 
died  in  Orange,  N.  J.,  October  29,  1885. 

"Educated  by  private  tutors,  he  spent  two  years 
at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  where  he  shared 
first  honors;  at  the  age  of  fifteen  years  and  six 
months  (while  under  legal  age)  he  became  by  spe 
cial  authority  a  cadet  at  the  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point  July  i,  1842.  In  his  class  were  Gen 
eral  Stonewall  Jackson,  General  Reno,  and  others 
who  subsequently  became  distinguished. 

"He  led  his  class  in  mathematics,  and  was  gradu 
ated  July  i,  1846.  He  was  appointed  brevet  second 
lieutenant  in  the  corps  of  engineers  (the  highest 
class),  and  served  during  the  War  with  Mexico,  in 
the  operations  resulting  in  the  capture  of  the  city; 
was  promoted  for  meritorious  conduct,  and  in  1848 
was  made  assistant  and  instructor  of  practical  engi 
neering  at  West  Point.  He  was  engaged  in  the  Red 
River  and  other  Government  explorations,  and,  later, 
as  engineer  on  the  Western  frontiers,  and  in 
Oregon  and  Washington.  He  was  sent  to  Europe 
during  the  Crimean  War,  on  a  commission  to  study 
the  organizations,  arms,  field  and  siege-works,  and 
operations  of  the  different  armies,  the  results  of 
which  were  published  in  his  elaborate  report,  "The 
Armies  of  Europe,"  and  which  was  used  in  re 
organizing  our  own  armies  during  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion.  He  wrote  a  number  of  other  military 
works  of  a  practical  character,  and  devised  the  well- 


NOTES  ON  McCLELLAN'S  LIFE      303 

known  McClellan  saddle  for  cavalry,  which  has 
come  into  universal  military  use. 

"In  1857  he  resigned  from  the  army,  which  was 
then  largely  unemployed,  to  accept  the  position  of 
chief  engineer  of  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad,  and 
became  its  vice-president  in  1858,  and  in  1859  was 
elected  president  of  the  Eastern  Division  of  the  St. 
Louis,  Missouri  and  Cincinnati  Railroad.  Imme 
diately  on  the  breaking  out  of  the  War  of  the  Rebel 
lion  he  resigned,  to  re-enter  the  army,  and  April  23 
he  was  appointed  major-general  of  the  Ohio  Volun 
teers,  and  placed  in  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio,  which  included  the  States  of  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  Illinois,  with  portions  of  Virginia  and 
Pennsylvania. 

"In  a  month  he  was  in  the  field,  and  immediately 
engaged  in  a  most  successful  war,  which  made 
West  Virginia  a  loyal  State  ever  afterward. 

"His  subsequent  history  is  a  part  of  the  history 
of  his  country." 

Of  his  personal  qualities  and  characteristics,  Pro 
fessor  Coppee  has  this  to  say : 

"McClellan  was  about  five  feet  eight  inches  in 
height,  firmly  built,  with  broad  shoulders ;  solid  and 
muscular,  an  excellent  horseman.  Modest  and  re 
tiring,  he  had  withal  a  great  self-respect,  a  gracious 
dignity.  His  personal  magnetism  has  no  parallel 
in  military  history,  except  in  that  of  the  first  Napo 
leon  :  he  was  literally  the  idol  of  his  officers  and 
men.  They  would  obey  him  when  all  other  control 


304  ANTIETAM 

had  failed.  His  hold  upon  the  people  was  never 
relaxed.  The  army  idolized  him,  and  his  popularity 
followed  him.  In  1864  ne  was  chosen  to  deliver 
the  oration  at  West  Point  on  the  occasion  of  the 
unveiling  of  the  monument  erected  to  the  memory 
of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  regular  army." 

In  1864,  when  the  very  crisis  of  the  war  was  upon 
us,  and  when  it  was  perilous  "to  swap  horses  when 
crossing  a  stream,"  McClellan  was  made  one  of  the 
Presidential  candidates.  His  personality  was  his 
only  platform,  and,  even  then,  he  received  from  the 
loyal  States  and  the  army  alone  a  vote  of  1,800,000, 
against  his  opponent,  the  immortal  Lincoln,  who  re 
ceived  but  2,200,000,  in  an  undoubtedly  trammeled 
election.  We  can  feel  now  that  Lincoln's  election 
was  necessary  then;  but  how  sad  the  melancholy 
aftermath,  and  the  loss  of  Lincoln,  the  Pacificator, 
who  never  lived  to  be. 

In  1877  McClellan  was  elected  Governor  of  New 
Jersey,  and  declined  a  re-election. 

On  his  return  from  Europe,  in  1868,  he  received 
ovations  which  those  who  were  present  will  never 
forget  His  procession  through  the  streets  of  his 
native  city  was  literally  bordered  with  tears,  and 
no  subsequent  receptions  to  others  ever  equalled  or 
approached  that  of  McClellan  in  his  own  home. 

We  can  well  understand  how  Grant,  long  after  the 
War,  said  to  his  confidential  friend  and  companion, 
John  Russell  Young:  "I  saw  in  him  the  man  who 
was  to  pilot  us  through,  and  I  wanted  to  be  on  his 


NOTES  ON  McCLELLAN'S  LIFE      305 

staff.  I  should  have  liked  to  have  joined  McClel- 
lan,"  and,  as  McClellan  pathetically  said,  "would 
have  shared  my  fate/' 

And  how  Robert  E.  Lee,  after  the  War,  when 
asked  his  opinion  of  which  was  the  ablest  of  the 
Union  generals,  as  narrated  by  his  biographer  and 
military  secretary,  General  A.  L.  Long,  brought  his 
hand  down  on  the  table  with  emphatic  energy,  and 
said,  "McClellan,  by  all  odds!" 


NOTES 

ANTIETAM.  The  battle  of  South  Mountain,  September  14-15, 
prevented  Longstreet  from  closing  down  in  rear  of  Franklin 
and  Couch,  in  Pleasant  Valley,  and  forced  Longstreet  and 
D.  H.  Hill  to  turn  south  from  Boonsborough  to  Sharpsburg, 
and  abandon  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  from  Hagerstown. 
See  pp.  100,  101. 

CONSCRIPTION.  First  general  Confederate  conscription  was 
issued  ten  days  after  Stanton's  order,  in  April,  1862,  to  stop  all 
recruiting,  close  the  offices  and  sell  the  furniture  to  the  best 
advantage.  See  p.  29;  also  "Confederate  Conscription,"  in 
Index. 

CULPEPER.  Technique  of  the  strategy  and  tactics  used  by 
McClellan  to  pass  by  his  flank  across  Jackson's  front,  and 
intervene  between  the  two  halves  of  the  Confederate  army, 
and  strike  Longstreet  directly,  by  a  frontal  attack. 

(All  of  the  above  only  to  be  found  in  the  Supplemental 
Volume  LI,  of  the  Official  War  Records,  published  and  issued 
in  1898-1899,  instead  of  Volume  xix,  which  had  been  pub 
lished  in  1887.)  The  general  movement  commenced  five 
weeks  after  the  last  gun  was  fired  at  Antietam. 

Impossibility  of  an  earlier  advance  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
which  the  President  insisted  on.  Up  until  the  movement 
commenced,  or  at  least  to  October  15th,  the  Army  was  living 
from  hand  to  mouth,  as  practically  no  quartermaster's  stores 
had  been  received  since  spring.  The  horses  had  largely  de 
creased  since  the  Antietam  campaign  commenced.  See  note 
"Supplies,"  below;  Lee's  statements  also  of  how  McClellan's 
army  was  without  means  for  a  movement.  Any  advance  of 
McClellan  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  would  also  have  opened 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  to  a  fresh  invasion,  as  Lee's 
whole  army  was  at  Winchester,  thirty  miles  from  the  Poto 
mac,  and  McClellan's  army  would  have  been  east  of  the 
mountains,  near  Bull  Run,  and  entirely  beyond  possibility  of 
reaching  and  attacking  Lee's  new  invasion  except  by  a  long 
pursuit  into  Pennsylvania,  and  an  entire  abandonment  of  our 

307 


3o8  NOTES 

movement  to  Culpeper  or  Richmond.  Lee  proposed,  to  both 
Generals  Loring  and  Jackson,  this  precise  movement  (see 
their  dispatches  received).  November  was  too  late  for  such 
a  general  Confederate  invasion,  and  McClellan  left  one  whole 
corps  and  nearly  half  of  another  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Potomac  to  prevent  even  the  threat  of  such  a  movement. 
See  pp.  176,  177;  182,  183;  182-190;  193. 

FRANKLIN  AND  COUCH  at  battle  of  Crampton's  Gap  and 
occupation  of  Pleasant  Valley.  Franklin  held  these  until  the 
night  of  September  16,  and  Couch  until  September  17;  the 
purpose  to  prevent  a  great  turning  movement  by  Lee,  from 
Sharpsburg  across  the  Potomac,  to  Boteler's  Ford ;  thence 
down  Virginia  to  Harper's  Ferry,  then  across  the  Potomac  and 
down  the  north  bank,  and  up  east  of  the  South  Mountain, 
to  occupy  the  passes,  open  Washington  and  Baltimore  to  cap 
ture,  and  compel  McClellan,  by  want  of  supplies,  to  retire  into 
Pennsylvania.  It  was  all  balked  by  McClellan.  See  pp.  82-86; 
90-92. 

GRANT  followed  the  same  route  in  June,  1864,  that  McClel 
lan  did  in  June- July,  1862,  from  Cold  Harbor  (Games'  Mill), 
to  Harrison's  Landing. 

Grant  crossed  there  to  unite  with  Butler's  army  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  James  River.  McClellan  crossed  the  James  also 
in  considerable  force,  and  had  there  been  one-half  as  many 
Union  troops  then  on  the  southern  bank  as  Grant  found  there 
when  he  reached  there,  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy  would 
have  been  inevitably  perforated. 

But  Burnside's  Army  of  North  Carolina  was  sent,  not  up  the 
James,  but  up  the  Rappahannock  to  Pope;  and  McClellan  was 
ordered  to  trail  along  after  Burnside  and  leave  Lee  free  to 
move  anywhere  at  will. 

If  President  Lincoln  had  had  the  nerve  or  experience  to 
send  to  General  McClellan,  at  Harrison's  Landing,  in  July 
or  August,  1862,  the  dispatch  he  sent  to  General  Grant  at 
City  Point,  just  opposite,  August  17,  1864  (see  "War  Rec 
ords,"  Vol.  XLII,  Part  2,  page  343),  and  which  reads  as  fol 
lows  :  "I  have  seen  your  dispatch  [from  Grant  to  Halleck, 
in  reply],  expressing  your  unwillingness  to  break  your  hold 
where  you  are.  Neither  am  I  willing.  Hold  on  with  a  bull 
dog  grip  and  chew  and  choke  as  much  as  possible.  A.  LIN 
COLN/'  How  different  it  would  have  been !  In  1862  it  was 
Pope  and  Halleck  and  Stanton  who  held  on  "with  a  bulldog 


NOTES  309 

grip,"  and  chewed  and  choked,  while  Lincoln  broke  his  hold, 
and  made  McClellan,  also,  break  his.     And  then! 

See  the  protest  of  Commodore  Wilkes,  "War  Records,"  Vol. 
xi,  Part  2,  pp.  356-358;  and  see  also  General  Upton,  who, 
says,  "Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,"  page  371,  "The 
fact  should  not  be  overlooked  that  the  misguided  advisers  of 
the  President  and  the  Confederate  Commander  were  aiming 
at  the  same  object."  See  pp.  27,  37,  43. 

MCCLELLAN. — Manufactured  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
after  its  disruption  under  Pope,  in  August  and  September, 
1862,  remanufactured  anew,  out  of  three  disrupted  armies,  the 
new  Army  of  the  Potomac,  never  to  be  again  remade  until 
the  war  was  over.  Grant  never  made  an  army;  they  were 
made  for  him.  Sherman,  Thomas,  Meade,  Buell  and  Mc 
Clellan  made  armies,  and  they  learned  it  under  McClellan, 
in  whose  army  they  were.  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar,  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  Frederick  the  Great,  and,  above  all  others. 
Napoleon  made  armies,  which  faculty,  like  that  of  all  great 
architects,  is  a  personal  endowment ;  and  they  who  best  made 
armies  also  best  fought  them,  and  had  the  qualities  which 
Coppee  attributes  to  McClellan,  saying,  page  303,  "His  per 
sonal  magnetism  has  no  parallel  in  military  history,  except 
in  that  of  the  first  Napoleon."  See  pp.  53-54;  284-286; 
303-305. 

POPE.— A  curious  commentary  on  the  state  of  mind  of 
General  Pope  is  to  be  found  in  his  letter  in  reply  to  General 
Halleck  of  October  20,  1862,  "War  Records,"  Vol  xn,  Part  3, 
page  822.  Halleck,  in  reply  to  General  Pope's  previous  let 
ter  says,  page  820:  "The  feeling  of  many  of  his  officers  to 
ward  you  was  such  that  you  could  not  have  commanded  them. 
No  one  can  deny  this.  .  .  .  The  assignment  of  General 
McClellan  to  this  command,  or  rather  his  retention  in  it,  was 
not  my  act  nor  that  of  the  War  Department;  it  was  the  act  of 
the  President  alone.  I  did  not  even  know  of  his  decision  on 
the  matter  till  he  himself  announced  it  to  General  McClellan" 
^ To  this  General  Pope  replied:  "Your  reason  for  retaining 
him  in  command,  'the  feeling  of  many  officers  of  the  Poto 
mac  army/  is  the  very  strongest  reason,  in  my  view,  why  he 
should  not  be  retained."  His  view  was  that  of  the  boarding- 
house  keeper  who  said  "she  always  tried  to  find  out  what  the 
boarders  didn't  like,  and  then  give  them  plenty  of  it." 

Halleck's   letter,    above   quoted,   is   a   direct   and   categoric 


3io  NOTES 

affirmation,  which  I  have  italicized,  of  what  is  stated  in  the 
text  of  this  book,  on  pages  47,  48-52,  60-62. 

STEINER,  DR. — Inspector  of  the  Sanitary  Commission,  a  resi 
dent  of  Frederick,  Maryland,  where  he  owned  a  farm.  After 
second  Bull  Run  he  had  leave,  and  went  to  Frederick  on  the 
last  train  which  reached  that  city,  remaining  there  as  an  ob 
server  during  the  entire  Confederate  occupation,  and  accom 
panied  McClellan's  army  on  its  campaign  to  Antietam.  His 
diary  was  made  at  the  time.  His  important  statements  are 
those  of  an  expert,  an  official  inspector  of  troops.  See  pp. 
57,  77-78,  122-124,  133-134. 

i 

SUPPLIES. — By  a  doctored  system  in  the  Antietam  cam 
paign,  after  the  battle  the  people  of  the  North  were  made 
to  believe  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  being  lavishly 
supplied,  while  it  was  being  actually  starved  and  nearly  naked ; 
while,  in  fact,  these  supplies  went  to  the  stay-at-homes  in 
Washington  under  a  fiction  that  McClellan's  army  was  a  part 
of  "the  defenses  of  the  Capital,"  under  the  official  order  of 
September  2,  and  ignoring  the  unpublished  direct  and  per 
sonal  order  of  the  President  for  McClellan  to  take  command 
of  the  army  in  the  field.  See  pp.  173-177. 

WAR  RECORDS,  United  States  Official,  Supplemental  Volume 
LI.  Most  of  the  actual  material  only  is  to  be  found  in  this 
supplemental  volume,  published  eleven  years  after  volume 
xix,  in  which  these  thousands  of  most  important  papers  should 
have  appeared  their  suppression.  See  pp.  n,  12;  also  "War 
Records"  in  Index. 


INDEX 


ABOLITIONISTS,  22,   248. 
"A   Few   Acts   and  Actors   in   the 
Tragedy  of  the  Civil  War," 
147,   149. 

Aquia   creek,    41,    42,   44. 
Alexander,    General,    quoted,    136. 
Ammunition,    why    McClellan   did 
not    receive    heavy     artil 
lery,    147-149. 

Antietam,    Battle   of,    19,    71,    86, 
87,  88,  100,  101,   102,   103, 
160. 
and  Gettysburg  compared,   117, 

151. 
losses      at,      compared.      141- 

142. 
forces  at,  compared,  120-129. 

130. 

"artillery   hell,"   136. 
belittled,    56. 
Burnside    at,    105-109,    111-115, 

116. 

"Burnside's     blundering     sacri 
fice  of  life  at."  106. 
errors  at,    105-106.   114,   115. 
comparison     with     forces     en 
gaged    at    Chancellorsville, 
127. 

Fredericksburg.    126. 
Gettysburg,     120,     121,     127. 

128. 

Second    Bull    Run.    117.    118. 
Seven   Davs'   battles,   117. 
Shiloh.   125,   126. 
Murfrepsborough,     127. 
Confederate  forces  at,   117-120. 

line    at.    101. 
forces    engaged,    116-129. 
greatest  battle  of  war.  88.  135. 
greatest  day  of  battle.   152. 
grandest  victory  of  war,   88. 
Lee    force    at,    101-102. 
Lee's   report   (quoted).   102. 
losses  on  each  side,  137,  139, 

140.    142. 

prisoners,    etc.,   138-141. 
McClellan's  plan  at,   102. 
material  to  battle  at.   133 
plan    at.     116:    closely    fol 
lowed    by    Lee    at    Gettys 
burg,     116 ;     followed    'by 


Antietam — continued. 

Marshal    Oyama    at    Muk 
den,    116. 

reports     of     Confederate     com 
manders    at.    106-107,    109, 
110,    111,   112. 
Union    forces    at,    117-120. 
weather    conditions    of    eve    of, 

100 ;    see    Note,    p.    307. 
Applet'on's   Cyclopedia   of   Ameri 
can  Biography,  227. 
Appomattox,  198. 

Union    forces    hold,    35. 
"Armies   of  Europe,   The,"  302. 
j  Army  becomes  quiescent.   205. 
commanded    by    President    and 

Secretary    of   War,    22. 
foreigners  in   Union.   259. 
"Around  the  World  with  Grant," 
198-199.      263,     264,     275, 
285,    304-305. 

Averell's      cavalry,       action       of, 
south   of    James,    36. 

BALTIMORE'S    peril,    92. 

"Barbara  Fritchie,"  122,   131. 

Barnard.   General,   orders  of   Sec 
retary   of   War    to,    47. 
relinquishes    command,    47. 

"Battles  and  Leaders,"   136.   212- 
213. 

"Battle  of   Culpeper,"   206-208. 

Bavard's    dying    message    to    Mc 
Clellan.    285. 

Benjamin.        Secretary,       excuses 
Cabinet      interference      in 
army   affairs,    218. 
report    of,    146. 

Benningsen,    198. 

Bernadotte,    198. 

Beverly    Ford.    168. 

Bolivar,    Virginia    Heights.  65,  68. 

Bounties,    259,   261. 

Bradford.    Lieutenant.    147,    148. 

Bragg  marches   toward  the  Ohio, 
63. 

Bristoe,   campaign   of   1863,    256. 

Brooke.    Major-General,    report  of, 
138-139. 

Brown,    John,    raid,   69.   80. 

Buell,   a   pupil   of   McClellan,    54. 


3I2 


INDEX 


Bull    Run,    First,    51  ;     see    also 
Manassas. 

second  battle  of,  43. 

second  campaign,  24. 
Burnside,   General,   50,    104. 

aids   McClellan    to    retain   com 
mand,  190. 

assumes    command,    190. 

driven    back,    145. 

given   command,   205,   293. 

Halleek's   orders   to,   45. 

Lee   watching,    41. 

not  a  tactician,   105. 

not  qualified   as  general,   113. 

protests      against      McClellan's 
rush.   182. 

retires   to   Fredericksburg.    200. 
Burnside's    failure     to    cut    Lee 
off,   150. 

forces   at   Antietam,    109. 

force    goes    to    Fredericksburg, 
42. 

mistakes,   Longstreet   on,   212. 

plan   of  campaign.   205-206. 
President    approves,    190. 

withdrawal    permits    Confeder 
ate  junction,  213. 
Butler   at   New    Orleans,    144. 

trouble    with    fugitive    slaves, 
244. 

CABAL,,    Chandler    a    member    of, 

215. 

civilian,    at   Washington,    215. 
Lincoln    not   strong   enough    to 

force,    217. 

Stanton   backed   up   by,    272. 
Cameron,    Secretary,    on    fugitive 

slaves,    244-245. 

Campaign   of   1862.    Stanton's   in 
terference    in,    21,    24,    30. 
Cartridges,  blank,   McClellan  able 

to   fire   only,    88,   146. 
Cavalry,    Lincoln's    query    to    Mc 
Clellan    concerning,    166. 
Cedar   Mountain,   44,    70. 
Chancellorsville,    24. 
Lee   forces  at,    203. 
Confederate  forces   at,   127. 
Union  forces   at,   127. 
Chandler,    Biography   of    Senator, 

216,    217. 

Zachariah,    215,    216,    217. 
Chantilly,    58. 
Chickahominy    divides    army,    26. 

Union  forces  cross,  35. 
City    Point,   36. 
"Coffee-boilers,"    130,    131. 
Cold    Harbor,    Grant    at.    239. 
"Comments  on  Bourbaki's  Opera 
tions,"    199. 


Committee    on    Conduct    of    War, 

Civilian,    143,   144. 
Confederate    Army,     cabinet    in 
terference    in,     217,     218,. 
219. 

leaves     Pennsylvania,     58-59. 
commanders  ignorant  of  topog 
raphy    of    country,    28. 
concentrate    at    Frederick,    59. 
conscription.    29,    30,    31,    170, 

251, 

engineers'    reports,   35. 
forces  at  Gaines  Mill,  34-36. 
at    Seven    Days'    battles,    30- 

34. 

minimized,    28. 
opposing    Burnside   at   Antie 
tam,    109-112. 

loss       at       South       Mountain, 
Crampton's      Gap,      Antie 
tam,    etc.,    136-140. 
official    report,    84. 
States,    regimental   strength   of, 

33. 

Congressional    Committee    on    the 
Conduct    of    the    War,    9, 
216,    236,    294 
"Conquest    of    Spain,"    300. 
Conscription.       See      Confederate 
conscription,   and    note,    p. 
307. 

Coppe£,   Henry,   300,   301. 
Corinth,    dispersal    of    army    con 
centrated   at,    23. 
Pope's   "victory"  south  of,  279. 
siege    of,    39. 
Corliss,  Major,  161. 
Cornwall  is,     Lord,     228-229,     269- 

270. 
Couch,  General,  order  to,  98,  154. 

division,    145. 
Crampton's    Gap,    battle    of,    87, 

162. 

Crane,   Colonel,   report  of,   140. 
Crawford,    Genrral    (quoted),    70. 
Crimea.    227,    302. 
Crisis,   The,  51. 

Crooks,   General    (quoted),   113. 
Culpeper,    44,     45.  --Q10rt 

Great  movement  on,  178-190. 
McClellan's  disposition  of  units 
in  movement  on.  182-190. 
orders  to  Averell,  187;  Bay 
ard  188-189  ;  Burnside, 
187,  188;  Couch,  186,188; 
Franklin,  183-184,  188, 
189;  Getty,  184;  Ninth 
Corps,  189 ;  Pleasonton, 
183,  186,  187,  188;  Por 
ter,  Fitz-John,  184,  188; 
Reynolds,  184-185,  187- 


INDEX 


313 


Culpeper — continued. 

188,  189:  Sickles,  188; 
Sigel,  188;  Sixth  corps, 
187;  Stoneman  ,  184; 
Sturgis,  183,  184,  189 ; 
Sumner,  189 ;  Sykes,  185. 
reports  on  advance  to  Alex 
ander.  192;  Lee,  192.193; 
Pleasonton.  192 ;  Sickles, 
192;  Willcox.  192,  193; 
see  Note,  p.  307. 

Curtin,    Governor,    146. 

Cyclopoadia   of   American    Biogra 
phy,   300. 

DAVIS,   Colonel   B.   P.,   161,   167; 

death   of.    168. 
Jefferson,  approves  invasion  of 

Pennsylvania.    56. 
concedes  McClellan   could  have 

ended  war,   253. 
"History   of   the    Confederacy," 

29. 

Lee's  report  to,  56,  57. 
on   the   hopelessness   of   South 
ern    cause,    253-254. 
proclamation,    56-57. 
Lieutenant-Colonel    Harbroner, 

161. 
Major    Nelson    H.,    report    of, 

136. 

Desertions,   260,   261,   270. 
"Destruction  and  Reconstruction" 

(quoted),  28. 

"Detroit  Post  and  Tribune  Biog 
raphy,   The,"   215-216. 
Drafting,   260,   261. 
DuPont,  Colonel    (quoted),   21-23. 

EMANCIPATION   Proclamation,  243- 

244,    250.    251. 
a    war    measure.    249-250. 
did  not  free  slaves,   251. 
enforced     South      conscription, 

251. 
increased    hostility    of     South. 

251. 
its   political    effect   upon    other 

nations,    252. 
prolonged   war,   251. 
Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo   (quoted), 

284. 

Equipment,    damaged,    119. 
Exhaustion  of  North  and  South, 
269. 

FERRERO'S   report,    112. 
Financial  depletion,  261-262,  270. 


Forrest  a  born  general,  160. 
and  Van  Dorn  at  Holly  Springs, 

160. 

rides  around   Grant,   160. 
Fortifications,      Grant's       respect 
for     renewed,      224,      225, 
226. 
Grant's  lack  of  respect  for,  223- 

224. 

Humphrey's  treatment  of.   226. 
McClellan  learns  their  value  at 

Crimea,  227. 

Meade  to   Grant  on.   226. 
value   of,    223. 

Warren's   faith   in,   224,   225. 
Forty-eighth     Pennsylvania,     his 
tory   of    (quoted),   259. 
Franklin,    General,    official   report 

of,   97,   139. 
General   McClellan's    orders    to, 

97.     See  Note,  p.  308. 
Fredericksburg,    24. 
battle  of.  202,  203. 
Burnside  goes  to,  42. 
Confederates   abandon,   72. 
Confederate  forces  at,  126. 
Union  forces  at,  126. 
Friedland    (1807)    campaign,   198. 
Fugitive  slaves,  244,  245. 

GAINES'  Mill,  28. 
battle   of,    181. 
Confederate  forces  at,  34-36. 
Union  forces  at,  34-36. 
Garfield,   James  A.,  22. 
Garrett,  President,  B.  &  O.  R.  R., 

146. 
Gettysburg,  battle  of,  52,  58,  89, 

96,   131.   134.   151,   211. 
and    Antietam    compared,    117, 

151. 
forces  at,  compared,  120-129, 

130. 

losses  at,  compared,  141-142. 
Lee's  frontal   attack  at,   117. 
Meade's   peril   after,    215. 
Stuart    destroys    Lee's    chances 

at,  159. 

campaign,  Anderson,  R.  H.,  re 
port  of,  195. 
Meade  and  the,  143. 
Stonewall      Jackson's      route 

map  for,  92. 

"God   bless   you.   General   McClel 
lan,"  '285. 
Gordonsville,  41. 
Grant,  General,   36   (quoted),  52- 

53,  64,  89,   242. 

and    Sherman's    friendship,    ro 
mance  of,  280-281. 


INDEX 


Grant — continued. 

commends  McClellan,  135. 
compels    Stanton    to    bend    the 

knee,  272. 

given  command,  217. 
never  made  an  army,   53. 
on    draft,    260,    261. 
vindicates   Porter,   290. 
Grant's   confidence  in   McClelllan, 

275. 

final  campaign,  36. 
peril   in   pursuit  of  Lee,   264. 
tribute    to    McClellan,    285. 
"Great  Campaigns,"   Adams,   198, 

199. 

Green,    Lieutenant,    101. 
Griffln,  General  Charles,  describes 

ford.   152. 
report   of,   101. 

Guild,     Medical    Director,     defec 
tive  report  of,  136-137. 
Gwyn,    Colonel,    report    of,     155, 
156. 

HAGER,  General,  220. 
Ilagerstown,   72. 

Lee's  army  taken,  58. 
Ilalleck,   General,   24,   40,  48,   64, 

85, 

address     against     giving     com 
mand  to  McClellan,  46. 
alarmed  at  Pope's  defeat,   48. 
carries      Rurnside's      plan      to 

Washington,    206. 
cause    McClellan's   dismissal   to 

save   himself,   297. 
directs     that     McClellan     shall 

take  charge  of  defenses  of 

Washington,    174. 
equivocal  message  to  Burnside, 

206. 
false  dispatch,  39.    See  Halleck- 

Pope   dispatches. 
letter    to    Grant    (1862)    as    to 

payment     of    troops,     etc., 

261-262. 

letter  to  Pope,  46. 
letter  to  McClellan  after  Pope's 

defeat,  47. 

letter  to  McClellan,  45. 
mutilates    official    records,    40, 

295-296. 

on  Burnside,  190. 
on  deserters,  260. 
order  for  removal  of  army  from 

Peninsula,  42. 
order  of  September  2,  61. 
orders   to   Burnside,   44-45. 
-Pope    dispatches,    40,    41,    46, 

90,    183,    278-286.    291-297. 
letter  of  July  5,  1865,  to,  40. 


Halleck — continued. 

position  officially  strong,  61. 
stakes  reputation  on  ability  of 
army    to    take    Richmond, 
46. 

statement   erroneous,    46-47. 
threatens    General    Humphreys 

with   arrest,    71. 
Hancock,     General,     at    Snicker's 

Gap,   187. 
letter  of,   136. 

on   McClellan's  treatment,   235. 
report  of,   140. 

Harper's    Ferry,    59,    72,    76,    78, 
90,    91,    94,    95,    101,    103, 
130,     145.     182. 
cavalry  expedition  from,  160. 
Benning's   report   of,   163. 
Colonel  Voss'   report  of.   160- 

161,  163.  164,  165,  166. 
fruits  of,   166. 
Lee  mentions,  163. 
Longstreet  on,   167. 
McClellan's  mention  of,   167. 
Pendleton's    report    of,     164- 

165,  166. 

Walker,  Gen.  John  G-,  on,  167. 
disposition        of        Confederate 

forces  about.  161-162. 
defense    of,    64,    65-66. 
investment   of.    78,    79.    80. 
McClellan's   report   on,    91. 
surrenders,    73,    162. 
topography   of.    65-68.    82-83. 
Harrison's  Landing  described.  36 
McClellan's    position    at,    35. 
operations   at,    36. 
Huntbleman,  50. 
Hill.    A.    P.,    44. 

drives    back    Burnside,    145. 
D.     H.,    on    condition    of    Con 
federate   troops,    227. 
on    the    suffering    of   men    in 

trenches,    234. 
report,  36. 

"History  of  the  Confederacy,"  29. 
Holly    Springs.    Forrest   and    Van 

Dorn  at,   160. 

Grant's  report  of  raid  at,   160. 
Hood's     fatuous     inactivity,     266- 

267,    268. 

opportunities,    267-269. 
the   menace   of,   267-269. 
Hooker,   General,    letter  to   Stan- 
ton   on   Burnside   at   Antie- 
tam,   1'06. 
Humphreys,    General,    171. 

application  for  court  of  inquiry, 

70-71. 
get's    new    equipment,    145. 


INDEX 


Humphreys — continued 

Halleck  threatens,  with  arrest, 

71. 

inadequate    equipment,    71,    79. 
inefficient   equipment,    119. 
on  fortifications,  226. 

"I  AM  so  borne  upon,"  215. 
"Important    movement    pending," 

189. 

Ingalls.   Chief  Quartermaster,   re 
port  of  delay  in  supplying 
McClellan,   177. 
Colonel,  on  McClellan's  celerity 

of  movement,    181. 
General,  70. 

General,  report  to  General 
Meigs,  44,  45. 

JACKSON,   Stonewall,   27,  44,  302. 

and  Lee,  junction  of,   28. 

brilliant  exploits  over  Union 
commanders,  180. 

bottled  up,   180,   241. 

cut  off  from  striking  McClel 
lan's  communications,  184, 
185. 

offers  his  resignation  from 
army.  218.  219. 

on  cabinet  interference  in  con 
duct  of  army,  218. 

ordered  to  suppress  Pope,  41- 
42. 

ordered  to  cut  off  McClellan's 
communications,  179. 

withdraws  resignation  from 
army,  219-220. 

won  no  laurels  from  McClellan, 

180,    181. 
James   River,    41. 

correct  military  base,  26. 

Grant's  change  of  base  at,   27. 

McClellan's  change  of  base  at, 

27. 

Johnston,  J.  E.,  begs  Jackson  to 
reconsider  his  resignation, 
219. 

endorses  Jackson's  offer  of 
resignation,  218. 

on  cabinet  interference  of  con 
duct  of  war,  219. 
Jones,    General,    88. 

report  of,  121-137. 

KENTUCKY,   declaration   of  Union 

men  of,  242. 
excepted     from      Emancipation 

Proclamation,   243-244. 
necessary  to  hold,  243. 
Kimball,  General,   report  of,  139. 


LAFAYETTE,,   Marquis,   229. 
"Lectures  on  India,"  Max  Muller, 

10. 
Lee,    General   Robert    E.,    51,    53, 

145. 
abandons      idea      of      invading 

Pennsylvania,    172. 
balked    in    campaign    of    1863, 

256. 

bewildered,  203,  205. 
captures    letter    from    Pope    to 

Halleck,  45. 

charged    with   conduct   of   Con 
federate  forces,  29. 
military    operations,    220. 
commends    McClellan,    135. 
complains    of    shortage    of    offi 
cers,    32-33. 

crosses  into  Maryland,  63. 
declares    McClellan    the    ablest 

Union  general,   277. 
greatest    of    Union    generals, 

305. 

forces   Pope,   47. 
General     Orders   No.    14.   29. 
had    all    artillery    he    wanted, 

145. 

letter  of.  of  August  16,   29. 
letter    of,    to    General    Loring, 

172. 

"may  attack,"  150. 
on   straggling,    132,   134. 
orders      Jackson      to     suppress 

Pope,  41-42. 

pursuit  of,  was  hazardous,  264. 
quoted   on   capture  of   Harper's 

Ferry,   96. 

retreats   from   Maryland,    88. 
sacrifices     judgment     to     duty, 

265. 

starts   for    Rapidan,    43. 
to  President  Davis  on  needs  of 

army,   172. 

writes  to  Jackson,  41. 
watches  Burnside's  movements, 

41. 
Lee's  army,  report  of  supplies  to, 

176-177. 
army    encamped    at    Frederick, 

72. 

flight  to  Virginia,  150-152,  154. 
force  at  Antietam,   101-102. 
incompatible  orders,  203.  205. 
invasion  of  Maryland,  55. 
invasion    of    Pennsylvania,    56, 

152. 
losses     at     Second     Manassas, 

125. 

lost  opportunity,    264-266. 
lost  order,   73,   75-86,   89. 


INDEX 


Lee's  lost  orders,   directions  con 
tained    in,    76-77. 
McClellan    anticipates    their  | 

disclosures,   73-74. 
McClellan    determines    if,    is  j 

genuine,  73. 

McClellan's      knowledge      of, 
too  late  to  circumvent  Con-  I 
federate  movements,   78  et  I 
seg. 

success  of  directions  contained  ' 
therein,   78-79. 

order  to  move  to  Rappahan- 
nock,  45. 

projected  turning  movement,  its 
menace  to  Washington,  95. 
possibilities  of,   93-95. 

report  to  Jefferson  Davis,  '56, 
57. 

reports,  88. 

surrender,  198,  199,  255,  265. 
not  a  military  necessity,  265- 
266. 

turning  movement  not  success 
ful   with   McClellan,   95. 
used    on    Hooker,    95. 
used   on    Pope,    95. 
"Life  of  Chase,"   147. 
"Lincoln   and   Seward"    (Welles), 

48. 

Lincoln,  President,  22,  25,  48,  49 
(quoted),  71. 

assassination,  248. 

begs  McClellan  to  take  the 
army,  60. 

desires  end  of  war,  263. 

directs  McClellan  to  take 
charge  of  defenses  of 
Washington,  174,  175. 

during  war  organized  States, 
248. 

enforces    personal    orders.    24. 

excuses  himself  for  appointing 
McClellan,  51. 

"has  little  influence  with  this 
administration,"  215. 

ignorant  of  insufficient  sup 
plies,  174. 

ignorant  of  Pope-Halleck  in 
trigue,  298. 

letter  vindicating  McClellan, 
237-238. 

message   to   Halleck,   40. 

offers  to  resign  Presidency, 
215. 

on   slavery    242-249. 

order  to  McClellan  regarding 
McDowell  corps,  222. 

places  McClellan  in  command 
of  Washington  forces,  49, 
51,  58. 


Lincoln — continued. 
saves  Meade,  215. 
Lincoln's     sole     object     to     save 

Union,   237. 

telegraphs  McClellan,   62. 
to   McClellan,  43. 
turns    his    back    on    War    De 
partment,   63,   175. 
vindicates   McClellan,    236-238. 
Longstreet    anticipated    and    neu 
tralized,  189. 
battle  order,  209. 
gives  final  order  of  battle,  203. 
halted,   58. 
isolated,  201. 
letter   of,    31. 
on  Burnside's  mistakes  at  Cul- 

peper,  212. 

Longstreet's  vain  orders,    55. 
Loring,   General,   57. 

General,  letter  of  Lee  to,   172. 
London    Heights,    65,    67,    68,    69, 

72,  76,  80,  93.   124,   161. 
Louisa  Courthouse,  41,  44. 

MAGRUPER  dispatches,  223. 
Malvern    Hill,    28. 

General  Sumner's  report  of  cap 
ture   of,    36. 
Jackson   at,    181. 
Lee's  defeat  at,  35. 
Manassas.  Second,  50-54,  117-118, 

287-288;  see  Bull  Run. 
Confederate  forces  at,  50,  51. 
Lee's  losses  at,  125. 
Pope's  forces  at,  50. 

losses  at,   125. 

Marching  distances  of  contending 
armies    in    Maryland    and 
Virginia      campaign      com 
pared,    131. 
Martinsburg,     reconnaissance     to, 

171. 

Lee's  account  of,  171. 
Pleasonton's  report  of,  171. 
Maryland    campaign,    comparison 

of  forces  at.  202-203. 
events   which   led   up   to,   19- 

21. 

opens,  55. 

view   of   final   epoch   of,   201. 
Heights,  65,  67,  68,  72,   76,  78, 
79,   80,   81,   83,   85,  92,   93, 
95,   98,   100. 
cavalry  garrisons,   59. 
invasion  of   Lee,   55. 
McClellan,  General  George  B.,  22, 

23,  24,  26,  27,  28,  41,  51. 
"a   much   abused   man,"   214. 
accused    of    slowness,    42,    43, 
44. 


INDEX 


317 


McClellan — continued. 
adds  instructions,   42. 
and    Lee   move   simultaneously, 

241. 

at  Antietam  awaits  delayed  am 
munition,    88 
baffles    Jackson    at    White    Oak 

Swamp,   181. 
checkmates  Lee,  55. 
clamors  for  heavy  ammunition, 

146. 
commended    for     activity     and 

valor     by     General     Scott, 

274-275. 

could  have  ended  war,  253. 
could   Lincoln  have  saved?  61. 
created  Army  of  Potomac,  235. 
crosses     Lee's     front     by     the 

flank,    178. 

crosses    Potomac,    178-179. 
declared     by     Lee     the     ablest 

Union   general,   277. 
greatest   Union   general,    305. 
determines   if   Lee's    lost   order 

is  genuine,  73. 
"did  not  attack  early  enough," 

143. 

did  not  claim  command,  47. 
did    not'    protest    against    ad 
vance  of  his  force,  47. 
directed  to  pursue  Lee,    64. 
fears   cabal   at   Washington.  60. 
Fitz-John     Porter's     letter     to, 

36. 
forces    opposed    to,     minimized 

at   Washington,    125. 
Governor  of  New  Jersey,  304. 
Grant's   confidence   in,    275. 

tribute   to,    285. 
had   little   ammunition,    145. 
had    no    artillery    ammunition, 

145. 
had    thiee   disorganized   armies 

in   field,    64. 
Halleck   advises  against  giving 

command  to,   46. 
Halleck's  letter  to,  after  Pope's 

defeat,   47. 

idol  of  officers  and  men,  303. 
in  actual   command,   62. 
in  charge  of  defenses  of  Wash 
ington,  174. 
in  Mexican  War,  302. 
keeps  Lee   at  Richmond,   43. 
leaves  army,  213. 
letter  of   Halleck   to,   45. 
letter  of,  to  Halleck,  60;  reply 

to,   60. 
life  and  personality,  300-305. 


McClellan — continued. 

Lincoln  begs,  to  take  the  army, 

60. 

refutes    charge    of    slowness 
of,  43. 

main    purpose    to    save    Union, 
246,   248-249. 

most    successful    of    our    com 
manding  officers,  275. 

moves  into  Pope's  territory,  45. 

moves  troops,  45. 

never   lost   conquered  territory, 
144. 

not   actuated    by    personal    mo 
tives,  46. 

not  in  command  of  defenses  at 
Washington,  47. 

on  slavery.   242. 

paralyzes   Lee,    203. 

Pope  pours  his  wrath  on,   289. 
refutes    charge    of    slowness 

of,  43. 
to  relieve,  38. 

position       of      general-in-chief 
taken   from,   25. 

President  orders  he  be  sent  for, 
47. 

Presidential    candidate,    304. 

prevents    Lee's    great    turning 
movement.    82-86,   90-92. 

prepares  to  cross  Potomac  and 
attack  Lee,  169. 

placed    in    command    of   Wash 
ington   forces,   49,   51. 

relieved  of  command,  190,  205, 
293. 

reorganizes  army  on  the  march, 
186. 

saving  factor  of  a  demoralized 
army,  133. 

saddle   for    cavalry,    302-303. 

starts  for  Fort  Monroe,  43. 

stripped   of   authority,    235. 

studies  Crimean  War,  302. 

superior   to   Jackson,   181. 

to   be  sent  forward,   53. 

to  command  all   troops  in  Vir 
ginia,  45-46. 

to  coommand  all  forces.  42-43. 

to  reorganize  army,   51-53,   58. 

to  take  command  of  all  forces 
in  field,  63. 

unable  to  save  Harper's  Ferry, 
65. 

understood    artillery.    135-136. 

Upton  vindicates,  42. 

uses  fugitive  slaves,  244-247. 

vindicated  by  Lincoln,  236-238. 

why    he    did    not    attack    next 
morning,  144-145. 

why  was  he  removed,  278,  297. 


INDEX 


McClellan's  alleged  inactivity,  75. 

appeal    for   ferryboats,    36. 

army,  Lee  on  supplies  of,   173. 
needs    of,    during    campaign, 

172. 

robbed      of      supplies,      174, 
175. 

army's   applause   of,    213. 

average  daily  march  greater 
than  any  other  command 
er,  199-200. 

caution    to    Franklin,    91. 

celerity,  44. 

in  Culpeper  campaign,  181. 
or  slowness,  191-200. 
compared  with  Meade,  194- 
195 ;  Confederates,  195  ; 
Kershaw  (General),  195; 
Lee,  196;  Longstreet,  196; 
Sherman's  march,  197 ; 
Vicksburg  campaign,  197 ; 
Freedland  (1807)  cam 
paign,  198 ;  Grant's  pur 
suit  of  Lee,  198-199  ;  Bour- 
baki's  operations,  199 ; 
Army  of  Potomac  regiment 
itinerary,  199-200. 

circular  on  straggling,  132- 
133. 

command   of   artillery,    141. 

danger  of  court-martial,   61. 

detractors,   236. 

disposition  of  his  units  in  move 
ment  on  Culpeper,  182- 
190. 

force  exaggerated.   28. 

"inactivity,"  96,  274. 

letter     to     Adjutant  -  General 

Townsend,   242-243. 
to    Buell,    243,    248-249. 

movements    bewilder   Lee,    203. 
Lee's    letters   to    Stuart   con 
cerning,    203-204  ;    Jackson 
concerning,      203-204 ;      to 
War  Department,  205. 

odd  correspondence  with  Sec 
retary  Cameron,  276. 

orders  to  Sykes,  185. 

plan,  27,  28,  104-115. 

a  capital  essay  on  principles 

of  war,   255. 

for  army  movements  through 
out  rebel   States,   244. 
of    frontal    attack,    169. 
Washington    interference    in, 
170. 

personal   qualities,   303-304. 

position  at  Harrison's  Land 
ing,  35. 

removal,  the  cause  of,  242-252. 


McClellan's   report   on   armies   of 

Europe,    227. 
on   Harper's  Ferry,   91. 
to    Halleck     (September    8), 

62. 

success    a    menace    to    political 
ambitions    of    his    enemies, 
273,    274. 
successful      direction      in      the 

South  and  West,   144. 
tribute    to    Army    of    Potomac, 

9Qg 

to  "'Lincoln,     298-299.       See 

Note,   p.    309. 
McDowell,   26,    27,   50. 

message  to  McClellan,  27. 
Meade,    General,    54,    89,    151. 
and    the    Gettysburg   campaign, 

143. 

a    pupil   of   McClellan,   54. 
peril    after    battle    of    Gettys 
burg,   215. 
"Medical  and  Surgical  History  of 

the   War,   The,"   138. 
Meigs,  Quartermaster-General,  98- 

99. 

Meigs,  General,  report  of,  on  sup 
plies  to  McClellan,   177. 
"Memoirs,"    Grant's.    52-53,    197, 

250-251,   271,   273,   280. 
of   Lee,"   276. 
Merrimac,   26,   222. 
Michie,    General    Peter    S.,    12-13, 

20    (quoted),   24-25,   214. 
Miles,    Colonel,    59,    80,    93,    100, 

161. 

at  Harper's  Ferry,   85-86. 
defense  of  Harper's  Ferry,   65- 

66. 

despatch  of,  59. 
syndicate-sacrificed,    180. 
"Military    Policy    of    the    United 
States,"   9,   15,   20,   36,   40, 
43,    62-63,    113.    124,    133, 
138,  142,   175,  282. 
Mine  Run   movement,  256. 
Monitor,   222. 
Monroe,    Fort,    McClellan    starts 

for,  43. 
Monroe,      Fortress,      removal     of 

troops  to,   42. 
Moral    exhaustion    of    the    North, 

269-270. 

Morell's  division,  losses  at  Seven 
Days  and  in  Pope's  cam 
paign,  155. 

Morris,  Colonel,  report  of,  139. 
Murfreesboro,    Confederate   forces 

engaged   at,    127. 
Union  forces  engaged  at,  127. 


INDEX 


NAPOLEON,  9,  16,  52.  53,  136,  174, 
198,  255-256,  269,  284, 
303. 

at  Boulogne,  206. 
Ulm,    campaign    of,    185-186. 
Negro     soldiers     in     Confederate 

army,  123. 

Nelson,  Inspector,  report  of,  137. 
North     American,     Review,     211, 

290. 

North   Carolina,   army  of,   64. 
depleted     of     native     recruits, 
259-260. 

"Onions,  to  make  treason,"   247. 
Official  Orders   (quoted),  28-29. 
Oyama,  Marshal,   116. 

PAKKMAN,   Francis    (quoted),    16. 
Peninsula,  army  withdrawn  from, 

42. 

campaign,  Confederate  artil 
lery,  lack  of  ammunition 
for,  233. 

Confederate    defenses,    weak 
ness   of,    233.    234. 
condition    of    roads.    231. 
Magruder    on,    227-228,    229- 

230. 
McClellan's    plan     for,     227, 

254-255,    256-257. 
relative  positions  of  contend 
ing    forces,    231-234. 
strength    of    forces    in,    232- 

233. 

movement  begun,  222. 
of    troops    from,    45. 
unanimously       recommended, 

222. 
Pleasonton's    cavalry    detained 

at,  47. 

Confederate  army  leaves,  58-59 
Pennsylvania,    Confederate    army 

leaves,    58-59. 
Lee  abandons  idea  of  invading, 

172. 

Lee's   invasion   of,    56,   152. 
One    Hundred   and    Eighteenth, 

154-156. 
losses   of.    156. 
Petersburg,  232. 
fall  of,   255. 
Grant  at,   255. 
"Personal    Memoirs,"    Sherman's, 

282. 
Recollections    of    Distinguished 

Generals,"  280. 
Pleasonton,  General,   154. 

on  winding  up  campaign,  209- 
210. 


Pleasonton's       ability,       General 

Sickles  on,   211. 
cavalry  detained  at  Peninsula, 

Pope,    General,    21,    41,    44,    51, 

address  to  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia,  38-39. 

appointed  to  command  of  Army 
of  Virginia,  45. 

army's    valuation    of,    283. 

attack  on  McClellan,  292. 

at  Corinth,   39. 

boastful  address  to  army,  282. 

campaign,    256. 

campaign,  Army  of  Potomac  in, 
288,  289. 

defeat,  47. 

Halleck  alarmed  at,  48. 
Stanton  alarmed  at,  48. 
Secretary  Welles  on,  48. 

did  not  understand  his  own 
plan,  289. 

exiled  in  Minnesota,  46. 

force    at   Rappahannock,    45. 

given  command  of  Army  of 
Virginia,  38,  280. 

-Halleck     dispatches,     278-281, 

294-295,  296. 

army  not  deceived  by,  28'0. 
blames    President    and    cabi 
net,   292. 
"deep  personal  obligation"  to 

Pope,   291. 
excuse    for,    280. 
Stanton's    inquiry   into,    280. 

in  the  West,  39. 

letter  of  July  5,  1865,  to  Hal 
leck,  40. 

losses  at  Second  Manassas.  125. 

remarkable  letters  to  Halleck, 
291-297. 

repudiates  Halleck's  dispatch, 
39. 

orders  to,  38. 

sent  to   Minnesota,   291. 

testifies  before  Congressional 
Committee  on  Conduct  of 
War,  40. 

threat  to  Halleck  causes  Mc 
Clellan's  removal,  216-217. 

to  McClellan,  43.    See  Note,  p. 

309. 
Poplar  Spring  Church,  battle  of, 

259. 
Porter,   Fitz-John,   22,   50,   154. 

at  Games'  Mill,   181. 

court-martialed  on  crooked  evi 
dence.  290-297. 

letter   to    McClellan.   36. 

obtains  transports,  42. 

Pope  pours  his  wrath  on,  289. 


320 


INDEX 


Porter,    Fltz-John — continued. 
saved    Pope    and    Washington, 

290. 

vindicated,  290. 
Potomac,  Army  of,  31,  41,  44,  45, 

49,   64. 
daily    itinerary    of   a   regiment 

of,  199. 

great  work  belittled,  56. 
high  on  roll  of  historic  armies. 

299. 

in   front   of   Richmond,    26. 
McClellan    created,    235. 
recall    of,    48. 
marches    off,    213. 
quartermaster's    report   of   sup 
plies    to,    176;    Meigs'    re 
port,    177. 
second   base  of  operations   for, 

254. 

sent   to    Pope,    288. 
supplies  of,  186. 
starving   for   supplies,    171. 
to  be  withdrawn  from  the  Pen 
insula,   42. 
river,  Captain  Winslow  reports 

fording,   97. 
fording  the,  152-153. 
General    Wool    reports    it   as 

fordable,   97. 
road,   91. 

topography    of,    92. 
Preface,  9-17. 

President  has  no   power  to  dele 
gate   command,  25. 
is    commander-in-chief,    24-25. 
Prevost,   Colonel,  shot,  155. 

RAMSEY,  Colonel,  148. 
Rapidan,   Lee  starts  for,   43. 
Rebel      commissioners,      Lincoln's 

conference   with,   250-251. 
demands  concessions  of,  251. 
Rebellion,    divergent  views   as  to 

suppression    of.    247. 
Lincoln  represented  enlightened 
views    in    suppression    of, 
248 

radicals  did  not  represent 
people  in  suppression  of, 
248. 

Secretary  Chase's  radical  views 

as  to   suppression  of,   247. 

Reconstruction,     period     of,     247, 

248. 
Recruiting    offices    closed,     order 

rescinding,     118-119. 
service  discontinued,   28-29,   31. 
Report    of     Committee    on     Con 
duct   of   War,    133,   175. 


Report  of  Joint  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
63. 

Report's,  official,  removal  of,  183. 
Reorganization  on  the  march,  64- 

74. 

Reynolds.  50. 
Richmond,   26,  27,  30. 

armies   face   each   other   below, 

41. 

abandoned,   255. 
fall  of,   27. 

I  Ripley,  General,  146,   147,  148. 
order    of,     from     Secretary    of 

War,   60. 
I  Rodgers,   Commodore,   McClellan's 

plan  outlined  to,  27. 
Roosevelt.      Theodore       (quoted), 
15-16. 

SACKETT,  General,  108,  112. 
Scott,     General,     commends     Mc 
Clellan    for    activity     and 
valor,    274-275. 
Secretary    of    War   as    strategist, 

144. 

but  a   clerk,    220. 
promises  ammunition,    146. 
Seven   Days'    battles,   27,    50,   51, 

117,  124. 
forces  at,   30-34. 
losses    of   Morell's   division   at, 

115. 
!  Seward,   Secretary,   60. 

ignorant  of  insufficiency  of  sup 
plies,   174. 
refuses   to   accede   to   recall  of 

McClellan,  48. 
Shepherdstown,    154 

Confederate    forces    at,    157. 
losses  at,   157. 
Early,   report  of,   157. 
Hill,  A.  P.,  report  of,  157. 
Jackson,  Stonewall,  at,  157. 
Union   losses   at,    157. 
Sherman,  biography  of,  196-197. 
"Sherman's    Bummers,"    197. 

march  to  the  sea,  266-267,  269. 
Sheridan   on    desertion,    261. 
Sheridan's  army,   53. 

ride,    285. 

:  Shiloh,  battle  of,  strength  of  Con 
federate  forces  at,  126. 
Grant's    army    at,    126. 
Sigel,  General,  50. 
Sickles,   General,   on   Pleasonton's 

ability,  211. 
Slavery,     22,    250 ;    see    Fugitive 

Slaves 

Slaves  freed  by  constitutional 
amendment,  251. 


INDEX 


321 


Slaves  not  freed  by  Emancipation 

Proclamation,    251. 
South,   Conscription   in,   251  ;   see 

Confederate    Conscription. 
South   Mountain,   65,   76,    92    93 

130. 
battle  of.  58,  71,  72,  76,  82    87 

162. 

topography   of,   66. 
Stanton.     Secretary.     21      23      %>4 

25.    48,    64.'  85. 

alarmed   at    Pope's    defeat,    48. 
backed   up   by   cabal,   272. 
"bluffer,    a."    272. 
cause   of   continued   war.    271. 
demands  McClellan's  dismissal, 

48. 
Grant's  character  study  of,  271- 

273. 

interference  of.    214,   217,    273 
message   to  Halleck,   39-40. 
message    to    Pope.    39-40. 
on  drafts   and   desertions,   °60 

261. 

on   slavery.    242. 
order   of   April   3,    28. 
order  of  May  18,   26:   of  June 

8,   26. 
order    to    McClellan    regarding 

Blenker's  division,   222 
suppresses     McClellan     tribute. 

274. 

"State  suicide."  247,  249. 
Steiner,  Lewis  H.,  diary  of  (quot 
ed),    57-58,    72,    77-78     79 
133-134,  250.     See  Note,  p' 
310. 

"Stigma,    an   Undeserved,"   290 
Stragglers,     130.     131,     132.     133 

134.  135.   138.   140-141. 
officers  among.   134.   135. 
Straggling.     Pope    complains    of  l 

288-289. 
Stuart  destroys  Lee's  chances  at 

Gettysburg,  159 
Stuart's     "ride     around     Meade," 

159. 

McClellan,"    159. 
useless   cavalry   raids,    159-160. 
Substitutes  and   bounties,   259. 
Supreme  Court,   24. 
Supplies.     173-177.    See  also  Hum-  i 

pnreys   and  Note.   p.  310. 
Sykes'   brigade,   155-156. 

* 

TAYLOR.  Lieutenant-General  Dick. 
28.   50. 

Thomas,  General,  a  pupil  of   Mc 
Clellan.    54. 
welds  an  army.   267. 


Toombs.  General,   107. 
Turner's  Gap.   66,   72,  76.  83,  «4 
87,   93,    94. 

UNION  forces  at  Games'  Mill,  34- 

36. 

Seven    Days'    battles.    30-34 

losses      at      Antietam.       South 

Mountain,     C  r  a  m  p  t  o  n's 

Gap.   etc.,  140. 

Upton,    General    Emory,    abilities 

as  an  army  officer,  14. 
an  Abolitionist.   214. 
biography   of.    12,    13,    30;    see 

Michie, 
misled,   140. 
on  Pope.   40. 
on  "War  Department'  strategy," 

quoted,'  9,  20,  36.  43,  44,  49 
62-63,  75,  113,  124  133. 
138,  142,  175,  213-214 
217,  242.  253.  259.  271 ' 
273,  282.  286,  287-288,' 
289  :  see  Military  Policy 

vindicates    McClellan,    42.    214. 

VAX    DORX    rides    around    Grant, 

Vicksburg,    89. 

Virginia,   Army  of,   38,  64. 

Pope's   address   to,   38-39. 
Pope  given  command,  38,  4.~>. 
Governor    of.    requests    Jackson 
to     reconsider     resignation, 
— T«J. 

Military  Institute.  Jackson  asks 
to  be  ordered  to,  218. 

WAR,  a  perfectly  conducted,   256. 
Congressional      Committee      on 
Conduct    of.    Pope    testifies 
before,    40. 

critics,   civilian.   143    144 
debt,  262. 
Department    interference,    275 ; 

see  Stanton. 
Lincoln    turns    his    back    on 

63.    175. 

records   suppressed   and   hid 
den,  90. 

interference  of  the  Secretary  of, 
in  the  war,   217,   254 ;   see 
Stanton 
strategist's,   80,   89,   278     -788 

289. 
"strategy,"     24,     49.    64.     75. 

215.   258,    266-267.    268. 
most  critical   period  of,   263. 


322 


INDEX 


War — continued. 

of  the  Rebellion :  Official  Rec 
ords  of  the  Union  and 
Confederate  Armies ;  see 
War  Records 

Order   No.   3,   29. 

our  gravest  peril  in  the  clos 
ing  years  of,  253. 

"Records,"  10,  27,  29,  30,  31, 
32,  33.  35,  36,  37,  43,  62, 
68,  73.  81.  82,  88,  90,  92, 
97.  101.  106,  118,  126,  128. 
132,  136,  142,  150,  152, 
158,  164.  165,  166,  172, 
183,  184,  199.  200,  202, 
209,  213,  222.  223,  231, 
240.  243,  251,  254,  267, 
290,  291,  294.  See  Note, 
p.  310. 

"Rules  and  Articles  of"  shall 
govern  command,  45. 

Secretary    of,     duties    are    ad 
ministrative,    24. 
not  entitled  to  exercise  com 
mand,    24. 

orders  of,  to  General  Bar 
nard,  47 ;  see  Stanton ; 
see  Secretary  of  War. 

why  it  lasted  four  years,  23. 
Washington,   47,    55,  '58. 

at  Lee's   mercy,   91. 

force  necessary  to  render  se 
cure,  222. 

further    blundering    at,    42. 

McClellan's  bars  all  advance 
to,  98. 

peril  of,  92. 

removal  of  army  from  Rich 
mond  to.  Wilkes'  protest 
against,  37. 

scare    in,    240. 
Waterloo.  9,  16. 


Watson,    Assistant    Secretary    of 

War,    146. 

Wayne.    General,    229. 
Welles,   Secretary,  51,   60. 

ignorant     of     insufficiency      of 

supplies,   174. 
on  recall  of  Army  of  Potomac. 

48. 
refuses    to    accede    to   recall   of 

McClellan,   48. 
Commodore   Wilkes'  protest  to, 

37. 

on  Pope's  defeat,  48. 
White,  Colonel,  112-113. 
White  Oak  Swamp,  McClellan 

baffles  Jackson  at,   181. 
Whittier,   John  G.,  122,  131,  248. 
Wilderness,    Grant    at,    239,    255. 
Wilkes.     Commodore,     protest    to 

Secretary  Welles.   37. 
Wilson.   Major-General  James  H., 

13,    14. 

William    Bender,    147-149. 
on  the  Battle  of  Antietam,  140. 
Wolseley,    Lord    (quoted),    284. 
Wool,    General,    85. 

on  fordability   of  Potomac.   97. 
on    fugitive   slaves,    245. 
order  to  Miles,  65. 
report  of,  59. 
Worthless    equipment,    154,    155  : 

see   Humphreys. 
replaced,   145. 
Wright,   Marcus   J.,   276. 

YORK   River,   26. 
Yorktown,    227-230. 

"Campaign  of  1781,"   229. 

Goldsborough  bombards.  233. 
Young,    John    Russell,    263,    264, 
275,   285,   304-305. 


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